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The overarching aim of this study is to trace evidence of resistant behaviour among subordinate groups 
in the first forty years of Fiji’s colonial history (1874-1914). By rereading archival materials “against 
the grain”, listening to oral history, and engaging postcolonial scholarship, the study intends to disturb 
accepted ways of understanding Fiji’s past. This approach reveals the existence of numerous people, 
voices, and events which until recently have remained largely on the margins of Fiji’s process of 
historical production. As a chronological survey, the study produces a body of evidence which 
uncovers a rich array of forms of resistance. The points at which these forms of resistance engaged 
dominant culture are divided into two broad categories. The first examines several forms of organized 
resistance such as the Colo War of 1876, the Tuka Movement of 1878 to 1891, the Seaqaqa War of 
1894, the Movement for Federation with New Zealand from 1901 to 1903, the Viti Kabani Movement 
of 1913 to 1917, and the various instances of organised labour protest on Fiji’s plantations. The second 
addresses everyday forms of resistance in the villages and plantations such as tax and land boycotts, 
violence and retributive justice, avoidance protest, petitioning, and various aspects of women’s 
resistance. In their entirety these aspects of resistance reveal a complex web of relationships between 
powerful and subordinate groups, and among subordinate groups themselves. These conclusions 
preclude framing resistance as a totality and advocate instead a conceptualization of resistance as a 
multi-layered and multi-dimensional reality. In contributing to the reconstruction and revision of Fiji’s 
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In Fiji, as elsewhere in the world, numerous signs and inscriptions, including all the 
major landmarks, statues, building and street names, public holidays and school 
textbooks, denote and flatter the triumph of authority. By comparison, little is known 
of those historical figures who dared to be different, those who disagreed with and 
defied, Fiji’s rebels, dissidents, and revolutionaries. These individuals, their 
movements and their deeds have been edited out of history, out of Fiji’s landscape, 
and out of its people’s memories and historical consciousness. The intention in this 
thesis is to uncover the nature of resistance in Fiji between 1874 and 1914, to detail 
who it was that rebelled, what they were disaffected about, why they resisted, how 
they went about challenging their opponents, and what happened to them as a 
consequence. 
 
When I came out of high school, my view of Fiji history was largely derived from 
Kerr and Donnelly’s Fiji in the Pacific: A History and Geography of Fiji,1 the core 
textbook from which generations of Fiji citizens acquire their formal knowledge of 
Fiji history. My conceptual image of Fiji’s past was of a country which had excelled 
under British tutelage, where indifferent villagers obeyed the wise rule and exemplary 
leadership of their chiefs, and where Indian labourers toiled endlessly in the sugar 
plantations to build the colony’s economic prosperity. 
 
Imbued as they were with elements of Marxism, my tertiary studies at the University 
of the South Pacific induced a profound transformation in the way that I understood 
colonialism. Belief in British benevolence gave way to a conviction about the 
pervasiveness of unequal power relations in all contexts including Fiji’s colonial past. 
I began to suspect that contrary to public discourse,2 a massive undercurrent of 
                                                 
1 G. J. A Kerr, and T. A. Donnelly, Fiji in the Pacific: A History and Geography of Fiji. Milton, 
Queensland: The Jacaranda Press, 1969. 
2 Popular belief is well captured by Simione Durutalo, Alexander Mamak and Ahmed Ali who speak of 
a general tendency to view Fijians and other Pacific Islanders as passive and complacent participants in 
colonial acculturation and assimilation. See Alexander Mamak and Ahmed Ali (eds.) Race, Class, and 
Rebellion in the South Pacific. Sydney, N.S.W.: Allen and Unwin, 1979. 13, 138. Simione Durutalo, 
“Internal Colonialism and Unequal Regional Development: The Case of Western Viti Levu, Fiji.” M. 
A. Thesis. Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1985a. 243; and Simione Durutalo “The Paramountcy 
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resistance to colonialism existed but that the capitalist class, with the complicity of 
colonial officials, chiefs, and mainstream historians, had conspired to hide it from 
posterity. With Durutalo and other Marxists of the time, I wanted to see Fiji as “a 
country whose people have a heroic history of struggle”,3 and I looked with envy at 
Third World icons of resistance such as Mahatma Gandhi, Franz Fanon, Che Guevara, 
and Nelson Mandela. 
 
Although Marxism continues to inform my understanding of the past and the present, 
post-Marxist and postcolonial thinking has since moved the debates beyond the 
antithetical binaries and determinism that rendered classical Marxism too constrictive. 
Today, historians can draw on the histories of the everyday lives of ordinary people 
from the work of Edward Thompson, Eric Hobsbawm, Eric Wolf, Howard Zinn, and 
James Scott,4 the theories of power drawn from Michel Foucault,5 the 
historiographical work of Ranajit Guha and the Subaltern Studies School,6 the 
influence of Homi Bhabha and other postcolonial scholars,7 the important 
                                                                                                                                            
of Fijian Interest and the Politicization of Ethnicity.” Suva: Unpublished Paper, University of the South 
Pacific, 1986. 3. 
3 Simione Durutalo, “Buccaneers and Chiefly Historians.” in Journal of Pacific Studies. 11, 1985b. 
153. 
4 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class. New York: Vintage, 1966. Eric Wolf, 
Europe and the People Without History. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982; Eric 
Hobsbawm’s four volume history of the modern world, The Age of Revolution. New York: Vintage, 
1996; The Age of Capital. New York: Vintage; 1996; The Age of Empire. New York: Vintage, 1989; 
and The Age of Extremes. New York: Vintage, 1996; Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United 
States. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1980; James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday 
Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985; and Hidden Transcripts: 
Domination and the Arts of Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. 
5 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings. Brighton: Harvester, 
1972; The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. London: Tavistock Publications, 
1974; The History of Sexuality. 2 Volumes. Robert Hurley (trans.) New York: Pantheon, 1978; and 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Alan Sheridan (trans.) New York: Vintage Books, 
1979. 
6 Ranajit Guha, “The Prose of Counter-Insurgency.” in Subaltern Studies II: Writings on South Asian 
History and Society. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983a. 1-42; Gayatri Spivak, “Can the Subaltern 
Speak?” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Cary Nelson and Larry Grossberg (eds.) Urbana 
and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988. 271-313; Dipesh Chakrabarty, Habitations of 
Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subaltern Studies. Chicago: Chicago UP, 2002. 
7 Homi Bhabha, “Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority Under a Tree 
Outside Delhi, May 1817.” in Critical Inquiry. 12: 1, Autumn 1985. 144-65; and “Of Mimicry and 
Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse.” in Modern Literary Theory: A Reader. Philip Rice and 
Patricia Waugh (eds.) Second edition. London: Edward Arnold, 1992. 234-41; Dipesh Chakrabarty, 
“Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for ‘Indian’ Pasts?” Representations. 37, 
1992. 1-26; Gyanendra Pandey, “In Defense of the Fragment: Writing about Hindu-Muslim Riots in 
India Today.” in Representations. 37, Winter 1992. 27-55; Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its 
Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993; and 
Shahid Amin, Event, Memory, Metaphor: Chauri Chaura, 1922-1992. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995. 
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contributions of feminist historiography,8 and the emergence of similar offshoots in 
Pacific History and the wider field of Pacific Studies which are discussed below. This 
thesis is informed by these post-Marxist and postcolonial frameworks and by a re-
reading of Fiji’s early colonial archive. 
 
Methodology: Reading the Archive ‘Against the Grain’. 
 
By the “archive”, is meant the extensive records and documents relating to Fiji’s pre-
colonial and colonial history. This includes official published and unpublished 
documents, reports of commissions, official correspondence, diaries, mission records, 
proceedings of the Council of Chiefs, newspapers, contemporary works written by 
individuals, and other such written sources. As I read it, the archive also contains oral 
history, the complexities of which are discussed below. 
 
The question of the relationship between the archive and power has been cogently 
discussed by the Haitian archivist, Michel-Rolf Trouillot. Rather than read the archive 
as a neutral institution, Trouillot has described it as a politically active repository of 
historical experiences and facts which are not created equal.9 In Fiji, as elsewhere, 
what is deemed important in history is a function of who decides what is worth 
recording and remembering. It is a function of power. 
 
The term “power” is used here in the Foucauldian sense to explain its physical or 
governmental character, as well as its more important but subtle manifestation in 
multiple deployments in the most minute and intimate everyday relations including 
knowledge and knowledge production.10 The process of historical production in Fiji 
has made certain people and events visible and important, and others invisible and 
forgettable. I see my role as a historian as consisting partly of combing this archive 
                                                 
8 Sheila Rowbotham, Hidden from History. 300 Years of Women’s Oppression and the Fight Against It. 
London: Pluto Press, 1973; Angela Davis, Women, Race and Class. New York, Random House, 1981; 
Joan Wallach Scott, Gender and the Politics of History. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988; 
Joan Wallach Scott (ed.) Feminism and History. New York: Oxford UP, 1996; Lata Mani, Contentious 
Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. See 
also journals such as Gender and History and the Journal of Women’s History. 
9 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1995. 29. 
10 Foucault, 1972, 1979. 
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with a view to restoring visibility to those characters and stories that have been 
previously by-passed or relegated to the margins of history. 
 
Such a position presents a number of methodological challenges. How does one 
decipher the voice and practice of ordinary people in an archive weighed down by the 
unrelenting inscriptions of colonial officialdom? How does one read Fijian and Indian 
thoughts in European documents? How can one evoke the daily experiences of village 
and plantation women, when most accounts are written from the vantage point of 
powerful men? How can a historian today claim to know the motivations and 
aspirations of individuals who lived in a world so far removed from his/hers? What 
kind of power relationship is the historian establishing with these colonised 
individuals as he/she writes from the comforts and privileges of twenty-first century 
postcolonial academia? 
 
I do not wish to claim success or finality in the methodological position adopted in 
this thesis. The questions raised above are part of on-going debates about the nature of 
history and the universal question about how the past is and should be represented. 
They have no easy answers. I readily concede that the past is not a static transparent 
object the complexity of which can be unfolded with a ready-made formula. There are 
parts of any society and its past that remain opaque and inscrutable to the gaze of the 
historian. This is particularly so of the experiences of individuals that I seek to 
reconstruct in this thesis. Therefore, as in all historical enquiry, much is dependent on 
the historian’s capacity to draw credible inferences from the available evidence. 
 
My own subjective position and personal history with Fiji is fraught with 
shortcomings. For instance, I do not know the Fijian and Hindustani languages well 
enough to understand the nuances that are communicated in the small but important 
sample of the archival documents produced in Fiji’s vernacular languages. This is a 
serious handicap because Fijians and Indians, when they wrote, did so mostly in their 
mother tongue. (Chapters Five and Six discuss the reasons why they were often 
forbidden to speak or write in English.) Only a portion of these texts were translated 
into English. Yet, while epistemological and hermeneutic differences between 
cultures are undeniable, these cultures are not sealed or irreconcilable. Weaknesses 
born from difference can be compensated for by other strengths. For instance, being 
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neither Fijian nor Indo-Fijian may enable a certain detachment and balance. This can 
be advantageous in a climate where ethnicity is contentious and ethnic antagonism 
obtrusive. 
 
In seeking to recuperate ordinary people’s voices and experiences, I propose to read 
the archive “against the grain” or “contrapuntally”.11 Reading against the grain 
recognises that a multiplicity of contending voices, stories and truths inform the 
archive. However, these contending voices do not carry equal power or resonance. 
The archive is composed of a hierarchy of truths, the most powerful of which acquire 
legitimacy and are easily discernable, while others are less detectable, often obscured. 
 
Yet, as I demonstrate in the thesis, as much as the archive reflects the deeds, interests 
and worldviews of institutions and individuals who control the means of historical 
production, other voices and stories can never be completely suppressed. A historian 
who reads against the grain will seek to unsettle the authority of received notions of 
the past by finding those moments where ordinary men and women interfered with the 
otherwise monotonous yet fractured narratives of colonial pacification and ordering. 
 
Such interventions are typically signalled indirectly through the mediation of colonial 
officials, missionaries, chiefs, plantation inspectors, and the newspapers. Although 
they are part of officialdom, they often act as signposts pointing a historian in the 
direction of other stories not deemed essential to the central narratives relating to 
colonialism. These traces of other stories constitute the subtext of the archive. It is in 
this subtext that a historian can begin to read against the grain. When pursued with 
sufficient rigour, the fragments of these stories can reconstruct at least partially the 
world of ordinary men and women in a way that simultaneously draws them away 
from the periphery of the past and reconfigures the centre. 
 
                                                 
11 Reading against the grain has been used in Pacific History, notably by Peter Hempenstall and 
Bronwen Douglas. See Peter Hempenstall, “The Colonial Imagination and the Making and Remaking 
of the Samoan People.” in European Impact and Pacific Influence: British and German Colonial 
Policy in the Pacific Islands and the Indigenous Response. Herman Hiery and John MacKenzie (eds.) 
London: Tauris Publishers, 1997. 65-81; Bronwen Douglas, “Provocative Readings in Intransigent 
Archives: Finding Aneityumese Women.” in Oceania. 70: 2, 1999. 111-29. In postcolonial literary 
theory, this approach has been popularised by Edward Said See Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism. 
London: Vintage, 1993. 100-116. Guha has used a similar approach in 1983a and Elementary Aspects 
of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983b. 
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The archive also contains a small number of documents originating from subordinate 
people themselves. These include letters, petitions, and oral testimony. When this 
evidence is juxtaposed with the subtext of dominant narratives, the blurry image 
acquires a little more clarity. As I hope to demonstrate, sources as diverse as the 
Governor’s despatches and the girmit labourer’s oral testimony, can be used together 
to reconstruct the realm of ordinary people’s resistance. 
 
Two brief examples are used to illustrate how reading against the grain works in the 
thesis. Firstly, the public debates conducted in the newspapers from 1901 to 1903 
between factions supporting and opposing federation with New Zealand, do not 
merely reveal a deep chasm between the interests of some settlers and those of the 
government. The debates also render visible a profound and widely held sense of 
discontent among Fijians and their eagerness to exploit this “European” quarrel to 
petition the King for a change of government (see Chapter Three). In this case we can 
reconstruct Fijian dissent through the medium of newspapers which claimed to 
represent the views and interests of colonists. 
 
Secondly, when the Proceedings of a Native Council indicate that the “murmurings of 
the people” became a regular feature on the agenda of the Bose Vakaturaga (Council 
of Chiefs) in the 1880s, we can deduce that there was widespread discontent among 
ordinary people about the way that their affairs were being run. That the Bose 
Vakaturaga comprised essentially the most powerful chiefs in the colony, and the fact 
that translation of its deliberations was controlled by colonial officials, did not prevent 
this grassroots disaffection from reaching the ears of the most powerful men in the 
colony, and being recorded for the attention of historians writing from posterity (see 
Chapter Five). 
 
Voices of the past can be further amplified by listening to the oral testimony of their 
descendants. In a context where so much history was and continues to be 
communicated by oral rather than written means, my visits to Nadi, Ba, Ra, Nadroga, 
Navosa, Colo, Tailevu, and several other talanoa (story-telling) sessions with people 
from other parts of Fiji, were particularly insightful. Talanoa sessions were never 
strictly “interviews”. Rather, they were collective discussions involving groups of 
villagers who were connected with the individuals and events discussed in the thesis. 
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Because the details and interpretations often added a different dimension to those 
presented in the archival materials, the visits highlighted the dangers of confining 
research to archival reading rooms and university libraries. 
 
Being on location is all the more important in Fiji because one is exposed to an 
intricate web of connections and relationships that people endlessly forge with one 
another and with their past. Such networks only reveal themselves if the historian is 
prepared to go on site. For instance, with respect to the Tuka Movement (see Chapter 
Two) competing versions of history existed from one village to the next. The 
discussions helped to underline the existence among ordinary people of widely 
divergent experiences of colonialism and of contending versions of the past. This 
raises serious questions about the assumption often made by Marxists and in popular 
culture about the existence of a homogenous subaltern class.12 The visits were also 
useful in more practical ways for conveying a better sense of space and terrain and to 





The development of a distinct Fiji historiography cannot be isolated from the broader 
evolution of Pacific History.13 During Fiji’s colonial era, histories tended to follow 
the process of nation-building or political evolution, and depicted the lives and careers 
                                                 
12 “Subaltern” was the term coined by the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci to refer to the large 
anonymous mass of ordinary urban and rural people whose existence was etched in the shadow of 
capitalism. See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Quintin 
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (eds.) London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971. 
13 Among several other accounts of the development of Pacific historiography, see Jacqueline Leckie, 
“Towards a Review of History in the South Pacific.” in Journal of Pacific Studies. 9, 1983. 9-69; 
Nicholas Thomas, “Partial Texts: Representation, Colonialism and Agency in Pacific History.” in 
Journal of Pacific History. 25: 2, 1990. 139-58; Brij Lal (ed.) Pacific Islands History: Journeys and 
Transformations. Canberra: The Journal of Pacific History, 1992; Peter Hempenstall, “The Line of 
Descent: Creating Pacific Histories in Australasia.” in Australian Journal of Politics and History. 41, 
1995. 157-70; The special edition by Doug Munro of “Reflections on Pacific Historiography” in 
Journal of Pacific Studies. 20, 1996; Robert Borofsky, Remembrance of Pacific Pasts: An Invitation to 
Remake History. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000; and David Hanlon, “Beyond ‘the 
English Method of Tattooing’: Decentering the Practice of History in Oceania.” in The Contemporary 
Pacific. 15: 1, Spring 2003. 19-40. Futa Helu has valuable articles in his Critical Essays: Cultural 
Perspective from the South Seas. Canberra: Journal of Pacific History, Australian National University, 
1999. Some of the essays trace indigenous pre-contact history writing which he deciphers from current 
mythology, songs, poetry, dance patterns, woven mat designs, tapa-making, agriculture, architecture, 
engineering, seafaring and other transmitted cultural knowledges. 
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of “great men” as the engines of history. They are essentially ‘top-down’ histories of 
administrative ordering, disciplining and pacifying, not ‘bottom-up’ social histories of 
ordinary people. In their overall effect, they tend to normalize good order and 
compliance and ignore resistance.14
 
The next phase emerged largely as a result of the influence of J. W. Davidson, first 
professor of Pacific History at the Australian National University. Davidson rejected 
ethnocentric European histories of the Pacific Islands and advocated island-centred 
history. In this history Pacific Islanders were presented as active participants in the 
making of their own histories. Rigorous empiricism, fieldwork and personal 
experience replaced the rhetoric of imperial benevolence and inevitability, and the 
image of a forlorn native was replaced by clearly intentioned indigenous actors with 
choices in their hands.15 K. L. Gillion’s work on Fiji Indians best exemplifies this 
phase of Fiji’s historiography.16 His detailed empirical work on indenture in Fiji was 
the first serious attempt at reconstructing of the origins and experiences of Fiji’s 
Indian indentured labourers. 
 
Gillion opened up the field for a corpus of historians who enriched Fiji history with 
fresh ideas and insights.17 While they may be said to now occupy the mainstream, 
their approaches and interests varied markedly. Together they demonstrated 
conclusively that the cultures of Fiji proved actively responsive to the impact of 
colonialism and capitalism. The image emerged of a complex society whose 
dynamism and vitality consistently thwarted European attempts to bring Fiji under 
complete control. It showed Fijians and Indians to have their own motivations and to 
                                                 
14 The most prominent historian of this era is R. A. Derrick. See in particular A History of Fiji. Revised 
Edition. Suva: Government Printing, 1950. 
15 For details of Davidson’s vision, see J. W. Davidson, “Problems of Pacific History.” in Journal of 
Pacific History. 1, 1966. 5-21. For Davidson’s legacy in the larger context of Pacific Historiography, 
see Barrie Macdonald, “‘Now an Island is Too Big’: Limits and Limitations of Pacific Islands History.” 
Journal of Pacific Studies. 20, 1996. 23-44; Doug Munro, “The Isolation of Pacific History.” in 
Journal of Pacific Studies. 20, 1996. 45-68; and Peter Hempenstall, 1997: 67. 
16 See Gillion, Fiji’s Indian Migrants: A History to the End of Indenture in 1920. Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1962; and Gillion, The Fiji Indians: Challenge to European dominance 1920-1946. 
Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1977. 
17 See among others, Peter France, The Charter of the Land. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
1969; Ahmed Ali, Plantation to Politics: Studies on Fiji Indians. Suva: USP Institute of Pacific 
Studies, 1980; Timothy Macnaught, The Fijian Colonial Experience: a Study of the Neotraditional 
Order under British Colonial Rule prior to World War II. Canberra: Australian National University, 
1982; Deryck Scarr, Fiji: A Short History. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1984; and David Routledge, 
Matanitu: Struggle for Power in Early Fiji. Suva: USP Institute of Pacific Studies, 1985. 
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be active agents in forging their own destiny. In these various works, resistance was 
not consciously suppressed. Rather, resistance did not figure among the leading 
questions on the contemporary agenda. Moments of resistance were mentioned but the 
priorities of the time lay elsewhere in questions of policy, frameworks of colonial 
administration, wars, the Christian missions, and in the biographies of great 
individuals.18
 
These early studies are valuable as building blocks without which research such as my 
own would be impossible. Yet, as valuable as the contributions are, these histories 
tend to suffer in varying degrees from certain limitations. Most of them have a heavy 
coastal, eastern Fiji, and Viti Levu bias. This reflects the location of the seat of power 
in Fiji, capitalist economic development, the interests of Europeans, and consequently 
the weight of the archive. They also tend to be preoccupied with the ruling families. 
As such this “island-centred” history has tended to be a history from above rather than 
from below. Because most of these historians were periodical visitors to Fiji and 
spoke neither Fijian nor Hindustani, few of them ventured into the large oral archive 
that lies deceptively dormant in popular consciousness.19 There is also a strong male 
gender bias. Women are often left out or included as minor characters on a stage 
where the protagonists are all men. 
 
These histories also show a marked preoccupation for warfare and other large 
conflagrations. In Fiji, the emphasis on cataclysm has given the impression that 
Fijians were constantly at war, that European intervention restored peace, security, 
law and order. However, the absence of war does not necessarily mean that peace is 
restored. This thesis will show that all sorts of states were possible between extremes 
of war and peace. 
 
When Deryck Scarr says that ethnicity ruled the colony,20 it also rules his history of 
Fiji. Scarr’s tendency is to see Fiji as a plurality of racial groups and to understand 
Fijians, Indians, and Europeans as homogenous ethnic groups. Several scholars have 
                                                 
18 Fiji’s histories of resistance are discussed later in the Introduction. 
19 A notable exception is France, 1969. Through his knowledge of the Fijian language and use of the 
tukutuku raraba (the earliest available transcribed oral histories), France managed to reveal a highly 
mobile and fluid culture both in time and space. His insights mean that the book continues to attract 
wide readership and to enjoy currency. 
20 Scarr, 1984: 134. 
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succumbed to this orthodoxy and reinforce it by inscribing ethnic difference as the 
primordial factor in Fiji’s colonial history.21 Even if racial compartmentalisation was 
a powerful means of ordering colonial space, some individuals resisted these colonial 
demarcations and converged with other communities to forge a common cross-ethnic 
bond, as will be shown in chapters Three to Seven. 
 
Many of these positions are shared by subsequent histories but less so than this early 
wave of historiography. Among the first to challenge this wave of mainstream 
historians were Marxists offering class-based approaches to the study of Fiji history.22 
Foremost in their critique was the argument that ethnicity-based models of 
historiography were masking class interest and privilege.23 The evolution of modes of 
production replaced archival empiricism. Marxist histories also placed Fiji in the 
wider context of global capitalist and colonial expansion. In these works, colonialism 
and capitalism form a monolithic power structure and act as the driving forces of 
history. 
 
A criticism that can be made of William Sutherland’s Beyond the Politics of Race: An 
Alternative History of Fiji, is that while the historian’s sympathy and solidarity with 
the “masses” is obvious, their voices are not heard. It is as if they were buried under 
the insurmountable weight of capitalist exploitation. While it is a useful critique of 
capitalist operations and class dynamics in Fiji, Sutherland lacks a sense of the lives 
and stories of ordinary people. This is also partly due to the failure to use archival 
materials. Sutherland seems content with applying the Marxist model of analysis in 
Fiji and thereby opens himself to the charge that his “alternative history” is in fact an 
exercise in rhetorical reaffirmation. 
 
Simione Durutalo’s work has similar limitations. It implies that the state was too 
powerful, smart and organised for Fijians to oppose. His work represents the colonial 
                                                 
21 See Gillion, 1962; Macnaught, 1982; Scarr, 1984; Asesela Ravuvu, The Façade of Democracy: 
Fijian Struggles for Political Control 1830-1987. Suva: Reader Publishing House, 1991. 
22 See among others, Vijay Naidu, The Violence of Indenture. Suva: University of the South Pacific, 
1980; Durutalo, 1985a; Durutalo, 1986; and William Sutherland, Beyond the Politics of Race: An 
Alternative History of Fiji to 1992. Canberra: ANU, 1992. 
23 See in particular, the scathing attack on Routledge, Macnaught, Scarr and others in Durutalo, 1985b: 
117-56. 
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administration as an effective machinery in the control of the Fijian population.24 
Studies have since shown that control was imperfect.25 With the exception of Naidu’s 
study of the violence of indenture,26 Fiji’s Marxist histories left too little room for the 
release of suppressed characters and voices, or for uncovering the complexities and 
ambiguities of people’s responses to domination. My intention in this study is to 
demonstrate that control was consistently breached, undermined or postponed by the 
actions of the colonised. Agency was real, not merely rhetorical, and resistance was 
widespread if equally messy and imperfect as the attempts to control it. 
 
This does not mean that these approaches are useless as analytical tools. They are the 
historiographical building blocks that make Fiji’s current histories possible. They 
allow historians to ask different questions and to continue the endless process of 
historiographical revision and refining. 
 
Within more recent scholarship, one finds a group of postcolonial cultural historians 
who have helped to enlarge the scope for reading and writing colonial Fiji.27 
Grounded in the theoretical development of post-structuralist and postcolonial theory, 
and building on the anthropological approaches pioneered in Pacific History by 
Marshall Sahlins and Greg Dening,28 these scholars are more attuned to the 
fragmented and contradictory nature of colonialism and have helped to unsettle and 
challenge notions of linear histories of colonialism’s authority and power. 
 
In Colonialism’s Culture, Nicholas Thomas draws attention to the messy nature of 
Fiji’s colonial encounter. He emphasises the internal discursive and practical 
fragilities, fractures, complexities, ambiguities, and contradictions of the colonial 
                                                 
24 Durutalo, 1985a. 
25 Nicholas Thomas, Colonialism’s Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994. 
26 Naidu, 1980. 
27 Among others see John Kelly, A Politics of Virtue: Hinduism, Sexuality, and Countercolonial 
Discourse in Fiji. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991a; Thomas, 1994; John Kelly and Martha 
Kaplan, “Rethinking Resistance: Dialogics of Disaffection in Colonial Fiji.” in American Ethnologist. 
21: 1, 1994. 123-51; Martha Kaplan, Neither Cargo nor Cult: Ritual Politics and the Colonial 
Imagination in Fiji. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995; and James Heartfield, “'You are not a 
White Woman!': Apolosi Nawai, the Fiji Produce Agency and the Trial of Stella Spencer in Fiji, 1915.” 
in Journal of Pacific History. 38: 1, 2003. 69-83. 
28 See among others Marshall Sahlins, Islands of History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985; 
and Greg Dening, The Bounty: An Ethnographic History. Melbourne: History Department, University 
of Melbourne, 1988. 
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enterprise.29 While this approach is useful in accounting for the deficiencies in the 
application of colonial power, it rarely evokes the complexity, ambiguity, and 
contradiction in the multiple points of resistance by colonised people themselves. This 
thesis is an attempt at examining how colonialism’s power was challenged and 
transformed by the disruptive practices of subaltern peoples. 
 
Martha Kaplan and John Kelly have shown that the projects of the colonisers could 
never completely organise all areas of the practice of the colonised, nor could the 
colonised ever again make their history in terms unaffected by colonialism. Their 
respective work explores the strategies employed by colonised Fijians and Indo-
Fijians to challenge colonial authority and to remake themselves in a context where 
they were denied any political space.30
 
Among those who resist easy classification is Brij Lal, Fiji’s most productive and 
accomplished historian. The sheer breadth and depth of Lal’s contribution to the 
history of Fiji Indians and indenture make his work an essential companion to anyone 
studying in this field. Of particular relevance to this study is the publication of Chalo 
Jahaji which brings together Lal’s most important articles on indenture.31 As a 
collection, Chalo Jahaji is the one history of Fiji’s early colonial past that comes 
closest to being a people’s history. As discussed below, his interest in matters of 
resistance and his concern with women as agents of history make his work, an ideal 
springboard from which to launch new propositions. Since his early studies of 
indenture, Lal has broadened his field of research to include larger issues of cross-
ethnic relations, and contemporary postcolonial history. 
 
                                                 
29 Thomas, 1994: 15-16, 97, 106, 167. See also Nicholas Thomas, “Sanitation and Seeing: The Creation 
of State Power in Early Colonial Fiji.” in Comparative Studies in Society and History. 32: 1, 1990. 149-
70. 
30 See Kaplan, 1995 and Kelly, 1991a. 
31 Among the previously published articles that are collected in Chalo Jahaji, see “Kunti’s Cry: 
Indentured Women on Fiji Plantations.” in Indian Economic and Social History Review. 22, 1985. 55-
71; “Veil of Dishonour: Sexual Jealousy and Suicide Fiji Plantations.” in Journal of Pacific History.” 
20, 1985. 135-55; “Murmurs of Dissent: Non-Resistance on Fiji Plantations.” in Hawaiian Journal of 
History. 20, 1986. 188-214. Among Lal’s large corpus of other literature dealing with Fiji’s early 
colonial period, see Girmitiyas: The Origins of the Fiji Indians. Canberra: Journal of Pacific History, 
1983. Second Edition, Lautoka: Fiji Institute of Applied Studies, 2004; Broken Waves: A History of the 
Fiji Islands in the Twentieth Century. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992; and Chalo Jahaji: 
On a Journey Through Indenture in Fiji. Canberra and Suva: Australian National University and Fiji 
Museum, 2000. 
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Recent historiography has also been influenced by the anti-elitist approach to history 
writing initiated by Thompson32 and developed in postcolonial circles by the 
Subaltern Studies collective. Led by Guha, Subaltern Studies sought to produce 
historical methods and analyses in which subaltern groups were viewed as the subject 
of history.33
 
Writing in 2000, Robert Borofsky remarked that subaltern studies has only slowly 
moved into the Pacific region’s scholarly writings.34 Among those who have 
supported a subaltern approach in Pacific history, Peter Hempenstall has called for 
more inclusive histories that look beyond self-chosen elite players and strive to 
release previously muted or ignored voices.35 In an earlier publication with Noel 
Rutherford, Hempenstall placed people’s resistance histories on the future agenda of 
Pacific historiography.36 He has also shown support for breaking history into a 
multitude of histories, and for a greater openness to multi-vocal story-telling.37 Klaus 
Neumann has added his voice to the growing number of historians who attack 
hegemonic constructions of the past. Historians must be more sensitive, he believes, 
to the “trash of history”, or to those individuals and practices that seem irrelevant, 
insignificant, marginal, or negligible.38
 
Doubt has been cast - on archival and epistemological grounds - about the possibility 
of letting the subaltern speak and of constructing a totalising history that can narrate 
the politics of subaltern lives.39 This has seen a turn away from total histories towards 
local histories. Yet, some of the Pacific’s most respected scholars continue to 
highlight the need for more “people-centred” histories of resistance. In his influential 
essay “The Ocean in Us”, the Tongan philosopher Epeli Hau’ofa writes that the duty 
                                                 
32 Thompson, 1966. 
33 Guha, 1983a; 1983b; Guha, “On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India.” in 
Subaltern Studies I: Writings on South India History and Society. Delhi: Oxford UP, 1982. 1-8; For a 
critique and a discussion of the progression of Subaltern Studies, see Chakrabarty, 2002; and Vinayak 
Chaturvedi (ed.) Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial. London: Verso, 2000. 
34 Robert Borofsky, “An Invitation.” in Remembrance of Pacific Pasts: An Invitation to Remake 
History. Robert Borofsky (ed.) Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000. 25. 
35 Peter Hempenstall, “Releasing the Voices: Historicizing Colonial Encounters in the Pacific.” in 
Borofsky: 52, 60. 
36 Peter Hempenstall and Noel Rutherford, Protest and Dissent in the Colonial Pacific. Suva: Institute 
of Pacific Studies University of the South Pacific, 1984. 151. 
37 Hempenstall, 2000: 46-60. 
38 Klaus Neumann, “Starting from Trash.” in Borofsky: 68. From the same author, see also Not the Way 
it Really Was: Constructing the Tolai Past. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992.
39 Among other critiques, see Spivak, 1988; Pandey, 1992; Chatterjee, 1993; and Amin, 1995. 
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of Pacific scholars is to write about “ordinary people, the forgotten people of history, 
… their resistance and struggles”.40 At a time when dominant local and international 
powers are so effective at imposing their truths and wills, cultures of resistance must 
be strengthened for the sake of present and future generations. He adds, 
 
In order to bring into the center stage grassroots resistance and other unnoticed 
but important events for our peoples, we must refocus our historical 
reconstructions on them and their doings.41
 
People-centred histories help to build and strengthen cultures of resistance. This he 




Definitions of resistance have changed over time. This reflects changes in our 
understanding of the concept. In the 1970s and 1980s, historians tended to focus on 
the more organised and spectacular forms of resistance such as mass protest and 
rebellion.43 Reflecting renewed interest in Gramscian thought and the cultural roots of 
resistance in the early 1990s, Douglas Haynes and Gyan Prakash described resistance 
as: 
 
those behaviours and cultural practices by subordinate groups that contest 
hegemonic social formations, that threaten to unravel the strategies of 
domination; ‘consciousness’ may not be essential to its constitution. 
Seemingly innocuous behaviours can have unintended yet profound 
consequences for the objectives of the dominant or the shape of a social 
order.44
 
                                                 
40 Epeli Hau’ofa, “The Ocean in Us.” in Borofsky: 458. 
41 Hau’ofa: 458. 
42 Hau’ofa: 469. 
43 Among others, see Peter Hempenstall, Pacific Islanders Under German Rule: A Study in the 
Meaning of Colonial Resistance. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1978; Mamak and 
Ali, 1979; and Hempenstall and Rutherford, 1984. 
44 Douglas Haynes and Gyan Prakash, “Introduction.” in Contesting Power: Resistance and Everyday 
Social Relations in South Asia. Douglas Haynes and Gyan Prakash (eds.) Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1991. 3. 
 14
With reference to Fiji, John Kelly takes resistance to be “a search for ways to contest 
or at least evade some of the things presented as obligatory while maintaining or even 
improving the things that truly enable effective speech and action”.45 The resistance 
needs to create an opponent, and to transform the obligatory into the contestable.46 
While definitions are useful the evolution of thinking about resistance is more 
important. 
 
Resistance and resistance theory have been of recurring interest among scholars since 
the 1960s. Much of the early impetus was provided by the decolonisation process in 
Africa with the most incisive theories unsurprisingly coming from African 
scholarship.47 Yet, the study of resistance in the colonial context has suffered from a 
wave of scepticism, much of which originates from its traditional use (especially in 
the context of African decolonisation) as a neat, unproblematic and unambiguous 
opposition to a colonial monolith.48 This view of resistance saw it as a perpetual 
antithesis to alleged totalising systems of domination such as the capitalist 
bourgeoisie, racism and patriarchy. With a certain romance, resistance was conceived 
of as the spectacular and heroic occasions when colonised people rose against all odds 
to challenge their masters. Radical history consisted in championing and glorifying 
such occurrences.49
 
Scepticism for this binary approach has come from several directions. To begin with, 
some authors argue that the meaning of acts of resistance is not fixed. As Ortner 
                                                 
45 Kelly, 1991a: 23. 
46 Kelly, 1991a: 25. 
47 See among others Terence Ranger, “Connections Between Primary Resistance Movements and 
Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa.” in Journal of African History. 9, 1968. 631-41; 
Allen and Barbara Isaacman, “Resistance and Collaboration in Central and Southern Africa.” in 
International Journal of African Historical Studies. 10, 1977. 31-62; For more recent developments, 
see Jean Comaroff, Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and History of a South African 
People. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. 
48 Among critics of the binary, oppositional approach to resistance, see Sherry Ortner, “Resistance and 
the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal.” in Comparative Studies in Society and History. 37, 1995. 173-
93; Lila Abu-Lughod, “The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of Power Through 
Bedouin Women.” in American Ethnologist. 17, 1990. 41-55; Kelly and Kaplan, 1994; Akhil Gupta 
and James Ferguson (eds.) Culture, Power, Place: Explorations in Cultural Anthropology. Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1997; Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler (eds.) Tension of Empire: Colonial 
Cultures in a Bourgeois World. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. For an important 
discussion of resistance and accommodation among plantation workers in the Pacific see Brij Lal, 
Doug Munro and Jacqueline Leckie (eds.) Plantation Workers: Resistance and Accommodation. 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993. 
49 One such example is Mamak and Ali, 1979. 
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points out, “the intentionalities of actors evolve through praxis and the meaning of 
acts change over time, both for the actor and the analyst”.50 To compound difficulties, 
Scott points out that much of this resistance is inscrutable to historians and other 
researchers because it depends on anonymity and secrecy for its effectiveness. Thus, 
everyday observable resistance only forms the tip of an iceberg.51
 
In her work on Indonesia under Dutch rule, Ann Stoler showed that homogenizing 
versions of domination and resistance accorded poorly with the fact that both their 
quality and intensity varied considerably in different cultural, geographical and 
historical contexts.52 These are conclusions that Pacific historians Peter Hempenstall 
and Noel Rutherford had also arrived at by the mid 1980s.53
 
Another limitation of the dichotomous model is that resistance is often assumed to be 
progressive and the resister always right. In the Pacific, the assumption that a militant 
stance is generally the most worthy or the most historically consequential, has been 
warned against by Nicholas Thomas. Celebrations of resistance, he cautions, can 
obscure why particular regimes were actively supported and complied with by 
disaffected people.54 It also tends to sanitise the internal politics of the dominated. 
Bronwen Douglas has shown that resistance histories in the Pacific have tended to 
prioritise and emphasise conflicts between Islanders and Europeans, while 
disregarding the internal complexities of many of these conflicts.55 Peter Hempenstall 
and Noel Rutherford in their survey of protest movements across the Pacific, concur 
with this view.56 As will become apparent throughout this thesis, ordinary people 
fought oppressive authority irrespective of its ethnicity. However, the subaltern also 
made complex alliances with those in power. This and other self-generated 
                                                 
50 Sherry Ortner, “Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal.” in Comparative Studies in 
Society and History. 37, 1995. 175. 
51 Scott, 1990: 87. 
52 See Ann Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial 
Order of Things. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995. 
53 Hempenstall and Rutherford: 15, 147. 
54 Thomas, 1990: 139-58. 
55 Bronwen Douglas, “Conflict and Alliance in a Colonial Context.” in Journal of Pacific History. 15, 
1980. 21-51. 
56 Hempenstall and Rutherford: 147-52. 
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impediments made intra-subaltern solidarity difficult to coordinate. This points to an 
inherent fluidity in the complex world of subaltern people.57
 
In the same vein, Hempenstall has observed that collaborators and resisters were often 
the same men in the Pacific, thereby making these categories redundant.58 Doug 
Munro has pointed out that resistance and accommodation should not be regarded as 
polar opposites. When studying the activities of plantation workers for instance, the 
distinction between resistance and accommodation became exceedingly blurred. Most 
of them chose a course of action based on careful calculations aimed at maximising 
benefits and minimising disadvantage. In certain situations, this meant that 
compliance and collaboration were more advantageous, and that choosing the side of 
dominant power was more rewarding. The outcome was a hybrid that fitted neither 
the category of accommodation nor that of resistance and where the division between 
resistance and non-resistance became unreal.59 There were, as Borofsky observes, 
“degrees of resistance, degrees of accommodation, with a host of subtle complications 
in between”.60 One of these complications, as Ortner points out is that subordinate 
groups do not constitute a single unitary group: “[S]ubaltern groups are internally 
divided by age, gender, status, and other forms of difference and … occupants of 
differing subject positions will have different, even opposed, but still legitimate, 
perspectives on the situation.”61
 
Much of the conceptual context for rethinking the nature of resistance has come from 
the late twentieth century evolution of theories about power, agency, and the subject. 
Michel Foucault’s work on power and Homi Bhabha’s notions of subjectivity and 
agency among subordinate populations are among the most prominent.62 This 
transformation has seen the singular category of resistance dissolve into multiple 
points of resistance, or resistances. For instance, when Foucault redefined power to 
draw attention to the multiple ways in which it is deployed in minute and intimate 
everyday relations, he also wrote: “[W]here there is power, there is resistance.”63 It 
                                                 
57 Ortner: 179. See also Hempenstall, 1978: 207. 
58 Hempenstall, 1978: 219. 
59 Munro, 1993: 30-1. 
60 Borofsky: 182. 
61 Ortner: 175. 
62 Foucault, 1972, 1974, 1978, 1979; Bhabha, 1985, 1992. 
63 Foucault, 1978: 95. 
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follows that if power is variable and fragmented, so is resistance. James Scott’s study 
of everyday forms of resistance and Eugene Genovese’s study of the world that 
African-American slaves made for themselves fall into this category.64
 
Yet, if Foucault acknowledged the pervasive presence of resistance, he also doubted 
the existence of a subject with will and intentionality. In this, he was joined by 
postcolonial thinkers among whom Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak, and Dipesh 
Chakrabarty are the most prominent.65 Their pessimism about the ability of the 
subaltern to speak and the possibility for a resistant subaltern subject position to exist, 
has come under attack from a number of theorists.66 Ortner for instance, argues that 
by refusing to attend to her as a person, subject, agent, or any other form of 
intentionalised being with her own hopes, fears, desires, projects, a strict post-
structuralist position leads to the “de(con)struction of the subject”.67 The 
disappearance of the individual actor as a subject of history and maker of his/her own 
destiny thereby allowed “resistance” to be replaced by such phrases as the “failure of 
the pacification process”, thereby shifting the debates back to how forms of 
domination are sustained and reproduced, rather than how they are contested. This 
problem has been highlighted by Gyan Prakash who has observed that “while there 
are scrupulous accounts of Western domination, we have yet to fully recognize 
another history of agency and knowledge alive in the dead weight of the colonial 
past”.68
 
Several scholars have sought to salvage the subject in the wake of its erosion under 
post-structuralism and to reassert resistance as a vital area of investigation. As 
recently as 2000, Edward Said wrote in a collection of essays dedicated to Pacific 
History: 
 
                                                 
64 Scott, 1985 and 1990; Eugene Genovese, Roll Jordan Roll: The World the Slaves Made. New York: 
Random House, 1976. 
65 Bhabha 1985 and 1992; Spivak, 1988; Chakrabarty, 1992 and 2002. 
66 Among them see Benita Parry, “Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse.” The Oxford 
Literary Review. 9, 1987. 27-58. See also Sumit Sarkar, Writing Social History. Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1996. 82-108. 
67 Ortner: 186. 
68 Gyan Prakash, “Introduction.” in After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial 
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I think resistance is terribly important because in no place did people just give 
up and say: OK, you can have the land, we are leaving. They always stood and 
fought. And with that resistance came a culture of resistance, a history of 
opposition.69
 
Among those who refined theories of resistance Dirks, Eley, and Ortner have pleaded 
that  
 
the theoretical exploration of the subject as an active agent must be concerned, 
at least in part, with the question of resisting or at least eluding that subjection. 
We need a subject who is at once culturally and historically constructed, yet 
from a political perspective, we would wish this subject to be capable of acting 
in some sense “autonomously,” not simply in conformity to dominant cultural 
norms and rules, or within the patterns that power inscribes.70
 
It is largely in these terms that I understand and read the subjects whose contestatory 
practices I discuss in this thesis. I share these scholars’ unease about the disappearing 
subject. I detect a certain autonomous power in subalternity, among which is the 
power to resist. Hence where Foucault posited the pervasiveness of power in the most 
minute of relationships, thoughts and practices, I want to see how subordinate groups 
consciously or unconsciously, selectively or haphazardly, critically or uncritically, 
variously avoided or rejected such invasions and refused to function as passive 
receptacles for the effects of power. 
 
My position is that resistance and power are phenomena that are constantly 
conditioned and shaped by one another in all facets of human relations. They form an 
inseparable relationship in which neither is ever complete. Power is constituted and 
reconstituted partly as a result of the tests it endures and erosions it suffers from the 
contestatory actions of the subordinate. It also exerts itself differently across all kinds 
of contexts and induces various collaborative and resistant behaviours in response. In 
the same way that power is never totally unified and coordinated, much resistance is 
                                                 
69 Edward Said, “A View from Afar (Middle East) – An Interview with Edward Said.” in Borofsky, 
2000: 451. 
70 Nicholas Dirks, Geoff Eley and Sherry Ortner (eds.) Culture/Power/History: A Reader in 
Contemporary Social History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 18. 
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piecemeal, fragmented, tentative, ambiguous, filled with imperfections and messy. As 
much as domination is not an overarching superstructure so is resistance not an 
overarching understructure. 
 
The Boundaries of the Thesis 
 
As I began to compile a register of disorder to itemise instances of resistance during 
Fiji’s colonial era, it quickly became apparent that the “one hundred years of 
resistance” I had in mind was far too ambitious a time frame. Resistance being so 
complex and instances of it so abundant, the period of study was reduced to the first 
forty years of colonial rule. Periods of dissent have continuities that extend well 
beyond the somewhat artificial cut-off dates of 1874 (the signing of the Deed of 
Cession) and 1914 (the onset of World War I). The end of indenture in 1920 was 
considered as another possible cut-off point. However, a plethora of developments 
between 1914 and 1920 would have forced the discussion beyond practicable limits. 
Hence, in the same way that the 1874 annexation of Fiji by Great Britain marks an 
approximate beginning for the study, the onset of World War I marks an approximate 
end of the period under examination. 
 
In terms of inclusion, the colonial terrain was far too complex to attempt to reproduce 
it “as it actually was”. All colonised people adopted “intermediate attitudes” including 
a great deal of subordination and collaboration. No effort is made in the thesis to 
reconstruct a holistic image of the colonial encounter. Rather, as a survey of 
resistance, this project sets out to magnify one aspect of the encounter which has been 
neglected. If resistance and collaboration are two sides of the same coin, one side has 
remained faceless. The present study sets out to sketch the complex face of resistance. 
 
Yet, magnifying resistance without reference to the other constituent parts of the 
colonial encounter can result in the production of a rather skewed image of the 
colonial past. The danger is that the resulting profile of the colonised individual 
makes of this highly complex character a one-dimensional combatant perpetually 
opposed to authority. To avoid creating this impression, the reader’s attention is 
hereby drawn to the existence of aspects of the colonial encounter other than 
resistance, which can depict a fuller image of colonial dynamics. 
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 A survey may seem outmoded in the wake of recent scholarship. Adrian Muckle’s 
recent thesis on the 1917 wars in New Caledonia highlights the value of in-depth 
micro-studies of resistance.71 In Fiji, studies such as Kelly’s and Kaplan’s72 enjoy the 
same advantage of rendering fuller accounts than is possible here, of the complexity 
of relationships which were always partly collaborative and partly antagonistic. On 
the other hand, a survey has the advantage of revealing the interconnectedness of a 
range of insurgent histories across time. No such survey currently exists in the 
historiography of Fiji. 
 
The recent studies by Kelly, Kaplan, and Muckle, are also useful for tracing histories 
of representation which explain how historical events were perceived by the actors 
who participated in them. Yet, if all historians represent the past, not all histories 
deliberately set out to examine changes in the representation of the past. The evidence 
presented in this thesis does not seek to explain changes in the representation of 
resistance in Fiji. Without getting into a lengthy theoretical debate about 
hermeneutics, I believe in the possibility, even desirability, to write about history 
rather than to confine scholarship to the study of representations of history. While 
conceding that all historical utterances, once transmitted, fall into the realm of 
representation, this thesis sets out to reconstruct a version of Fiji’s past which has 
been neglected. It implies a certain confidence in a past that can be retraced, yet I 
make no claims to finality or to a higher truth. 
 
As a caveat, it is necessary to point out the necessary omissions which have had to be 
made in the taxonomy of resistance. Aspects of cultural and discursive resistance (or 
contestatory knowledge formations) were originally included in the survey to examine 
how they challenged dominant ways of seeing and knowing. They have since been 
left out because their study merits far more space than is available here. Because this 
sort of history is difficult to quantify and verify, it also requires a frame of analysis 
that is markedly different from that which has been adopted here. Hence, the struggle 
                                                 
71 See in particular Adrian Muckle’s “Spectres of Violence in a Colonial Context: The Wars at Koné, 
Tipindjé and Hienghène – New Caledonia, 1917.” PhD Thesis. Canberra: Australian National 
University, 2004. 
72 Kelly, 1991a; Kaplan, 1995. 
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between subjugated and dominant knowledges is alluded to rather than explicitly 
discussed. 
 
Culturally conditioned modes of resistance such as those brought with them by 
indentured labourers from Polynesia, Melanesia, and India, are also deferred to a 
future comparative study. This deferral also applies to such interpretations of past 
resistance which are premised on indigenous ways of knowing and remembering.73
 
I also omit those occasions when dominant groups activated resistance to protect their 
already privileged position. This includes most Europeans whom, although 
heterogeneous as a group,74 mostly occupied a position of comparative advantage vis-
à-vis ordinary Fijian, Indian, and Melanesian people. For this reason, the discussions 
will be confined mainly to those who occupied the lowest rungs of the colony’s order 
of things. 
 
Finally, this study deliberately omits treatment of Rotuma. Although the island was 
annexed under the ambit of the larger Fijian colony in 1881, Rotuma presents its own 





The discussion combines a chronological with a thematic approach and is divided into 
two broad sections. The first consists of the first four chapters and explores the 
organised, confrontational, and often dramatic aspects of resistance. The second, 
consisting of the last three chapters, examines what happened in between the larger 
conflagrations. This will cover the less spectacular and more mundane everyday 
resistance. 
                                                 
73 For an important discussion of what such a study might entail, see David Hanlon, “Beyond ‘the 
English Method of Tattooing’: Decentering the Practice of History in Oceania.” in The Contemporary 
Pacific. 15: 1, Spring 2003. 19-40. 
74 For discussions of Europeans in Fiji, see R. A. Derrick, 1950; Deryck Scarr, “John Bates Thurston, 
Commodore Goodenough and the Rampant Anglo-Saxons in Fiji.” in Historical Studies. 11: 43, 
October 1964. 361-82; John Young, Adventurous Spirits: Australian Migrant Society in Pre-Cession 
Fiji. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1984; and Claudia Knapman, White Women in Fiji, 
1835-1930: Ruin of Empire? Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986. 
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 Chapter One is concerned with the Colo War of 1876. Until now, the people of Colo 
in the interior of Viti Levu, have not been judged favourably by history. By refusing 
to accommodate and yield to powerful outsiders (both local and foreign), its 
inhabitants have acquired notoriety as a ‘deviant’ and ‘backward’ people. Coastal 
dwellers, chiefs, missionaries, and colonial officials have routinely cast kai Colo75 as 
ignorant, uncivilised, cannibalistic and fearsome tevoro.76 This stigma lingers with 
persistent force in the present.77 Internalised and normalised in national and popular 
consciousness, the perception of Colo is of a wild, primitive, disorderly, dangerous, 
and evil place: something to laugh uncomfortably about. 
 
Colonial historiography’s representations are scarcely more flattering. Kerr and 
Donnelly describe this war under the heading “The Devil Tribes” in the following 
terms: 
 
Gordon’s first problem was to put down a rising of some of the mountain 
tribes in the Sigatoka valley. These ‘devil tribes’, as they were called, had 
attacked Christian Fijian villages, murdering and eating many of the 
inhabitants. Gordon realized that if he did not deal with them immediately, 
they would gain more followers. 
 
                                                 
75 Kai is a Fijian prefix denoting the place that people come “from”. Colo means “bush”, “outback” or 
“mountain”. 
76 Tevoro is an adaptation of the word “devil”. 
77 At a recent reconciliation ceremony to commemorate the killing of Reverend Thomas Baker by the 
people of Nabutautau village in the interior Navosa Province, the Prime Minister of Fiji, Laisenia 
Qarase, was quoted as saying that “Reverend Baker would always be remembered in our country 
because he was killed while trying to spread the work of God in a land that was still in the dark.” Fiji 
Times, 14 November 2003. The ceremony was organised to offer a traditional apology to Baker’s 
family. The people of Nabutautau have repeatedly sought to shake off the stigma associated with 
Baker’s death. They first approached the Methodist Church in 1905 with a request that a memorial be 
erected in memory of Baker’s death. Minutes and Journals of the Fiji District Annual Synod 1874-1892 
and 1891-1907. F/4/B: Journal for 1905, Item 33. Another attempt in post-independence years resulted 
in the erection of another Memorial by the President of the Methodist Church, Paula Niukula, to 
commemorate the fall of seven other vuli (or students) who were also in Baker’s party. These stones 
are today positioned on the site where the attack occurred and signify the village’s apology to the 
Church and to the families of the fallen men. 
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Organising his own small force, which was assisted by the chiefs of the coastal 
tribes of Viti Levu, Gordon successfully defeated the devil tribes and punished 
several of the leaders.78
 
Kerr and Donnelly were articulating the orthodoxy of the time which generally 
viewed colonialism as the driving force of history. Those who stood in the way of 
colonialism were adjudged to be small in number, isolated, ignorant, and recalcitrant. 
Generations of Fiji Islanders grow up knowing and memorizing this version of the 
war.79 Because alternative histories of the war tend to be local to Colo and disruptive 
of this dominant version, they struggle to gain national legitimacy. 
 
The only detailed study of the Colo War of 1876 was undertaken by Timothy 
Macnaught.80 He argues convincingly that this war “was not a rebellion against 
British rule but a local war on a larger scale”.81 Macnaught’s study shows that British 
administration and settlers were important players in the unfolding and resolution of 
the conflict, but the motor of history was definitely Fijian. In the thirty years since this 
study, references to the war by other historians have been made in passing in larger 
general studies. They usually refer to the war as the last and most brutal of Fiji’s tribal 
and colonial wars82 or as Colo’s challenge to Governor Arthur Gordon’s policy of 
indirect rule, the legitimacy of the new colonial administration and the whole premise 
of the natural “civilizing” of Fijians.83
 
In reconstructing this war, generous space has been allocated to chronicle the context 
within which it took place. This is intended to familiarise readers with some of the 
key political, economic, geographical, and religious circumstances of pre-colonial mid 
nineteenth century Fiji. It will also show that resistance did not take place uniquely in 
response to Western colonialism and that it had a long prior history within and 
between the various Fijian polities. The conflict is also recast as a war of 
                                                 
78 Kerr and Donnelly, 1969. 37. 
79 The improved 1994 edition still uses the same words albeit with the omission of the phrase “devil 
tribes”. 
80 Timothy Macnaught, “The Subjugation of the Highlands of Viti Levu, Fiji.” B.A. Hons Thesis. 
Sydney: Macquarie University, 1971. 
81 Macnaught, 1971: 72. 
82 See for instance Scarr, 1984: 76; and Sutherland, 1992: 39. 
83 Martha Kaplan, “The ‘Dangerous and Disaffected Native’ in Fiji: British Colonial Constructions of 
the Tuka Movement.” In Social Analysis. 26, December 1989. 22-45; and Kaplan, 1995: 84. 
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independence to challenge views that uncritically accept Fiji as a constituted whole 
under Bauan, Eastern, and Christian hegemony and which represent Fiji’s transition to 
colonial rule as ordered and peaceful. 
 
Chapter Two establishes some continuity of organised resistance between the Colo 
War and the Tuka Movement which emerged on the Ra coast from 1878 and lasted 
until 1891 (although the repercussions were felt well into the Twentieth Century). It 
accounts for the transition from warfare to religious protest as one of the main 
channels through which Fijians would thereafter challenge authority. The Tuka 
movement is typical of popular religious movements which arise in times of 
tribulation. It shares much in common with such movements in other parts of the 
world and the Pacific.84
 
Most early descriptions of the movement labelled it a superstition with an unfortunate 
and misguided anti-colonial agenda,85 but later representations of the movement (by 
Worsley and Burridge in particular86) placed it firmly in the category of cargo cults. 
Martha Kaplan’s Neither Cargo nor Cult is the first serious attempt at historicizing 
Tuka and of understanding its meaning in the evolving fabric of colonial Fiji. This 
chapter builds on her anthropological work with more emphasis on the chronology of 
events and the key characters involved in the movement. The discussion also ventures 
beyond Drauniivi to test the popularity and reach of the movement in other parts of 
the Vatukaloko polity. 
 
Chapter Three is concerned with two popular movements of the early Twentieth 
Century. The little known movement for federation with New Zealand (1901 to 1903) 
is discussed as the first countrywide organised movement of ordinary Fijians to 
demand the end of British rule. As such it acts as an important precursor to the second 
movement, the Viti Kabani, which emerged in 1913 and which at times functioned as 
a second government in Fiji. 
 
                                                 
84 Caroline Ralston, “Early Nineteenth Century Polynesian Millennial Cults and the Case of Hawaii.” 
in Journal of the Polynesian Society. 94: 4, 1985. 307-32. 
85 See Arthur Webb, “Fijian Superstitions.” in Victorian Review. 12, August 1885. 399-412; and Basil 
Thomson, Fijians: A Study of the Decay of Custom. London: Heinemann, 1908. 
86 See Peter Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound. New York: Schoken Books, 1968; and Kenelm 
Burridge, New Heaven, New Earth. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969. 
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Because no major study exists of the Federation Movement, I begin by placing it in 
the wider context of popular dissatisfaction with the administration of the colony in 
the late 1890s. This is followed by a reconstruction of the events which led to the 
London conference to decide the future status of the colony. The presence of this 
movement challenges the orthodoxy that the Viti Kabani opened a deep vein of 
discontent among ordinary Fijians.87 The vein of discontent had never stopped 
flowing. 
 
A few historians have paid passing attention to Apolosi Nawai, the founder of the Viti 
Kabani, but they all begin their account in 1912 when he was already twenty-eight 
years old.88 Discussions of the Viti Kabani suffer from the same fate. To fill this gap, 
an attempt is made at retracing some of Apolosi Nawai’s early years. A number of 
trouble spots are also identified in the decade preceding the formation of the Kabani 
with the intention of providing some context for the emergence of the movement and 
its leader. 
 
Aside from dealing with indigenous movements, the colonial administration was also 
kept busy by a number of strikes and protest marches mounted by the colony’s 
indentured labourers. In Chapter Four, a brief account of the migration of indenture 
labourers from India is followed by a survey of the ways in which these labourers 
organised themselves to combat the oppressive conditions under which they worked 
and lived. This survey serves as an indicator of the level of organisation which was 
possible when the resources of these workers were so few and fragmented. 
 
With the exception of Fijian and Melanesian labourers, the history and experience of 
indenture has been well covered by Gillion, Lal, Ali, Naidu, Shameem and Kelly.89 
                                                 
87 Macnaught, 1982: 91. 
88 See in particular, A. D. Couper, “Protest Movements and Proto-Cooperatives in the Pacific Islands.” 
in Journal of the Polynesian Society. 77: 3, 1968. 263-74; Timothy Macnaught, “Apolosi R. Nawai: 
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89 See among others, Gillion, 1962; Ahmed Ali, Girmit: The Indenture Experience in Fiji. Bulletin of 
the Fiji Museum 5, 1979; Naidu, 1980; Shaista Shameem, “Sugar and Spice: Wealth Accumulation and 
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However, in the absence of a register of organised labour protest, this chapter 
foregrounds a number of these protests and accounts for their frequency across the 
period of indenture. The intention is to show that while instances of organised labour 
protest were uncommon and occurred at irregular intervals, they did occur. Their 
existence is used to test the view of indentured labourers as mere survivors of history. 
 
Chapters Five to Seven explore the daily struggles of ordinary people that invade 
periods of normality in between larger conflagrations, though we must guard against 
the assumption that all relationships at this level were adversarial, continuously 
oppositional, or that large confrontations were inevitable. The following three 
categories have emerged from the data: everyday resistance in the villages, everyday 
resistance on the plantations, and women’s resistance. Because of their 
distinctiveness, they are examined separately, as detailed below. 
 
History, argues James Scott, teaches that subordinate classes have rarely been 
afforded the luxury of open, organized, political activity.90 Because the weak are 
often scattered across the countryside, illiterate, lacking formal organization, and 
lacking the institutional means to act collectively, they are more likely to employ local 
means of resistance that require little coordination and are best suited for extended, 
guerrilla-style, defensive campaigns of attrition.91 Scott defines such everyday forms 
of resistance as: 
 
The prosaic but constant struggles between the peasantry and those who seek to 
extract labour, food, taxes, rents and interest from them. … Everyday resistance 
consists of the ordinary weapons of the relatively powerless groups: 
footdragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, 
slander, arson, sabotage, and so forth. These Brechtian forms of class struggle 
have certain features in common. They require little or no co-ordination or 
planning; they often represent a form of individual self-help; and they typically 
avoid any direct symbolic confrontation with authority or with elite norms. To 
                                                 
90 Scott, 1985: xv. 
91 Scott, 1985: xvii. 
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understand these commonplace forms of resistance is to understand what much 
of the peasantry does ‘between revolts’ to defend its interests as best it can.92
 
As Simione Durutalo accurately noted, there is a tendency in Fiji to see villagers as 
docile, passive, and grateful for British rule.93 Ahmed Ali, for instance, claimed in 
1980 that “Fijian loyalty to authority was generally unquestioning”.94 Another view 
claims that Fijians were saved from hard work by the presence of Indian indentured 
labourers from India. These orthodoxies merge in the following quote from Ken 
Gillion: 
 
… colonialism was far from oppressive for the Fijians: they had been left with 
more than enough land for their needs and their culture had been respected and 
honoured, even though altered and standardised as the approved “Fijian way 
of life”. Thanks to Indian immigration, they had not had to work on the sugar 
plantations. It was for good reasons that indigenous Fijian protest was a rare 
event in the crown colony of Fiji.95
 
Chapter Five tests these orthodoxies by reviewing aspects of resistance in the villages 
including evading and subverting the authority of their chiefs, absenteeism and flight, 
tax evasion, and a silent but effective boycott of land registration. Such practices 
illustrate the wide range of responses (not always aimed at the same person or 
institution) that ordinary villagers used to challenge authority of all sorts. The chapter 
also includes a discussion of luveniwai, a ritual of invulnerability practised by young 
people to defy the village hierarchy in several districts of Fiji. It ends with an account 
of how villagers used Christian churches and the possibilities offered by education, to 
overcome the permanent status of subservience that the administration reserved for 
them. 
 
Chapter Six asks the same questions of the strategies used on plantations by labourers 
to variously subvert, defy, and challenge plantation managers. The high incidence of 
violence used by labourers against their employers, against other labourers, and 
                                                 
92 Scott, 1985: 29. 
93 Durutalo, 1985a: 243. 
94 Ali, 1980: 137. 
95 Gillion, 1977: 175. 
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against themselves warrants an examination of how retributive violence acts as 
resistance in intensely suppressive environments such as the plantation. Labourers, 
however, were more likely to seek other ways of coping with the violence of their 
employers. The chapter brings together strategies of survival such as feigned illness, 
absence from work, desertion, petitions, acts of sabotage and other such “weapons of 
the weak”, and asks how effective they were in disrupting the production process and 
undermining plantation authorities. The chapter ends with a discussion of the 
importance that labourers placed on religion and education in harnessing for 
themselves a sense of moral strength and a future less dependent on the dictates of 
their masters. 
 
While women have a long tradition of household resistance which is analogous to 
everyday resistance, the domestic space presents an arena which is both similar and 
distinct from that which their male counterparts encountered in the villages or on the 
plantations. Reconstructing this fragment of resistance is perhaps more difficult than 
any other. To borrow from Spivak, “if in the context of colonial production, the 
subaltern has no history and cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more 
deeply in shadow”.96 Commenting on this difficulty Brij Lal points out that written 
records, far from being neutral sources, exclude the perspective of women and have in 
fact shrouded the faces of indentured women with a veil of dishonour.97 Subordinated 
as Fiji’s women were, first within indigenous (Fijian and Indian) hierarchies and then 
within the colonial hierarchy, Chapter Seven asks if, when, how and why, they left 
traces of their insubordination. In so doing, the discussion attempts to challenge 
another orthodoxy: that women were mere bystanders on history’s highway. 
 
While a global surge in women’s histories has run parallel to the women’s movement 
since the 1960s, very few women’s histories have been undertaken about Fiji’s early 
colonial era. Foremost among them are Claudia Knapman’s White Women in Fiji98 
and Shaista Shameem’s “Sugar and Spice: Wealth Accumulation and the Labour of 
Indian Women in Fiji, 1879-1920.”99 Because Knapman’s study deals primarily with 
                                                 
96 Spivak, 1988: 287. 
97 Lal, 2000: 222. 
98 Knapman, 1986. 
99 Shameem, 1990. 
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European women and looks at colonized women almost exclusively in terms of their 
sexual relations with European men, its usefulness to this study is limited. 
 
Shameem on the other hand, deals extensively with indentured women and boldly 
claims that they “expressed their resistance loudly, clearly and persistently, so much 
so that it would be fair to say that the indenture labour system came to an end because 
of women’s actions against exploitation and oppression.”100 She adds that “one of the 
remarkable aspects of indenture was not that there was no resistance but that women’s 
resistance to exploitation and oppression was markedly different from men.”101 The 
validity of these claims will be assessed, although greater emphasis will be placed on 
her more important point that the Indian community itself was fractured by relations 
of power, with gender being most prominent among them. 
 
A few male historians have also addressed specific aspects of women’s lives within 
larger studies. Among them, Lal’s articles about indentured women remind us that the 
benefits and suffering of indenture were not distributed equitably and that women 
bore the brunt of the hardships. Yet in spite of their vulnerability, he finds them often 
defiant, courageous and independent.102 In his study of the politics of virtue in Fiji, 
Kelly documents the sexual abuse of women on Fiji’s plantations and explains the 
process by which this abuse was transformed into a moral weapon and mobilizing 
force to initiate and then precipitate the end of indenture.103 For all this affirmative 
optimism, Jane Harvey has remarked that indentured women’s acts of resistance in 
Fiji only had “limited potential for challenging the injustice and brutality that [they] 
encountered within the plantation system”.104
 
This historiography indicates that indentured women have received comparatively 
greater attention than their Fijian counterparts. But for a few exceptions,105 the 
colonial experience of Fijian village women remains a glaring gap in Fiji’s 
historiography. Chapter Seven is a fragile attempt to address this problem. It teases 
                                                 
100 Shameem: 284. 
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105 See for instance Vicky Luker, “Mothers of the Taukei: Fijian Women and the Decrease of the 
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out the meaning of such phenomena as the increase in divorce rates, the chiefs’ 
persistent concern at the refusal of many women to marry, the increased incidence of 
abortions and stillbirths, general disobedience and flight from villages. The inferences 
that are drawn from this study are necessarily tentative and await more comprehensive 
studies to redress the imbalance. 
 
In framing this survey, I reiterate my opposition to predetermined models of 
resistance. I simply want to highlight a number of alternate dates, events, and 
characters that seldom if ever get a mention in our conversations about the past. I 




The Colo War of 1876 
 
Finding a starting point for this study is to acknowledge that several of the conflicts of 
colonial times have their roots in pre-colonial history. The continuities that bridge 
pre-colonial and colonial power relations are fundamental in accounting for the little 
known Colo War of 1876, the first of several overt confrontations between disaffected 
peoples and the amalgam of forces that emerged to become Fiji’s dominant colonial 
order. In piecing together the complexities of the war, this chapter begins with a 
search for traces of the conflict in the twenty-year period preceding the event and sets 
out to reconstruct the Colo world of the time. This first section is important to the 
overall thesis because it sketches the context from which important historical, 
geographical, political, and thematic issues are discussed in subsequent chapters. 
 
Context for Antagonism: A Series of Events 
 
In the absence of a significant enough body of work on the war, I begin my discussion 
by situating Colo in its historical, political and geographical context. Of particular 
importance is the evolving alliance between the leading chiefdom of Bau, the growing 
number of planters and settlers, the Wesleyan mission and the newly established 
colonial administration under Sir Arthur Gordon. Many historians1 identify the Battle 
of Kaba of 1855 as a watershed in post-contact Fijian history mainly because it 
established the island of Bau and its Vunivalu, Ratu Seru Cakobau as the most 
powerful political forces in Fiji. But the war only settled long standing quarrels 
between Bauan chiefs and their rival Rewan counterparts. Together, these districts 
constituted only a fraction of the population and land of Fiji. Although several other 
regions were in one way or another sympathetic or loosely allied with one camp or the 
                                                 
1 For Fiji’s pre-Cession history see among others R. A. Derrick, A History of Fiji. Suva: Government 
Printing, 1950; David Routledge, Matanitu: Struggle for Power in Early Fiji. Suva: USP Institute of 
Pacific Studies, 1985; Deryck Scarr, Fiji: A Short History. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1984; G. J. A. 
Kerr, T. A. Donnelly and Max Quanchi, Fiji in the Pacific: A History and Geography of Fiji. 4th 
Edition. Milton, Queensland: The Jacaranda Press, 1994; Andrew Thornley, Exodus of the I Taukei: 
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other and would have felt some repercussions, most people remained relatively 
untouched by this event. Although everyone saw this battle as a victory for Cakobau, 
Bau, and the Wesleyan mission, the war is striking for the number of problems that it 
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 The number of upheavals sustained in the two decades following the Battle of Kaba 
suggest that power in the islands was still in considerable flux. There were divisions 
within the Bauan establishment itself with the dissident chief Mara spearheading a 
long struggle against Cakobau until his capture and execution in 1859. In 1860, the 
district of Nakorotubu between Tailevu and Ra, claimed to be an independent state.2 
Several other coastal and inland chiefdoms also proclaimed themselves free of 
tributary obligations to Bau. In 1866, Cakobau was forced to launch a campaign to 
subdue the people of Vugalei (a few miles North of Bau) who had refused to 
recognise his rule. He was also at war with the people of Viria in Naitasiri and those 
of Lomaivuna and Waikalou (Soloira). The chiefs in these areas had for some time, as 
Reverend Thomas Baker wrote, “been forming a league in reference to the lotu, 
agreeing that no one single town should lotu by itself, but that when it should be 
agreeable to all parties they would lotu together”.3 Cakobau’s army prevailed and 
much wasting and plundering followed in the wake of the campaign. Among those 
eager for a share of the spoils of war were a number of planters. They moved into the 
lands left empty by retreating and beaten enemies and purchased them from Cakobau 
with muskets, powder, and lead.4 The deep-seated antagonism that this created among 
the original owners was to resurface with grave consequences a few years later. 
 
Bauan expansionary projects were encountering stiff resistance from all corners of 
Viti Levu. Out west, the villages in Navosa resented Bauan ambitions and were 
deeply suspicions of all individuals who associated themselves in one way or another 
with Bau.5 Here the Wesleyan mission was singled out as the most dangerous of 
Bau’s allies. The missionaries had not sought to conceal their attachment and support 
for Cakobau and were widely recognised to be partisan in all matters relating to Bau. 
Bau was using the lotu to solidify and extend its influence and vice-versa. The 
character of conversion was therefore as political as it was religious. There were also 
                                                 
2 Derrick, 1950: 146. 
3 Cited in Andrew Thornley, Exodus of the i Taukei: The Wesleyan Church in Fiji 1848-74. Na Lako 
Yani ni Kawa I taukei Na Lotu Wesele e Viti 1848-74. Trans. Tauga Vulaono. Suva: USP Institute of 
Pacific Studies, 2002. 341. Lotu refers to Christianity. 
4 Gordon to Earl Carnarvon, 19 November 1875. Arthur Hamilton Gordon, Fiji: Records of Private 
and Public Life, 1875-1880. Edinburgh: R. & R. Clark Limited (Printers), 1897. Volume 1. 337. See 
also John Young, Adventurous Spirits: Australian Migrant Society in Pre-Cession Fiji. St Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press, 1984. 149. 
5 Thornley, 2002: 337. 
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conflicts between Bau warriors and inland tribes in northern Viti Levu. In the South, 
tribes of the interior were also unsettled by increased European settlement along the 
tributaries of the Rewa River.6
 
In May 1867, buoyed by a series of military successes, Cakobau, a few missionaries 
and a number of settlers organised a coronation ceremony that crowned him King of 
Bau and its dependencies. The settlers propped up Bau because they perceived it to be 
the strongest of Fiji’s chiefdoms, and the most likely to validate their (sometimes 
dubious) land claims and to enforce laws that would protect these new properties. The 
missionaries were also interested in enlarging Bau’s sphere of influence, because it 
gave them a better platform from which to conduct their evangelical mission.7 Among 
the missionaries present at the ceremony, was the zealous Reverend Thomas Baker. 
Baker had arrived in Fiji a few days prior to the execution of the dissident chief Mara 
(of Kaba fame) on Bau. On that occasion he had remarked, “Mara was the principal 
rebel chief and it is hoped that the event of his death will strike home to the remainder 
of the rebels and be the means of their subjugation”.8 Back then, Cakobau had been 
battling to consolidate his position at the helm of the Bauan polity. Eight years on 
however, he had designs over the whole of Fiji. This made him and those perceived to 
be his allies, infinitely more threatening to independent communities all around the 
archipelago. Baker’s support for Cakobau was not without consequence. Just two 
months after the coronation, he was killed at Nabutautau on 21 July 1867. He was 
thirty-five years old. 
 
It is worth noting that British Consul Jones had passed through Nabutautau two years 
before. He had been welcomed in the village because Britain did not then pose an 
immediate threat to the autonomy of the area. Katakataisomo, the same Nabutautau 
chief who ordered Baker’s execution, had accompanied Jones back to the Northern 
coast where they encountered several refugees fleeing Bauan soldiers. Cakobau’s son, 
Ratu Epeli Nailatikau was leading an operation to extend Bauan influence in the north 
and centre of Viti Levu. A member of the expedition later recalled that the air was full 
                                                 
6 See John Young (Chapter Four), Routledge, and Thornley 2002 in particular. 
7 See the first three chapters in Thornley, 2002. 
8 Cited in Thornley, 2002: 206. 
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of smoke from the burning villages plundered by the Bauan army.9 Fearing an attack 
on the village, Katakataisomo decided to return to fortify the area. 
 
What is generally retained from Baker’s death is the savagery of it. He was 
defenceless, probably clubbed from behind and eaten. But so were seven other 
members of his party. Few historians acknowledge them, as if they did not matter, as 
if they were forgettable. The seven Fijian vuli were killed (and eaten) because they 
represented the same threat that Baker did.10 Christian evangelism, whether it wore 
white skin or black, was invading the land that Bau could not conquer by military 
means. Conversion to Christianity was linked in the minds of the hillmen with 
subservience to Bau. The lotu was the means by which Bau (and other coastal chiefs) 
would extend political control beyond its own sphere of influence. In this sense, 
Baker was not simply a bushmen’s curiosity as is often presumed in contemporary 
popular consciousness. Rather, he had moved knowingly into areas where the lotu 
was understood principally as an agent of destruction.11 His murder and that of the 
seven other vuli was an unequivocal response to the challenge posed by Cakobau’s 
coronation on Bau. It defied the coronation and all that it represented. 
 
It was also a challenge to the settlers who were arriving in increasing numbers, lured 
by prospects of cheap land and labour. They were taking up the best land in all the 
valleys of Viti Levu and were pushing inland. This they did with the complicity of 
coastal chiefs who used the money to buy guns to secure their current positions and 
further their own ambitions inland. The sale of these lands also formed a useful buffer 
between their coastal chiefdoms and the inland tribes they had antagonised. In some 
cases the land was sold without consulting those who cultivated it and without the 
consent or knowledge of the owners altogether. Ratu Kini Nanovo the Kalevu of 
Nadroga was one such chief.12 Ratu Kini aspired to a degree of importance on par 
                                                 
9 A. J. Boyd, “Exploration of Navitilevu.” in Transactions of the Fijian Society. 1919. This publication 
does not contain any page numbers. 
10 The seven men who died with Baker were mainly from South Eastern villages in Tokatoka, Rewa, 
Beqa, and Deuba. Two vulis in the party managed to escape. They were Aisea Nasekai and Josevata 
Nagata. For more details on the circumstances of these murders, see Thornley, 337-48. 
11 Thornley, 2002: 348. 
12 Carew to Gordon, 18 October 1875. Records of Private and Public Life, I: 280. Kalevu is the title 
given to the paramount chief of Nadroga. 
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with other leading chiefs of Fiji. He led Nadroga’s own “valu ni lotu” or “war of 
Christianity” 
 
by the simple and cogent means of killing and driving out all tribes who were 
not inclined to accept the new faith. He carried his crusade through the 
southern portion of Colo West burning and slaughtering as he went, and then 
applied the same method of conversion to the tribes in the hill districts of 
Waicoba and Tuva.13
 
In 1867, Ratu Kini had hired a secretary, Duncan Murray, whose main responsibility 
was to find as many settlers as he could find to buy land in Nadroga. Money 
generated from such sales was then used to procure muskets.14 Many of these muskets 
were put to use during Ratu Kini’s invasion of Western Colo in 1868. Immediately 
after the war, Ratu Kini and his allies sold large portions of the territories they had 
invaded and used the proceeds to purchase yet more weapons to consolidate his 
position as the leading chief in the area. The records of the Land Claims Commission 
reveal that within a few days of the conquest in 1868, all the principal sales in the area 
had been completed.15
 
The arms build-up with the accompanying political and territorial aggression was 
gradually framing the form of resistance (military) which would eventually arise. The 
tribes in Colo West laid claim to many of the areas sold off to planters by Ratu Kini 
and his allies. The new planters who occupied these were therefore exposed to 
considerable harassment by the original owners in the nearby hills. Inevitably, the 
relationship between Colo villagers and planters was thus characterised by 
antagonism. On a visit to Nadroga in October of 1868, the missionary Lorimer Fison 
reproached the chief for exposing the purchasers of the lands to the retaliatory actions 
of the rightful landowners. Ratu Kini replied, “[i]t is true but the white men have 
many guns. They are a war-fence to my back.”16
 
                                                 
13 Paper 27: “Native Lands Commission.” in Journal of the Fiji Legislative Council (hereafter JFLC) 
1914. 6. National Archives of Fiji (hereafter NAF). 
14 John Young: 144. 
15 See the records of the Land Claims Commission and Executive Council Sitting for the rehearing of 
Claims to Land, 1875-1887. NAF. 
16 Cited in John Young: 141. 
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Map 4: South-western Viti Levu before Cession. 
 
The coronation of Cakobau, the death of Baker and seven vuli, the 1868 invasion of 
Western Colo by Ratu Kini, and the land sales that ensued, were all symptomatic of 
the collision course on which Bauan-coastal-settler-Wesleyan projects were headed 
against the autonomy of the interior tribes of Viti Levu. Several events in the next six 
years would further aggravate the animosity. 
 
Pressed by settlers to avenge the death of Thomas Baker, Cakobau sent a punitive 
expedition to the highlands in April 1868. Because the village of Nabutautau lay in 
the centre of the island, Cakobau devised a plan to make a three-pronged attack on the 
interior from the Sigatoka (south-west), Ba (north) and Rewa/Wainimala (east) rivers. 
One of the missionaries, Carey, thought at the time that the expedition gave Cakobau 
“a reason for attacking tribes he had long wished to conquer in order to make himself 
the sole head of Na Viti Levu”.17 However, the outcome was a comprehensive and 
devastating humiliation for Cakobau. Two of his armies were routed, and the third 
returned without engaging in combat. Thirteen Bauan high chiefs and more than sixty 
soldiers lost their lives in the conflict. The inland tribes were defending their own 
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lands and were more familiar with the terrain. Nadawarau (in Muaira) joined Navosa 
as did Namosi and Noemalu, all of them united in a combination of fear and contempt 
for Bau. One of Cakobau’s advisors, John Bates Thurston, lamented at the time that 
“victory would have seen the whole of Viti Levu recognise his power and authority. I 
now fear many petty tribes before submissive to Bau, will become troublesome.”18 In 
hindsight, Thurston’s optimism about the recognition of Bauan paramountcy was 
misplaced. The Tuka Movement from the 1870s to the 1890s and other regular cases 
of insubordination and defiance against Bau in the first decade of the Twentieth 
Century (see Chapter Three) suggest that Bauan supremacy would always be 
contested. 
 
However, his prediction about the eruption of trouble among pacified tribes gained 
instant credence. An immediate resurgence of local religious beliefs occurred with 
many mission teachers being targeted for intimidation. One mountain tribe sent 
Lorimer Fison a terse message: “There are three classes of men we will now strive to 
kill – Chiefs and Missionaries and Native Teachers, that your grief may be great.”19 
All mission teachers from around Soloira had to be withdrawn and the mission station 
at Davuilevu was temporarily closed.20 By May 1868, the owners of the land grabbed 
by settlers in 1866 and 1867 in Naitasiri and Tailevu North returned to their hereditary 
planting grounds. Insults and assaults between settlers and Colo villagers became 
matters of daily occurrence.21. In July 1868, villagers managed to drive Wainibuka 
planters off the land and to turn back under fire, two British boats sent to restore the 
evicted planters. The following year, the largest plantation on the Sigatoka (owned by 
Burt and Underwood) was burnt to the ground and the settlers were relegated to the 
coastal fringe.22
 
                                                 
18 Cited in Thornley, 2002: 351. 
19 Cited in Thornley, 2002: 350. 
20 Thornley, 2002: 351. 
21 Gordon to Carnarvon, 19 November 1875. Records of Private and Public Life, I: 314. 
22 Macnaught, 1971: 6. 
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Map 5: Map of Colo East before Cession.23
 
But Cakobau would yet do more to antagonise the inland tribes. Before the year was 
out, he sold vast tracts of land (200,000 acres) to the Melbourne based Polynesian 
Company, including some land (in Beqa, Cakaudrove, Ra, and Suva) that did not 
belong to him. He had resorted to this in a desperate bid to pay off an old and 
accumulating debt to the United States Government. While these land sales did not 
include areas of the interior of Viti Levu, they brought hundreds more settlers to Fiji24 
putting more pressure on existing fertile coastal and accessible river valley lands. 
 
Resistance to political and religious encroachments again surfaced in 1869, when the 
people of Sabeto also renounced Christianity and joined their mountain allies against 
Bau and the mission. This created an inner ring of districts immediately inland from 
the coast all around Viti Levu that opposed Bauan and Wesleyan incursions into the 
interior. In the north the districts stretched from Sabeto (near Nadi), to Nalawa (near 
Rakiraki), and in the south from Tavuni (near Sigatoka), through Namosi, to Viria 
                                                 
N
23 This map indicates the location of the various Colo Vanua involved in wars against Bau between 
1867 and 1874. 
24 This exodus is well documented in John Young, Adventurous Spirits: Australian Migrant Society in 
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(near Nausori). It is in these highly permeable border areas and in the relatively more 
impervious interior that the drama would unfold. 
 
All over the valleys, settlers were driven back from disputed lands while Wesleyan 
teachers were forced out of nominally Christian areas. There were raids in Navua, 
another area of flat and fertile land. Numerous complaints were received from 
planters elsewhere in the group. Several of these were exaggerated as a deliberate 
ploy to get the government involved in expeditions that, it was hoped, would lead to 
the confiscation of more land and the freeing-up of freshly captured labour.25
 
1870 saw more of the same. Land alienation reached such levels that British consul 
March feared that widespread discontent among Fijians would result in the outbreak 
of a racial war.26 In the absence of a strong government that could assure their 
protection and further their interests, the planters armed themselves and their Vanuatu 
and Solomon Islands indentured labourers with weapons to form small but fierce 
armies which they used to hunt down any stray Kai Colo.27
 
On June 5 1871, Cakobau sent shock waves through the town of Levuka by 
announcing that a new administration had been set up to govern Fiji. Cakobau himself 
was proclaimed King of Fiji. Much consternation and disquiet followed the 
announcement especially among the Levuka residents.28 When it became obvious that 
this government had been created with the express aim to support and advance the 
interests of the settler community, the unrest subsided. Funds for the administration of 
government were provided partly by auctioning the recently conquered Lovoni lands 
and selling its people as slaves to planters mainly in Lau and Taveuni. Like 
Nabutautau, Lovoni had never been conquered and Cakobau had resorted to trickery 
and betrayal to bring about its submission. The sale brought between £1500 and 
£1900 to government coffers in successive years.29 Many Fijians viewed these events 
                                                 
25 This is well documented by Young. See Chapter Four in particular. 
26 France: 93. 
27 Many Melanesian labourers died in the process. Young speaks of the death of nine Tana men on 
Burt’s plantation in Sigatoka. He attributes these deaths to planters arming their labourers. See John 
Young: 145-6. 
28 For details of this proclamation and reactions to it, see Derrick, Legge, Scarr, Routledge, Young, and 
France in particular. 
29 Derrick, 1950: 201. 
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with a mixture of contempt and fear for they provided further evidence of Bauan 
treachery or vere vaka Bau (the evil ways of Bau). Almost overnight, Cakobau 
effectively claimed paramount authority over people and territories that had never 
seen themselves as constituting a nation wide polity, let alone him as its head. The 
response to his challenge was swift. 
 
Barely a month after the proclamation, two Ba planters, Spiers and Macintosh, were 
killed while out shooting duck in the valley. Spiers was one of the settlers who had 
been evicted from the upper Rewa in 1868. Like Spiers, McIntosh had bought his land 
from the Tui Ba and guarded his new property with armed indentured labourers from 
Tana (Vanuatu).30 He made himself dangerously unpopular by denying mountain 
tribes access to the coast where they normally traded and visited relatives. He also 
prohibited their use of the river to collect kai (fresh water mussels).31 Most 
importantly however, both were recipients of land claimed by interior tribes. As such, 
they had become involved in a much wider conflict involving land disputes in the 
border zone that lay like a buffer between coastal and interior Fijians. Some 
historians32 have tended to highlight the death of a handful of Europeans in this 
conflict. The murders of Europeans made for ‘big news’ especially in the European 
community. They also led to retributive action by the government and/or the settler 
community. For this reason they are well documented. Yet, as France points out, the 
number of fatalities of rival Fijians in this conflict was much greater and ran upwards 
of 300.33
 
In this case, interior tribes showed themselves to be as averse to Bauan encroachments 
as they were to coastal ones. In 1870, the Tui Ba (a coastal chief) began selling to 
settlers large tracts of land that did not belong to him. Between 1870 and 1872, he 
sold forty-two properties which stretched fifty miles around the coast and twenty 
miles up the river on both banks. In that area as Young writes, “every scrap of 
available land was claimed by a settler”.34 Land was bought with guns, and the Tui 
Ba’s military capabilities grew with every piece of land that he sold. As one of the 
                                                 
30 Most indentured labourers in Ba were from the island of Tana in Vanuatu. 
31 John Young: 198. 
32 Derrick and Scarr in particular. 
33 France: 92-3. 
34 John Young: 193. 
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settlers testified to the Land Claims Commission, “Tui Ba told me that his reason for 
selling land was to place a barrier between himself and the mountaineers”.35 But in 
dispossessing his own people of “every inch of their tribal lands”36 and in selling land 
claimed by interior tribes, he was also creating animosity between settlers and the 
landowners. Attacks from the mountains began soon after the first land sales and 
continued sporadically until 1873 and the murder of the Burns family (discussed 
below).37
 
Meanwhile, Spiers and McIntosh had their deaths avenged by a combined force of 
planters, about 100 Melanesian labourers, and government soldiers. They skirmished 
extensively in the mountains inland of Ba but usually with the wrong people,38 and 
created in the process more antagonism and many more future adversaries. Early in 
1872, a young Kai Colo was caught cutting a digging stick by Solomon Island 
labourers near the Ba River. In his account of the murder, J. B. Thurston described 
how after he was caught, “the prisoner was taken to the planter, Lindbergh, who 
refused to save his life, despite the pleas of the son of Tui Ba the arch enemy of the 
Kai Colo. The labourers hacked off his head, took it to another planter to admire, then 
smoked and dried it, Solomons style.”39
 
Punctuated with violence and uncertainty, 1872 was another eventful year. In 
February, the rising tension between ethnic groups was manifested further by the 
formation in Levuka of Fiji’s Ku Klux Klan with aims not dissimilar to those of its 
American counterpart.40 In July, the Burt plantation in Sigatoka was burnt again.41 By 
                                                 
35 Cited in John Young: 193. 
36 Land Claims Commission Report cited in John Young: 193. 
37 John Young: 370. 
38 See Derrick, 1950: 204. Note that the rejection of the Cakobau Government was not confined to Viti 
Levu. Wainunu in Bua, Vanua Levu was the last stronghold of traditional religious beliefs in Vanua 
Levu and its chief Tui Wainunu declared war on Bau in protest over the proclamation and dismissed all 
recently appointed Wesleyan teachers. See Thornley: 490. The hostilities ceased with the defeat of Tui 
Wainunu and his supporters and their imprisonment in Bua. 
39 Thurston to Layard, 18 February 1874. Cited in Macnaught, 1971: 9. 
40 The Ku Klux Klan was replaced in July 1873 by the White Residents’ Political Association whose 
guiding principle was “to protect by all legitimate means the liberties and privileges of the white 
residents of Fiji”. See E. Crane, “King Cakobau’s Government.” M.A. Thesis. Auckland: University of 
Auckland, 1938 cited in Derrick, 1950: 231. The formation of these associations reflect European 
residents’ own anxieties about being a minority in Fiji, and of their own initiatives to preserve and 
protect their interests. 
41 Burt was particularly resented by his Colo neighbours for his arrogant and cruel behaviour. His 
equally brutal partner Underwood had been killed in the meantime by his Tana labourers in Kadavu. 
See Young and Thornley for details about the cruelty of these planters. 
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the end of the year, many settlers were convinced that a major campaign would be 
needed to clear Kai Colo off the land, once and for all. The government however was 
reluctant to engage in what it knew would be a long and costly war.42
 
Another significant development of 1872, was the appointment of Ratu Isikeli 
Tabakaucoro of Viwa (near Bau) as the governor of Ra. As a governor, one of Ratu 
Isikeli’s main responsibilities was to determine taxable individuals and begin 
collecting one pound per adult male and four shillings from women. The introduction 
of this tax system necessitated the activation of a census.43 While the main intention 
of the taxes was to raise money for the government and to force as many villagers as 
possible into plantation labour, the census functioned as a more subtle means of 
spreading the government’s legitimacy into the homes of people who had never 
conceived of a polity beyond their own immediate vanua. It was one small way in 
which the government could make itself visible and win the recognition and consent 
of hereto independent tribes. 
 
This brings to the fore another theme of pre-colonial antagonism: the effect of 
alliances between the Bauan chiefs, the government and settlers in recruiting 
plantation labour in subjected communities. Either from ignorance or evasion, very 
few Fijians responded to the tax. Many were consequently charged and imprisoned 
for the maximum term of six months. Those planters who paid the debt off with the 
government could then use the offender for six months though periods of enforced 
labour often lasted for up to a year and a half. This led to the wholesale emptying of 
entire districts of their male population.44 Two provinces were particularly badly hit. 
They were the provinces with Bauan governors, Ba and Ra. Ratu Isikeli was himself 
actively involved in labour recruitment in Ra and the Yasawas and quickly acquired a 
reputation for unscrupulous behaviour. Resident settlers blamed him for unsettling 
and upsetting local tribes and for the tragic consequences that would ensue in 
February 1873.45 Gordon later wrote that people in these provinces remembered this 
                                                 
42 Not all contact between villagers and planters was characterised by violence. Some relationships 
were very amicable and embodied much goodwill. This section however, treats with the war of 1876 
and traces the roots from which antagonism grew. 
43 Kaplan, 1995. 43. 
44 Gordon, Records of Private and Public Life, I: 201. 
45 Ratu Isikeli had bought himself a ketch and was paying for it by supplying 250 labourers to two 
European recruiters. See Fiji Times, 26 March 1873. 
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as a terrible time of tyranny and misrule.46 Because most of the labour recruiters were 
Bauans, the imposition of the tax and the experience of labour both fuelled anti-Bauan 
and anti-government discontent. 
 
Ratu Isikeli was also a Bauan man, and closely related to Cakobau. His appointment 
effectively completed the Bauan-Christian encirclement of Viti Levu (with the 
exception of Namosi). The map drawn by Richard Philp while visiting the islands in 
1872 shows Cakobau’s sovereignty to extend no further than Tailevu North and parts 
of Namosi in the southwest. What the map does not show is that Cakobau could count 
on his lieutenants in Ra and Ba47 and the backing of the Kalevu in Nadroga. On either 
sides of Nadroga were the Kalevu’s other allies, Nadi and Serua. This coastal ring was 




Map 6: Richard Philp’s 1872 map. The dotted line shows his assessment of the extent 
of Cakobau’s sovereignty.48
 
1873 saw the intensification of conflicts in the North of Viti Levu, beginning in 
January with attacks on the Burness farm at Vunisamaloa twelve miles up the Ba 
                                                 
46 Gordon, Records of Private and Public Life, I: 201. 
47 By the end of 1872, the government had also replaced the Tui Ba with a new pro-Bauan governor. 
See the settlers’ petition in the Fiji Times, 26 March 1873. 
48 Richard Philp’s Diary. 1872. Microfilm 128. National Archives of Fiji. 
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River.49 In February a Ba planter’s men shot two mountain women who had come 
down to the river to fish for kai.50 By now the planters pursued a shoot on sight policy 
against all ‘big heads’ (many of the inland warriors had begun to grow their hair as a 
sign of their opposition to Bau and the mission). The mountaineers (as they were also 
known) responded with a bloody reprisal of their own. On the fourth of February 
1873, the Burns family was killed on their property at Vunisamaloa, as were eighteen 
of the Melanesian labourers (mostly Tana men). The planters attributed the killing to 
the natural savagery of the ‘big heads’ and to the downgrading of the Tui Ba in favour 
of a Bauan man, which created in the process, “a bitter enemy … of a previously 
staunch ally of white settlers”.51 Writing fifty years later, Brewster believed the attack 
to have been in retaliation for the Burns labourers’ killing and eating of a young Colo 
man.52 Scarr and Young both ascribed the killing to land disputes originating from the 
Tui Ba’s land selling frenzy.53
 
An expedition was immediately sent by the government to punish the murderers. Led 
by Swanston (Minister for Native Affairs) Major Fitzgerald, Captain Harding, and 
Ratu Isikeli, the appearance of punishment soon gave way to evidence of a veritable 
war of subjugation. In his notice calling for Ba settlers to join the force, the Major 
invited “anyone who is fond of shooting” to accompany him.54 Macnaught calculated 
that more than 2000 men were recruited for the expedition, more than any previous 
operation.55 This was not mere retaliation. The objective was to acquire control over 
the entire interior. The targets in the north and north-west included the tribes of 
Qaliyalatina, Naloto, Magodro, Yakete, Vaturu and Sabeto none of which had 
connections with the Burns murder. Many villagers lost their lives, almost a thousand 
men, women and children were taken prisoner and several hundred were killed. Most 
                                                 
49 Burness to Evans, 3 January 1873. The “Swanston Collection. Correspondence re Military Campaign 
in the Ba and Ra Provinces. Inwards and Outwards, 1873.” M/9. Burness left the area soon after to 
settle on disputed Vatukaloko lands in Ra where he was again harassed by neighbouring tribes. This is 
discussed in the next chapter on the Tuka Movement. 
50 Macnaught, 1971: 13. 
51 See the settlers’ petition in the Fiji Times, 26 March 1873. 
52 A. B. Brewster The Hill Tribes of Fiji. London: Seeley, Service & Co. Limited, 1922. 32-3. Brewster 
had been in the planters’ militia in the first Ba expedition to avenge the deaths of Spiers and Macintosh. 
53 Scarr, 1984: 62, John Young: 370-1. 
54 Letter from Berry to Place, 22 April 1873. Cited in Colman Wall “Old Fiji Letters.” in Transactions 
of the Fijian Society. 1918. 26. 
55 Macnaught, 1971: 16. 
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of the villages were burned, the gardens destroyed and those who escaped fled in all 
directions.56
 
The move to the prized village of Nabutautau in the centre of the island continued into 
August and it eventually fell on September 11th (though the villagers had been alerted 
by Fijian soldiers and the village was deserted when it was taken). Several of the 
prisoners were sent to Lovoni on Ovalau which had since 1871 become a gaol. Other 
prisoners (men, women and children) totalling 800 and all from the interior of Ba 
were taken to Koro where in January 1874 they were tried for rebellion. One quarter 
were acquitted and the rest sent to work on plantations. The revenue of the sale was 
again used to finance government.57 The Magodro (including Sabeto and Vaturu) 
were allowed back in 1876 but were confined to the village of Nasolo on the Ba coast 
where they could be kept under surveillance. The lands claimed by the government 
after the campaign were later returned to them. The Naloto people (interior of Ba) 
were also kept in servitude in Ba before being moved to Toqe after Cession. 
 
Meanwhile, a few miles east of Ba, another front in the war of attrition between the 
interior and the government had opened in the Tavua Bay area with the killing of a 
local chief by labour recruiters angry that his men had deserted.58 A few days later, 
Koroi i Latikau, a Bauan recruiter, was murdered in the same area. Bau and Viwa had 
been abusing their tributary relationship with Ra to hire labour out to European 
planters. The emptying of the land of its male population made for a combination of 
misery and anger which ended in tragic circumstances. To make matters worse, a 
chief from the Tavua Bay had been killed. To avenge Latikau’s death, government 
troops, consisting of a few Europeans, about forty drilled Fijians and a hundred other 
auxiliaries, attacked the village of Nakorowaiwai on the 4th of March 1873. Having 
stormed it, as the clash was later related, a horrible massacre took place. Women and 
children were shot down as they ran from their burning houses. Living children were 
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thrown into fires or had their brains dashed out. Many of these people had just 
returned from work in Taveuni. They were not mountaineers but coastal villagers.59
 
The massacre, apart from worsening an already deep-seated resentment against Bau 
and the government, also opened a more profound wound. As Kaplan has argued 
conclusively, massive damage had been done to the ritual pre-eminence, authority, 
and autonomy of the Vatukaloko people, the spiritual guardians of the ancestral home 
of Degei and the sacred Nakauvadra Range.60 The battle of Nakorowaiwai had 
opened a religious as well as a political front. Eventually, it would turn into one of the 
most potent of Fiji’s anti-colonial movements: the Tuka (see Chapter Two). 
 
Cakobau was also stretched in Eastern Colo where he faced a resurgence of hostility 
in the Naitasiri districts of Naqali, Viria, and Matailobau, and extending as far as 
Nadawarau (Muaira) and Waikalou (Soloira) in the upper Rewa. A major battle took 
place at Nasorovakawalu in March 1873 which Cakobau won notably with the 
support of Wesleyan trainees at the recently opened Navuloa Wesleyan Training 
Institution.61 The participation of these trainees only reinforced the perception that 
this was a war of Bau and the lotu. Many villages in Waikalou, Nalawa, and Nasau 
districts were burnt. In spite of their defeat, this latest military flashpoint was another 
reminder to the government of the determination of Colo polities to preserve their 
political, territorial and religious independence.62 For the government, these 
campaigns only worsened its precarious financial situation. Already laden with large 
debts, and facing a continuous barrage of attacks from hostile settlers, the government 
could ill-afford to be at war. Its inability to suppress Colo permanently also severely 
diminished its prestige and credibility among Fijians and settlers alike. 
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By the end of 1873, the Cakobau Government was on the brink of collapse. A petition 
signed by 300 “white settlers” had been sent to the Foreign Office, with a request for 
the British annexation of the islands. They pleaded that 
 
the Government of Fiji is unable to render that protection which is properly 
the province of a Government to do; that the great body of natives are 
dissatisfied with it; that the discontent has spread widely, and is yet spreading; 
whilst among the settlers the discontent has been so great as to lead large 
bodies of them to take up arms against the Government.63
 
The British Government responded by sending the Goodenough and Layard 
Commission to investigate the request and to determine the viability and desirability 
of annexation. By March 1874, Cakobau, Thurston, and several of the major chiefs of 
Fiji were summoned by the Commission and coerced into backing-down from their 
determined stand to continue governing Fiji.64 The debts, widespread discontent 
among Fijians and settlers alike, and the policy pursued by newly elected British 
Prime Minister Disreali for imperial enlargement,65 made the government’s position 
almost untenable. 
 
Meanwhile in Colo, news of the government’s imminent demise rekindled old 
quarrels. Unresolved problems flared up again in which anti-Bauan and anti-lotu 
sentiments again featured prominently. The tension was sometimes such that absence 
from Colo was construed as a slight on the vanua and treasonous to the cause. A 
Nadawarau chief who tried to return to his village after an absence of four months 
was told “you are no longer a Dawarau man … but a Bau man and we don’t know you 
                                                 
63 The petition is contained in 73/8507, CO 83/4. PRO. 
64 This British commission had been sent from London to investigate settler requests for the annexation 
of the islands. The following passage taken from a letter by Cakobau to Goodenough and Layard 
indicates the desire of the principal chiefs of coastal and Eastern Fiji to continue to rule over the islands 
independently of Great Britain: “The chiefs of Fiji have discussed as I desired them to do the matter 
about which you were sent to Fiji by the Queen. After they had discussed it they signed a paper which 
they sent to me. In this paper their desires are made clear, they do not wish to give the Government of 
Fiji to any Foreign Power.” 6 March 1874, 74/4994, CO 83/5. This letter was withdrawn on 19 March 
1874. See 74/4995, CO 83/5. PRO. Deryck Scarr discusses this incident and other aspects of the power 
struggle between the Cakobau Government, the chiefs, the settlers and the Goodenough-Layard 
Commission in “John Bates Thurston, Commodore Goodenough and the Rampant Anglo-Saxons in 
Fiji.” in Historical Studies. 11: 43, October 1964. 378-81. 
65 His predecessor Gladstone generally regarded colonies to be too expensive. 
 49
or care for you”.66 A central highlands alliance or Lomaicolo was formed between the 
interior districts of Nadaravakawalu, Muaira, Noemalu and Naqarawai to bolster 
political autonomy and resist the spread of Christianity. The Lomaicolo alliance was 
said to have the backing of Nabutautau, the Navatusila village being fully rebuilt and 
defiant as ever.67 Lomaicolo proved a constant source of frustration for mission 
teachers and converts alike especially for those who settled in the neighbouring 
districts of Naboubuco and Nailega to the north and Soloiara, Matailobau in the south 
and east. 
 
In late March, Lomaicolo forces attacked a Christian village at Naigunugunu in 
Naitasiri, killing as many as fifty-seven people in the process.68 Few sources are clear 
as to the reasons behind the attack. Thornley deduces a religious motive,69 while 
Brewster pointed out that the whole of the head of the Wainimala was in arms against 
the government.70 One can surmise that the lotu and the matanitu continued to mean 
the same thing for many of these interior tribes. Desperate to avoid the loss of recent 
advances, and the conflict from spiralling out of control, the government immediately 
despatched Major James Harding (of Ba campaign fame) with an expedition into 
Wainimala. After moving in from Viti Levu Bay through Nalawa, Harding’s force 
was attacked at Nagusunikalou.71 Brewster describes this battle as unprecedented in 
the history of Fijian warfare.72 After less than a month, Lomaicolo’s leadership was 
weakened by capture and execution. Cakobau’s army took all that could be seized and 
carried everything downstream on bilibili (bamboo rafts). The loot contained many 
large lali (Fijian drums) thus depriving these hill tribes of an important source of 
communication and mobilisation.73 Resistance from Colo East had been broken and 
the potential for future alliances with tribes west of the Rairaimatuku and Nadrau 
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plateaus was seriously compromised. Colo West was thus deprived in 1876 of a 
potentially formidable Colo-wide alliance. 
 
The Causes of the Colo War 
 
This long series of events suggests that there were many reasons for a confrontation to 
take place in the interior. Firstly, as Kaplan points out, the polities of the interior were 
constructed differently from those of the coast.74 This means, as Routledge infers, that 
the configuration of the interior homeland stood against the development of any kind 
of extended authority structure, whether Fijian or foreign.75 Reporting to the Fiji 
Legislative Council in 1914, the Native Lands Commissioner G. V. Maxwell, claimed 
for instance that Nadroga had “a constitution considerably more civilised than the 
rudimentary and inchoate social system obtaining in Colo West”.76 This was 
principally because the chiefs in Nadroga appeared to be well established and 
recognised. By contrast the chiefs of Colo West seemed to benefit a lot less from the 
privileges of their rank: 
 
One of the most striking features in the communal system of Colo West is the 
absence of chiefly customs, and the character and manners of the people at the 
present time indicate great independence of will and impatience of control. 
They seem to have never rendered to their chiefs the obedience, deference, and 
respect that is so marked in other provinces. There are numerous instances of 
the hereditary chief vacating his position in favour of a more efficient warrior; 
and while that is perhaps inevitable where tribes had to fight for their 
existence, it appears from the general history of the tribes that the chiefly 
position was almost nominal in times of peace. The people seemed to do 
nothing for their chiefs except when definitely ordered, and the orders had to 
be given with discretion. There was no “sevu” or presentation of the first fruits 
of the season, no “tama” or respectful greeting, no “veibuli” or ceremonious 
installation of a chief, no clapping of hands on touching a chief (e.g. after 
shaking hands), or on his finishing a meal. In fact, the chief appears to have 
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been of little consequence except in actual time of war, and the Commission 
could find no hereditary or customary titles or offices in the whole province 
which carry any special privileges in respect to land.77 (Italics in original.) 
 
Maxwell interpreted this lack of a hierarchy as an indicator of weakness and 
inferiority. Adolf Brewster who was commissioner in various parts of Colo for about 
thirty years, disagreed. His view was that: 
 
Under the old patriarchal system, as it existed among the hill tribes, all men 
were free and equal, and tyranny and oppression not to be borne with. But 
there was an iron discipline where the welfare of the clan was concerned; 
members were expected to die for it and sacrifice themselves, when necessary, 
for the divine head, the chieftain.78
 
There is also evidence that traditional authority was just as fragmented on the 
northern coast throughout the large province of Ba and the Yasawa Islands.79 This 
degree of egalitarianism prevented large chiefdoms and paramount chiefs from 
emerging and facilitated instead a system of loose alliances and coalitions. 
Consequently, the government could not rely on the same degree of collaboration that 
it received from paramount chiefs and chiefly classes in other parts of the group. 
 
Secondly, their sense of space and territory was different. The ocean is not visible 
from Nabutautau in the centre of the island. What is more evident is the vastness of 
the land and the abundance of natural resources. When Brewster first became 
acquainted with the people of Colo he was astounded to find that “the natives thought 
their country the biggest in the world”.80 The people who inhabited these lands could 
not have accepted the claims made over their heritage from a man (Cakobau) whom 
they had never seen, whose power had never been recognised in these parts, and who 
himself came from a diminutive islet. These wars then, were wars of independence. 
They had been fought for the preservation of a people who saw themselves leading 
independent lives, laying claim over large, fertile and enviable expenses of territory, 
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natural resources, a vibrant religion and way of life. They were fighting to retain their 
worldviews, their ways of seeing, of understanding, of doing, of remembering, of 
knowing. This is the world they sought to protect from the increasingly ambitious, 
hostile and threatening incursions from the coast. Yet, this independent spirit also 
precluded any pan-Colo unity from emerging. They often suffered from shifting 
alliances and diverging views about how to proceed. Colo districts were not equally 
disaffected and not always opposed in the same ways or to the same enemy. 
 
The people of Colo also take pride in claiming to be among the original inhabitants of 
the land and view coastal peoples as latecomers to Fiji. In spite of their vast land and 
ancient heritage, Kai Colo often suffered from the cultural denigrations of coastal 
people. Bauans regarded them as ‘kaisi’ or low class, barbarous people lacking in 
culture and manners.81 This view was also adopted by some administrators including 
G. B. Evans, the government’s Secretary for Ba and the Yasawas, who described the 
mountaineers as “the most filthy race I ever had to contend with”.82 Power is not 
easily tolerant of defiance and is usually suspicious of difference. Although difficult 
to prove, it can be assumed that Kai Colo resented these representations. 
 
The third source of antagonism came from the religious transformation driven from 
the coast by indigenous agents and foreign missionaries. By the 1870s the 
missionaries had acquired considerable influence in Fijian politics. The island of Bau 
was the centre of Wesleyanism in Fiji83 and although the mission’s evangelical drive 
was not inherently violent and the mission rarely took an active role in wars of 
conquest or subjugation, it was nevertheless widely identified with Bau’s political 
ambitions. The lotu’s reputation was also plagued by the cavalier and occasionally 
mercenary methods used by some of its most prominent exponents. Among them 
Semisi Fifita, a protégé of the prominent Tongan warlord Enele Ma’afu, was 
particularly conspicuous in his use of gun-toting methods to secure conversions.84 
This is not to deny that Christians themselves were the victims of persecution. But 
while many tribes welcomed the lotu as a source of peace and spiritual well-being, in 
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other places such as Colo, the Bible was emblematic of coercive force and its 
association with the gun and the government persists to the present day.85 As 
Thornley points out, Cakobau’s influence had brought many Fijians to Christianity 
but driven many others away.86
 
In 1868, Colo had been subjected to campaigns of aggression from the coast by Ratu 
Kini Nanovo, the Kalevu. Ratu Navula a leading chief from the Nadi coast used the 
same pretext of evangelism to expand his power base in western Colo. He brought 
several districts in the immediate vicinity of Nadi under subjection and compelled 
them to adopt the “sulu” (the recognised outward sign of Christianity). Many were 
forced to flee into the hills during his “war of Christianity”.87 The same strategy was 
used in Ra and Tavua where the advances were led by Cakobau’s son and other 
Bauan chiefs. Coastal chiefs stood to gain much from the opportunities offered by 
evangelism. They could consolidate their positions and even acquire power over lands 
and people with whom they had until then exercised very little or no legitimate 
influence. The moral authority of the Wesleyan mission was thus constantly 
undermined by the violence of its most publicly visible adherents. The mission’s 
cause was not helped either by the involvement of some of its senior members in land 
purchases at a time when discontent over land alienation was rife.88
 
The political connection between the mission and the government did not always 
manifest itself in such overt and dramatic ways. Rather, it often assumed the form of a 
more subtle partnership to acquire greater information and control. Reflecting on his 
expedition through Viti Levu in October 1875, A. J. Gordon (one of the Governor’s 
aide-de-camps and distant relative) observed on the usefulness of this alliance: 
 
Native teachers are a most useful body of men because of their constant 
communication with one another, providing information, and for rapidly 
circulating orders or advice that might prove to be most dangerous were this 
power possessed by a body less well affected towards the government than the 
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Wesleyans. They are of great assistance to the government, for while 
inculcating the precepts of the faith, they at the same time teach the people to 
obey the law and uphold authority. By their habits they set an example of 
cleanliness, orderliness, and industry which in time must bear fruit.89
 
This passage suggests that religious transformation was a relatively peaceful process. 
Yet, evangelism by its very nature involved religious, cultural and territorial 
aggrandisement. As such, the church was often party to a frequently imperceptible but 
nonetheless potent attack on the cosmologies of Colo and their powerful keepers. 
Resisting Christian encroachments became a matter of life and death for the priestly 
establishment (bete) which was charged with the spiritual protection and well-being 
of their communities. In this context the posting of the Wesleyan teacher Esala Seru at 
Beimana in the western heartland of Colo in 1874, was perceived as an act of 
provocation and he was among the first to feel the ire of the Kai Colo in the 
immediate lead up to the 1876 War. 
 
Fourthly, the series of events underscores the rapid spread of capitalist relations of 
production in Fiji as a consequence of the arrival of a large number of planters. From 
the mid 1860s onwards Fiji’s reputation for cheap land and labour had attracted 
hundreds mainly from Australia (but also from New Zealand) hoping to make a quick 
fortune on the back of the cotton boom. Planters constituted the frontline of capitalism 
in Fiji. Their dependence and insistence on cheap land and labour and the reluctance 
of many Fijians to provide either, made the likelihood of conflict almost inevitable. 
Unlike the traders, these people had come to make their home in Fiji and depended on 
space for their profits. They pushed inland from Ba, Sigatoka and Rewa where they 
hoped to acquire the last remaining tracts of fertile land. There, they attempted to 
establish private properties which they cordoned off and guarded jealously. But these 
localities brought them into contact with people who had had access to and cultivated 
these lands from time immemorial and for whom therefore, the significance of these 
lands extended far beyond their mere material use. Private and communal conceptions 
of land ownership collided with increasing force as good land became more scarce. 
Inland, Colo people watched with increasing apprehension as vast tracts of land 
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bordering theirs changed hands, new owners moved in, entire villages were forced off 
their ancestral homes, large areas declared out of bounds, and labourers ordered to 
shoot trespassers on sight.90
 
The interior districts were also witness to the sale, one after another, of entire islands 
in the Yasawas to land sharks (such as Evans) by enterprising Bauan chiefs. The 
powerful but unscrupulous Ratu Epeli Nailatikau (Ratu Seru’s eldest son) had, from 
the late 1860s, warned chiefs in the islands that if they didn’t sign the deeds of sale, 
they would be arrested and carried away. Once the land was sold, planters placed 
tabus on everything on the island and effectively forbade villagers from using the 
land. Some old women were sentenced to hard labour for three months for digging 
their own crops. Youths found guilty of eating coconuts were sentenced to twelve 
months.91 Anyone who dared complain would be flogged or sent away for long 
periods of prison labour mainly on Vanua Levu plantations. While working as a tax 
collector for the Cakobau administration, Alex Eastgate reported that he had found in 
Yasawa-i-Ra twenty men returning from the Macuata coast where they had been 
fishing for bêche de mer at Ratu Epeli’s behest. After working there for seven months, 
all they had to show for their labour were two bags of fish.92
 
The Yasawa alienation was all the more menacing for Colo given that some islands 
(such as Viwa) had been claimed by settlers in spite of the fact that the people living 
on them had never owed allegiance to Bau, were never consulted on the sale of their 
islands, had never sighted or signed any of the deeds, and never received any 
payment.93 The presence of the armed native constabulary created an atmosphere of 
fear and intimidation. This was compounded by the merging in the same man of the 
military, administrative and legal apparatus of the state. Major James Harding was at 
once commander of the armed constabulary and commissioner for the Yasawas where 
he ruled without exception in favour of planters. His Fijian troops were charged by 
many with outrages and cruelties perpetrated especially against women.94 The 
soldiers who accompanied him around the islands were “allowed full liberty to 
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plunder and destroy property at will, and to ravish women at their pleasure”. In one 
town only one woman had survived the soldiers’ assaults.95
 
Another source of anxiety and irritation was the tactic used by planters and their local 
chiefly allies to provoke clashes in certain districts with “the almost avowed object of 
aiding the Exchequer by obtaining lands to sell and prisoners to dispose of”.96 One Ba 
planter (Fitzgerald) went as far as setting fire to his own house and claimed it was 
burnt by the mountaineers, so that he could then claim compensation and get the 
government involved in a punitive expedition. Such an expedition, some planters 
hoped, would free up more land and labour from dispossessed landowners and get 
their own claims endorsed. Writing in 1875 about agitation among planters near the 
mouth of the Sigatoka River, Governor Gordon alerted the Colonial Secretary to this 
abuse: 
 
Fox is a notorious alarmist. … There can … be no doubt that he and a 
considerable number of the white settlers in his neighbourhood wish to bring 
about a collision, which will eventually lead to the destruction of the tribes 
who now occupy the extensive and fertile plains of the Sigatoka. Those great 
tracts of rich lands will thus, they think, be rendered easy of acquisition. Nor 
will it be easy to dispute the defective titles which they have obtained from the 
late Ratu Kini of Nadroga, of lands over which he exercised no shadow of 
authority, and to the property of which he had no claim.97
 
Land loss and proletarianisation were thus tied together. Once the land was sold, 
planters needed manpower to render it productive. Racial ideas of the time dictated 
that no self-respecting white man would himself work the land (though many did). 
This created a huge labour crisis because Fijians had little incentive to work for the 
meagre wages offered by planters. Enforced recruitment and taxation were two of the 
strategies used to get around the problem. Both had direct bearing on the escalation of 
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tension in the interior. Forced recruitment offered several entrepreneurial chiefs the 
opportunity to profit from selling the labour of subject districts. In Ra for instance 
(where the Bauan chief Ratu Isikeli was governor), men from whole districts were 
dragged out of their homes to work on plantations.98 In Qaliyalatina (northern Colo), 
men were taken to work on plantations in return for tabua (whale’s teeth) and a 
promise to be returned at the end of a year.99 Taxation produced hundreds of 
prosecutable individuals who had not paid their dues. These men and women were 
driven onto plantations where they worked long hours to maximise the profit of an 
often ill-disposed planter and learn to respect, protect, and expand his private 
property. Aside from causing widespread social, economic, and demographic 
displacement, such practices also fuelled more discontent and resentment. 
 
Omnipresent in relations between Europeans and indigenous population was the 
conviction among the former of their racial superiority.100 Many Colo Fijians first 
experienced this as labourers working for planters. Most planters saw themselves as 
constituting a homogenous group with similar problems, interests and aspirations. 
They stuck together in what they perceived to be a hostile environment. Although 
there were exceptions, their general expectation that space between ‘races’ (already 
enforced by some missionaries) should be demarcated and legalised, did not endear 
them with their indigenous neighbours and subordinates.101 Few were those who 
formed relations of trust, goodwill, and mutual respect with adjoining Fijian 
communities. Some had good reason to fear Fijians, for like the lotu, the settlers were 
usually perceived to be in legion with Bau, and to have acquired their present 
properties by ill means. 
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Aside from the general origins of the conflict already explored, there were also more 
immediate reasons for the deterioration of relations between Colo and its adversaries. 
The signing of the Deed of Cession in Levuka on October 10 1874 is a case in point. 
Goodenough had been happy to use minor chiefs’ discontent to discredit Cakobau and 
his government in the lead-up to Cession102 but they were promptly ignored in the 
ensuing process of formalising the British takeover and negotiating the post-Cession 
distribution of power. Colo was not party to the cession of the islands to the British 
Crown. None of the districts North of the line from the Kalevu’s province of Nadroga 
in the west to Tailevu in the southeast, were represented at Cession talks by their own 
leaders. Walter Carew is reported to have been at the signing of Cession but he could 
hardly be said to represent Colo. Kai Colo did not recognise him as their spokesman, 
neither did they see themselves as constituting one unified entity. 
 
This exclusion is hardly surprising. Chiefdoms other than Bau, Cakaudrove and Lau 
were not considered prominent enough to participate in the making of decisions about 
the future of the colony. Perhaps more importantly, Colo chiefs would not have 
agreed to surrender sovereignty even if they had been consulted. Colo was never a 
part of the process because its participation was likely to inhibit rather than facilitate 
the transition. When it became clear that annexation was no longer a question of 
choice but of time, the established chiefs of the coast and the east endeavoured to 
secure for themselves and their families a continuing power and influence in post-
cession politics. They were not about to concern themselves with the wishes of their 
traditional enemies in the interior. Cakobau likened Fiji to a piece of driftwood and 
while his boat was certainly sinking and rudderless, this was not so in Colo where 
most districts remained fiercely independent and self-sufficient. Colo was not 
involved because it had much to lose and little to gain from the new order. It had not 
been nor intended to be party to the emerging ‘nation’ that other chiefs around Fiji 
were beginning to imagine. 
 
As we saw earlier, the interim colonial administration was well aware that the 
annexation of Fiji had been undertaken without the consent of the interior districts of 
                                                 
102 See the “Commodore’s Report on Annexation.” Goodenough to CO, 6 April 1874, Admiralty Paper 
74/3714, CO 83/5. PRO. 
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Viti Levu.103 Two strategies presented themselves as it sought to enforce a new law 
and a new order in the interior. The first, favoured by acting governor Sir Hercules 
Robinson, proposed that force was most desirable and that the government should 
“send a native force across the mountains to command their submission”.104 Others 
however, including Layard and a number of senior advisors to the Cakobau 
government, believed that it would be best for Colo to be ‘eased’ into the new order. 
Anxious to avoid a repeat of the New Zealand Wars and its costly consequences, the 
government charged Walter Carew with the responsibility of convening a meeting 
between the government and the interior districts.105 Carew was a New Zealand born 
former planter who had served in the 1871 Ba Campaign but who had since become 
well-acquainted with Colo residents who gave him almost unlimited access to the 
region. Carew’s individual ability to liaise with and mediate between antagonistic 
groups in the region helped to ease conditions that would otherwise have precipitated 
a more immediate and bloody conflict. 
 
The meeting took place at Navuso on 22 January 1875, bringing sixty-nine chiefs 
mainly from the more pacified areas of eastern Colo. If the meeting is to be judged by 
the official response, it was “completely successful”, and “a thorough understanding 
has been come to with Kai Colos from whom no serious trouble need now be 
anticipated”.106 “They have come to give themselves to Britain,” declared Layard.107 
The people had cut their hair as a token of their submission and five of the chiefs went 
voluntarily to Levuka with Mr Layard to look at the town and pay heed to her 
Majesty’s warship “Dido”. Several coastal chiefs were there too to vouch for the new 
order and to plead with them to give up their “false sense of importance and 
strength”.108 After being warned of the consequences of any misbehaviour they were 
told to return to their districts and honour their pledge of loyalty. The chiefs of Colo 
raised but three concerns. They were anxious to retain their lands, hold on to their 
custom regarding polygamy, wary of the lotu being thrust on them, and asked the 
                                                 
103 “Memorandum by Consul March respecting Affairs in Fiji.” 7 May 1873. CO 83/4. PRO. 
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right to renounce Christian education. After receiving assurances on all counts that 
change if needed would be gradual and implemented only after consultation, the 
chiefs returned to their homes. 
 
Unbeknown to them, they had been infected with the deadly measles virus, sparking a 
huge epidemic that would take one in five people throughout Fiji.109 The disease was 
particularly devastating in Colo. Almost all the chiefs who had come to the Navuso 
meeting perished and with them vanished the tentative promises to submit. Measles 
heralded a vastly more perilous enemy than had ever been encountered before. It was 
invisible and could not be repelled by conventional means. Influenced by priests in 
danger of losing their social and political prominence, Kai Colo ascribed the new 
mysterious malady to the wrath of the ancestral gods. With half of Colo’s leadership 
eliminated within three months of the Navuso meeting, it is not surprising that many 
believed the new rulers had conspired to introduce the pestilence to weaken Colo’s 
strength.110
 
The consequences were immediate. Reporting on his expedition through the centre of 
Viti Levu with Walter Carew, Arthur J. Gordon wrote that they had met at Navuso, a 
teacher fleeing from Navosa. He told them the people had gone back to worshipping 
their own gods and that they now saw the epidemic, the lotu, and the government as 
the same enemy.111 Similar reports came from all over the interior. People were 
throwing off the sulu, expelling Wesleyan teachers, and reverting to heathen practices. 
The disease had severely undermined all previous progress made at pacifying the 
interior. Colo bore the brunt of the disaster. For while Cession had borne little 
significance for the people of Colo, measles was to affect their destiny in the most 
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dramatic ways. For many years later, time was not referred in terms of pre or post 
cession, but rather of pre and post measles days.112 Hence, Routledge’s argument that 
the 1875 measles epidemic was the determining phenomenon of Nineteenth Century 
Fiji History, is particularly pertinent.113
 
The 1876 war was precipitated by a number of other important factors. First, there 
was the decision by the Wesleyan mission to send a teacher, Asela Seru, to Beimana 
in the heartland of Colo West in 1874. While he was tolerated, his presence also 
provoked a lot of tension. In a letter he wrote to the governor in November 1875, 
Walter Carew reported that in his meetings with villagers in the interior, they had 
indicated that “religion is the only thing they hate and fear”.114 As the go-between for 
all concerned parties, Carew was now conducting, on foot, extensive shuttle 
diplomacy in the Colo region to keep hostilities in check. To this end he advised 
ordained ministers based in Cuvu (traditional seat of the Nadroga Kalevu) “to leave 
the people to themselves for a while, and not to attempt to push Christianity upon 
them against their wish”.115
 
But religion was only one part of a complex and intricate web of issues in which local 
and regional politics also played an essential role. The ambitions of Nadroga form the 
second important factor which precipitated the war. Esala Seru’s banishment to the 
coast (at Vatukarasa) in the wake of the measles epidemic, furnished Colo’s coastal 
adversaries with a pretext to press their claims inland. When Colo prisoners of war 
were interrogated about their motives for going to war, they replied that if the lotu 
was the principal cause, the taunting of the Nadrogans to “convert or fight”, was a 
close second.116 Ever since the buccaneering days of Ratu Kini Nanovo, a fragile 
peace had prevailed between the coastal province of Nadroga and the districts 
immediately inland from the mouth of the Sigatoka. Evidence of friction between the 
two had already come to the attention of officials in early 1874 when fearing for his 
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life, the new Kalevu of Nadroga Ratu Luke Nakulanikoro, had refused to accompany 
the touring Goodenough-Layard Commission up the river.117
 
The situation in 1876 was somewhat different. The British were, at least nominally, in 
charge. The Kalevu of Nadroga had been rewarded for his loyalty with the position of 
Roko Tui Nadroga (provincial commissioner) in the colonial administration, measles 
had weakened the interior, and Christianity had again become a convenient 
justification for waging war inland. Nadroga was gaining ascendancy and a gaudiness 
to match. Carew had nothing pleasant to say about Nadroga in the first few months of 
1876: “They keep me fully occupied, and I have had to write very long and very plain 
letters to them, both officially and privately; and if they do not improve their 
behaviour I shall be compelled to ask your Excellency to dismiss the native 
magistrate, or even to take him to Bau for a while.”118 The stakes were high, 
including ownership of the Sigatoka valley’s fertile tracts of land. 
 
Thirdly, the planters formed another interested party and had their eyes firmly 
focussed on the land for as most knew, the Sigatoka river district comprised without 
doubt “the most valuable portion of Fiji, both soil and climate being everything to be 
wished for”.119 The planters were small in number, isolated, and lived a risky life in a 
potentially dangerous environment. As such they had reason to be fearful and some 
were the unfortunate victims of aggression. In Nadroga, however they were often its 
instigators. Like their adversaries in Colo and their friends on the coast, the planters 
were never just on the fringe of the conflict. They were an important constitutive part 
of it. Neither were they a homogenous group. Some planters were cohabiting very 
well and were respected by Kai Colo for their hard work and friendly character. 
However, such bonds were rare and greatly overshadowed by suspicion and 
increasing hostility.120
 
Soon after arriving in June 1875 Gordon met one of the Nadroga planters settled on 
the coast between Korotogo and Cuvu. The man, Cowen, informed him that villagers 
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from the mouth of the Sigatoka River were going to give trouble. Gordon had then 
remarked that even if it was so, the planter “clearly wishes it, and he and others may 
do much to render a collision inevitable”.121 Two months later Carew reported from 
Cuvu that “Page and others who will not leave the natives alone are animated by the 
sole desire to bring matters to a crisis”.122 As part of their taunts, planters told their 
rivals that, 
 
… annexation had abolished their laws and customs; that their laws for 
transmission of property no longer existed; that their cherished habits had 
become illegal; that their lands were now property of the Crown; and that they 
were now expected, even required, to labour on white men’s plantations.123
 
Such reports were intended, as the administration believed, “to compel government to 
send an expedition into the interior, for the capture of the inhabitants and the 
confiscation of their lands”.124 Planters claimed that the government was on their side 
and told villagers that it would come to make war on them. Fearing the worst, the 
lower half of the Sigatoka valley responded by uniting and preparing itself for war. In 
October 1875, war-painted inhabitants of Tavuni village intercepted Page’s steamer 
suspecting it to be moving upstream with a war party. A few days later Captain 
Stevens,125 commanding officer of the HMS Barracouta, moved his man-of-war into 
the area. This act of intimidation had been executed at the behest of one of the 
planters and prompted an immediate rebuke by the government. This unauthorised 
interference, the governor complained, was calculated to frustrate the administration’s 
plans to permanently pacify the districts. It encouraged “coastal natives and hostile 
whites” and made it “difficult if not impossible to restrain them from an attack on the 
mountaineers”.126 Near Korotogo, the American Meader who was illegally occupying 
Conua land, was shooting at Kai Conua. Another planter, Byrnes, was making 
accusations against Kai Conua about the theft of hundreds of his goats, which were 
proven upon investigation to be without substance.127
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 Fourthly, and coinciding with this escalation of hostilities, was the visit to the interior 
by the Lands Commissioner. His presence only heightened the suspicions and anxiety 
of the Kai Colo and Carew was forced to make another emergency visit to the interior 
to explain the motives of the commission in terms that would reassure the people. 
Carew made it known to Kai Colo that he intended to take  
 
a number of officers into the interior, and there establish a government village; 
that it would not be a white man’s affair, nor a Bau man’s camp, nor a camp of 
sea-coast people, but that I should ask all the tribes to give me some young 
men to be trained as officers with the others, and … that I was the enemy of 
oppression in all its forms.128
 
He also promised them that they would not be forced to pay taxes and that those who 
tried to force Christianity on them would be punished. He had also been given the 
authority by Gordon to inform Colo chiefs and people that the government intended to 
protect their rights to land, that no “white man” would be allowed to buy land except 
through the government and then only if it was clearly the wish and interest of the 
indigenous proprietors.129 This placed the government at considerable variance with 
the immediate objectives of the planters. 
 
The fifth immediate reason for the deterioration of relations was the arrival of a 
detachment of sixty armed native policemen (mainly from the coastal districts of Ba, 
Nadi and Nadroga) in November at Cuvu, home of their traditional Nadroga enemy. 
The interior villages were immediately unsettled and Carew was furious. He pleaded 
with Gordon to have the contingent returned to Levuka. Gordon however, believed 
that properly handled, the police would be “a great civilising and educational 
instrument” and declined Carew’s request.130 This latest development forced Carew 
into further shuttle diplomacy. Ironically, as his life had become “of essential value to 
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the state,”131 the actions of the state made his own position inland increasingly 
precarious. 
 
Amidst these conflicting agendas and mounting tension, the Kai Colo were 
themselves engaged in deliberations about how to protect themselves. Numerous 
meetings were taking place up and down the country attended by delegates from as far 
north as Cawanisa (near Tavua) and as far south as Naqalimare (near Sigatoka). In 
some districts, the meetings were so regular and protracted that some of the villages 
were running out of food.132 These gatherings helped foment among them a sense of 
belonging to a unified entity. In years past, some of these districts had been rivals in 
wars waged within the interior. They certainly came with different grievances, 
preoccupations and experiences with the world beyond their borders. But they also 
shared a common heritage and a similar desire to preserve it, and hold off common 
adversaries. The regularity of the gatherings also improved the already extensive and 
sophisticated network of communication that would be necessary for a successful 
operation in such an extensive and often rugged terrain. 
 
The meetings generated considerable debate over issues of policy and tactic. While 
several tribes were inclined to preserve peace and favoured a wait-and-see approach 
(such as Beimana), an increasing number of leaders took a more militant position. 
Chief Nabisiki of Driodrio near Namoli in the district of Noikoro, was one of the 
leaders urging intervention. In anticipation of open warfare, he had been training his 
‘sotia’ in imitation of the police for the past two years133 and was said to be ready for 
action. Large food rations and stockpiles of ammunition and muskets were collected 
and stored in strategically located caves. Messages were sent to potential allies in 
Wainimala to keep escape routes open to the east in case of defeat. After much 
thought, consultation and planning over the risk of engaging foreign intrusion, it was 
agreed that Colo would protect itself by all means other than force. Colo would 
defend itself, but it would not fire first.134
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In anticipation of further trouble, the Legislative Council had passed on September 8 
1875, the Peace and Good Order Ordinance which provided for the deportation of 
anyone from any district if necessary by force. Its deterrent effect was negligible, and 
Carew was forced to advise Gordon that a meeting would soon be needed to defuse 
the situation: 
 
I have the honour to state to Your Excellency my firm conviction that great 
trouble will shortly arise in the section of the Colony represented by the hill 
tribes of Serua and Nadroga, unless action be at once taken in the matter; … I 
further take upon myself the liberty of suggesting to Your Excellency the 
advisability of calling a meeting of the hills tribes of Nadroga and Serua as 
soon as convenient.135
 
This meeting was eventually convened at Navola on the Serua Coast on the 4th and 5th 
of January 1876. Gordon himself addressed the meeting and laid down the law. While 
he promised that Christianity would not be imposed and that taxes would not initially 
be levied, he also declared his intention to establish a police camp in the interior and 
confirmed the appointment of a person (Carew) to rule over the interior.136 In a rare 
admission that the disputes might be linked to the manner in which the Crown took 
possession of the islands, he added: 
 
Understand this: it is not pretended that Great Britain has conquered you, as 
though you had been taken in war, to be enslaved or carried off to other 
places. You are not a conquered people but Great Britain has joined you to her 
in order that peace might be established in the country, and for the welfare of 
all alike.137
 
It is difficult to know how this speech was received by the assembled leaders. A mere 
two days later, with hardly enough time for delegates to take the news back to their 
communities, Carew and a detachment of 140 armed policemen made their way from 
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Cuvu to Nadi and then thirty-six miles into the centre of the island to the area’s only 
government aligned village, Nasaucoko.138
 
In the wake of this deployment, the shortcomings of the Navola meeting became 
immediately apparent. Kolikoli, chief of Beimana, informed Carew on his arrival in 
Nasaucoko that his force would be met head on if they persisted in marching further 
inland.139 The police detachment was perceived in Colo as an armed invasion and 
Carew as its head was no longer welcomed. In a message to the Roko Tui Nadroga, 
one of the chiefs exclaimed: 
 
Behold, now I see and know that you are bad minded toward us, and therefore 
gave us to a whiteman. You mean war; or why is it that soldiers have gone up 
to the waters of Nasaucoko? It is now a clear thing that you hate us.140
 
Navola had failed because almost all tribes north of the line from Beimana had 
boycotted the meeting. The villages of Wala and Waibasaga in Naqaqa which had 
broken rank to attend the meeting had instantly become targets of harassment. The 
other Naqaqa tribes were not Christian. They had not attended the Navuso meeting 
and they had never submitted to a coastal chief let alone a foreign power. They were 
aware of land claims made against them and their neighbours and felt confident in 
their military capability to defend themselves. 
 
The people of Noikoro too were angry that the chief of Navola, Manumanunivudi had 
claimed at the meeting to be their representative and that he was speaking on their 
behalf. They considered themselves an independent vanua and regarded 
Manumanunivudi’s claim to be deeply offensive. Most of the tribes represented at the 
meeting were from the lower Sigatoka valley. But even amongst them there was 
discontent with the meeting. The Conua people were vexed at being placed under the 
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management of their bitter Nadroga enemies. Like Noikoro and the people of so many 
other Colo districts, they considered themselves as independent vanua.141 And as 
always, they were wary of Nadroga’s political and Christian ambitions in the area. 
The Navola meeting did not therefore, as colonial officials had hoped, resolve 
anything. This was due in large part to the rapidity and manner in which the armed 
constabulary was despatched into the interior and a month after the meeting, Gordon 
conceded that the establishment of the camp at Nasaucoko had been premature.142
 
The official purpose for the camp had been to exercise moral influence in the area, 
“partly to encourage and protect the well-disposed, and partly to overawe their 
neighbours”.143 Instead it caused panic. “The enemy were in such force” wrote 
Carew, and were “so excited by the sudden and unexpected nature of our arrival” that 
we could “have commenced a war”. Obviously nervous about the effect created by the 
presence of the force Carew alerted Gordon that their arrival had thrown “the whole 
of this part of the interior, consisting 150 villages, into the greatest consternation, and 
I consider it almost certain that they will, in a spirit of desperation, make a combined 
attack on us in our camp”.144 Carew was also concerned about the comportment of the 
armed constabulary. Captain Olive and his men seemed to understood their mission as 
one of making war. In this respect, the men from Lau and Cakaudrove were said to be 
particularly impatient.145 Their demeanour would not have been lost on Colo warriors. 
Ordinary men and women too were said to be agitated fearing that they would be 
removed in the same way that their neighbours from Magodro and Sabeto had been 
three years earlier.146
 
Staying true to their pledge not to fire first, the Kai Colo continued to hold meetings. 
They kept communication lines open with Carew and his force at Nasaucoko largely 
through the intermediary of women. He was informed for instance that “the whole of 
the tribes from Nabutautau to the mouth of the Sigatoka were assembling a great 
force” and that if they proceeded further, they would be cut off from the coast.147 The 
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garrison had effectively been surrounded and the food supplies cut. To make matters 
worse for them, the cash that colonial officials had brought for trading purposes had 
no value inland and negated any opportunity they may have had to bargain themselves 
out of starvation. In these early days of attrition, the resolve and organisation of Colo 
seemed to gain ascendancy over the confusion and disarray which prevailed in the 
colonial camp. The first victim of this war of nerves was Captain Olive who after a 
close encounter with Kai Colo and severe rebukes by Carew and Gordon, became 
mentally unstable and was ordered back to Levuka for stress leave. 
 
Carew’s response to the siege was to continue with a policy of prudent diplomacy and 
“to proceed most carefully and slowly for a considerable time”. His proficiency in the 
language, his appreciation and familiarity with the culture, and his close friendships 
with many Kai Colo had engendered in him an untypical degree of admiration for 
them. From the confines of the camp, he wrote to Gordon, “I myself respect these 
men for their daring, their activity, and love of freedom, and hospitality to those they 
do not suspect of being connected with their enemies”.148 Carew was determined to 
hold out against the now incessant and increasingly impetuous calls from the coast to 
launch an all out war. “Our policy is a waiting one”, he wrote. “The outside world in 
Fiji cannot understand any other than a fighting policy, and reckless running here and 
there, and blazing off of guns, etc.”149 He too chose to communicate with loyal and 
enemy towns “in a most round-about manner with the agency of women”.150 He also 
used the intelligence of Fijian mission teachers stationed on the fringe of unsettled 
districts to find out about the true allegiance of chiefs. 
 
At this point, far from being formidable in its organisation or acting as an all-
knowing, all conquering, and all-powerful machine, colonialism in Fiji appeared 
fragile, vulnerable, and quite susceptible to attacks from disaffected quarters of the 
population. In addition, and despite Carew’s presence, the administration’s knowledge 
of the interior was at best patchy (see the adjoined map by Arthur J. Gordon). 
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 Key 
April 12    Position of villages first burnt April 12. 
April 17    Position of villages burnt by Sigatoka highlanders April 17. 
April 20  ########  Position of villages burnt by Naqaqa heathen. 
April 22                    Position of heathen villages burnt by Roko Tui Nadroga. 
April 22  +++++++  Position of heathen villages burnt from camp at Nasaucoko. 
 
Map 7: Arthur J. Gordon’s map of the war area.151
 
Gordon could not count on much military support either. Gordon also had to contend 
with dissention from within his own ranks. Colonel Pratt who commanded a small 
force of royal engineers (about twenty men) preferred to see the conflict spread so that 
there would be more land to confiscate, and a better chance of “clearing off the 
natives”.152 In any case, the engineers were hopelessly ill-equipped and unprepared 
for this kind of conflict and would probably have been defeated. Pratt refused Gordon 
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the services of his men to serve in battle (at least until reinforcements could be 
secured from other colonies), and it became increasingly evident that the government 
would rely extensively on the goodwill and support of local allies first for its survival 
and later, for its success.153
 
Probably unaware of their opponents’ own frailties and limitations, Kai Colo 
continued their deliberations about the most expedient and effective means of 
negotiating a resolution to the immediate crisis created by the establishment of the 
Nasaucoko camp. Two broad camps emerged from these discussions. Kolikoli, chief 
of Beimana remained steadfastly committed to the pledges he had taken at Navuso 
and Navola. Rabalabala of Koroinasau and Vakayavanuku, the newly appointed Buli 
(district officer) of Vatukarasa (Serua coast) seemed keen to back the new colonial 
order. For them, cooperation was probably the most effective way of retaining some 
power and autonomy. But these men must also have realised the danger that a 
substantial military confrontation and a potential defeat would pose for the well-being 
of their people. With such motives in mind and a sense of urgency to avert an open 
war, these chiefs initiated meetings of their own. The last of these was held at the end 
of March at 1876 at Vatukarasa.154 Neither side managed to persuade the other of the 
soundness and sensibility of its position and the impasse continued. 
 
The opposing faction took a much more militant stance on the violation of Colo 
space. Its position was further hardened by the arrival in mid-February of 
reinforcements at the Nasaucoko camp followed by reports that a number of “whites” 
had “come to Nadroga to make war”.155 A month later, a state of emergency was 
proclaimed for the provinces of Namosi, Serua, and Nadroga and the districts of 
Vuda, Nadi, Veitoga, Nadrau, Nalawa, Nailega, Matailobau, Nadawarau, Soloira, and 
Navunaqumu except those areas situated within two miles of the coast.156 This 
measure effectively suspended the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and restricted all 
movement in and out of interior districts. In their combined effect, these 
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developments rendered the conciliatory position less defendable and the militant 
stance more justifiable. 
 
Gaining prominence at the head of the anti-lotu and anti-government movement was 
Mudu, chief of Naicobocobo in the Naqalimare district of the lower Sigatoka Valley. 
With the support of Nabisiki, Nagusudradra (a prominent chief of Matawalu in 
Naqaqa district east of Nasaucoko157), Nauluniqili158 (also of Naqalimare), 
Nagusulevu chief of Nadrala (lower Sigatoka), Reba (of Navunasoni) and several 
chiefs from Tavuni (lower Sigatoka), Mudu persuaded other disaffected tribes that the 
time had come to meet force with force, to drive the police out, and remove the 
governor’s commissioner from their territory. Joining forces with them was the 
intractable village of Nabutautau. Gordon claims that the village had become a haven 
for refugees from previous conflicts and several fugitives from the law, and that 
consequently the village was bound to instigate trouble.159 While there may be some 
truth in this observation, it is also possible that such comments were intended to 
discredit Nabutautau’s long history of fiercely guarded independence. 
 
That this movement was gaining a significant following is confirmed by reports that 
government employees including a member of the armed constabulary and a senior 
government official (or Buli) had defected and joined ranks with Colo. From the 
lower Sigatoka Valley, through Naqaqa in the centre, and eastwards to Noikoro, large 
bands of men were practising kalou rere, described by a nervous missionary as “a 
process by which they are supposed to become as invulnerable as Achilles”.160 By the 
first week of April, the district of Beimana had switched its allegiance and the people 
had become impatient with Kolikoli’s persistent efforts to work with the government. 
They declared that “they, the people, are rulers, and not the chiefs, who are only 
                                                 
157 Nagusudradra had already made his position known on the second day after the colonial force’s 
arrival at Nasaucoko by offering Carew and his troops a whale’s tooth and begging them not to venture 
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158 Mudu and Nauluniqili had been at Navuso but had been annoyed by the display of twelve-pound 
rocket practice at the meeting, saying that the Government had tried to frighten them. Carew to 
Gordon, 16 January 1876. Letters and Notes, I: 6. 
159 Gordon, Letters and Notes, I: xi. 
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appointed to carry out the public will”.161 In a despatch sent on April 2, Carew 
explained to Gordon that the Kai Colo would rather go to prison than surrender their 
independence.162 Matters had finally come to a head. 
 
Hence before the onset of the war, resistance in Fiji manifested itself through multiple 
points of engagement with power. In its build up, resistance was not exerted against 
colonialism per se. Rather it came from various deployments of power by rival tribal 
groups with a long prior history of enmity, the threat posed by religious incursions, 
and the unpleasant experience of tax and labour. It also came from the autonomic 
status of the polities and their desire to protect territory from the designs of foreigners 
(both local and foreign). The failure of a long process of negotiation indicates that 
both sides were willing to reconcile their differences before the onset of a major 
conflict but that both were confident of winning the war if hostilities were to begin. 
The perception that the measles epidemic was a sign of the treacherous intentions of 
the new administration only aggravated the situation. It also shows that colonial 
power was fragmented, keen to impose its will and yet limited in its capacity to do so, 
sensitive to local welfare yet guilty of important errors of judgement, heavily 
dependent on the support of coastal chiefs and yet often at odds with the interests of 
other European allies. 
 
The 1876 War 
 
On April 10 1876, Kolikoli was again visited by Mudu and Nauluniqili and asked to 
join a planned attack on Vunarosawa, the outpost town of the Koroba district. Finding 
himself caught in a dangerous tug of war, and torn between his fear of Nadroga, his 
loyalty to the government, and his kinship ties with his Colo brethren, the old chief 
opted for a retreat into neutrality. He refused Mudu’s overtures to join the fight just as 
he had declined Carew’s offer to send government soldiers to Beimana for his own 
protection. Several hesitant villages on the fringe of the conflict, particularly in the 
upper Wainimala and certain areas of Noikoro, also remained undecided and opted for 
caution. They were torn by their fear of government, their sense of political 
pragmatism, and their sympathy and obligations to their relatives and traditional 
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trading partners. The struggle was delicately poised and many adopted the safety of a 






Map 8: Map of Colo villages and vanua involved in the 1876 war. 
 
All evidence indicates that armed hostilities began on April 12 1876 with a combined 
Colo attack on eight small Christian villages around the Mount Koroba area on the 
Nadi-Nadroga border. Having secured control over the area west of Nasaucoko, the 
Colo forces effectively surrounded the colonial garrison. But while Carew was in 
hourly expectation of an attack in the next few days,163 the Colo force seemed 
satisfied with the neutralising effects of the encirclement. In the meantime it pursued 
other more pressing objectives. Among those was the town of Burua which, had it 
fallen, would have delivered the entire coast between Cuvu and Nadi to the Colo 
force. In the event, Ratu Navula (Buli of Nadi and in charge of the defence of the 
town) sent a whale’s tooth to the Kalevu (Ratu Luke) asking him for assistance.164 
The town held out and the Colo army was forced to direct its next move to the village 
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of Nadromai, a mere four miles from Cuvu. In customary fashion a herald was sent to 




Map 9: Map of the 1876 general war area. 
 
As a front was established to Nadroga’s north on April 17 with the attack on 
Nadromai, another was opened simultaneously to the east with a large-scale assault on 
Batiri villages (see maps 7 and 8). These villages were all located on the east bank of 
the Sigatoka River south of Tavuni and eastwards along the coast to Korotogo. The 
Colo warriors all came from the neighbouring villages of Tavuni, Nadrala, Nokonoko, 
                                                 
165 For a description of the attack see Knollys to Carew, 29 April 1876. Carew Papers. 
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Vatuvoko, Nakasaleka, Koroivatuma and Bukutia. In the same fashion as those of 
Koroba, all Christian villages in the area were burnt. However, a number of women 
(about four in total) and a child who had failed to evacuate in time were caught in the 
mayhem and killed. All other women and children had already been moved to safer 
places on the west bank of the river. Reports indicate that two Nadroga men, and five 
“devils” died in the fighting but the figure is likely to be a little higher. Estimates of 
people killed on the Nadroga side during this attack vary from six to twenty.166 The 
nature of the raid suggests that coastal villages were waiting, prepared and ready for 
the assault. 
 
These attacks by Colo forces were widely described by colonial officials as 
treacherous, savage, destructive, and disorderly. Such representations reflect the 
authority and power of the forces that controlled the process by which “savage” and 
“savagery” were defined. Contrary to popular belief, these were not wholesale 
slaughters followed by rowdy cannibal feasts. The target villages had been warned of 
the attack and evacuated accordingly. In the attacks on the Koroba villages only two 
deaths were reported. They occurred in the village of Nawaqa just two miles north-
west of Nasaucoko. These were deliberate strikes on villages deemed to be aligned 
with the lotu. They were calculated to stop the advances of Christian, coastal, settler, 
and colonial interests in the area and the threats to the territorial, political, and 
religious independence of Colo, that they posed. The attacks on Koroba permitted 
Colo to cut the camp from its main communication, supply, and escape routes to the 
Nadi coast. It is significant that the people from surrounding villages who had profited 
from a brisk trade with the camp before the beginning of the war were merely turned 
away by Colo soldiers. No unnecessary force seems to have been used there. The 
evidently pre-concerted arrangement to attack Nadromai and the Batiri towns 
simultaneously was probably intended to cordon off the area and severely restrict the 
movement of the Kalevu and his forces. 
 
The counter-offensive, however, was swift and decisive. The very next day (18 April), 
Ratu Luke Nakulanikoro (the Kalevu) led his forces on a drive up the eastern bank of 
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the river and forced Colo soldiers into Tavuni Fort. The size and speed of the response 
suggests that the Nadroga force had been expecting and preparing for war for a 
considerable time. Tavuni Fort was quickly taken as were the towns of Nadrala (20th 
April) and Nokonoko (on the west bank). These were the same villages that his father 
Ratu Kini Nanovo had tried to conquer a few years earlier. The towns were promptly 
burnt forcing the Colo army to withdraw and regroup at the Naqalimare strongholds 
of Bukutia and Koroivatuma. Three days later, the Nadroga force retired to the coast. 
 
On April 24, a third front opened in the centre of the island at Tatuba (one of only two 
pro-government villages in Naqaqa), where the tribes of Wairoro, Nabutautau, and 
Naqaqa had assembled a large force intent on forcing any last remaining dissenting 
villages to join the fight. Tatuba was always likely to be a flashpoint after breaking 
covenant in January and participating in the Navola meeting. Reports indicate that 
three Tatuba men died in the ensuing clash, although no details are available of 
casualties on the Colo side. This incident provided the colonial force at Nasaucoko 
with a reason to intervene in the conflict. A detachment was sent to Tatuba and the 
other besieged village of Wala, with instructions to secure the villages and drive the 
mountaineers out. The expedition came back triumphantly two days later claiming to 
have burnt two Colo villages, killed Nabisiki, and secured Tatuba and Wala. Carew 
reported somewhat victoriously that “these savages have now received such a severe 
check upon the head of the river to the mouth, that I believe they will no longer be 
able to act on the offensive”.167 Carew’s enthusiasm was premature. Nabisiki was not 
dead. He was in fact preparing a march to Vatumali (a few miles from Nasaucoko) 
from Waibasaga, one of the villages supposedly burnt by government soldiers. 
 
There would be several other such reports during the war claiming the defeat of Colo 
forces and their impending demise. But the government was continuously overrating 
its efficacy and calculating its success by the number of villages it was burning.168 
But most villages attacked and burnt by the colonial force were already empty when 
the soldiers moved in. In the initial stages of the war therefore, very few Kai Colo 
were caught. They were fighting a guerrilla war. After the destruction of their village 
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bases, they would disperse and reconvene in other locations from where they would 
regroup, recover and launch more counter-attacks. As always, a prime consideration 
for them was to minimise the loss of life. In fact, the war was likened to a huge game 
of hide and seek169 in which thorough knowledge of the terrain gave the Colo force a 
slight edge over their opponents. 
 
By the end of April, the Governor had sent his aide de camp, Arthur J. Gordon, to 
Cuvu with instructions to oversee military operations from the Nadroga coast and to 
restrain the Kalevu and his apparently overzealous force from excessive military 
engagement with the enemy. By then however, the Kalevu and his allies were firmly 
in control of the situation. Ratu Luke had sent tabua to his allies in Serua, Namosi, 
and Nadi and had amassed a considerable force of auxiliaries capable of undertaking a 
war without the supervision of the young and inexperienced A. J. Gordon. This war 
would be fought over local issues on Fijian terms and Gordon’s command over the 
southern campaign was never more than nominal. 
 
The initiatives taken by coastal chiefs in the south were to prove fortuitous for the 
colonial administration. They had mustered a sizeable army at no cost to the cash-
strapped government. All 1200 men of the southern army gave their aid as feudal 
services, neither receiving nor expecting pay. Thirty-two pounds and ten shillings was 
all Gordon had to find to pay for the wages of Arthur J. Gordon’s twenty 
bodyguards.170 The chiefs of the southern coast also disposed of more knowledge and 
intelligence about the terrain and were better acquainted with the tactics and stratagem 
of the enemy than colonial troops could ever be. 
 
Weakened by the withdrawal of Pratt’s support, the Governor chose to place his faith 
in the hands of his local allies. He ordered each province to supply thirty men to 
reinforce the war campaign. This, he thought, would get the whole country involved 
in the suppression and avoid giving it the appearance of a conflict between whites and 
blacks.171 An enemy of the state was thus successfully converted into an enemy of the 
‘nation’. Fijian leadership and participation played an essential role in this process 
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and allowed Gordon to fight a short, cheap and successful war in Colo.172 The 
campaign was also plagued from the beginning by differences of opinion and clashes 
of personality among the handful of British officials who presided over the 
operations. The most senior of these officers, Captain Knollys, had the embarrassment 
of having his own guide (Black Brown) apprehended by Ratu Luke for supplying 
powder to the enemy.173 Progress on the battlefield was also slowed because in spite 
of their success, Fijian officers were rarely trusted by their British superiors. In the 
end however, all key battles were won through the astuteness of these Fijian chiefs. 
They saved the governor from certain embarrassment and the likelihood of a serious 
reprimand.174
 
The month of May brought more volatility and insecurity to the regions directly 
affected by the war. Walking along the western edge of the conflict on the track from 
Nadi to Cuvu, Gordon noticed several burning villages in the distance. He also 
observed that the friendly villages in which he slept had been stripped of their able-
bodied men,175 causing increasing social and economic disruption and apprehension. 
By mid May, the Colo blockade of Nasaucoko had become so effective that the camp 
had exhausted its food supply. Facing certain starvation, the new commander of the 
garrison, Captain Knollys, ordered raids deep in enemy country not so much to fight 
but to plunder gardens. The little that his troops found suggests that both sides were 
beginning to feel the costly effects of war. In Naqalimare, villagers were busy 
fortifying their positions with palisades and earthworks, and securing provisions in 
anticipation of a long drawn out struggle.176 Clearly, the Colo army was much better 
organised and coordinated than the colonial administration had presumed. Mudu and 
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Nabisiki were proving to be more talented strategists than it had been prepared to 
admit and Gordon was forced into offering a reward for their apprehension: 
 
It might not improbably result in their being killed, which would be a good 
riddance, but it might possibly lead to their being taken alive, which I should 
much prefer, for the act of their being tried and hanged, as they probably 
would be, would strike infinitely more terror than their being knocked on the 
head in a scrimmage.177
 
In the coastal villages of Nadroga and Serua, the cost of providing for accommodation 
and food for an army of such a size, placed a huge burden on the labour and resources 
of these host communities. This perhaps more than a desire to conquer was the factor 
that led Ratu Luke to take matters into his own hands and to launch a major offensive. 
 
The southern force had established a camp about ten miles up the Sigatoka River at 
Navalili. The force consisted of more than a thousand fighting men under the 
leadership of Ratu Luke Nakulanikoro. Also there to lend a hand were the Buli of 
Serua Ratu Kinijaoti Qaqabokola, and Ratu Matanitobua the Roko Tui of Namosi. 
There were also small detachments from the islands of Malolo and Vatulele, and a 
number of men from Koroinasau commanded by chief Rabalabala. On May 31st, 
Serua soldiers intercepted a warring party from Naqalimare intent on attacking the 
Navalili camp. They were beaten off and a “noted priestess and fighting woman of the 
Qalimari tribe” was killed along with a number of other Kai Colo.178 While Colo 
soldiers retreated, the Nadroga force launched an all out assault on the towns of 
Bukutia and Koroivatuma. By the 8th of June, both towns had been destroyed and the 
fugitives including many women and children had found refuge at the impregnable 
Matanavatu marble rock fortress near Toga. 
 
The fortress contained an extensive labyrinth of caves, fresh water, food provisions to 
last several months,179 and a large stock of knives, axes, muskets and ammunition. 
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Both sides thought it unassailable with the Colo army determined to hold out and 
outlast their foes. However, on the 17th of June, a lapse of vigilance by Colo sentries 
allowed Ratu Luke the break he needed to secure the entrance of the main cave. After 
a brief battle in which thirty eight Colo men were killed (and two on the government 
side) the rest of the occupants surrendered.180 Late on the scene and surprised by the 
speed of the capture, Arthur J. Gordon wrote that the number who turned out of the 
caves was almost equal to that of the government force (about 1200). Some were from 
as far away as Nabutautau.181
 
The taking of Matanavatu was a turning point in the war because although most of the 
Colo army managed to escape they did so in disarray. Those who fled were too 
demoralised, dispersed, and hungry, and no longer capable of mounting further 
substantial resistance. But rather than surrender to their Nadroga rivals, they ran 
towards the Nadi border where as they hoped they were captured by Nadi forces and 
taken to Burua. Thus deprived of their prize, the enraged Nadroga soldiers burnt Nadi 
gardens on their way back to Cuvu.182 By June 24th, the whole area south of Beimana 
had been taken. Severe retribution followed the fall of southern Colo. In its sweep 
northwards, the southern army left a long trail of villages plundered and burnt. Every 
single village great or small had been reduced to ashes.183 Mudu, the principal leaders 
of other southern Colo tribes, about eight hundred other prisoners, together with some 
two hundred muskets had fallen into government hands.184
 
The sudden and unexpected success of the southern army rendered the position of 
Naqaqa, Noikoro and Navatusila tribes immediately more perilous. The government 
had opened a new front in Nadrau a few miles north of Nabutautau with a contingent 
of more than 500 men under the leadership of Captain Knollys (who had been 
relieved in Nasaucoko by Le Hunte) and Ratu Navolioni Vuki, the Bauan Roko Tui of 
Ba. Most of the men were members of the trained and drilled police force encamped 
at Nasaucoko, and had been replaced there mainly by reinforcements from the eastern 
islands of Kadavu, Lau and Cakaudrove. Immediately after settling into Nadrau, word 
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had been sent to Nabutautau to surrender. In the south, several Noikoro villages had 
sensed the tide turning and sent word to Carew that they wished to soro.185 The loss 
of these allies further weakened the alliance of Colo tribes. The diplomatic efforts of 
Carew were also bearing fruit to the east. The border towns of Wainimala had adopted 
a neutral position at the beginning of the conflict. Now they formed a major obstacle 
for Kai Colo attempting to escape east.186 Surreptitiously of course, they hoped to be 
rewarded by having the government extend their influence over the neighbouring but 
disobedient Noikoro tribes. With Nasaucoko completing the encirclement of the 
interior by guarding escape routes to the west, Nabisiki and his allies were effectively 
trapped between Beimana in the south-west and Nadrau in the north-east. 
 
Confronted by such odds, many insurgents chose to tempt an escape east to 
Wainimala and north-west to Sabeto. Many others chose to remain in the area in small 
less detectable groups, hoping to survive through evasion. Among them were several 
leaders including Nabisiki and Nagusudradra who were both finally captured in mid-
July. Some others determined to defy the government until the end, chose to remain in 
their villages. In this manner, entire villages with stocks of food prepared to last for 
several weeks, journeyed across the hills to seek shelter in remote caves. For instance, 
when the government force stormed Nabutautau on July 2nd, it had already been 
evacuated. It took the government a month to finally locate these people and their 
hideouts. On the 16th of July, a report was received that an entire Naqaqa tribe was 
hiding in the Lobo ni Koro caves. After a siege of two days and two nights, the 
occupants were enticed out. Had they been aware that the government’s stock of 
ammunition at Levuka was exhausted a week earlier,187 they might not have 
surrendered so easily. They had large supplies of yam, ample fresh water fifty-six 
guns and plenty of ammunition.188 The last battle took place ten days later in the 
northern district of Nacawanisa where at the Nanuwai caves, Nasaqanivere, a deserter 
from the armed constabulary, led the last Colo stand. After a week of obstinate 
defence involving many clashes, several losses on both sides, some trickery, some 
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negotiation and even aural torture, the last remaining mountaineers gave themselves 
up. 
 
Most captured Colo men from this latter half of the conflict were marched to Ba. The 
principal leaders however, were taken to Vatula where the Governor himself was 
preparing charges and a trial against them. He had done the same at Nasigatoka on the 
29th of June. On that occasion, thirty-seven prisoners had been tried with fourteen of 
them receiving the death sentence.189 The next day, those found guilty of treason and 
the Batiri murders were hanged at one end of the rara while the others were shot in 
the middle of the ground. Mudu was one of the latter though he resisted until the end 
by running up and down the ground and urging his comrades to do the same. He was 
wounded first before a shot to the head finally killed him.190 The bodies were buried 
in three graves, Mudu’s in a mat. There was one escape during the night when 
Tabuarua, a professional poisoner, managed to free himself, but he was later 
recaptured in Naqaqa and shot by firing squad in Nasaucoko. These executions were 
not only necessary to eliminate the threat that these men posed as military adversaries. 
The men also represented a challenge to the legitimacy of the colonial administration 
as the new arbiter of power in Fijian affairs. This challenge needed to be eradicated 
publicly as a demonstration of the new government’s capability and determination to 
quell any other rising. 
 
Seventy men were tried at Vatula. Eighteen received the death penalty but twelve had 
their sentences commuted including Nagusudradra who was later re-instated as chief 
of Matawalu.191 The other six were executed in the village on the 4th of August 
including Nabisiki who was shot on August 8th allegedly while trying to escape. 
Nabisiki’s escape would have been fortuitous for Gordon was struggling to find the 
necessary evidence against him to impose the death penalty.192 Nasaqanivere was also 
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among those executed.193 Others were rounded up over the next two months, tried and 
executed on two separate occasions at Nasaucoko.194 In response to calls for 
clemency (particularly from William Macgregor and David Wilkinson),195 Gordon 
justified his decision by arguing that these executions were exemplary punishment 
needed to secure “future good behaviour” of others. This very public display of force 
would “strike terror” among the people by making an example of the leaders. It would 
be more efficacious than to pursue a policy of deporting entire tribes as was the 
practice under the former Cakobau administration.196
 
Gordon also had a few of the more dangerous prisoners deported outside of Viti Levu 
under the Peace and Good Order Ordinance of 1875. About 120 others were 
sentenced to hard labour on public works for periods ranging from two to five years. 
The rest were allowed to return to their districts. However, all persons whose villages 
were situated on hills or in positions difficult of access were prohibited from returning 
and they were ordered instead to build new villages in more accessible locations. The 
military headquarters at Nasaucoko were eventually removed to Natuatuacoko (Fort 




Before he left Nasaucoko on the 14th of August, Gordon wrote one last despatch to the 
Colonial Office in London to inform them of the “entire suppression of disturbances 
in Viti Levu and restoration of order”.198 But there had always been an order in the 
interior. This was the installation of a new order, a colonial order. And these were not 
mere “disturbances”. Gordon went out of his way not to use the term “war” or any 
other term implying warfare in any his despatches. He could not call it a “war” 
because he would have had to surrender command to the military and employ Her 
                                                 
193 A total of nineteen men were condemned to death at Vatula. All except six had their sentences 
commuted. Two were hanged and four were shot by firing squad. See the August 1876 entries in 
Carew’s “Notebook”. MS 105 – 2. Carew Papers. 
194 Carew speaks of the trial of thirty-three men and the execution of seven of them in early October. 
Gordon returned later in the month to try fifteen more, pardoning three, commuting seven others to 
imprisonment, and executing five. Gordon, Records of Private and Public Life, II: 193. The trunk of 
the tree from which these men were hanged still stands today. 
195 See in particular Dr. Macgregor’s letter to Gordon, 16 July 1876. Letters and Notes, II: 173. 
196 Gordon to Macgregor, 22 July 1876. Records of Private and Public Life, II: 89. 
197 Gordon, Letters and Notes, I: xix. 
198 Despatch 124, 14 August 1876, 76/12219, CO 83/10. PRO. 
 85
Majesty’s troops at considerable expense and delay.199 It was only once the war had 
been won that he called it his “little war”. This appellation has survived into modern 
historiography as “Gordon’s Little War”.200 But neither was it ever “Gordon’s”, nor 
was it “little”. It was a war whose roots lay in the power struggles of pre-cession days 
and particularly the unresolved question of Bauan and Christian influence in the 
interior of Viti Levu. During the war itself, Colo’s opponents were variously referred 
to as the lotu (Christian), the matanitu (government) and sometimes the coast, 
reflecting the multi-layered constitution and agenda of the colonial force. It only 
became a colonial war once the government established the police post in the interior. 
Until then, colonialism had been nominal and its signs and symbols were limited to 
the occasional visit of a European official. The continuity was provided by a profound 
desire by Kai Colo to remain autonomous and a rejection of all attempts (Christian, 
Bauan, coastal, chiefly or British) to form a larger political entity in which they would 
play a subordinate part. They were Kai Colo, not Kai Viti. 
 
Kai Colo were not all united in this endeavour. Those who chose the side of colonial 
power did so with good reason. Compliance and collaboration (even when feigned) as 
opposed to armed resistance, can be the subtle means by which a degree of control 
can be retained, and desired outcomes achieved.201 There always were therefore, 
numerous players on centre stage all struggling to shape the outcome of the war. They 
came to the conflict with varying agendas, loyalties and sympathies. They fought or 
collaborated for various reasons against various forces at various times. No one single 
group therefore, could ever claim monopoly over power or agency at any time. 
 
On the basis of the evidence presented in the chapter, I am presuming that Kai Colo 
fought for the preservation of their order, their territory and resources, their people 
and the way they understood the world around them. They chose a military option to 
                                                 
199 Gordon to Carnarvon, 18 November 1876. Records of Private and Public Life, II: 225. 
200 “The story of a little war” is the subtitle of Gordon’s Letters and Notes Written During the 
Disturbances in the Highlands (Known as the “Devil Country”) of Viti Levu, Fiji. 1876. Edinburgh: 
Privately Printed by R. & R Clark, 1879. Among others who have used the term, see Brewster, 1922; 
34, 47, 67. William Morrell, Britain in the Pacific Islands. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960. 364-9; 
Scarr, 1984: 76; and Martha Kaplan and John Kelly “On Discourse and Power: ‘Cults’ and ‘Orientals’ 
in Fiji.” in American Ethnologist. 26: 4, 1999. 843-63.
201 For other Oceanic examples of this strategy, see Peter Hempenstall, Pacific Islanders Under 
German Rule: A Study in the Meaning of Colonial Resistance. Canberra: Australian National 
University Press, 1978; and Peter Hempenstall and Noel Rutherford, Protest and Dissent in the 
Colonial Pacific. Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies University of the South Pacific, 1984. 
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secure their geographical, economic, and cultural space. Their stratagem was adapted 
for Fijian warfare. In this war they faced an enemy with multiple dimension to which 
their methods of warfare proved ultimately ill-suited. Laxity in the patrol and 
surveillance of key defence positions undermined the successes achieved notably in 
guerrilla warfare. It can also be argued that Colo soldiers often surrendered 
prematurely. Yet, minimizing loss of life always seemed of primary importance in 
their engagement with the enemy. The government force itself lost relatively few 
troops. This has less to do with superior tactical ability than with the Colo protocol of 
announcing intentions to the enemy before the act. Consequently the burning of a 
village for Kai Colo was more symbolic of victory than killing a large number of its 
inhabitants. A burning village signified loss of sovereignty. Defeated occupants 
expected to lose ownership of surrounding lands and to be forced into new tributary 
relationships with their conquerors. That Colo suffered many more losses than 
government forces can be attributed partly to the fact that the armed constabulary was 
not bound by similar protocol.202 Their reputation was for reckless, violent, and vile 
behaviour. Evidently, government troops also benefited from a larger arsenal of 
weapons and numerical advantage over their Colo counterparts. 
 
For the people of Colo, the war was less about resistance than about the preservation 
of independence. It did not take place simply because of colonialism or uniquely in 
response to colonialism. It had a long prior history with many interweaving factors, 
actors, events, and locations most of which are different from those normally given 
significance by existing histories of Fiji. Cession had represented the end of an epoch 
and the beginning of a new one for most Europeans and Fijian chiefs. But for the 
people in the interior, the measles epidemic of 1875 was much more of a watershed. 
So was the war of 1876. With their leadership decimated first by measles and then by 
the war, it would take a long time for ordinary people to recover from their first 
experience of the new colonial order. The government force had left the whole Colo 
country burning – “a land wasted by fire in very truth”, as Gordon remarked upon 
leaving the interior.203 More than a thousand men and women had been displaced to 
Sigatoka and Ba to serve prison terms. Food was scarce and the land had been laid to 
                                                 
202 By the end of May, Knollys estimated Kai Colo losses to have run into the hundreds, while those of 
the Government did not reach fifty. Knollys to Carew, 29 May 1876. Carew Papers. 
203 Gordon, Record of Private and Public Life, II: 112. 
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waste. Furthermore, the draconian Ordinance XXIX of 1876, the original intention of 
which was to severely discourage movement in the “disturbed” districts and prevent 
the potential spread of the conflict to other areas of the group, now served to seal the 
area off from the rest of Fiji. Colo was divided into two (east and west) and 
effectively quarantined. Non-residents were prohibited from entering the area unless 
in possession of a pass. Most of what we know of Colo for the next few years came 
via the official reports of the all-powerful resident commissioners at the new 
government headquarters of Fort Carnarvon in Natuatuacoko (Colo West) and 
Vunidawa in Naitasiri (Colo East). It is not surprising then, that Gordon, in a letter to 
his wife, wrote that the war was “without the smallest chance of renewal”.204
 
Resistance however, did not end. Its military character had proven impracticable, even 
counter-productive. The brutal nature of this conquest certainly acted as a deterrent 
for any further overt military confrontations. Yet, military conquest can achieve only 
a certain degree of pacification. The desire of Colo people to retain control of their 
lives and destinies lived on and continued to inspire subsequent subversions of the 
new order. The war went underground where it assumed a variety of forms which are 
discussed in several of the next chapters. The nature of Colo agency was radically 
transformed by the failure of the military campaign. No longer capable of finding 
expression on its own terms, agency in Colo acquired a character much more 
concomitant with the power of the colonial establishment. In this regard, Nicholas 
Thomas has argued that Gordon’s colonial style was not militaristic. Rather it was 
expressed through knowledge, vision and regulation.205 This is precisely the 
manifestation that the most consequential of rebellious movements within and outside 
Colo would take in the future. 
                                                 
204 Gordon to Lady Gordon, 11 August 1876. Letters and Notes, II: 249. 
205 Thomas, 1994: 110. 
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Chapter Two 
Navosavakadua and the Tuka Movement 
 
The Colo War did not signal the end of an era. While it suppressed further armed 
resistance and brought the area of Colo under the ambit of colonial rule, it did not take 
away the underlying antagonism which had been at the source of the conflict. Neither 
was the antagonism confined to Colo. It resonated among the tribes of the Ra 
Province and around the north western quadrant of Viti Levu where the Tuka 
Movement rose in three successive waves during the late 1870s, the mid 1880s, and 
early 1890s. In many ways, this movement extended the Colo War but changed the 
means and sites of resistance. If Kai Colo fought with military weapons, Tuka’s 
weapons took a more religious, cultural and symbolic form, but they were used to 
express similar fears and grievances against the presence and designs of foreign forces 
and individuals such as Bauans, settlers, labour recruiters, the mission, and the 
colonial government. Local intra-Ra politics gave this conflict its particular 
distinctiveness as did the majestic presence of the Nakauvadra Range which formed 
the geographical and mythical backdrop of the rising. Nakauvadra is the sacred 
mountain range from which most Fijians trace their origins. The close proximity of 
rebelling communities to the Range, the identity they derived from their guardianship 
of this sacred site, and the inspiration and leadership provided by the priests in the 
area all combine to make the role of religion and religious syncretism a central feature 
of this chapter. Yet, the religious nature of this movement is best understood by 
beginning our analysis with concrete examples in the Ra province of land 
dispossession, local rivalries, chiefly ambitions, abuses of labour recruitment, lost 
autonomy and prestige, all of which furnished the movement with its initial impetus. 
The background to the movement, its nature and historical development, the religious 
philosophy of its leader Navosavakadua, and the significance of Tuka to our 
understanding of resistance in Fiji form the substance of this chapter. 
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Map 11: Map of Ra and Northern Colo with Main Districts.2
                                                 
1 Note that these are approximate locations. Many of the villages involved in Tuka activities were 
ordered demolished and inhabitants relocated to other sites. See despatch 53, Thurston to SS, 12 
August 1891. CSO Despatches to SS. NAF. 
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The Battle of Nakorowaiwai: 1873. 
 
When tracing the origins of the Tuka Movement, the same key elements that shaped 
the Colo conflict become immediately apparent. To begin with, the encroachment of 
Bauan power in Ra was especially resented in this region of independent chiefdoms, 
where people claimed primacy in the chronology of Fijian settlement. The cultural 
and religious significance of the Nakauvadra Range gave those in its proximity the 
distinctive status and identity to form well-defined and autonomous polities. In this 
context, Bauans were regarded as impostors and invaders. Their propensity to extract 
excessive tribute, taxes and labour from Ra caused much offence and hostility. 
 
In appointing Ratu Isikeli Tabakaucoro as Governor of Ra in 1872, the Cakobau 
Government hoped to facilitate the extraction of taxes, the recruitment of labour, and 
maintain Bauan influence in the area. During his term, Ratu Isikeli achieved this aim 
by capitalising on local rivalries between local Ra factions, strategically playing 
chiefs against each other and siding with some to better control all.3 However, people 
resented his “high-handed” and “arbitrary” rule,4 including his involvement in the 
labour trade. Using his influence, Ratu Isikeli had assisted labour recruiters to procure 
numerous Ra and Colo men to labour on distant plantations. With his help and the 
cooperation of several other local chiefs who sold the services of the men of their 
tribes for their own enrichment,5 north western Viti Levu was gradually emptied of 
much of its manpower, and quickly became the largest supplier of plantation labour in 
Fiji. 
 
Ratu Isikeli was also in the habit of selling land to European settlers without 
consultation with local landowners.6 Ratu Isikeli was not alone in this practice. The 
early 1860s had seen a spate of land sales in Ra, identical to that of Ba and Nadroga 
(see Chapter One). It prompted the transfer of large tracts of Ra’s best coastal land to 
                                                                                                                                            
2 The dotted line indicates the approximate area of the twelve yavusa claiming membership of the 
Vatukaloko polity. 
3 Report 735. Land Claims Commission and Executive Council Sitting for the rehearing of Claims to 
Land, 1875-1887. Hereafter LCC. NAF. 
4 R 735. LCC. 
5 Despatch 60, Gordon to SS, 23 May 1878. CSO Despatches. 
6 Deryck Scarr, “A Roko Tui for Lomaiviti: The Question of Legitimacy in the Fijian Administration: 
1874-1900.” in Journal of Pacific History. 5, 1970. 12. 
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settlers and speculators in return for guns which local tribes used to attack or ward off 
enemies.7 In one particular transaction which was to prove highly consequential by its 
repercussions, a large area at Yaqara (also known as Raviravi) extending from 
Drauniivi and Rabulu on the coast to Naseyani in the foothills of Nakauvadra, was 
sold by the Tui Vatu (or chief of Vatukaloko), Tavakece Rareba, to Clough a 
Canadian settler in 1861.8
 
When Clough died in 1869, one of his neighbours, Samuel A. St. John, persuaded 
William Isaac Thomas, a Levuka based settler, to occupy the land while he attempted 
to contact Clough’s heirs. The measure was intended to prevent Vatukaloko people 
from recovering possession of the land. Thomas considered the land ideal for cotton 
farming and the scheme was immediately implemented. As St. John had anticipated, 
the local Vatukaloko people understood that by Clough’s death the land should revert 
to them and questioned the manner and legality of Thomas’ occupation. However, in 
August 1870, and without the knowledge of other landowners, Tavakece resold the 
land to Thomas instantly making Thomas the largest European landowner in Fiji.9 
However, Yaqara was also claimed by several Vatukaloko yavusa including Nubu, 
Mali and Wacakena, all of which denied Tavakece’s right to sell alone and contested 
Thomas’s right to use the land.10 A deep and lasting wedge was thus formed in the 
area between Thomas and surrounding land claimants. Over the next thirty years, a 
spirit of animosity prevailed in the area creating in the process an environment 
conducive for conflict. 
 
As we saw in Chapter One, the killing of a chief by labour recruiters in the Tavua Bay 
area in January 1873 brought an already volatile situation to boiling point. It is 
difficult to link this killing with the murder a few days later of the Bauan recruiter 
Koroi i Latikau because in his letter to Swanston, Evans does not mention where the 
deserting labourers or their chief came from.11 However, given the close kinship ties 
that existed between people of the bay area, the possibility that Latikau’s murder by 
men from Nakorowaiwai was in retaliation for the killing of the chief cannot be 
                                                 
7 R. 778. LCC. 
8 The background to this land sale is taken from R 778. LCC. 
9 Cyclopedia of Fiji 1907. 1907. Suva: Fiji Museum, 1984. 248-50. 
10 R. 777. LLC. 
11 Evans to Swanston, 22 January 1873. The Swanston Collection. 
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discounted. The location of Nakorowaiwai on land adjacent to Yaqara (and possibly 
claimed by Thomas) by people who disputed Thomas’s right to the land only 
increased the likelihood of confrontation in the area. Hence, the killing of the local 
chief and of Koroi i Latikau, the grievances about Bauan leadership and dealings, the 
abuse of labour, and grievances about land alienation created an environment ripe for 
a showdown. 
 
When it eventuated in early March 1873, the Battle of Nakorowaiwai (already 
mentioned in Chapter One) epitomised the determination of the local Vatukaloko 
people to retain control of their affairs, to resist Bauan and other foreign claims to 
their lands and way of life. The response of the Cakobau Government revealed the 
determination with which it was prepared to act when its legitimacy was openly 
challenged. 
 
When they fought at Nakorowaiwai to avenge the death of Koroi i Latikau, 
government troops could not have struck at a more sensitive site. Its location in the 
midst of the Nakauvadra Range placed Nakorowaiwai in the heart of what Brewster 
called “Fiji’s Holy Land”,12 the spiritual home of Degei, arguably the most important 
of Fijian gods. The massacre marked a serious loss of ritual pre-eminence, authority, 
and autonomy for the traditional guardians of the sacred mountains – the Kai 
Vatukaloko. Nakauvadra is the epicentre of the Vatukaloko polity and those who died 
at Nakorowaiwai had relatives and other close traditional ties with the other twelve 
constituent tribes of the polity.13 These connections spread in concentric circles all 
around the mountains and the massacre had repercussions in areas where antagonism 
to the new order had previously been negligible. 
 
                                                 
12 Brewster, 1922: 82. Basil Thomson referred to Nakauvadra as “the Olympus of the Fijians”. See his 
“The Kalou-Vu (Ancestor Gods) of the Fijians.” in Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute. 24, 
1895. 341. 
13 For a detailed sketch of the historical development of the Vatukaloko polity, see Martha Kaplan’s , 
“Land and Sea and the New White Men: A Reconsideration of the Fijian Tuka Movement.” PhD 
Dissertation. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1988, and Neither Cargo nor Cult: Ritual Politics and 
the Colonial Imagination in Fiji. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995. Among the twelve constituent 
yavusa of Vatukaloko are Mali, Wacakena, Namacuku, Nadokana, Nakorosoqo, Nacolo, Naliwani, 
Tokaimalo, Nasoqo, Korosovaulevu, and Nubu. 
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The First Wave: Tuka 1876-1878. 
 
Repercussions from the sacking of Nakorowaiwai did not become apparent to 
officials until after Cession. Cession passed in Ra as it had in Colo: without any 
consultation. The people’s consent (or lack of it) to annexation was usurped by Ratu 
Isikeli when he signed over Ra’s allegiance to the Queen at the ceremony. Yet, the 
collapse of the Cakobau Government, the transition to British rule, and the prospect of 
a substantial re-arrangement of political power in Fiji, must have prompted some 
optimism in Ra that things were about to change and that years of Bauan oppression 
were at an end. Supporters of annexation had led many ordinary men and women to 
believe that under the new administration they would be free of taxes, that they would 
be protected from the power of their chiefs, that certain laws would no longer apply, 
and that in general everyone would be able to follow their own will and pleasure.14
 
Reporting as Native Commissioner in the early months of 1878 on recurring tension 
in the Ra Province, David Wilkinson wrote that ordinary people had placed much 
faith in promises of change and that they were bitterly disappointed when these were 
not fulfilled.15 Instead, new laws came into being which made a mockery of the 
dream of liberty that was supposed to materialise under the new Matanitu. To make 
things worse, Ratu Isikeli retained his position as administrative head of the province 
allowing him to continue to intervene in local affairs with his customary heavy-
handedness, and Bau to maintain its extraction of tribute from Ra. Several traditional 
chiefs had their power eroded by the reorganisation of power and space in the area. 
Districts (including Vatukaloko) were parcelled off by the new administration thus 
breaking the traditional unity that previously formed the identity of these areas. For 
instance, the Vatukaloko and Navunivou people of Raviravi in Tokaimalo, who 
claimed land and allegiance northwards to the coastal village of Drauniivi, were 
                                                 
14 Wilkinson and Eastgate to Gordon, 5 February 1878, CSO 78/550: “Report of Special Commission 
to Enquire Charges Against Roko Tui Ra.” All CSO files are located at the National Archives of Fiji 
(NAF). I am heavily dependent on this file for the contextual background of the Tuka Movement. It is 
one of the few primary sources that contain detailed information about the development of the agitation 
from late 1876 to early 1878 that mark the early stages of the Movement. The file consists of the 
following two reports: the “Report of the Special Commission of enquiry into charges against the Roko 
Tui Ra,” 5 February 1878; and the “Native Commissioner’s Report of his visit to the Provinces of Ra 
and Ba during the month of February 1878,” March 1878. The file has been used briefly by Kaplan and 
Scarr in larger studies. See Kaplan, 1995 and Scarr Viceroy of the Pacific: The Majesty of Colour A 
Life of Sir John Bates Thurston. Canberra: ANU, 1980. 
15 CSO 78/550. “Native Commissioner’s Report.” 
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redirected eastward to Saivou and Ra’s new administrative centre of Nanukuloa the 
seat of the Roko Tui Ra, Ratu Isikeli Tabakaucoro. This rearrangement resulted in the 
bypassing, dismissal or replacement of several traditional chiefs who instantly turned 
against the administration and began to agitate against key political appointments. 
 
One such appointment was the posting in 1876 of Ratu Semi Davui, Ratu Isikeli’s 
brother, as the new Buli and Native Stipendiary Magistrate of Rakiraki to replace two 
local chiefs. The two chiefs, Ratu Alipate Vutoni and Tavakece (not to be confused 
with deceased Tui Vatu), were former rivals but their dismissal drew them instantly 
together against their common Bauan adversary. Their objective was to resume the 
power over their people which they felt unjustly deprived of, and in the process to 
prepare the way for open revolt. The campaign got under way in secrecy in late 
187616 and gained momentum through the following year. The reguregu for a 
deceased high chief of Tavua in February or March 1877, provided Tavakece and his 
supporters with an ideal opportunity to consult with potential allies from Navatu, 
Vatukaloko and Tavua with the objective of forming a united front to repossess the 
government of their land.17 In the absence of concrete plans, they would complicate 
the Roko’s rule by refusing to obey his orders and by actively preventing others from 
performing their duties towards him. The results were immediately visible as the 
frustrated Ratu Semi’s report to the Bose Vakaturaga of December 1877 attests.18
 
Back in the Ra province, numerous meetings were called and a genuine movement 
was beginning to take shape. These meetings heard the same call: 
 
 if we are to be successful we must proceed vakaviti we hate the Roko, we hate 
the magistrate and we want our land back. Let us stick to that and when they see 
what we are able to do they will hear us. Let every man woman and child say we 
hate the Roko and his brother and will endure them no longer. And when we go 
                                                 
16 Reporting on the rising, Gordon estimated that the rapid suppression of Kai Colo had prevented the 
conflict from erupting in Ra. Despatch 60, Gordon to SS, 23 May 1878. CSO Despatches. 
17 CSO 78/550. “Report of Special Commission.” 
18 See his comments about Ra people’s refusal to work in “Notes of the Proceedings of a Native 
Council,” Rewa, December 1877. 6. 
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to meet them let no man come empty handed let it be seen we are in earnest and 
let no man that is true to us remain at home if he does he is no true man.19
 
The older Rakiraki chiefs urged the younger men to take the lead in the agitation. One 
of them pleaded that 
 
our land is being differently governed to any other land. These two children 
from Bau have come and ruled over us – Let us discuss the matter – Our land is 
our land – Let it be so and of the truth – I said I am old, it is with you youths to 
recover our rights.20
 
Being divided about who among them should succeed Ratu Isikeli, they were united 
in their preference of Ratu Tevita Suraki, a chief from Bua (Vanua Levu), to be 
installed as the new Roko Tui once the current one had been disposed of.21
 
While much of the agitation was directed against “Bauan foreigners”, Wilkinson also 
linked the Rakiraki rising to discontent about labour practices. He remarked on the 
strongest remonstrance made by people everywhere about the trouble that was caused 
by the absence of almost all able-bodied men and the consequent inability of the rest 
to produce food and other necessities. This rendered village and community 
obligations exceedingly oppressive or altogether impossible for those who stayed 
behind. The result was a great scarcity of food, filthy towns, bad houses, roads not 
attended to and the inevitable failure to produce the assigned quota of produce for 
taxes.22
 
Wilkinson also reported that young Ra labourers were frequently abused by planters, 
recruiters and local magistrates. They were threatened with forced enlistment in the 
Armed Native Constabulary without pay if they refused to renew their indenture. The 
magistrate in Taveuni was in the habit of re-enlisting the men for another twelve 
months without seeking the approval of the men’s chiefs, in direct violation of the 
                                                 
19 CSO 78/550. “Native Commissioner’s Report.” 
20 Cited in Scarr, 1980: 57. 
21 Support for Ratu Tevita in Ra may have been facilitated by his marriage to a Ra woman, and because 
while Ra and Bua are traditional rivals or tauvu, their close proximity to each other across the Bligh 
Waters encouraged close kinship ties, similar dialects and identical customary traditions. 
22 CSO 78/550. “Native Commissioner’s Report.” 
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agreement under which people left their homes.23 This exploitation of labour caused 
anguish and resentment to grow among labourers and their families back home. 
 
Wilkinson also mentioned the great trouble caused by European settlement in Ra. He 
was particularly critical of a dispute involving Thomas and his neighbour, Tom 
Burness. In spite of the objections of the Kai Vatukaloko, Thomas had continued his 
occupation of the land, but switched from cotton to pastoral grazing. The Yaqara deal 
acquired a new complexion in September 1874 when the new Tui Vatu, Naivulalevu, 
leased the entire area claimed by Thomas to Burness. Burness already claimed 
ownership of Vunitogoloa and Toqovere lands and ruled over nearby villagers with 
quasi-absolute authority.24 The 1874 lease brought about a long and bitter dispute 
between Burness and Thomas over the right to use the land. Yet, because the dispute 
involved neighbouring tribes, the threat of instability extended well beyond relations 
between the two planters.25 Official documents frequently blame Burness for 
instigating the trouble, and for unsettling good order among Fijians in the area. Such 
was Gordon’s exasperation with Burness that he wished him deported.26 Whatever 
Burness’s role was in the disturbances, the decision by the Tui Vatu to lease the land 
to Burness, reflects the perception among Kai Vatukaloko that Thomas was the 
illegitimate occupant of their own land. As will become evident, with or without 
Burness’s coaxing, they continued to publicly display their resentment of Thomas. 
 
Local land and settler politics thus complicated an already complex situation. The 
power of the administration suffered from these local conflicts in which strongmen, 
local or foreign, openly defied the orders and commands of appointed officials. 
Settlers, magistrates (native and European), newly appointed chiefs, old traditional 
leaders, Wesleyan catechists, all competed for influence among the people. But the 
competition of these interests also created a kind of disorder and uncertainty among 
ordinary people which led them in their insecurity to join a movement that promised 
                                                 
23 CSO 78/550. “Native Commissioner’s Report.” We have seen however, that many chiefs worked in 
collusion with labour recruiters to sell the services of their own villagers. 
24 At first Burness prevented villagers them from collecting, using, or trading any of the coconuts in the 
area. By 1877 however, he was threatening them with expulsion if they disobeyed his edicts. See CSO 
78/550. “Native Commissioner’s Report.” 
25 R. 778. LCC. 
26 Gordon to Le Hunte, 19 March 1878. Records of Private and Public Life, III: 74. 
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to be both more stable and empowering. Wilkinson attributed disaffection among the 
people of Ra to this lack of union in authority.27
 
By disrupting the previously undisputed power of traditional priests, the spread of 
Christianity in the area also precipitated the formation of a religious adversary. While 
it was never in the interests of missionaries to antagonise or eliminate Fijian 
religiosity, the mere presence and advance of Christianity around them was likely to 
cause some discomfort to Nakauvadra’s hereditary priests. The mission’s reputation 
was not enhanced by the irreverence of some of its indigenous emissaries. A desolate 
reverend Lorimer Fison recalled how in 1862, Rawaidranu led a party of Wesleyan 
teachers up to Nakauvadra and stripped Degei’s temple “sacrilegiously robbing the 
sacred shrine of some of the most holy relics”.28 If they did not already resent the 
presence of Christianity in close proximity of their most sacred site, traditional priests 
charged with the guardianship of Nakauvadra must have felt deeply aggrieved by this 
desecration. The circulation in the 1870s of more Fijian catechists is likely to have 
caused further offence and alarm among the customary priests of Nakauvadra. Among 
the latter was a man who was destined to lead Tuka, one of colonial Fiji’s most 
enduring and insidious popular movements. 
 
While preparations were under way in Rakiraki for a political confrontation against 
Bauan influence in the area, the embryo of a parallel movement was being organised 
from the village of Drauniivi under the guidance of a man called Navosavakadua. 
Since 1873, several escapees from the Nakorowaiwai rout had sought refuge at 
Drauniivi and the village became a sanctuary for those who had survived the terror 
and those seeking redress and the re-establishment of Vatukaloko’s customary 
prestige in the area.29 Navosavakadua had been born Dukumoi in Drauniivi’s 
Nakubuti clan of oracle priests. His family was noted for its anti-Bauan stance, his 
father having been flogged by Cakobau in pre-Cession times.30 Like many other 
young Ra men of his age, Dukumoi had left his district in the early 1870s to work as a 
                                                 
27 CSO 78/550. “Native Commissioner’s Report.” 
28 Fison cited in Thornley, 2002: 231. 
29 A. B. Joske to Colonial Secretary (hereafter CS), “Report on the Suppression of Tuka in Colo East,” 
1 August 1891, CSO 91/2344. 
30 Despatch 53, Thurston to SS, 12 August 1891. CSO Despatches. 
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labourer on Selia Levu plantation in Taveuni.31 It is difficult to ascertain with 
certainty whether Navosavakadua made the trip willingly or if, like many others, he 
was forced to go for failing or refusing to pay taxes to the Cakobau government.32 
However, his experience of indenture, like that of so many of his contemporaries, 
must have had some influence on his receptiveness to foreign domination. Over time, 
Dukumoi acquired the title of Navosavakadua33 by virtue of his leadership, charisma, 
life giving ability, and apparent infallibility in the face of such powerful adversaries as 
the colonial administration and the church.  
 
Soon after his return to Ra, a vision appeared to Navosavakadua (late in 1876 or early 
1877) that the land was soon to be visited again by Degei’s twin nephews, 
Nacirikoumoli and Nakausabaria. There are various accounts as to why the twins had 
left Nakauvadra but most tell of a quarrel between uncle and sons involving the 
shooting of Turukawa, Degei’s pet pigeon, after which the twins were banished. 
However, the version which emerged in the late 1870s was that the twins had left in 
disgust at the people for adopting Christianity and other modern innovations.34
 
Word of Navosavakadua’s miracles and prophesies soon spread inland to Colo where 
people believed that spirits had appeared at the head of the Wainimala River. In 
August 1877 the twins were believed to have visited Drauniivi, his home village. By 
the end of the year and coinciding with the annual council of chiefs meeting in Rewa, 
he was prophesying the end of the world. There can be little doubt that the timing of 
this prophesy was meant as a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the new 
                                                 
31 Reference to Navosavakadua’s time in Taveuni is made by William Sutherland in “The ‘Tuka’ 
Religion.” in Transactions of the Fijian Society. 1910. 53; Laura Thompson in Fijian Frontier. New 
York: American Council Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940. 117-8; Durutalo, 1985a: 243; and Kaplan, 
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weigh this loss of labour against the loss of village manpower needed to meet his provincial tax quota. 
See Eastgate to CS, 3 November 1876, CSO 76/1476. This file is about Ratu Isikeli’s refusal to let all 
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help meet tax and other obligations. 
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Nakauvadra and led to the exile of the twins is given by Basil Thomson in “The Kalou-Vu (Ancestor 
Gods) of the Fijians.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute. 24, 1895. 340-359. Read also 
Adolph Brewster, The Hill Tribes of Fiji. London: Seeley, Service & Co. Limited, 1922; France, 1969; 
and Kaplan, 1995. 
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government and the chiefs who had surrendered the government of Fiji’s people to a 
foreign power. This resurgence of Vatukaloko power was symbolised by the 
reoccupation of Nakorowaiwai by survivors of the massacre and of the use of its 
sacred meeting place, Vale Lebo.35 Led by Nabolawaqa, new houses were built and it 
appeared as if the site would be restored to its former glory.36 Meanwhile, 
Navosavakadua called on his followers to prepare for siganilewa or judgement day 
which would take place in four years’ time. This occasion would reward all tamata 
dina or dedicated faithfuls who would be granted tuka or immortality. 
 
Immortality rituals were not unusual in Fijian custom. They were performed in 
preparation for war and for more benign occasions such as luveniwai (see Chapter 
Five). In 1867, Rev. Fison had been told of an old priest in Ra who professed to have 
found a “wai ni tuka” or “elixir of life”.37 Navosavakadua synthesised this element of 
local origin with other components of Fijian mythology, added a selection of 
Christian principles and what Wilkinson simply labelled “white man’s ideas”, to 
create what officials called a “superstition”.38 Unbeknown to Wilkinson, this 
“superstition” was about to grow into a potent philosophy and an extensive mass 
movement. Together with the agitation of the Rakiraki chiefs, Navosavakadua’s new 
religion developed into a rallying point for the organisation of a potent political force. 
If the original motivations of the Rakiraki chiefs had been anti-Bauan, with Tuka they 
assumed a wider scope. Gordon spoke of it in terms of a “movement” acting “against 
the authority of the Government” and working towards “the overthrow of 
Christianity”.39 In the first months of 1878, the religion had been propagated by its 
emissaries “to some considerable distance”,40 with evident success, and Wilkinson 
warned that if Tuka was united with any disaffected movement against authority, the 
result would be “disastrous to all peace or progress” in the colony. As he wrote: 
 
                                                 
35 Vale Lebo is an important historical spot and means “the House of Concealment” in the Nakauvadra 
dialect because it became the hiding place of the twins after their quarrel with Degei. See Joske to CS, 
1 August 1891, CSO 91/2344. 
36 “Notes of the Proceedings of a Native Council,” Rewa, 1877. 43. See Recommendation Nine in 
particular. 
37 Cited in Kaplan, 1988: 60. 
38 Despatch 60, Gordon to SS, 23 May 1878. CSO Despatches. 
39 Despatch 60, Gordon to SS, 23 May 1878. CSO Despatches. 
40 Despatch 60, Gordon to SS, 23 May 1878. CSO Despatches. 
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There is one thing I would specially notice about the tenets or doctrine or 
teachings of the fraternity they are evidently anti-every thing modern. Anti-lotu, 
anti-matanitu. Though it is not announced publicly … It is believed and 
regarded by the great majority of the people as opposed to authority and the 
good order of the present day. … It is simply a revival of the ancient.41
 
The “revival of the ancient” posed a significant threat to the new administration 
because among other things it sought to reassert Ra’s historical precedence in terms of 
the origins of Fijian settlement, the ritual pre-eminence of Nakauvadra in Fijian 
religious belief, and the recovery of the government of Ra lands. In this, the chiefs of 
Rakiraki and Tuka were always likely to form a politico-religious alliance. 
 
Taking advantage of the Bauan brothers’ absence at the Bose Vakaturaga in Rewa, a 
public meeting took place in Rakiraki in December of 1877, in which it was decided 
to write a letter of complaint to the Governor against Ratu Isikeli and Ratu Semi so 
“that these two brothers be pushed away from us”.42 Chiefs from Nakorotubu were 
invited to form part of the anti-Roko alliance but the plot failed when one of them 
(Buli Nanuya) reported the matter to Ratu Isikeli and the administration was alerted to 
the scheme. 
 
A commission of enquiry was appointed to look into the matter. It consisted of Ratu 
Vuki (Roko Tui Ba and Yasawas and related to the two brothers), Alex Eastgate 
(Stipendary Magistrate of Ra and Tailevu), and Wilkinson as Native Commissioner. 
When it convened at Navolau in January 1878, hundreds of people descended on the 
town with clubs, spears and axes and demanded that the Roko Tui gather his 
belongings and leave the place. After some tense moments during which Wilkinson 
sensed a dangerous indefiniteness among the protesters, an element of calm returned 
and the commission was allowed to conduct its work. By surrendering the initiative 
back to the commission, the rebels lost their advantage and they were made to pay 
dearly for it. Ratu Isikeli was cleared of any wrongdoing and the commission 
commended Ratu Semi for suppressing the oppression of Ra people by their chiefs. 
The commission also ventured to claim that the people much preferred the current 
                                                 
41 CSO 78/550. “Native Commissioner’s Report.” 
42 CSO 78/550. “Report of the Special Commission.” 
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form of government to that of the past.43 It then recommended the immediate removal 
of all the “indolent and mischief making fellows” at the centre of the insurgency. 
Among those who were deported to various parts of Fiji were Nabolawaqa, Tavakece, 
and several Buli of the region.44 Realising the symbolic significance of 
Nakorowaiwai, Gordon also took the opportunity to order the houses at 
Nakorowaiwai pulled down.45 For his part, Navosavakadua was deported to Lakeba in 
the Lau Group.46
 
While the rebellion had been snuffed out before it could develop on a grander scale, 
the signs were ominous that the movement had brought a wide range of people 
together, all of them united in their disaffection with the current state of affairs and in 
their desire for a greater degree of self-determination. Sympathy for the rising can be 
estimated to have involved almost the entire north-western quadrant of Viti Levu. 
Commenting on the affair at the Bose Vakaturaga in 1878, Ratu Vuki warned of the 
extremely turbulent character of the disturbance and that “what they have said has 
affected the minds of the people even, as far inland as Colo, and all messages were 
carried in a warlike manner”.47 He also expressed his fear to Wilkinson that this 
disturbance could end up causing far greater “evil” than that which had been put down 
in Colo in 1876.48
 
However, because it contained no explicit anti-foreigner rhetoric and was conducted 
according to Fijian protocol, Wilkinson regarded the whole conflict as “vaka viti”, “a 
Fijian affair from beginning to end a combination started carried on and matured in 
pure native fashion”.49 He advised Gordon to deal with it as such by letting the people 
be “as long as they don’t breach morals and good order”. He also suggested that 
government needed to improve its image in the area if it was to avoid another such 
outbreak: “let the native feel that the government is his friend his protector in the 
broadest and commonest sense … and Kalourere-sm and every thing belonging to it 
will pass away into the legendary lore of his land but he will be a peaceful and 
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respectable member of his mataqali.”50 Wilkinson was therefore aware that the mass 
removal of ringleaders would not solve the problem of transforming a fiercely 
independent population into pacified, submissive, and obedient subjects. 
 
While the deportations caused a leadership vacuum and successfully prevented further 
organised resistance, it was not long before reports of renewed discontent and 
defiance from the interior came to hand. In 1879 for instance, the Buli Nadrau who 
had until then been a key government ally in the interior, was reputed to be upset over 
the government’s failure to honour its Vatula promise about placing Qaliyalatina 
district under Nadrau rather than Ba. This prompted Le Hunte to warn that if the 
dispute was not settled “the greatest mischief may arise”51 Losing Nadrau’s support 
would certainly cause neighbouring districts to follow suit. In Naboubuco, along the 
frontier between Ra and Colo East, the people of the large village of Nasoqo were 
refusing to pay taxes to the Roko Tui Ra. The village of Nasoqo is the most inward 
point of the Vatukaloko polity though it also shared intimate relations with Nadrau. Its 
people had family who had died in the battle of Nakorowaiwai. They were in regular 
contact with relatives on the coast at Drauniivi, Togovere, and other Vatukaloko 
districts such as Tokaimalo. The death of Ratu Isikeli Tabakaucoro after the 1879 
Bose Vakaturaga and his replacement by Ratu Tevita Suraki may have appeased some 
insurgents but by December 1880, the new Roko Tui Ra, regarded Nasoqo people as 
generally troublesome.52 The deportation of Tamanivalu, one of Nasoqo’s disruptive 
leaders, to Bau did not have the desired outcome. By 1883 the district of Nasoqo was 
in disarray. The people disobeyed orders at their convenience while a considerable 
number of them left the villages particularly to Tailevu, mostly in search of work.53 In 
these parts therefore, formal colonial control was essentially nominal. 
 
The Second Wave: Tuka 1884-1886. 
 
Things were deemed quiet enough for the Bose Vakaturaga of May 1883 with the 
support of Governor William Des Voeux, to recommend that Navosavakadua and 
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another leader of the Rakiraki agitation be allowed to return to their home districts.54 
Navosavakadua returned to find the villagers of Drauniivi impoverished by five years 
of poor harvest, the main cause of which was the destruction of crops by Thomas’s 
wandering cattle.55 In a letter to William Sutherland, then Stipendiary Magistrate of 
Tailevu, the villagers complained that as of December 1884, no less than 28,428 yam 
hills had been destroyed by Thomas’s cattle. Numerous other dalo (taro) and vudi 
(large banana) plants had also been lost. The extent of destruction spread across vast 
areas from Drauniivi through to Naseyani, and Vunitogoloa. Among those claiming 
lost produce was Navosavakadua.56 Thomas was immediately written to and asked to 
fence his property. But five months later, the cattle were still not properly fenced in 
and continued to stray,57 a problem which persisted until July 1887.58 Thus, when 
Navosavakadua came back from exile, he returned to a climate of discontent similar 
to that which had prompted the first rising. 
 
However, Navosavakadua himself was a changed man. His exile had only 
strengthened his resolve and he came back with a more sophisticated philosophy. 
More important to him than the loss of food crops was the need to rebuild the 
ancestral, spiritual, and political ascendancy of his people. Upon his return to Ra, he 
informed the people that he had been to Tonga where he was received with distinction 
and where he had left his soul in safe keeping, bringing only his body to Fiji. He also 
proclaimed his invulnerability, alleging that the authorities had tried to kill him but 
that his divine mana had always saved him.59 If he ever was to be killed, his followers 
should trust that only his body suffered: “Kevaka Kau na mate dou vakabauti au ga” 
or, “If I die believe in me.”60
 
Navosavakadua had come back with a modified doctrine predicting that the world 
would shortly be turned upside down or tavuki. This meant, in Brewster’s words, that 
“all existing affairs would be reversed; the whites would serve the natives, the chiefs 
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would become the common people and the latter would take their places”.61 He 
prophesied the expulsion of foreigners white and Bauan, the expulsion of Church and 
Government,62 and the return of the twins whom he identified as the true Jehovah and 
Jesus. He professed that while the Bible was virtuous and compatible with Fijian 
mythology, the missionaries had deceived the people by claiming Jehovah and Jesus 
as Christian gods. Their real names were Nacirikaumoli and Nakausabaria. They were 
Degei’s twin sons and they were Fijian gods.63 Navosavakadua quoted freely from the 
Bible and used Jesus’ teaching in guiding and directing his followers, the keynote 
being to leave all and believe in him with the certain reward of tuka or immortality.64 
“Wai ni tuka” was the sacred water which he used to anoint his followers, like a 
baptism. Those thus blessed were granted immortality. It was the physical form 
through which he transmitted his power to his people65 All those who did not believe 
in him would become the slaves and servants of his faithful disciples.66
 
In 1884, the first signs that Tuka was being reactivated began to show. Three men 
from Vunitogoloa were deported to Matuku in the Lau Group for “illicit heathen 
practices” and “conspiracy against their chief” implicit in the tuka religion.67 When 
A. B. Joske took up his position in October 1884 as the new European Stipendary 
Magistrate for Colo East and visited Naboubuco, he found the people turbulent, 
refractory, in the habit of evading the district courts, and being generally disobedient 
to the orders of the Native Magistrate.68 He ordered the Nasoqo people to build a 
lepers’ house but unbeknown to him, they built a large bure kalou instead.69 They 
also built a new village which they called Navala and styled it a Koro ni vunivuni or 
“place for the concocting of schemes or conspiracies”. Navosavakadua visited the 
village some time in mid 1885 where he was received with great welcome and 
feasted.70
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Writing retrospectively in 1910 about this second wave, the Native Commissioner 
William Sutherland described it as a phenomenon that had been favourably received 
by local inhabitants, that it was an organised movement, that the ground had been 
prepared for it beforehand, and that Government officers had been successfully kept 
in ignorance of what was transpiring.71 In 1885, the Wesleyan missionary Reverend 
Arthur Webb was one of the few who seemed to have any notion of the presence, 
growing strength and spread of the movement. He described Tuka simply as 
“Radicalism”: 
 
It is a movement that goes behind the Government and is inimical to it and goes 
behind the Lotu and in some instances aims directly at its subversion … There 
has been … far more of political aim than of religious departure in these 
disturbances. … They most frequently occur in seasons of general distress … 
and at seasons when the native mind is, from some causes or other, in a state of 
unrest or dissatisfaction.72
 
Notwithstanding people’s grievances or the general state of distress that they were 
experiencing, Navosavakadua was an excellent organiser. He moved around the 
countryside and with his lieutenants, effectively planned the enlargement of the 
movement and disseminated his vision to a people keenly receptive to the promise of 
change. Lodges for him and his followers were said to exist in every village.73 In 
August 1885, Ratu Tevita Suraki reported with concern that a large number of 
“Togavere men and like tribes” were living at Udu and Savudoi (in the district of 
Muaira) on the Wailoa River, only a few miles south of Nasoqo (see map 15). Udu 
had been one of the staunchest anti-Christian villages prior to Cession74 and the 
Togavere people who lived there were refugees of the Nadawarau campaign of 1874, 
and other pre-Cession wars.75 They were now settled permanently in Udu with the 
blessing of the current Buli Muaira.76 The presence of this Togavere colony in the 
heart of Muaira but with ties all the way to the northern coastline, made it an ideal 
strategic location from which to propagate Tuka into Colo East. On 26 October 1885, 
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about thirty young men from Drauniivi under the leadership of Bete and Tauvoli 
proceeded to Udu. Their purpose was to ‘bukuta’ or propose a compact that would 
allow Tuka advocates access to the village.77 They had blackened their faces (a habit 
usually adopted in war time), were armed with a few guns, wore shoulder sashes and 
occupied themselves with military drill. Prayers were learnt and new Tuka meke 
(traditional songs and dances) were taught and performed.78 Upon being expostulated 
with by the teacher and some Wesleyan Church members, the men refused an 
explanation of their conduct and replied that they would report “only to 
Navosavakadua of Nakauvadra who would bring about their [Wesleyans] death”.79
 
The Government only became aware of these Tuka activities on November 10th 1885. 
By then Tuka had filtered through undetected to an even greater proportion of the area 
than the 1877 rising. Confirming Thurston’s worst fears, Tuka had spread to 
Naboubuco, Muaira, Nadrau, Qaliyalatina, and even to Ba in the west. These interior 
districts were all pre-Cession enemies of Bau and were situated on the fringe of 
Navatusila and other adjacent districts still isolated by Ordinance XXIX of 1876 
prohibiting the movement of people in and out of Colo. The infiltration of Tuka in 
areas which were recent adversaries of the government in the Colo War, raised the 
potential for a resumption of hostilities. These developments were regarded as 
“extremely dangerous” by some of the old hands in the administration.80 On the other 
side of Tomaniivi (or Mount Victoria, Fiji’s highest mountain) and in the direction of 
Viti Levu Bay, Tuka had become endemic in the Saivou and Nalawa districts where 
Tuka leaders could now depend on a new and ardent following.81 In addition to the 
religious principles that guided this lotu ni vanua (religion of the land), the 
government also discovered a parallel administration with a bureaucracy modelled on 
the official one. Navosavakadua was at its head, with a hierarchy under him 
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consisting of lieutenants, sergeants, scribes,82 and other cadres of men some of whom 
had done terms of service with the Armed Native Constabulary and knew company 
drill perfectly. Several men such as the Turaga ni Koros of Udu, Savudoi, Nakorobilo 
and the Buli of Muaira, held official positions in the colonial administration and 
received government salaries but supported Navosavakadua. 
 
They did not however engage in armed warfare. Insubordination was a more 
immediate consequence of the reversal advocated by Navosavakadua. People simply 
refused to follow the orders of Wesleyan teachers and government officers. This tactic 
wreaked havoc both with Wesleyan and government lines of command. Those who 
continued to follow instructions from Suva found their work severely hampered by 
the popularity of Tuka and much government and Christian work ceased in affected 
areas.83 Moreover, soldiers, teachers, pastors, and government functionaries also 
switched their allegiance and joined the movement.84 The defection of these state and 
church officials prompted more ordinary men and women to embrace Tuka. 
Complaining to Thurston about Tuka’s disregard for constituted authority and its 
rapid spread, Carew wrote: “these Kai colo people are most persistent and obstinate 
and think of nothing else than the aggrandizement of their districts.”85 Yet, because 
their resistance was expressed through religion rather than arms, the administration 
was engaged in a form of ideological warfare in which the primary weapons were 
those of persuasion and faith. Because they appealed to people’s proud past, their 
current difficulties and interests, and future aspirations, Tuka leaders were able to 
work on the conquest of people’s minds and avoid detection and subsequent 
confrontation with a heavily armed enemy. The conquest of people’s minds is 
difficult to measure but Navosavakadua’s widespread support and popularity86 
suggests that until his arrest, he was winning the war of persuasion. 
 
                                                 
82 Carew to Administrator, 10 December 1885 enclosed in CSO 85/3059. See also the Fiji Times, 3 
July 1886. 
83 Brewster, 1922: 237. 
84 Fiji Times, 3 February, 1886. 
85 Carew to Administrator, 2 December 1885, CSO 85/3059. 
86 Carew and Roko Tui Ra believed Navosavakadua’s influence to have spread “far and wide”. They 
identified Nadrau in the centre of the island, Tavua on the northern coast, Saivou and Rakiraki in the 
north-east as the most likely boundaries. The Fiji Times estimated that support for Tuka was “pretty 
general throughout Colo”. Fiji Times, 3 February 1886. 
 108
However, the growing popularity of the movement was tempered by notable 
exceptions. Reservations about the movement came from various quarters. By 
venturing into Muaira, Tuka was mounting a challenge on a polity where thanks 
mainly to Carew’s efforts, the chiefs had pledged their loyalty to the government and 
the Wesleyan church. They were beneficiaries of the colonial order and like the more 
established Roko Tui, they must have regarded the destabilising effect of Tuka as a 
threat to their own interests. Those Wesleyan teachers and converts who resisted the 
Tuka offensive probably felt the same way. It is significant that Udu’s Wesleyan 
teacher, Mesake Vocevoce (from Nadi) remained loyal to the government through the 
upheavals and that without the information imparted by him and his evidence in court 
it would have been difficult for the prosecution to procure the punishment of any of 
the offenders.87 This suggests that people were by no means unified in who the 
oppressors were or how to go about resisting them. It is most likely too that a 
substantial number of ordinary villagers calculated their involvement in the movement 
to maximise the excitement and benefits of their participation but also to minimise the 
risk of being caught in the likelihood of a government crackdown. This precluded 
overt public involvement or condemnation. 
 
The appearance of inequalities and disjunctions within the movement is also verified 
by the complaints of women in Navosavakadua’s entourage. They were required to 
chew and prepare yaqona continuously by day and by night. Prepared in this way, it 
was believed that yaqona could preserve Navosavakadua and other senior priests in 
the condition of mind and body most susceptible for the entrance into their bodies of 
the ‘yalo ni kalou’ or spirit of the gods.88 Thurston also alluded to allegations that 
women who gave themselves up to sexual intercourse with him were promised 
immortality.89 Hence, beyond the air of excitement that descended to disturb the 
mundane nature of their lives, Tuka offered little else by way of incentives for women 
to actively support the movement. Aspects of women’s resistance are discussed in 
Chapter Seven. 
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However, the test of Tuka’s durability was always likely to come from the colonial 
administration. By early December 1885, Navosavakadua had been identified as the 
real force behind the movement and his arrest and permanent deportation were 
considered paramount and to be effected with utmost urgency.90 Writing to Ratu 
Tevita Suraki with instructions to secure the prophet’s arrest, Carew imparted his and 
other Colo chiefs’ fear that “neither Colo nor Ra would ever be at rest” until 
Navosavakadua’s capture.91
 
The Government’s Crackdown 
 
The whole affair took an unexpected turn on December 8th when Navosavakadua 
himself fronted up at the trial of dozens of his followers at the Colo East 
administrative centre of Vunidawa. He was immediately arrested and taken to Suva 
Gaol as were all other key priests and lieutenants of the movement. Carew warned the 
colonial secretary that none of these men should be allowed to return “until some 
considerable time shall have elapsed after the expiration of their sentences. Most were 
subsequently deported. Close to a hundred others, mostly belonging to the scattered 
Togavere tribes of Nalawa, were tried in Vunidawa by the provincial court with about 
half being sentenced to varying terms of hard labour. Most spent their prison terms 
building bridle tracks in the interior of the island under the watchful eye of A.B. 
Joske.92 Specific instructions were given that upon their release these men should be 
sent by water to the Roko Tui Ra in Naiserelagi and that on no account should they be 
sent back inland unless under guard, for it was feared that they would scatter and give 
more trouble. Carew also recommended that a new government station be established 
between Naboubuco and Nalawa so as to make its presence more tangible.93 On the 
religious front, Wesleyan authorities responded with urgency by dispatching “an army 
                                                 
90 Carew to Thurston in CSO 85/3059. This files also contains a letter from Joske to Carew dated 22 
November 1885, in which the former urges Navosavakadua’s immediate arrest and deportation “to 
Rotumah or some place right out of Fiji”. 
91 Carew to Roko Tui Ra, 5 December 1885, CSO 85/3059. 
92 Joske dedicated much of his time to the construction of bridle tracks. As he wrote later, “Owing to 
the extent of my districts … my life was rather nomadic. My office was the roadside …” See Brewster, 
1922: 290. Most of the 250 miles of track however, were built by men punished by him for various 
offences. The employment of prison labour to build roads saved the government considerable sums of 
money. It also fulfilled the need to render the interior amenable to pacification and accessible for trade. 
93 Carew to CS, 15 December 1885, CSO 85/3259. 
 110
of agents” into the area (mainly from training institutions on the coast), “to reason the 
misguided back to their allegiance” and neutralise the influence of the prophet.94
 
The next three months saw the government move to eradicate Tuka. The koro ni 
vunivuni village of Navala which had been built like a mountain fortress and 
contained a bure kalou, was ordered destroyed and the inhabitants relocated to a more 
visible and accessible spot at Mataiqamunu in the immediate vicinity of the Buli 
Naboubuco’s residence. This was resisted for two months notably due to 
Tamanivalu’s influence at Nasoqo. The “lepers’ house” in Nasoqo was also ordered 
demolished. Meanwhile, closer to the coast, the Roko Tui Ra’s zeal for stamping 
Tuka out was manifest from mid-January, with the presence in Naiserelagi of 120 
men arrested for their involvement in the movement. They came from villages in 
Nalawa, Saivou, Tokaimalo, Raviravi and Rakiraki. Such arrests continued through 
the months of February and March 1886. The provincial court heard from all that 
Navosavakadua had endeavoured to propagate the “lotu ni vanua” but all the accused 
were also notably bound by an oath not to divulge any information that might be 
damaging to Navosavakadua or his cause.95 Only ten of these men, all of them known 
priests of the movement, were convicted while the others were dismissed by the court 
and ordered to build a road.96
 
In his report on these cases, Joske pointed out that most of the people concerned in 
this matter had each done three or four terms of indentured service and that this 
exposure had brought them in contact with “a certain class of whites” and their stories 
about Freemasonry and secret societies. He deduced that Tuka appeared to be a 
humble imitation of them: “They seem to use signs and a shibboleth as a means of 
recognition amongst themselves. In drinking yaqona they make a military salute. This 
is the vakarokoroko or salutation to the chiefs “over the water”, viz, Nakausabaria and 
Nacirikoumoli.”97 It is also possible that the brutal experience of indenture and the 
harsh living conditions they had to endure, rendered these men resentful of foreigners 
(European and Bauan), and made them more resolute about preserving their land, 
                                                 
94 Thornley, 1979: 153. 
95 Joske to CS, 12 February 1886, CSO 86/397. 
96 See CSO files 97/2036 and 97/3547 and Despatch 53, Thurston to SS, 12 August 1891 for an 
indication of official confidence in the merit of bridle tracks and road building (especially in Tuka 
areas) in the process of pacification. 
97 Joske to CS, 12 February 1886, CSO 86/397. 
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recuperating control of their affairs, and fashioning their future in their own image. 
Aspects of plantation resistance are discussed in Chapters Four and Six. 
 
During the months of January and February of 1886, Navosavakadua was kept under 
surveillance at the police camp in Suva. This allowed the Government time to find 
and lay charges serious enough to remove him permanently. While he was held there 
numerous reports came to hand that the government had failed in several attempts to 
destroy his life.98 His legendary hair was the subject of much speculation. 
Navosavakadua had grown his hair as a symbol of his opposition to the Christian 
colonial order, and it was believed by his supporters that much of his power lay in his 
sacred locks. His hair was thus ordered cropped. Yet rumour surfaced that his hair had 
miraculously survived and that the scissors had bent backwards in refusal of such a 
sacrilege.99 Navosavakadua was finally tried on 17 March 1886 at Rukuruku in Viti 
Levu Bay in the province of Ra and sentenced to twelve months with hard labour for 
Vakatubuca “or conduct calculated to raise evil in the land”.100 He was incarcerated at 
the Suva Gaol two days later and allotted a “European cell … to avoid intercourse 
with others as much as possible”.101
 
During his incarceration, Navosavakadua was kept under constant surveillance and 
forbidden to communicate with any other prisoner. A list of offences he committed 
while serving time in gaol impresses the danger with which Navosavakadua was 
regarded. On 16 May 1886, he was placed in separate confinement with reduced diet 
for four days for singing. In response to this offence, Thurston, now acting Governor, 
ordered the Superintendent of Prisons to place Navosavakadua in leg irons and not to 
allow him sent beyond gaol precincts in the performance of any labour. On 14 July, 
he was placed in solitary confinement for forty-eight hours after being found 
conversing with another inmate. On 10 September, he was found in possession of half 
a sheet of foolscap and eight pages of the Town and Country Journal. For this offence 
he was placed in solitary confinement with reduced diet and no bed for four days. A 
                                                 
98 Several of these accounts survive to the present day and are transmitted by word of mouth. I heard 
five of them while visiting the village of Drauniivi on 23 May 2004. While Joske admitted that some in 
government were keen on having him hung (see Brewster, 1922: 245), it is unlikely that any attempt 
was ever made on his life. 
99 Brewster, 1922: 245. 
100 Despatch 137, Mitchell to SS, 19 October 1887. CSO Despatches. 
101 Milne (Superintendent of Prisons) to CS, 20 March 1886, CSO 86/599. 
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week later he was found speaking to another prisoner outside the bathhouse. Both 
were flogged.102
 
Yet in spite of these restrictive measures, Navosavakadua’s mere presence in Suva 
continued to inspire Tuka and, convinced of his permanent threat, the administration 
set out to remove him altogether. His prison term having ended, it became imperative 
to find an alternate way to permanently exclude him from contact with other Fijians. 
This view was endorsed by the chiefs at the Bose Vakaturaga who resolved during 
their May 1887 deliberations that Navosavakadua was a “monomaniac” and that they 
were of one mind about the man: “Let him now be sent far away; to Rotumah if 
possible.”103
 
The draconian Ordinance 20 of 1887 providing for “the deportation and confinement 
of Disaffected or Dangerous Natives”104 was immediately drafted and enacted, and 
the “dangerous fanatic”105 was shipped to the furthest and most isolated island of the 
colony: the newly annexed island of Rotuma. He spent the rest of his life there until 
his death on 13 June, 1897, just four months before the expiry of his confining 
order.106
 
The 1891 Revival 
 
If the leading spirit of Tuka was now out of the way in Rotuma, and his most active 
deputies deported to all corners of the archipelago (especially Lau, Lomaiviti and 
Taveuni), the movement lived on. Speaking at the May 1887 meeting of the Bose 
Vakaturaga, the Buli Saivou reported that while Navosavakadua was still in Suva, the 
teachers of no less than eight villages had left the district with “no one attending 
church as their minds were bent on Luveniwai, and they have been without teachers 
                                                 
102 Visiting Justice to CS, 4 October 1886, CSO 86/1939. 
103 Resolution XI, “Notes of the Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1887. 21. 
104 Fiji Royal Gazette, 13 October 1887. 
105 These were the terms used by Governor Mitchell to describe Navosavakadua as he sought to send 
the man away “by the first opportunity that may occur”. Despatch 97, Mitchell to SS, 4 July 1887. CSO 
Despatches. 
106 Leefe to CS, 13 June 1897, CSO 97/2550. In Rotuma, Navosavakadua married a woman of 
considerable landed property. Oral tradition speaks of her giving birth to three children including twins. 
Talanoa Session with Leone Tamaikara Naisua, Drauniivi Village, 23 May 2004. Navosavakadua died 
from scrofula after suffering from the disease for four to five years. Leefe to CS, 13 June 1897, CSO 
97/2550. 
 113
ever since”.107 In several of the areas, Tuka fused with luveniwai108 to make 
governance even more difficult. In February 1889 the Roko Tui Bua died. Ratu Tevita 
Suraki was directed to succeed him and promptly left for Vanua Levu to take up his 
new appointment. With all senior Ra chiefs either dismissed or deported, the 
government chose to appoint another Bauan chief to the position of Roko Tui Ra.  
 
The new appointee, Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, took office on 1st June 1889. For his 
subsequent service to the colonial government, Ratu Joni was later praised as “a 
synonym for rectitude of purpose and high endeavour”. His supporters among settlers 
claimed that were Fijians allowed to vote, all of them would have voted for him.109 
However, in Ra of the late 1880s and early 1890s he received little cooperation. It is 
difficult to estimate the extent to which future rebellion in the area was related to his 
appointment. Ratu Joni certainly did not lack decisiveness in dealing with opponents 
of the administration. Arrests and deportations continued at a steady rate. On 16 
September 1889 for instance, another eleven political prisoners from Ra were 
deported mostly to Kadavu, Lomaiviti, Vanuabalavu and Somosomo in Taveuni.110
 
In September 1890, A. B. Joske, the lone European government representative in Colo 
East (Carew being too preoccupied with the huge upsurge of labour cases at the 
Naduruloulou government station in Rewa), was sent to relieve the Resident 
Commissioner of Colo West. While it is difficult to establish the extent to which his 
absence facilitated the resurgence of Tuka, the lack of any significant outward and 
visible signs of the colonial administration in the area certainly did not help the 
government’s cause.111 Barely two months after Joske’s secondment, Rokoleba, a 
priest from Nubumakita appeared among the people at Udu. He had been one of 
Navosavakadua’s deputies in the 1885 rising and had been summoned to Ra to face 
charges in connection with his involvement but had somehow escaped deportation. 
During this preliminary visit, as many as forty men and women (the men blackened 
from head to toe in warlike fashion) undertook a pilgrimage to a former stronghold of 
                                                 
107 “Notes of the Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1887. 21. 
108 See Chapter Five for a discussion of ordinary people’s practice of luveniwai in everyday resistance. 
109 Cyclopedia of Fiji 1907: 211. 
110 See Sekope, Luke and Wiliami deportees from Ra to Native Commissioner, 1 June 1891, CSO 
91/2240. This is a letter of complaint by some of the political prisoners regarding their treatment by the 
Roko Tui Cakaudrove. 
111 Brewster, 1922: 279. 
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pre-Cession times and attempted to raise the spirits of their forefathers and bring them 
back with them to Udu in a Waqa ni yalo (receptacle for the spirits).112 The promise 
of everlasting life and the resurrection of the dead were clearly appealing at a time 
when most Colo villages were experiencing alarmingly high rates of mortality.113
 
Rokoleba also claimed to have been visited by Navosavakadua. Rokoleba returned a 
few weeks later to take up permanent residence in the village and from December 
onwards, the people of Udu neglected going to church and disregarded the observance 
of Sunday. This was in line with the Tuka practice of “inculcating disregard of all 
authority outside of its own limits; teaching that Tuka is the only true way of life; by 
giving implicit obedience to the command of the Priest or head, and taking its 
followers from the communal duties”.114 On 27 January 1891, sixteen men and ten 
women shaved their heads in anticipation of Navosavakadua’s impending return. 
Many more ranging from “youths upwards to grey haired and toothless old men” from 
the nearby villages of Nabuecadra and Matainasau villages were also implicated.115
 
When his movements are placed in the context of other developments in Ra, 
Naboubuco, Muaira and Nadrau,116 the evidence suggests that Rokoleba was part of a 
larger and well coordinated drive to intensify the presence and influence of Tuka in 
the area. Acting in concert with other Tuka emissaries, Rokoleba was the Nalawa 
circuit’s envoy to the Udu-Muaira sector. Another emissary and key figure in the 
Boubuco wing of the movement was Dresa from Rewasau village. After his arrest in 
Nasoqo, officers found a list of twenty two villages in which Dresa could count Tuka 
faithfulls.117 Reporting on the magnitude of Tuka’s spread in the interior of Viti Levu, 
Joske wrote that all men from the borders of Matailobau to the confines of Namosi 
                                                 
112 Joske to CS, 11 May 1891, CSO 91/1546. 
113 The Fijian population had been experiencing steady decline since 1885 and by the early 1890s, the 
mortality rate was so high that many observers believed that the Fijian ‘race’ was dying off. See Fiji 
Blue Books for statistics. One of the reasons for this decline in Colo East was the absence of men on 
plantations or their incarceration for practising Tuka. In Nubumakita for instance, all the young men 
were reported to be either labouring on distant plantations or serving time in gaol and building roads as 
punishment for practising Tuka. See Joske to CS, 10 June 1891, CSO 91/1828. This placed a much 
greater burden on women who stayed behind in the villages to till the land, fulfil obligations to the 
chiefs and the village, and raise infants. 
114 Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi to Joske, 15 March 1891, CSO 91/1133. 
115 Joske to CS, 11 May 1891, CSO 91/1546. 
116 Qaluma, the Tuka movement’s roving vunivola (scribe) was said to have visited Nadrau in late 1890 
and had secured the mass conversion of its people. 
117 Joske to CS, 1 August 1891, CSO 91/2344. 
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had been stirred by it.118 Minuted in the same report was an irate comment by Carew: 
“I believe the superstitions have filled the minds of the people throughout the whole 
of Viti Levu certainly in Colo West – Navosa and all the way to Suva or near it 
including Kasavu “not 200 yards from my residence”. 
 
But while Udu may have been one of the first villages to feel the resurgence of Tuka, 
Nasoqo was certainly the nerve centre of proceedings.119 In February 1891 and still 
unknown to government, a new Tuka bure was being built a few miles up the river 
from Udu in the village of Navuniwaiwaivula, home of the Buli Naboubuco. Women 
were busy plaiting twelve mats each to furnish the bure. The construction of such an 
important public display of Tuka power followed the visit to the village of Raicula, 
Nasoqo’s high priest and his presentation of a tabua. Raicula was the head centre of 
Tuka in Naboubuco and was later considered to be the most dangerous man in the 
district. He was in regular communication with Drauniivi, Vale Lebo, and other 
villages of Nakauvadra.120
 
The tabua itself had originated from Drauniivi and made its way up into the 
mountains to him at Nasoqo. He had presented it at Navuniwaiwaivula in the 
following terms: “I present this that we may be of one mind, that the Government be 
overthrown and the Tuka flourish.”121 When the bure was completed, Navulalevu of 
Lamisa, the assistant Buli of Tokaimalo who had been gaoled for his part in the 1885 
rising, was invited to assist in the consecration of the building and to take part in an 
important Tuka meeting. His attendance at this meeting gave it great kudos for he was 
a relative of Navosavakadua and some regarded him to be as great, if not greater than 
Navosavakadua in the organisation. He was also said to be the brother of the chief of 
Nakorowaiwai.122 Because of the secretive nature of the organisation, it is difficult to 
know what transpired. However a prayer was reportedly made for those who held 
                                                 
118 Joske to CS, 1 August 1891, CSO 91/2344. 
119 Nasoqo was home of Isireli Nacagilaba, considered by many to be “the grandfather of Tuka”. Other 
resident senior priests included his son Nacolauli, Raicula, Duaibe, and Seavula.. Joske to CS, 1 August 
1891, CSO 91/2344. 
120 Joske to CS, 1 August 1891, CSO 91/2344. 
121 Joske to CS, 1 August 1891, CSO 91/2344. 
122 Joske to CS, 1 August 1891, CSO 91/2344. 
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government appointments, “that they may be punished at the day of judgement 
whether they be magistrates or Bulis, may they be turned into pillars of salt”.123
 
The colonial administration was oblivious to any of this until mid-March 1891 when 
the Buli of Nalawa alerted Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi about the revival of Tuka in his 
district. In this regard it is telling that a report by Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi a month 
earlier about more damage done by Thomas’s cattle on Drauniivi plantations, did not 
yield any intelligence about the latest outbreak of Tuka.124 Ratu Joni’s report 
identified the headwaters of the Wainibuka River and Nalawa as being perpetual 
hotspots of the superstition and estimated that the movement had not gone beyond the 
presentation of propitiatory yaqona and feasts to the priests in return for wai ni tuka 
and that some had tried to raise the dead.125 This apparent lack of concern or 
intelligence about Tuka suggests that the government had little access to local 
indigenous intelligence networks, that people purposefully withheld intelligence, or 
that it underestimated the capacity and resilience of Tuka to mobilise people. 
 
When Joske returned in April 1891, he found the entire Colo East area rife with Tuka 
and Luveniwai. Exposed and powerless, he admitted that Tuka had become nothing 
short of sedition, that the current law was insufficient to deal with the movement, and 
that punishment ought to be more severe.126 This redefinition of Tuka from 
superstition to sedition was reiterated by Carew who proclaimed, “Tuka does mean 
the overthrow of Government. I have always said so.”127 Thurston himself toured the 
area, personally ordering and overseeing the flogging of hundreds of men at Nasoqo 
where he also threatened to hang, shoot and burn the new acting Buli Boubuco,128 if 
he didn’t make his people behave themselves.129
 
                                                 
123 Joske to CS, 1 August 1891, CSO 91/2344. 
124 See the report by Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi on “Damage done to crops from Drauniivi to 
Nakorowaiwai by Thomas’s cattle.” 16 February 1891, CSO 91/730. This file reveals that Thomas 
finally erected his fences in March 1891. Yet, cattle continued to stray well into the late 1890s. See 
CSO 99/2931 for more correspondence regarding the dispute. 
125 Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi to Joske, 15 March 1891, CSO 91/1133. 
126 Joske to CS, 1 August 1891, CSO 91/2344. 
127 Joske to CS, 11 May 1891, CSO 91/1546. 
128 The previous Buli Boubuco was in gaol on a charge of vakatubuca or “spreading evil reports”, the 
usual charge for Tuka. Scarr, 1980: 224. 
129 Scarr, 1980: 226. 
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Punishment and Exile 
 
The government’s crackdown on Tuka continued uninterrupted from April to July. 
There are conflicting reports about the level of violence used by the administration to 
punish the perpetrators and to permanently eradicate the movement. In his August 
1891 despatch to the Secretary of State for Colonies, Thurston detailed his meetings 
and movements in Colo and to Drauniivi but speaks of only one whipping, that of 
Senileba, the powerful priest of Nasoqo. However, oral tradition speaks of vast 
surfaces of masi cloth used to soak the large amount of blood that flowed during the 
public flogging of numerous captured votaries. The sites where these cloths were 
interned are still revered today.130 Eventually, all the leaders were arrested, publicly 
flogged, gaoled and deported.131 The attack sparked an exodus of refugees (especially 
from Nasoqo) who sought shelter wherever they could (including caves) though most 
ended up in Savulelele and Nubumakita.132
 
The governor also instructed Joske and Carew to identify a suitable site for a new 
government outpost in Northern Colo. Nadarivatu was duly identified as the best spot 
and a number of trainee carpenters from the new Native Technical School at Yanawai 
(near Savusavu in Vanua Levu) were brought in to build the new camp. The gaol was 
one of the first buildings to go up.133 A. B. Joske and twenty-five Armed Native 
Constabulary took command of the post in the hope that this physical display of 
power would discourage any further dissent. 
 
While most of the drama may have taken place at Nasoqo, the inspiration for 
disobedience and rebellion continued to flow from Navosavakadua’s irrepressible 
village of Drauniivi. While the village existed, it could continue to infuse the 
movement with its religious, cultural and political vitality and offer a persistent, well-
                                                 
130 Semi Duaibe, Personal Communication, 3 June 2004. This man is a descendant of one of the 
Nasoqo deportees. 
131 Joske to CS, 1 August 1891, CSO 91/2344. This file contains a list compiled by the government, of 
Tuka’s principal leaders with their various functions in the organisation and the level of danger they 
posed. Most were bete (priests). They were deported mainly to Gau and to Lau. See also CSO 91/2240, 
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132 Joske to CS, 10 June 1891, CSO 91/1828. 
133 CS to Thurston, 18 June 1892, CSO 92/2064. Nadarivatu had already been identified as a potential 
location for a government constabulary post after the second wave of Tuka in 1886, but a heavy 
schedule of other government affairs had delayed its establishment. See Despatch 21, Thurston to SS, 
16 February 1886. CSO Despatches. 
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organised and popular alternative to the fledgling colonial administration. The 
authorities referred to it as a “cancer”134 which had to be removed. In August 1891, 
on the advice of Joske and Carew, Thurston took the unprecedented decision to order 
the destruction of the entire village and decreed that Drauniivi’s name should forever 
be forgotten.135 The village was razed to the ground and its inhabitants deported to 
Korolevu in the Kadavu district of Naceva. So were the Wacakena people, inhabitants 
of the Nakauvadra villages of Natuna, Nayalayala, and Vale Lebo.136
 
With the displacement of hundreds of people,137 the decimation of its leadership, and 
the presence of an armed force in the neighbourhood, Tuka was finally broken. The 
government also took a number of other measures to prevent any future resurgence. 
Nasoqo was “straightened up” by Joske,138 though the continuous decline of its 
population reduced it to a mere shadow of its former grandeur. Chiefs and other 
government officials in Naboubuco, Muaira and other Lomaicolo districts who had 
been unable or unwilling to restrain their people from joining the movement were 
severely reprimanded while those whose loyalty was doubtful were replaced.139 The 
administration also restructured and subdivided districts, and removed and 
amalgamated several of the offending villages into more visible and accessible 
ones.140 This was calculated to render their management and surveillance more 
effective and their future resistance more easily detectable. The policy of regulating 
space, controlling movement, and imposing discipline through the systematic 
relocation and amalgamation of villages is discussed in Chapter Five. 
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136 For details of the names, number, and provenance of deportees from these villages, see the lists in 
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Drauniivi villages. CSO Despatches. 
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 Sending people into exile was intended at least partly to change their behaviour. It 
also had other potential outcomes. It could loosen the link between village and land 
and help dismantle the bond between land, people and their common history. It could 
also weaken their troublesome claims to precedence and, as the government hoped, 
lead to their permanent resettlement elsewhere.141 The exile of the Kai Drauniivi 
certainly benefited the Thomas Brothers who, in spite of continued but weakened 
opposition from other local and European claimants, profited by consolidating their 
claim on Yaqara.142 In the absence of the deportees, several other parcels of land 
claimed by Kai Drauniivi and Wacakena were leased to existing and new settlers by 
other local claimants. The size and number of these leases was such that the 
government could not find adequate land to resettle them when the term of 
deportation finally ended.143
 
The return of the exiles was carefully managed. Government had declined successive 
requests by Ra and Colo North chiefs to repatriate the deportees144 as well as several 
petitions by the deportees themselves to be allowed to return.145 Finally in 1902, after 
the expiry of the confining order and government’s failure to convince them to stay 
permanently in Kadavu, the deportees returned to the province of Ra. They were 
resettled in two successive years and dispersed in various districts. In 1902, the 
Wacakena people were divided and relocated at Naraviravi in Tokaimalo, Naqelecibi 
in Nailuva, and Vatukacevaceva in Naroko.146 The following year, the rest of the 
Drauniivi deportees were resettled near the government station at Nanukuloa.147 This 
proximity to the Roko Tui Ra was intended to facilitate their surveillance. It was also 
necessitated by the lack of sufficient land near the original village site.148
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In 1907 and after sixteen years in exile, the Kai Drauniivi were permitted to resettle 
on the original site of their village. The administration was cautiously optimistic that 
the new generation of villagers had grown up with “other ideas to those of their 
progenitors,” though Joske was quick to advise that the village should be kept under 
“strict scrutiny”.149 Yet, within seven years of the resettlement, the village had 
become the Ra centre of the Viti Kabani, an emerging politico-commercial enterprise 
which was poised to mount the largest unified anti-colonial challenge in Fiji and 
forms the subject of the next chapter. The local manager for the Kabani was Taivesi 
Mamaqarua, Drauniivi’s new Turaga ni Koro and cousin of Navosavakadua. 
 
However, a major change in Drauniivi’s strategy of resistance occurred in 1917 and 
1918 with the Ra sittings of the Native Lands Commission (headed by G. V. Maxwell 
and assisted by two Bauan chiefs). Until then, like many other villages around Fiji, 
Drauniivi had participated in a countrywide undeclared boycott of the Commission 
(this boycott is discussed further in Chapter Five). In 1917 however, the 
Commission’s new terms of reference included the power to appropriate for the 
Crown any land not submitted for claim by boycotting villages. Faced with the 
prospect of losing more of their land, the Drauniivi people elected to participate in a 
project which they also knew would legitimise the colonial administration’s right to 
arbitrate the validity of their claims. 
 
Leading Drauniivi’s submission was Mamaqarua’s son, Joeli Bavou, who compiled a 
seventy-five page book150 documenting Vatukaloko’s tribal history. The book 
presents a vision of the district as having temporal, genealogical and ritual precedence 
over all other peoples and polities including those Bauan or colonial. At the head of 
the polity stands Jehovah from whom descend other deities including Degei, 
Nakausabaria and Nacirikaumoli.151 The adoption of Jehovah as the spiritual head of 
Vatukaloko represents an important conceptual shift and reflects a new framework 
within which the Vatukaloko were willing to venture their claims in the evolving 
colonial order of things. In this case, resistance was marked by the appropriation of 
signs and instruments (such as the sitting of the Lands Commission, the act of writing, 
                                                 
149 Native Commissioner to CS, 12 December 1907, CSO 07/6293. 
150 This book is kept in the village and was consulted by Martha Kaplan during her anthropological 
fieldwork in Drauniivi. 
151 Kaplan, 1995: 150. 
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and the adoption of religious figures) from within the dominant centres of power. The 
counter-history which emerged allowed for a redefinition of Vatukaloko identity in 
ways that were more compatible with colonial expectations. This can be read as a 
major concession to colonial power, but it simultaneously constitutes one of the 
earliest written attempts at delegitimising the centralising and normalising practices of 
colonialism in Fiji.152 Although the account failed to influence the commission’s 
judgment in the short term, it continues in the present day to infuse Vatukaloko 





As for Tuka, one of its most effective weapons had been its capacity to spread without 
detection by the administration. From 1891, it was forced to adopt an ever more 
clandestine character so that if the practice persisted, the government was seldom 
aware of it.153 It was not until 1914 that the government learned of a highly organized 
Tuka secret society embracing all the leading chiefs and nearly all the men of 
Qaliyalatina, Toqe (on the Ba River), Naboubuco, and several from Colo West, 
including Nabisiki’s village of Namoli, Nukuilau and Vatubalavu. This offshoot of 
Tuka is well discussed by Macnaught154 and contains characteristics similar to those 
of its predecessors. A sacred society, the Bai Tabua, was formed in the service of the 
twin gods Nacirikaumoli and Nakausabaria. Its leader Osea Tamanikoro, from 
Nabatimaoli in Qaliyalatina professed that he would realise the reversals predicted by 
Navosavakadua and made the same explicit promises that foreigners would become 
their slaves, and that the church and the government would be driven out. All would 
then contribute to build a large new house at Vatukoro, the place where their fathers 
                                                 
152 The formation of such contestatory knowledges and their inscription, like graffiti, in the heart of 
colonialism’s mechanics of truth production, have not been dealt with in this thesis because of space 
constraints. They deserve, however, a separate study. 
153 Some Ra men from Naroko were discovered in 1896 to be practising Tuka though on this occasion 
none of the symptoms of sedition which had been so prominent five years before were evident. See 
Commissioner Colo and East to CS, 17 February 1908, CSO 08/974. After the turn of the century, 
several other minor tuka-related cases were uncovered and punished accordingly including one in 1907 
in Nadrau where an elaborate hierarchy of sergeants and scribes was discovered. It was presided over 
by a Vuki, or official responsible for overseeing Navosavakadua’s prophesy of turning the world 
upside down and return Fiji to its original owners. On this occasion, Joske sentenced ten men to two 
months with hard labour. Joske to CS, 17 February 1908, CSO 08/974. 
154 Macnaught, 1982: 95-8. 
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had defeated Cakobau’s force in 1868.155 This site would symbolise the end of 
oppression and the birth of a new Fiji under Tamanikoro’s leadership. Tamanikoro’s 
self-serving ambitions aside, there is little doubt that his appeal to the interior’s deep-
seated resentment of Bau, its suspicions of Christianity, and its contempt for the 
government and foreigners continued to strike a chord with many people. 
 
The government’s response was similar to previous outbreaks. The leaders (seventeen 
in all) were arrested, those who were holding government positions were dismissed 
and the district of Qaliyalatina was abolished. Tamanikoro was confined to Oneata in 
the Lau Group for ten years while his principal accomplices were deported to other 
islands in Lau and to Kadavu.156 For their part, ordinary villagers followed the lead of 
many of their neighbours and registered their dissent by converting to Roman 
Catholicism and Seventh Day Adventism. This they did both as a mark of protest and 
in the hope that the regulations administered so stringently by the Methodist Church 
would not apply so obstinately in other denominations. It also suggests that in many 
parts, villagers identified authority with the Church rather than the secular state. 
 
Yet, the administration could never be sure that Tuka had been completely eradicated. 
Writing in 1922, Joske speculated that in spite of Government’s best efforts, the 
practice continued to exist. Macnaught suggests that Tuka persisted into the 
thirties.157 My own impression on recent visits to the interior is that Tuka as a 
movement has all but disappeared from oral history. On the other hand, the memory 
of Navosavakadua, his prophecies, and magical deeds remain firmly embedded in the 




Religion was always of paramount importance in the movement. In many ways, the 
protest took a religious form because religion was the most effective rallying point 
existing at the time. While the essence of religion came from Nakauvadra, the 
leadership was provided by the powerful bete, and the following came from the 
districts where as Thornley points out there was dissatisfaction with economic, 
                                                 
155 Commissioner Colo North to CS, 16 July 1914, CSO 14/6625. 
156 Macnaught, 1982: 98. 
157 Macnaught, 1982: 99. 
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political and social conditions and where people “moved out of the church to 
highlight their predicament and sought instead the gods with whom they were better 
able to identify”.158 Hence, far from being a mere superstition leading to native 
madness, or a drug that worked to perpetuate the privileges of the powerful, religion 
acted in Tuka as a vehicle through which to channel rebellion. Where Wesleyanism 
often strengthened the rule of chiefs and imposed a temporal order of work and 
worship that suited the disciplinary and routinising aims of the administration, Tuka’s 
malleable syncretism allowed it to appropriate the potent power of Jehovah as a 
Nakauvadra god and use it as an emancipatory force. Navosavakadua and his 
associates appropriated the potent elements of Christianity and transformed them into 
an emphatic affirmation of the strength and pre-eminence of Fijian civilization. This 
counter-point repositioned Tuka supporters to the centre where before they had been 
alienated and marginalized. 
 
Tuka did not therefore reject Christianity. While it retained certain ingredients as 
signs of Fijian particularity, it skilfully claimed some of Christianity’s most powerful 
motifs to gain for itself a greater degree of universality, standing and acceptance. 
Biblical names were freely applied to places around Nakauvadra and 
Navosavakadua’s week was divided into seven days all named after Fijian deities, 
Tuono being the Sabbath reserved for meetings held at dedicated Tuka houses.159 No 
evidence could be found in primary materials to suggest that any intimidation took 
place against Christians or their buildings and institutions. They appear to have been 
merely ignored or boycotted. For instance, when the children of Lamisa in Tokaimalo 
stopped attending school in 1891, Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi noted that this was explicitly 
linked to the practice of Tuka.160 Yet, no attack was ever made on the school or its 
teacher. Navosavakadua and Tuka therefore challenged not through rejection but 
through appropriation. He appropriated Christianity and simultaneously challenged 
the normative order it had become associated with. 
 
For ordinary Ra and Colo villagers whose integration in the new order was not 
working in their favour, Tuka gave them the opportunity to reassert their autonomy by 
associating with a leader and movement that was more familiar and sympathetic to 
                                                 
158 Thornley, 1979: 161. 
159 Sutherland, 1910: 54. 
160 Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi to Joske, 15 March 1891, CSO 91/1133. 
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their interests. For those who adopted Navosavakadua as their leader and Tuka as 
their religion, the project was neither disorderly nor irrational. It was a restorative 
movement. As Sutherland put it, “Tuka was a scheme of regeneration”.161 But as 
much as it was restorative, the movement was not entirely backward looking. Rather, 
it was grounded in real grievances about very current inequities, and oriented towards 
a better, more dignified future. As such it was an empowering movement. 
 
Kaplan has argued that because Tuka created a polity of invulnerability and reversals, 
it became conceivable for its followers to envision a future in which inequities of 
power and status could be nullified. In this polity of reversals, the people were to have 
control over their chiefs.162 James Scott has argued about certain subordinate groups 
that while they may have trouble imagining other power arrangements than those of 
their immediate experience, “they have no trouble imagining a total reversal of the 
existing distribution of status and rewards”.163 The extent to which such a vision of 
was achieved under Tuka is debatable but if it was, then Reverend Webb had good 
reason to liken Tuka to “radicalism”. 
 
The longevity and persistence of Tuka suggests that Tuka was more than a mere 
superstition with an unfortunate and misguided anti-colonial agenda.164 Nor can 
Navosavakadua be dismissed as a “more or less stupid” “prophet of sorts”.165 In 
reality, Tuka’s politics was so closely integrated with the religion that the two became 
almost indistinguishable. While it failed to recognise and address the wide range of 
grievances that lay at the origin of the insurgency, the government realised the 
versatility of Tuka and opted to physically remove its most dangerous characters and 
four entire villages. In approving these measures, Basil Thomson wrote that stamping 
out Tuka required the same energy that government would employ against dangerous 
conspiracies of a political nature.166
 
                                                 
161 Sutherland, 1910: 55. 
162 Kaplan, 1995: 113. 
163 Scott, 1990. 80. 
164 For early representations of Tuka in published works, see Webb, 1885; Fiji Times articles on 16 
January, 3 February, and 3 July 1886; Thomson, 1908; Sutherland, 1910; and Brewster, 1922. 
165 Brewster, 1922: 237, 245. As a “mad prophet”, Navosavakadua was often compared to Te Kooti 
(and Tuka to the Hauhau Movement) by settlers who had come to Fiji from New Zealand. (See 
Brewster, Carew, Thomson, and Sutherland in particular). 
166 Thomson, 1895: 359. 
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Hence, Tuka caused the administration considerable anxiety.167 As the head of the 
movement, Navosavakadua certainly challenged British constructions of legitimate 
leadership which assumed that only white men and coastal, Christian, Bauan or other 
comprador chiefs could govern. His apparent imperviousness to the administration’s 
attempts to restrain and contain him, also symbolized the vulnerability of the colonial 
project, the administration’s organisational frailties, its incomplete knowledge and 
control of people and its incapacity to regulate all things at all time. The strategic 
manipulation of these weaknesses, opened avenues for people to contest the 
legitimacy of colonial authority and to imagine and occasionally live their lives 
independently of it. The movement was therefore never completely outside the 
confines of the dominant system of power nor was it completely controlled by it from 
the inside. 
 
There were certainly signs to indicate that Tuka had frailties and inequities of its own. 
Brewster accused Tuka priests of selfishness and occasional abuse in their quest to 
recuperate lost income and prestige.168 In admonishing villagers for practising Tuka, 
Thurston underlined the excessive demands of Tuka leaders such as Senileba who had 
coerced Nasoqo people into working his gardens and furnishing him with endless 
supplies of food, yaqona, mats, and other such goods and services. How could they, 
wondered Thurston in astonishment, continually choose such a relic of a disorderly 
past as Tuka over the benefits of peace and good order which British rule had 
achieved?169 This colonial order had been embraced by Fiji’s coastal chiefs, and their 
support of the administration inhibited the spread of Tuka beyond Ra and Colo. It is 
difficult to estimate the extent to which Tuka as an essentially self-contained local 
challenge found resonance with a wider pan-Fijian audience. In the end, Tuka was 
crushed before it could challenge the administration on a wider front. Its defeat came 
not because of any of Tuka’s internal flaws or deficiencies but because of the state’s 
ability and willingness to use its coercive power. 
 
This chapter of Fiji’s history again underlines the fallacy of understanding Fijians 
under colonial rule as being passive obedient people at the service of a benevolent 
                                                 
167 Sutherland, 1910: 56. 
168 Brewster, 1922: 247. 
169 Despatch 53, Thurston to SS, 12 August 1891. CSO Despatches. See also the excesses of Raicula in 
Udu in Joske to CS, 11 May 1891, CSO 91/1546. 
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administration. Power was contested at different levels, for a number of complex 
reasons, and by an enterprising population keenly responsive to its past prestige, 
present difficulties and future aspirations. Tuka showed colonial authority to be 
tentative and imperfect, although ultimately, the government was resolute and 
decisive enough to impose its will. Yet, Navosavakadua and Tuka were to have 
lasting effects on future manifestations of popular discontent in Fiji’s colonial history. 
Although the movement itself did not resurface with the same force it had in the 
1880s and early 1890s, Tuka infused its spirit into other popular movements such as 
the Viti Kabani. It is to this, the largest resistance movement of Fiji’s colonial history, 




The Movement for Federation and the Viti Kabani 
 
Apolosi Nawai is one of Fiji’s most well known rebels and has received relatively 
more attention from historians than other dissidents. The Viti Kabani is the best 
known of Fiji’s resistance movements. This is not surprising for when Nawai formed 
the Viti Kabani (Fiji Company) in 1913, he and his supporters mounted the single 
most important popular challenge to the colonial administration and the chiefs who 
were part of it. When it peaked in 1915 and again in 1917, the Kabani had established 
itself as a rival government in all parts of the colony except for Rotuma and stood as a 
powerful example of unarmed resistance which united a formerly disparate Fijian 
population of all backgrounds. Yet, in comparison with other historical phenomena 
and illustrious personalities such as Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, Apolosi Nawai and his 
movement remain relatively unknown and under-researched. Among the least 
understood is the specific political and socio-economic context within which he and 
his contemporaries evolved and the role that this played in the success of the 
movement. Until now, all existing historiography on Apolosi Nawai has begun with 
his rise to public attention in 19131 However, the forces that led to the formation of 
the Kabani were at work well before then. To fill this historiographical void, this 
chapter begins with the period from the end of Tuka in the early 1890s and surveys a 
series of historical developments that help explain the emergence of the Viti Kabani 
in the early 1910s. These moments are also used to bridge the two periods (Tuka and 
Viti Kabani) and to show the persistence of discontent across time. They include the 
Seaqaqa War of 1894, the movement for federation with New Zealand (1901-1903), 
and the popular rising against Bau in Tailevu from 1907 to 1912. The core section 
analyses the movement as a challenge to the colonial administration up to the period 
of Apolosi Nawai’s first exile to Rotuma in 1917. 
 
                                                 
1 A summary of all Colonial Secretary Office (CSO) files about Apolosi and the Viti Kabani up to 1915 
is contained in a memo from Allardyce to CS, 1 June 1915, CSO 15/5843. Other primary materials 
used in this chapter include the “Notes of the Proceedings of a Native Council or Council of Chiefs” 
(1914 and 1917), documents from Colonial Office file CO 83 (Public Records Office, London), the Fiji 
Times, and records of the Methodist Mission in Fiji. For secondary literature see Couper, 1968; 
Gaunavou Nawai and David Toma, Ai Tukutuku Bibi e Baleti Ratu Avolosi R. Nawai. Nadi: S.S.P. 
Press, undated pamphlet; Macnaught 1978 and 1982; Durutalo, 1985a; Sutherland, 1992; Kaplan and 
Kelly, 1994; Kaplan, 1995; Weeks, 1995; and Heartfield, 2003. 
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The Seaqaqa War: 1894 
 
The people of Ra and the interior of Viti Levu did not have a monopoly on resistance, 
neither did they resist all the time. Others around the colony had also lost land, polity, 
autonomy, status or had them diminished or altered. Some chose to express their 
dissatisfaction privately or in ways that would avoid detection while others chose a 
more dramatic path. Seaqaqa villagers in the interior of Vanua Levu chose the latter in 
1894 when they defied the colonial authorities in the last open armed confrontation 
between villagers and the government. This war has never been thoroughly 
investigated by any of Fiji’s historians. This can be partly attributed to the loss of the 
main CSO records pertaining to the war.2 Deryck Scarr is the only contemporary 
historian to pay this war any interest and sums it up as being “of the same nature as 
the Ra conspiracy seventeen years earlier”.3
 
Scarr’s allusion to the Tuka movement is not misplaced for the Seaqaqa War, though 
short-lived, shares some striking similarities with the conflicts in Ra and Colo. 
Seaqaqa is located in the interior of Vanua Levu and its people are also known among 
coastal dwellers as kai Colo. The people had long-established traditional and kinship 
ties with Wailevu in the south and resented the new colonial demarcations which had 
placed them, especially those from the tikina of Sasa, under the authority of Naduri in 
the north, the seat of the Roko Tui Macuata.4 In somewhat similar fashion to the 
Bauan appointments in Ra, the Roko Tui Macuata’s brother had been appointed Buli 
of Seaqaqa ahead of several prominent local aspirants (Ramasieli, Yacadra and 
Qaranivalu in particular), thereby accentuating the bitterness of the latter and creating 
powerful enemies. 
                                                 
2 In the introductory remarks to his short study of the war in 1962, J. W. Deering points out that many 
of the documents had already disappeared at the time of his writing. Deering compensated for this lack 
by using a Radio Fiji interview of Taito Tamatawale to reconstruct the chronology of events. Another 
indigenous account is that of Ua ni Wasaliwa, the nom de plume of a contributor to the official Fijian 
newsletter Na Mata. This account was submitted for publication a month after the hostilities and should 
be considered as one of the few existing primary sources of the conflict. It was translated by G.A.F.W. 
Beauclerc and republished in the Transactions of the Fijian Society in 1919. Basil Thomson refers 
briefly to the war in his 1908 book Fijians: A Study in the Decay of Custom London: Heinemann, 1908 
in which he contends that the outbreak “had no political importance”. 145. For his part Deering 
described the war as “anti-Christian and anti-British” in nature and “the last oppositional movement to 
colonial rule”. J. Deering, “The Seaqaqa War.” in Transactions of the Fiji Society. 9: 1, 1962. 113. 
3 Scarr, 1984: 107. 
4 Despatch 53, Thurston to SS, 25 June 1894. CSO Despatches. NAF. See also “Notes of the 
Proceedings of a Native Council,” Suva, 1894. 12. 
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Map 12: Map of Vanua Levu showing the location of Seaqaqa, 1894. 
 
The construction of a new sugar mill in Labasa had raised the strategic importance of 
the area, and the administration depended on the cooperation of neighbouring districts 
for the successful extension of sugar production. However, the arrival in such close 
proximity of their home of such a powerful economic player, the Colonial Sugar 
Refinery, reputed also to be a land-seizing and labour-hungry company, also raised 
anxiety. In 1894, the Sasa people were ordered to provide buabua posts for the 
construction of the new sugar mill at Labasa. The posts were rejected because they 
were not straight and the men were ordered to cut and carry new ones. 
 
Ordinary people were further incensed by the long distances they had to travel to 
work the cane fields near the Labasa coast and by the maize they had to grow closer 
to home for tax purposes, but which brought them so few visible benefits.5 When 
three constables arrived at Calalevu on 31 May 1894 to serve summonses on the 
villagers for non-payment of taxes, they were met by an angry crowd of armed men 
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with blackened faces, and beaten back.6 Under the leadership of Yacadra and 
Qaranivalu, Calalevu men then set off to the villages of Nacereyaga and Delaiviti and 
took them without bloodshed before burning villages in Saivou, killing two men.7 
Preparations for these attacks had been in place for some time and a temple had been 
built in honour of Vatewa, the god of war, whose worship had resumed in earnest.8
 
News of the insurgency reached Suva on 11 June prompting Thurston to assemble a 
force of forty armed native constabularies under Bauan command, and to travel 
immediately to Labasa. With the Tuka rising uppermost on his mind, Governor 
Thurston feared that if rebellion got a hold in Seaqaqa, it would quickly spread to Viti 
Levu including the recently disturbed districts of Naboubuco, Tokaimalo and Nalawa 
and “the whole colony would in all probability and within a week or two be thrown 
into a state of disorder which could only be remedied at the cost of much time, money 
and loss of life”.9 On arrival in Naduri, he picked up sixteen more Macuata recruits 
and was assured of the readiness of four hundred more men from Lekutu, Bua, 
Nayakasiga and Dama to support the government force.10
 
In the meantime, Qaranivalu, an old war leader and former turaga ni koro of Calalevu, 
had taken up position at Caumurimuri, an inaccessible highly fortified hilltop.11 The 
garrison numbered one hundred warriors at the most and carried no arms other than 
spears. Basil Thomson, writing fourteen years after the conflict, estimated that the 
battle was over in a matter of minutes12 However brief the clash was, it appears that 
this battle was fought, as many were in the 1876 Colo War, according to traditional 
Fijian war etiquette. Once the government force had shot dead seven of the rebels and 
gained a clear ascendancy on the battleground, a number of the insurgents gave 
themselves up while the rest took to the bush. Among those who escaped was 
Qaranivalu who was captured in Cakaudrove three days later. Two others took their 
own lives and a woman died of wounds suffered from a stray bullet.13
                                                 
6 Despatch 53, Thurston to SS, 25 June 1894. 
7 Thomson, 1908: 145, and Ua ni Wasaliwa, “The Seaqaqa War.” in Transactions of the Fijian Society. 
1919. Trans. G. A. Beauclerc. (Pages of the Transactions of the Fijian Society are not numbered.) 
8 Despatch 53, Thurston to SS, 25 June 1894. 
9 Despatch 53, Thurston to SS, 25 June 1894. 
10 Despatch 53, Thurston to SS, 25 June 1894. 
11 Despatch 53, Thurston to SS, 25 June 1894. 
12 Thomson, 1908: 146. 
13 Despatch 53, Thurston to SS, 25 June 1894. 
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 As he had done three years earlier in Nasoqo, Thurston ordered the bure kalou 
destroyed, and a large black basalt rock – a shrine of Vatewa – was symbolically 
thrown over the precipice.14 He then convened a meeting of all the people in the area 
and informed them that they would be forced out of their province, though he later 
changed his mind and decided to amalgamate the towns “because small towns without 
a town-chief, and impossible to be supervised, originated trouble”.15 The towns of 
Nacereyaga, Delaiviti, Navakaiteqe, Vuna, Watidratagane, Nukuseva, Naisogolato, 
Calalevu, and Savuroloka, were ordered removed to Natua to become only one town. 
Several others were amalgamated so that only three villages remained.16 For their 
part, the people of Volivoli, like those of Drauniivi before them, were taken en masse 
to Naduri and placed under surveillance. 
 
As in Colo, Ra and Naboubuco, the entire leadership was either executed, deported or 
imprisoned for lengthy periods. In late July, Qaranivalu and his associate Masuveni 
were hung while four other prisoners had their death sentences commuted.17 
Tamailaivou, one of the principal ringleaders of the rising and two chiefs (Ramasiale 
of Colo Wailevu and Ratu George Katonivere), were banished to Cikobia, Somosomo 
(Taveuni), and Lau respectively for their accessory roles in the rising.18 Two other 
priests received ten years penal servitude.19
 
Upon his return to Suva, Thurston addressed the chiefs assembled for their annual 
council meeting and urged them to weed out all remaining “old” and “evil” practices. 
Like most other officials, he grouped these practices under the general category of 
Kalou Rere and declared that “such practices are altogether foolishness, and it is a 
foolishness that leads men’s minds astray, leads them to forget the authority of the 
land and the word of God, and can only end in their ruin”.20 The chiefs responded 
                                                 
14 Despatch 53, Thurston to SS, 25 June 1894. 
15 Ua ni Wasaliwa. 
16 Ua ni Wasaliwa. Saivou and Nacereyaga were re-established at some later point for they appear on 
present day maps. 
17 Despatch 76, Thurston to SS, 13 August 1894. 
18 See Roko Tui Macuata to Acting CS, 2 July 1900, CSO 00/2610. 
19 Deering: 117. 
20 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” Suva, 1894. 3. 
 132
with “deep regret” in their letter to the Queen, that “a few of the people … should 
have reverted to the dark heathen practices of bygone ages”.21
 
This response suggests that the disturbance was misplaced, juvenile and retrograde. 
Supporting the commonly held view that isolated communities were necessarily the 
most backward and most likely to resist change, Basil Thomson proposed that 
Seaqaqa communities had been so “completely cut off from the influence of Mission 
and Government” that they may as well have been living “in another country”.22 
However, missionary accounts suggest that Seaqaqa grievances had been 
accumulating for more than two months and were explicitly linked to the protest over 
the payment of taxes to Macuata.23 The decision by five neighbouring villages to join 
the “movement” within hours of Calalevu’s first strike on Saivou, and reports that the 
Qaranivalu’s force had quickly grown to more than a hundred men,24 also suggests 
that there was more to this rising than the machinations of a few disgruntled 
individuals in a wild and isolated district of Fiji. Seaqaqa’s integration in the colonial 
order of things had not worked for its people. When they refused to pay their taxes, 
expelled the constables from their villages, and openly practised their Kalou Rere 
rituals, they rejected this new order because it had yielded so few benefits and too 
many hardships and anxieties. 
 
As in Ra, the religious rituals were the most visual and public signs of the Seaqaqa 
defiance, but behind them lay a primarily political grievance. When he rebuked the 
chiefs for the persistence of these rituals in their districts, Thurston was speaking 
about Kalou Rere rituals mainly in their function as conduits through which political 
ambitions could be channelled. Thornley makes this point succinctly when he 
concludes that the districts that were dissatisfied with economic, political and social 
conditions seldom found in the church an effective spokesperson to understand their 
disaffection or to highlight their predicament. For this reason, they tended to seek 
instead “the gods with whom they were better able to identify”.25
 
                                                 
21 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1894. 71. 
22 Thomson, 1908: 145. 
23 See Thornley, 1979: 139. 
24 Despatch 53, Thurston to SS, 25 June 1894. 
25 Thornley, 1979: 161. 
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The Movement for Federation: 1901 – 1903 
 
Opposition to the taxation system was not confined to Seaqaqa. As will become 
evident in Chapter Five, resistance to taxation was pervasive and mostly took the form 
of day-to-day evasion or as William Allardyce26 described it, “an obstinate mulish 
sitting down … accompanied by sporadic acts of violence including incendiarism”.27 
But discontent over taxation was also the origin between 1900 and 1902 of a little 
known movement that sought to federate Fiji with New Zealand. 
 
This movement was facilitated on the political front by the death of Governor John 
Bates Thurston in 1897. If, as Brewster remarked, “Thurston had left the people 
actively loyal”, his successor would leave them “passively disloyal”.28 Soon after 
arriving in the colony, the new governor George O’Brien,29 embarked on an extensive 
programme of reforms which he hoped would reverse the steady decrease of the 
Fijian population.30 This involved an intensification of the existing programme of 
relocation and amalgamation of Fijian villages, a meticulous farming programme to 
economise time and labour in the production and collection of taxes, and new 
stringent sanitary measures that, among other things, forced villagers to buy cows and 
coerced mothers into giving their children cow’s milk in feeding bottles.31 It was 
hoped that this tighter regimentation of village life would free up more time for 
people to spend on their personal betterment and that of their offspring.32 The state’s 
attempts to control, discipline, and regiment movement, space, and body are discussed 
in more detail in Chapter Five as are instances of their transgression. 
 
However, consultation gave way to inspections ordered and supervised by new 
European work programme inspectors. These reforms unnerved villagers. As 
                                                 
26 For biographical details, see the Cyclopedia of Fiji, 1907. 
27 Despatch 19, O’Brien to SS, 21 February 1901. CSO Despatches. 
28 Brewster, 1922: 155. 
29 Governor O’Brien arrived in the colony on 10 July 1897 and left on 17 July 1901. For biographical 
details see the Cyclopedia of Fiji 1907. 
30 See the Report of the Commission on Decrease of the Native Population 1893. Suva: Government of 
Fiji, 1896. 
31 Brewster, 1922: 154. The state’s attempts to control, discipline, and regiment movement, space, and 
body are discussed in more detail in Chapter Five as are instances of their transgression. See also 
Thomas, 1990: 149-70. 
32 Paper 14: “Supplementary Estimates 1899.” in JFLC, 1900. 5. 
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Brewster observed “we were daily stirring them up and causing resentment”.33 For 
example, great exception was taken to new laws relating to the location of pig sties. 
These had already been relocated a safe distance from villages, but were ordered 
moved even further away. The people rebelled and slaughtered their pigs. Brewster 
adds that interfering with pigs in Fiji was “tantamount in England to robbing a poor 
man of his beer”.34 As Brewster recalled of the immediate post-Thurston years, “there 
certainly was at that time a good deal of unrest and dissatisfaction”.35
 
Adding to the resentment was the tax scheme which paid for the salaries of European 
officials and many chiefs but yielded very few tangible benefits for villagers. In 
September of 1900, the government came under attack from the Reverend William 
Slade, a Wesleyan missionary based in Ba, who believed that Fijians were widely 
oppressed by the government, especially in the matter of iniquitous native taxes. He 
accused the government’s administration of Fijians of being tyrannical and of ruling 
by fear. He wrote that Fijians had been reduced to the condition of slaves not just to 
their chiefs but to the government and he concluded that Fijians were in a far worse 
position than Maori.36 For this reason, Slade argued, Fijians would be better off under 
New Zealand rule. The letter was circulated widely throughout the colony prompting 
the government to accuse Slade of engaging in “a political campaign amongst the 
natives, with the ostensible object of persuading them to favour federation with New 
Zealand”.37 The Governor put pressure on the Wesleyan mission to have Slade 
removed from the colony,38 but the mission stood by him and the pro-federation 
lobby won its first important battle. 
 
Previous attempts had been made at federating with New Zealand but few had met 
with any success.39 This time however, it brought together an unlikely alliance of 
                                                 
33 Brewster, 1922: 154. 
34 Brewster, 1922: 156. 
35 Brewster, 1922: 156. 
36 Fiji Times, 1 September 1901. 
37 Native Commissioner to CS, 24 December 1900, CSO 00/4899. 
38 The Cyclopedia of Fiji, 1907 claims that Slade was ordered to leave the country within twenty-one 
days and that this deportation order was later reversed after the intervention of the Australian and New 
Zealand premiers. However, the evidence from CSO records clearly shows that both the mission head 
and the parent board in Australia were satisfied with Slade’s mission work and his denials of 
wrongdoing. See CSO files 00/4899 and 01/63 in particular. 
39 For details of previous attempts at Federation, see R. A. Derrick, “The Federal Movement in Fiji.” in 
Transactions and Proceedings of the Fiji Society. 5: 4, 1951. 122-36. 
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disillusioned overworked and overtaxed villagers, several chiefs, nonconformist 
missionaries, and a number of local Europeans. The latter had been frustrated by years 
of Thurston’s protective paternalist style of government which had consistently 
impeded their access to Fijian land and labour.40 When the Premier of New Zealand 
Richard Seddon41 announced his plans to federate Fiji to New Zealand and followed 
this with a visit to Fiji (and other Pacific Islands) in May and June 1900, many rallied 
behind Humphrey Berkeley, a Suva lawyer, to agitate for constitutional change. The 
support of several Fijian chiefs was enlisted, most prominent among whom was the 
Tui Namosi, Ratu Matanitobua, the only surviving signatory of the Deed of Cession. 
His people and those from neighbouring Serua province had grown dissatisfied with 
the tax system which among other things, forced their dislocation for long periods to 
work the distant sugarcane tax fields near Navua. 
 
In their extensive visits to Fijian villages, the leaders of the “New Zealand Party” told 
villagers that they were overtaxed, that federation would free them of the present tax 
system and liberate them from all communal obligations.42 Late in 1900, reports and 
letters began to arrive in Suva warning of increased activities by supporters of the 
movement for Federation. In November, O’Brien received information from 
Wilkinson that the people of Vanua Levu were preparing a rising “against the whites” 
owing to their hostility at being put “under the dominion of the white-men”, meaning 
thereby the prospect of Federation with New Zealand. He added that he knew of no 
other occasion where real danger had been so manifest along this part of the country 
than during the last two months of the agitation.43 Yet, opinion was divided and if 
Wilkinson thought that Fijians in Vanua Levu were staunchly loyal to Great Britain, 
the Roko Tui Cakaudrove begged to differ and wrote to the Colonial Secretary in 
February 1901 requesting a meeting of the chiefs to talk about Federation. His request 
was turned down.44
 
                                                 
40 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” Nabouwalu, Bua, 1896. 45. 
41 For biographical details and a discussion of Seddon’s imperial designs in the Pacific, see R. M. 
Burdon, King Dick: A Biography of Richard John Seddon. Christchurch: Whitcombe & Tombs, 1955. 
See also Donald Denoon, Philippa Mein-Smith, and Marivic Wyndham, A History of Australia, New 
Zealand and the Pacific. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 2000. 
42 Despatch 19, O’Brien to SS, 21 February 1901. CSO Despatches. 
43 See despatch 13, O’Brien to SS, 12 February 1901. CSO Despatches. 
44 Roko Tui Cakaudrove to Native Commissioner, 12 February 1901, CSO 01/640. 
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While some chiefs wrote to say they had no desire to join the movement,45 others 
reported that too many of their people were dissatisfied with new government policies 
and that federation had become an attractive alternative. A leading chief of 
Nagonenicolo (close to the former Tuka districts of Nalawa and Naboubuco) 
expressed his displeasure at the government’s handling of the affair when he told 
Joske ahead of a Colo East council meeting at Burenitu: 
 
You are going to be disappointed to-morrow, sir; the people are going to vote 
for annexation to New Zealand. The young men are so determined, and we 
elders as their spokesmen will have to vote in accordance with their wishes. I 
do not want to do so myself, but I shall have to go with the crowd. Why has 
the Government given this chance to our youths? They always have a 
grievance of some sort or other and perpetually grumble. … Now an 
opportunity of flouting you has been given and they will avail themselves of 
it.46
 
By allowing meetings of provincial councils to discuss the proposed constitutional 
change, the government exposed itself to criticism from that “large part of the 
country” which Slade had identified as having “the greatest discontent” towards it.47 
For instance, at the Ba provincial meeting held in Yasawa in November 1900, 
delegates heard that the Bulu district favoured federation. In the same month, 
Inspector Potts reported from Lautoka that Fijian labourers were unsettled and that Mr 
Berkeley and one of his associates had encouraged them to ignore the law.48
 
In January 1901, Serua and Namosi villagers stopped paying taxes altogether and 
began to collect money and cut buabua logs to raise cash for Berkeley and the 
movement.49 Four of the leaders of the boycott (two from each province) were 
arrested outside Berkeley’s office on 15 January and deported to Tavuki in Kadavu 
under the same Ordinance XX of 1887 which had been enacted to remove 
                                                 
45 See Buli Navolau’s letter, 10 January 1901 enclosed in CSO 01/255 
46 Brewster, 1922: 156. 
47 Fiji Times, 1 September 1900. 
48 Potts to CS, 19 November 1900, CSO 00/4531. 
49 Aminiasi to Native Commissioner, 29 April 1901, CSO 01/1796. Buabua is reputed to be among 
Fiji’s strongest native timbers and was keenly sought after by the government and the CSR for the 
construction of mills, jetties, roads and buildings. 
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Navosavakadua.50 However, in spite of their chiefs’ orders against it, the collection of 
money for the federation movement continued through April and May51 and in June, 
the Navua stipendiary magistrate reported on the continually large number of 
absentees from Namosi tax fields.52 Reports also arrived that ‘So Kalou’ ceremonies 
or anti-government meetings with the gods had taken place in the province. These 
consultations with the gods had been practised in the past “when a new measure of 
Government was introduced, or when some unpopular foreign chief, or government 
official had been appointed”.53 At this time, these rituals threatened to give the 
movement the same religious complexion that had been such a formidable feature of 
Tuka. The government responded by threatening to dismiss all Fijian government 
officials in the province and began contemplating the desirability of dismembering 
Namosi altogether.54
 
Fresh reports of secessionism were also arriving from other parts of the colony. In 
Western Viti Levu, information arrived in February and March 1901, that Wesleyan 
teachers had begun preaching Federation.55 The Native Stipendiary Magistrate for 
Yasawa, Josaia Tupou, reported to the Roko Tui Ba that teachers in the district had 
been spreading reports that Fiji was now federated to New Zealand, that the governor 
had been removed from the colony and that the provincial tax inspector had run away 
to Nadroga.56 In May came the dismissal of Ratu Savenaca Radomodomo, the Native 
Stipendiary Magistrate of Cakaudrove and Bauan chief. Ratu Savenaca had been 
active in the Natewa Bay area in garnering support for federation. In Taveuni, he had 
impeded the government’s efforts to collect the signature of Fijians who wished to 
remain under English administration. Ratu Savenaca preferred to facilitate the 
circulation of a rival petition initiated by the New Zealand Party that favoured 
federation. After the termination of his services, Ratu Savenaca was ordered back to 
Bau where he was kept under surveillance.57
                                                 
50 Fiji Times, 31 August 1901. These men (only known as Timoci Nasau, Ratu Tevita, Sauduadua and 
Sekove) were released in October 1901 after serving nine months of their term. 
51 Buli Namosi and Buli Wainikoroiluva to Native Commissioner, 15 and 18 May 1901 respectively, 
CSO 01/1146. 
52 SM Navua to CS, 17 April 1901, CSO 01/1623. 
53 SM Macuata to CS, 11 January 1905, CSO 05/303. 
54 See minutes by Sutherland and Allardyce, 30 April 1901, CSO 01/1796. 
55 Ratu Jope Naucabalavu to CS, 1 April 1901, CSO 01/1440. 
56 Ratu Jope Naucabalavu to CS, 1 April 1901, CSO 01/1440. 
57 Sutherland minute, 27 June 1901, CSO 01/2747. 
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 In the face of mounting pressure O’Brien decided to introduce new legislation which 
he thought was needed to prevent “certain persons” from conducting a “systematic 
campaign amongst the native Fijians with a view to making them discontented with 
the present form of Government, and inducing some of them, if possible, to express a 
desire for federation with New Zealand”.58 This, he thought, would “unsettle the 
minds of Fijians”, “dislocate the machinery of the communal system which is 
indispensable to their existence” and bring about chaos. He believed that the 
movement had reached a point where two hostile camps had emerged and the 
likelihood of bloodshed had become a distinct possibility.59 The ensuing Ordinance 2 
of June 1901 providing for the “Peace and Good Order of the Colony”, stipulated that 
any person who caused a Fijian to be disaffected towards the Government or induced 
one to subvert or alter the present form of government was liable to be imprisoned 
with hard labour for up to six months.60 This made it difficult even illegal for Fijians 
and renegade Europeans to collaborate on constitutional change. The Government did 
not think either party capable of sustaining the movement and bringing about the 
desired outcome on its own. 
 
Before leaving the colony in July 1901, O’Brien told a number of senior Fijian chiefs 
assembled to farewell him that the New Zealand Party was only interested in getting 
“Fijian land and Fijian labour cheap for themselves”.61 There was some verity in this 
claim. A survey of the numerous letters received and published by the editor of the 
Fiji Times between June 1900 and June 1903, suggests that settlers were undeniably 
preoccupied with their own interests and the commercial benefits of federation. And 
until Reverend Slade’s letter, none seemed to care about how federation would be 
received by ordinary Fijians. Yet, O’Brien’s attack on pro-federation settlers failed to 
account for the motivations of thousands of Fijians in supporting the movement. 
 
The legislation only placed a temporary pause on the activities of Fijian petitioners. 
With O’Brien recalled and his successor yet to be named, William Allardyce assumed 
the interim Administration of the colony. But his hard line anti-federation stance and 
                                                 
58 Paper 23: “Peace and Good Order Ordinance 1901.” in JFLC, 1901. 1. 
59 Paper 23 in JFLC, 1901. 1. 
60 Supplement to the Royal Gazette, 2 July 1901. 
61 The Western Pacific Herald, 20 July 1901. 
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heavy-handed treatment of pro-federation activists caused any hope of a change of 
policy to rapidly dissipate. In mid-October, the Fiji Times published letters written to 
Berkeley by Namosi villagers in which they claimed to be “in a bad way” on account 
of the Government’s continued tyranny in their province. They also criticised the 
Roko Tuis of Tailevu, Ba, Ra (all Bauans), Cakaudrove and Bua for signing a letter 
requesting the King to appoint Allardyce as the colony’s new governor.62 The 
collection of signatures for a petition addressed to the King had resumed and was 
gathering such momentum that, if allowed to continue unchecked, it would soon cast 
serious doubts on the Government’s claim to retain the loyalty of Fijians. 
 
On 15 November 1901, the Government initiated a crackdown of the principal Fijian 
architects and promoters of the petition. Five days later, the Armed Native 
Constabulary arrested Ratu Avorosa Tuivuya, and then raided Berkeley’s home in 
search of Ratu Savenaca Radomodomo.63 Ratu Avorosa was the Tui Suva and had 
been active in Serua and Namosi with the collection of cash and buabua logs to send 
Berkeley to London with the petition. He was well known to authorities for having 
masterminded a strike by dockworkers in early October 1890 at Suva’s Queen’s 
Wharf.64 He had also earned a reputation for being “an agitator of the worst type” in 
1897 for his support of Nakelo villagers during a particularly acrimonious dispute 
against surveyors of the Native Lands Commission and rival claimants from 
Natogadravu (see Map 13).65 On that occasion, Ratu Avorosa had secured the 
services of Humphrey Berkeley to represent the villagers causing the Government 
considerable exasperation in the process. Allardyce had urged his deportation then,66 
and now late in 1901, with the entire constitutional future of the colony in the balance, 
he needed little encouragement to use Ordinance XX of 1887 and confine Ratu 
                                                 
62 See Fiji Times, 12 and 16 October 1901. 
63 For an account of this raid, see Fiji Times, 14 December 1901. 
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65 Roko Tui Tailevu to CS, 12 October 1897, CSO 97/4573. Resistance to land surveying is discussed 
in Chapter Five. 
66 Allardyce minute in Roko Tui Tailevu to CS, 12 October 1897, CSO 97/4573. 
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Map 13: Southern Viti Levu, 1900. 
 
Four more chiefs were deported to Kadavu in the two weeks that followed. They were 
all from Namosi and had been suspected of aiding the movement. They included Ratu 
Matanitobua’s son and buli of Veivatuloa, Ratu Alivate Lagivala, the long serving 
native stipendiary magistrate for Namosi Veceli Verebalavu, and Ratu Matanitobua’s 
two brothers Turaga Vakacawa and Ramari Rokotuivuna.68 As political prisoners 
these six men were confined without trial and the Fiji Times was quick to point out 
that the only crime committed by these individuals had been their attempt to obtain by 
constitutional means (agitation by petition) some amelioration of the condition of 
Fijians.69 Writs of habeas corpus were successfully filed by Berkeley and issued by 
the Supreme Court for the release of Ratu Avorosa and Ratu Savenaca, and the two 
leading chiefs of the movement were discharged on 6 April 1902 after serving 130 
                                                 
R
67 See Buli Nayau to CS, 19 February 1902, CSO 02/1546, and SM Lau to Acting CS, 11 May 1902, 
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68 See Beddard to CS, dated April 1902, CSO 02/2010. 










days of their term.70 The other four Namosi deportees had to wait for June 1902 and 
an act of clemency on the occasion of King Edward VII’s coronation, before they 
were freed.71
 
One can only speculate the extent to which the deportation of these leaders affected 
the success of the petition. Nevertheless, by February 1902, Berkeley was in New 
Zealand campaigning for federation and publicising the contents of the petition. 
Written in Fijian, the petition was signed by four thousand ordinary Fijians and fifty 
chiefs. It was translated by Rev. Slade, and a copy appeared in the Fiji Times.72 The 
letter was addressed to the King of England and divided into two parts. The first 
attacked the excessive power of the Government beginning with the Governor, the 
British officers, the Rokos of the provinces, and the Bulis in charge of districts. The 
petitioners explained that this elite portion of the population praised the system of 
government because they were well off and derived unfair advantage from it. The 
iniquitous tax system allowed chiefs to levy the people whenever they experienced 
financial difficulties. In some districts the Rokos rivalled each other in compelling the 
people to produce large quantities of tax produce, 
 
so that they may derive profit from the amount of the surplus, and thus add to 
their salaries. … When there is a surplus the people receive two or four 
shillings each, but the chiefs get a much larger sum.73
 
The petitioners went on to outline the burdens that government-appointed chiefs 
imposed on villagers such as the obligation to plant their gardens, to give them 
property, to build their houses, give them money, supply them with food, to be their 
messengers, to requisition villagers’ boats for free travel, and last but most 
oppressive, to make roads. 
 
The petition also condemned the newly appointed provincial tax inspectors for their 
endless and arbitrary impositions: 
 
                                                 
70 SM Lau to Acting CS, 11 May 1902, CSO 02/2678. 
71 Fiji Times, 25 June 1902. 
72 Fiji Times, 8 March 1902. 
73 Fiji Times, 8 March 1902. 
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… we are truly their slaves. They vex us every day with their multitudinous 
orders. They make us increase and widen the roads; they make us remove our 
villages without reason; they hurry us with building houses and encroach on 
other work so that what time have we to attend to our own affairs? Or to the 
affairs of our wives and children?74
 
The second division of Fijians, the petition explained, was comprised of both chiefs 
and commoners who did not hold any office. Their condition was “very wretched and 
pitiable”. They were “poor and miserable and hungry” not because they were 
disinclined to work, but because of the many encumbrances they constantly faced. 
This, the petitioners claimed, caused much discontent and was the course of the war at 
Seaqaqa, the trouble at Nakelo, Serua, and Namosi, and the steady decline of the 
Fijian population. The petition concluded by reaffirming the loyalty of Fijians to the 
king but requesting him to launch an enquiry into the existing system of government 
with the view of allowing Fiji to federate with New Zealand.75
 
The agitation led to several rounds of discussion at the highest levels of government 
between the Secretary of State for Colonies Joseph Chamberlain, the premier of New 
Zealand, Seddon, and the recently interested Prime Minister of Australia Edmund 
Barton.76 However, the inability of Seddon and Barton to agree on Fiji’s future status 
gave the Colonial Office the reason it needed to continue with the status quo. In 
August 1902, the Colonial Office announced its decision to turn down the annexation 
of Fiji by New Zealand.77
 
Although he had failed to secure the success of his mission, Berkeley returned in June 
1902 to a rousing welcome by two thousand Fijians and Indians. (The participation of 
Indian indentured labourers in organised resistance is examined in greater detail in the 
next chapter.) The collection of signatures continued in the latter half of 1902 
particularly in the interior districts of Navosa, along the Western fringe districts of 
                                                 
74 Fiji Times, 8 March 1902. 
75 Fiji Times, 8 March 1902. 
76 See for instance Fiji Times, 28 June 1902. 
77 Fiji Times, 13 August 1902. 
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Sabeto and Vaturu, and several other inland districts of the Ba province.78 The arrest 
of emissaries, the continued harassment and victimisation of its leaders,79 the likely 
reluctance of other Fijians to seek the tutelage of a country whose indigenous 
population had been dispossessed of their land,80 the Colonial Office’s decision to 
retain the status quo, and the enactment of a further repressive ordinance cited for all 
purposes as “The Natives’ Protection Ordinance” in 1903 by the new governor Sir 
Henry Moore Jackson, finally saw the demise of the movement. 
 
In Namosi however, the old chief Ratu Matanitobua found yet another way to defy the 
government. He had resigned in 1901 after twenty-seven years of government service 
and expressed unease about the recent orientation of the government’s native policy: 
 
Our rules have loaded down our diminutive native canoe with bulky engines 
and machinery beyond its capacity; while professing to improve its carrying 
capacities, they have simply swamped and sunk it.81
 
Ratu Matanitobua was suspected by government officials of giving tacit support for 
the federation agitation and leading officials of the administration began to call for his 
deportation as early as April 1901.82 After the Bose Vakaturaga of July 1902, where 
loyal chiefs had publicly criticised and insulted Ratu Matanitobua for his support of 
the movement and questioned his and his province’s loyalty to the King, he and more 
than eight hundred villagers from Namosi and Soloira deserted Methodism and 
adopted Roman Catholicism.83 So significant was this mass conversion that it was 
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regarded as secessionist.84 This repositioning is best explained as a rejection of 
Wesleyanism as a church that symbolised and embodied the established government 
structures, rather than any particular spiritual or political liberalism offered by the 
Roman Catholic church. The whole affair and the later burning of Wesleyan Bibles 
and hymn books belonging to Namosi converts at the Catholic mission in Naililili in 
Rewa, caused much consternation in the colony, and repercussions were felt far and 
wide though perhaps more among the mission boards of Australia and New Zealand 
than in Fiji.85
 
The movement for federation reveals important changes in the organisation and 
spread of counter-establishment resistance in Fiji. While the movement was again 
popular in the interior and western parts of Viti Levu, previous insurgencies such as 
Tuka tended to be localised affairs with limited reach outside the immediate vicinity 
where they were inspired. The hope of federation brought together a wide spectrum of 
formerly disconnected people sharing multiple grievances and a common mood of 
disaffection. And it signalled their readiness to demand change by uniting towards a 
common cause and goal. While the impetus for the movement was initially provided 
by a group of ambitious European men with an essentially commercial agenda, it was 
quickly seized upon and appropriated by disaffected Fijians as a vehicle to voice their 
own discontent and challenge their administration. Speaking on the agitation, 
Reverend Slade explained to New Zealanders that Fijians were not explicitly 
interested in federating with New Zealand. They were more intent on a change of 
government and a reform of policy: 
 
The great idea in their mind is that federation with somebody would mean a 
change of policy. They feel the present policy to be burdensome, galling, and 
that is their idea of change. It doesn’t mean New Zealand or anywhere else.86
 
The movement for federation therefore worked at cross-purposes and for different 
interests and agendas. If its initial aims were articulated principally by Europeans, 
                                                 
84 See Fiji Times, 4 March 1903. By the turn of the century, antagonism between Fiji’s two main 
Christian denominations (Wesleyanism and Roman Catholicism) had reached a state of open hostility. 
Many ordinary villagers exploited this rivalry for their own ends. 
85 See issues of the Fiji Times and Western Pacific Herald from February to June 1903. See also 
Thornley, 1979: 187-9. 
86 Cited in the Fiji Times, 11 April 1903. 
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Fijians saw in it the opportunity to articulate their own grievances and to envisage and 
then agitate for a political transformation of their own making. This example therefore 
tends to refute the theories of race and class antagonism already referred to in the 
“Introduction”, that see the colonial terrain as a space where one race and/or one class 
is perpetually pitted against the other to achieve political and economic supremacy. 
The movement for federation suggests instead that complex alliances were forged 
among disparate groups of people from different ethnic and class origins, with 
different agendas, expectations, and anticipated outcomes running alongside each 
other. It also showed Fijians’ willingness to use the legal apparatus of the state 
(lawyers and petitions) to challenge government policies and initiate change. In other 
words, Fijians found within the structure of the colonial state, the instruments with 
which to contest its legitimacy. Yet, the movement failed to bring about any 
significant transformation. The movement has been credited with spurring the issue of 
new Letters Patent which provided for the first time the representation of Fijians in 
the Fiji Legislative Council. This new constitution however, had little impact on the 
lives of ordinary people and the grumblings of the land were soon to resurface in the 
form of the Viti Kabani, the largest organised mass movement of Fiji’s colonial era. 
 
Apolosi Nawai and the Viti Kabani: 1913 – 1917 
 
In many ways, the movement for federation was a forerunner of the much more 
formidable challenge that the Viti Kabani would mount on the government in the next 
decade. To understand the rise of the Viti Kabani as a country-wide movement, it is 
first necessary to contextualise the spread of disaffection around Fiji in the first 
decade of the Twentieth Century and to seek therein traces of the Kabani’s 
charismatic leader, Apolosi Nawai. 
 
Apolosi Ralawaki87 Nawai was born in 1885 in the tokatoka Nacavacola of the 
chiefly mataqali Navatulevu of Narewa village from which the Tui Nadi is 
appointed.88 He was the third son of Panapasa Ralawaki Nawai and Makereta Ranadi. 
According to oral tradition, he was born in Yanuya on Malolo Island where his father 
                                                 
87 Apolosi Nawai often used the initial “R” for his middle name Ralawaki which means “one who can 
see through deceit and cunning”. Translation by Mr Uate Tale Karavaki. 
88 See Apolosi Nawai’s death certificate “A Vola ni Mate” ref. 5163 at the Registry of Births and 
Deaths in Suva. 
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was a Methodist teacher.89 Very little is known of his childhood and youth. His 
descendants contend that he was blessed, that he was gifted with supernatural powers, 
and that he excelled in academic work and religious studies.90 Nawai certainly 
attended the Methodist training school at Navuloa but a minute by Ratu Jope 
Naucabalavu the Roko Tui Ba (also a Bauan) claims that he was expelled from the 
school.91
 
The Nawai family, especially Apolosi’s father and his two older brothers Kiniviliame 
Labalabavanua and Josevata Kunagado (alias Misi Tana), appears to have been a 
thorn in the side of Ratu Jope Naucabalavu and other senior officials in the Nadi area. 
Josevata Kunagado was particularly prominent during a dispute over the appointment 
of the new Tui Nadi in July and August 1907 after the death of the previous 
titleholder, Ratu Navolioni Muacava Ragigia. This title had become contentious 
following the appointment at the beginning of the year of Eliasere Waqamate as the 
new Buli Nadi and his support for the sale of hundreds of acres of prime Nadi land to 
Europeans. Considerable pressure had been applied on Nadi lands since the CSR’s 
move in the area in 1903 to expand its Lautoka operations.92 Waqamate had refused 
to recognise the installation of Ratu Tevita Nawaqa Tana as the new Tui Nadi and 
was thought to favour another candidate from the village of Nakavu for the position. 
His choice was supported by the Bauan and colonial establishment, thereby creating 
enormous tension between supporters of either camp in the Nadi district.93
 
The issue of land is vital in understanding the climate of fear, suspicion, and 
occasional hostility that emerged among Fijians in the first decade of the twentieth 
century, and which made possible in the second, the emergence of the Viti Kabani. It 
therefore requires a short but necessary digression. Land had become a highly 
contentious issue in Fiji following the appointment of Sir Everard im Thurn as the 
new Governor of the colony. A few months after his arrival in October 1904, im 
Thurn decided to introduce a new law to the Legislative Council to reverse Arthur 
                                                 
89 Talanoa session with Apolosi Nawai and Josevata Kunagado, Vatutu village, Nadi. 23 April 2004. 
90 Talanoa session, Vatutu, 23 April 2004. 
91 Minute by Ratu Jope Naucabalavu, 25 November 1907, CSO 07/4887. A thorough search of the 
Methodist Church records did not yield verification of either point of view. 
92 See Paper 25: “Annual Report on Indian Immigration for 1903.” in JFLC, 1904.  
93 The conflict has not been resolved and to this day, there are two Tui Nadi, one supported by the 
government and the other acknowledged by the people. 
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Gordon’s long-standing laws against the sale of native lands. He was partly 
responding to the persistent clamour of settlers to free up Fijian land and labour, and 
partly acting on his own opinion that the colony would be best served by creating an 
economic environment through which the enterprise of European planters could be 
maximised. He duly convoked the only council of chiefs meeting of his tenure and 
informed them of his plans to alter the law. He told them that Fijians owned “a great 
deal more land than they can use” and that under the new laws, they would be 
encouraged to lease and sell more land, the money from which would help develop in 
them the virtues of individualism necessary to save the race from imminent doom.94 
A month later, Ordinance XI of 1905 came into effect to legalise, with the consent of 
the Governor in Council, the sale of Fijian land.95
 
The impact of the law was instant and dramatic. Within the next two years, 104,142 
acres of land, most of it prime agricultural land, was sold.96 While much of the land 
was acquired in an open and transparent way, other transactions were hotly disputed, 
with accusations of underhand tactics and breach of faith by government, Fijian 
officials and buyers alike. Much unease, suspicion, and occasional hostility and 
confrontation arose during and after this period of land sales. The intervention of 
Arthur Gordon, now Lord Stanmore and member of the House of Lords, resulted in 
the repeal of im Thurn’s laws97 but the aggressive search for leasehold land continued 
unabated. 
 
In this respect, prominent Bauan chiefs were again conspicuous in their active support 
and occasional coercive tactics in securing these lands either for the government, as 
Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi did in Bua. In addition to his position of Roko Tui Ra, Ratu 
Joni Madraiwiwi was installed as Roko Tui Bua in February 1905 and used his office 
to identify and release for the government 69,000 acres of Bua land at ten shillings per 
1000 acres for 99 year leases.98 There were significant monetary gains to be obtained 
                                                 
94 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” Suva, 1905. 2, 6. 
95 See the im Thurn Papers MS 2/10 for a comprehensive record of official correspondence regarding 
im Thurn’s land policy. 
96 In one of the largest transactions, the Thomas Brothers profited from the absence of Vatukaloko 
people to buy 7,898 acres of the land worth £900 at Yaqara in Ra. This sale alone accounted for more 
than one third of all lands sold in 1907. See Fiji Royal Gazette, 15 May 1908. For details of all lands 
sold (and leased) during im Thurn’s term, see the Fiji Royal Gazette 1906 to 1908. 
97 France: 161. 
98 See Despatches from im Thurn to SS, 13 and 28 January 1907. MS 2, im Thurn Papers. NAF. 
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by the leasing of these lands. Under section 4 of Native Regulation 5 of 1881, the 
Roko and Buli each received ten percent from the lease of native lands in their 
provinces and districts.99
 
In his capacity as Roko Tui Tailevu, Ratu Kadavulevu was prominent in the freeing of 
land in the south eastern parts of Viti Levu. A brief discussion of the 1909 land deals 
in Sawakasa indicates how the new land policies helped to spread disaffection among 
previously contented people.100
 
The Waidalice flats of Sawakasa, Tailevu101 had been targeted by the administration 
because they were especially fertile and useful lands for grazing and banana farming. 
The Roko Tui Tailevu and newly installed Vunivalu of Bau (since 1907) Ratu Penaia 
Kadavulevu, and the Assistant Native Commissioner W. A. Scott, were sent to the 
district and the neighbouring district of Namalata, on a tour of inspection in July 1909 
to investigate the possibility of securing these lands for long term leases to several 
interested European planters.102 While touring the area, Ratu Kadavulevu reportedly 
told Scott that the people of Sawakasa were “more like savages than anything else,” 
that they were “poor and miserable,” and yet owned some of the finest land in the 
colony. Because they did not derive the slightest benefit from the land, he advised that 
the Government should take it over and lease it for them.103 The Government then 
called a meeting at which the people were told that they were “poor”, “badly clothed”, 
and “possessed no property”. They were also told that they were “too indolent to 
cultivate their lands”; that they were “dying off”; that they did not derive “a single 
copper of benefit from their lands in the shape of rents”; that they possessed 
“thousands of acres of land which were lying idle and unproductive”; and that they 
                                                 
99 See by Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi’s claims on lease money from Ra land he had helped to set aside for 
grazing, CSO 02/4902. 
100 This example is by no means isolated. See for instance, the attempted acquisition by the CSR of 
6,800 acres of land at Wainibokasi which was resisted and foiled by landowners. im Thurn Papers 
MS2/10. 
101 Sawakasa district is located about twenty miles North of Nausori. 
102 Correspondence between the Native Commissioner (Sutherland) and W. A. Scott regarding 
Sawakasa lands in CSO 11/4274. W. A. Scott was involved in several other such visits around Fiji. In 
the Beimana district of Navosa for instance, landowners reported to the Lomary parish priest that Scott 
had forced them to sell some of their land. He had also threatened villagers that the Government would 
soon take all unoccupied Fijian lands and sell them at one penny per acre. See unsigned letter of 16 
October 1907 to Monseigneur Vidal. Roman Catholic Mission, Fiji: Correspondence with Government 
and Others re Native Affairs 1883-1924. Microfilm PMB 459. Canberra: The Australian National 
Library, 1972. 
103 W. A. Scott minute of 29 May 1912 in CSO 11/4274. 
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Map 14: South Eastern Viti Levu, 1910. 
 
                                                 






















In response, one of the villagers raised the collective concern of the people of 
Sawakasa, that the leasing of lands had not in fact yielded wealth, but rather the 
impoverishment of landowners. Their newly landless neighbours from Lodoni, for 
instance, were now frequent visitors to Sawakasa where they came to beg for food. 
The villagers decided to decline the offer of Government, fearing among other things 
that their lands would be leased to the CSR which was already notorious among 
landowners for offering the lowest rates in the colony of between two and three 
shillings per acre. They reconsidered however, after more pressure from Ratu 
Kadavulevu, and agreed to lease portions of their lands on the condition that they 
would earn one pound per acre, the going rate which Indian leasehold farmers were 
willing to pay. 
 
The Government reneged on this verbal agreement and leased the land for five 
shillings per acre to three European planters (Hunt, Craig and Chapman) all known 
friends of Ratu Kadavulevu. By April 1910, the villagers had been forbidden access to 
their land including large quantities of banana ready for cutting and selling.105 The 
villagers responded by pulling the new survey pegs off the ground,106 by hiring a 
lawyer, procuring the support of another prominent Bauan chief Ratu Wainiu, (Ratu 
Kadavulevu’s half-brother), and writing numerous letters and petitions to the Native 
Commissioner, the Acting Governor, the new Governor Henry May, and the 
Provincial Department, to complain about this breach of faith. They travelled as far as 
Bau to see Ratu Kadavulevu but were assaulted by men acting under his orders before 
they could get to the island. Their numerous efforts falling on deaf ears, one Sawakasa 
man exclaimed, “one thing is clear to us, that these lands of ours have been simply 
stolen”.107 For the next three years they refused to accept any of the rent money, 
accusing the Roko Tui Tailevu and the Government of trickery.108
 
Even if they had chosen to take the money as some did in the district of Namalata, the 
potential for investment from rent monies was very limited. Once Ratu Kadavulevu 
and other local chiefs had taken their share of the income, individuals could do very 
little with the scraps that eventually trickled down to them, other than to purchase a 
                                                 
105 Wainiu to Governor, 18 April 1912, CSO 12/3180. 
106 Fitzgibbon to CS, 21 August 1910, CSO 10/7297. 
107 Undated translation of unsigned “Paper B” in CSO 11/4274. 
108 See the statement of rentals in CSO 11/4274. 
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few goods from the local European stores. Hence, in the space of a few months, the 
villagers had gone from self-sufficient banana farmers to landless dependents, 
stripped of their main asset and of their capability to remain active agents in their own 
economic development. Or as Ratu Wainiu expressed it in his letter to the Governor, 
“their bread is snatched from their mouths”.109 Ratu Wainiu was severely 
reprimanded for his support of the Sawakasa people and forced to write a letter of 
apology.110 Yet, his involvement is significant for it suggests that Bauans were never 
wholly in agreement on various Fijian affairs. In the wake of Ratu Savenaca 
Radomodomo’s involvement in the Federation Movement, it also reminded the 
administration that not all Bauans could be counted on to toe the Government line. 
 
In spite of the administration’s threat to dissolve the district of Sawakasa as “a lesson 
to others outside as well”,111 disaffection against the administration and with Bauan 
hegemony was spreading in other areas of Tailevu. In the heartland of Tailevu the 
people of Verata showed signs of unrest which were caused, in the Native 
Commissioner Sutherland’s words, “by a long period of indifference to the welfare of 
the people by their Roko [Ratu Kadavulevu]”.112 A deputation of Verata natives was 
assembled to approach the Government and formally ask that Verata be made into a 
separate province to reclaim their rightful pre-contact status. Two months later, 
Sutherland was warning of dissatisfaction and unrest in several other districts of 
Tailevu, all of it caused, in his opinion, by misgovernment from Bau.113 For instance 
in early March of 1912 in the southern district of Tokatoka, Ratu Manoa Suguta, the 
Tora Dreketi (or leading chief of Tokatoka) and eight others wrote a letter to inform 
the Native Commissioner that they had appointed a new Buli and a scribe, and that 
they were transferring their allegiance to Rewa.114 The letter was written and sent 
from the village of Draubuta which within three years was to become the unofficial 
headquarters of the Viti Kabani. 
                                                 
109 Wainiu to Governor, 18 April 1912, CSO 12/3180. 
110 For the reprimand, see Governor to Wainiu, 31 May 1912. For the apology, see Wainiu to W. A. 
Scott, 31 May 1912, both in CSO 12/3180. As it had been in Namosi ten years earlier, the Native 
Commissioner’s advice to the Governor on this matter was to deport Ratu Wainiu along with other 
leaders of the protest and to dissolve the district of Sawakasa altogether. See his minute of 29 July 
1912, in CSO 12/4060. 
111 Sutherland minute to CS, 29 July 1912, in CSO 12/4060. 
112 Sutherland to CS, 16 February 1912, CSO 12/1136. 
113 See Sutherland’s minute of 28 April 1912, in CSO 12/2592. 
114 Ratu Manoa Suguta to Native Commissioner, 4 February 1912, CSO 12/2592. 
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 This latest Tailevu revolt had also originated in resentment at the abuse of power that 
Bau and the unpopular Ratu Kadavulevu seemed to exercise with impunity. Ratu 
Manoa and his co-signatories argued that the time and resources involved in servicing 
Bauan demands were affecting their very livelihood. Most men in the district derived 
their income from the banana trade, as farmers or puntsmen. Yet, when the call came, 
they were expected to interrupt their labours to attend to Bauan needs. House-building 
on Bau was particularly irritating and exhausting.115
 
Among several of the grievances specifically raised against Ratu Kadavulevu, Ratu 
Manoa and his associates wrote that they had been ordered by him to cut the cane of 
an Indian farmer, which they did, filling in the process twenty-one punts or worth 
more than thirty pounds of work but for which they were never paid. On another 
occasion the Roko “lavakid” seventy-five pounds from Tokatoka for his passage to 
the colonies (Vavalagi) and after raising the money and giving it to him, they found 
that the Roko had cancelled his trip. Their money was never returned.116 They also 
resented that while Tokatoka and other surrounding districts of Nausori, Namata and 
Nakelo had all been urged to lease land, Bau had not leased any of its own.117 There 
was also some disquiet over the manner in which the lease money was distributed. In 
May of 1912, Ratu Manoa organised a successful boycott of the usually opulent 
gathering for the distribution of rents among villages where, to the presiding Roko’s 
great embarrassment, only three of the nine Tokatoka villages brought baskets of food 
                                                 
115 The example cited in CSO 12/2592 is particularly pertinent. Ratu Manoa and his co-signatories told 
of their struggle to bake fifty to sixty puddings in order to acquire the ten dozen or so tabua necessary 
to take to Colo districts to ask for permission to cut the timber. They would then have to take a week 
off their work and plantations to prepare the logs in Colo and then a further day and night to float them 
down the river before reaching their homes. Then they would have to prepare food and again raft the 
timber for a day and night to Bau where they would stay for another week or two. When their food ran 
out, the Bauans sent to Tokatoka villages with orders for women to prepare more food. Once the work 
on Bau was complete, the men then returned in search of casual work to pay for the hire of the boats, 
leaves, reeds, and sinnet which had been used for the transport of the logs. The hiring of a boat alone 
cost the equivalent of one hundred yams or dalo thus putting immense pressure on limited village 
resources and on their communal life. As they wrote, “we have to forsake our wives and children, 
neglect our plantations … This we have suffered all the years that have gone by up to the present day. 
We have watched and observed that this is a cause of our decrease.” Indeed, most of those who signed 
a petition to complain against these excesses were women, for it was on their shoulders that fell the 
extra burden of weeding, planting, and attending to other communal work. Ratu Manoa Suguta to 
Native Commissioner, 4 February 1912, CSO 12/2592. 
116 Ratu Manoa Suguta to Native Commissioner, 4 February 1912 CSO 12/2592. 
117 Crompton and Muspratt to CS, 13 May 1912, CSO 12/2939. 
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to the ceremony.118 Ratu Manoa was again instrumental a month later, in organising a 
similar boycott of house-building at Bau where again only three villages accepted to 
go and cut the timber.119
 
In the end, although Ratu Kadavulevu was stood down (for an unrelated offence), the 
Government remained steadfast in its long standing partnership with Bauan chiefs and 
brought the Roko’s more reputable cousin, Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, back from Ba to 
replace him. Like his predecessor, Ratu Joni opposed Tokatoka’s proposed change of 
allegiance to Rewa, for the district was considered one of the richest and losing it 
would have further eroded Bau’s prestige. For his part, Ratu Manoa was charged with 
talaidredre (disobeying orders).120 His punishment only fuelled Tokatoka’s 
disaffection towards the government and created in the area a climate conducive to a 
more extensive resistance movement. 
 
The spirit of unrest among Fijians is captured in a letter written by Savenaca Seniloli 
in March 1912, in which he warned the Native Commissioner that “revolt seems to be 
of very common occurrence at the present time”.121 Examples of this climate of 
discontent are discussed in more detail in Chapter Five. The significance of these 
various expressions of fear, suspicion, discontent and hostility is that they linked 
previously disparate locations and peoples as the kai Colo, the Westerners of Nadi, Ba 
and Ra, the coastal dwellers of Tailevu and the island people of Moturiki, Ovalau, the 
Yasawas in a shared mood of rebelliousness. Apolosi Nawai and the Viti Kabani gave 
it an economic and political expression and effective organisational direction. 
 
Little is known of Apolosi Nawai’s movements between the time of the conflict over 
the Tui Nadi title in 1907 and his emergence in 1913 at the head of the Fiji Produce 
Agency, the forerunner of the Viti Kabani.122 What is apparent is that in his early 
twenties, Apolosi Nawai spent much time travelling the country first on Church 
                                                 
118 Sutherland minute to CS 16 May 1912, in CSO 12/2939. 
119 Buli Tokatoka to Roko Tui Tailevu, 15 June 1912, CSO 12/3780. 
120 Sutherland minute to CS, 16 May 1912, in CSO 12/2939. 
121 Ratu Savenaca Seniloli to Native Commissioner, 14 March 1912, enclosed in CSO 12/2592. 
122 Both oral sources and Macnaught (who does not cite his source) speak of Apolosi’s carpentry 
apprenticeship at the Davuilevu Technical College, and of his friendship with Lelean and Derrick both 
of whom were teachers at Davuilevu. The College itself did not come into existence until 1908. He 
may have been one of the first intakes that year. 
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affairs and then as a carpenter and resided in Nadi town only for short periods of 
time.123 A few official letters suggest that he travelled extensively during this time 
and that his movements were monitored by Fijian officials.124
 
Aside from the spirit of discontent that permeated many parts of the country, several 
other factors facilitated the formation of the Viti Kabani. Commenting on the rise of 
the company, Ratu Joseva Lalabalavu Sukuna,125 suggested that the Viti Kabani was 
partly inspired and modelled on the Tongan Company which was owned and operated 
by Tongans between 1909 and 1912. The watchword of that company was Tonga 
ma’a Tonga, or “Tonga for the Tongans”, none of which was lost in translation in 
Fiji.126 Like many other Fijians,127 Apolosi Nawai must have been familiar with and 
learnt from the Tongan popular movement. The network of connections he had sown 
in the course of his extensive travels prior to 1912 would soon make his own name, 
company and vision resonate in all parts of Fiji. Hence, when he first announced his 
scheme for the establishment of a Fijian company in 1912 while building a church at 
Korovatu in Vunidawa (Naitasiri), 128 the philosophy and planning for the venture had 
long been in the making. 
 
Nawai calculated that when trading banana, European middlemen made 
approximately £10,000 on an investment of £2,000.129 Under his scheme, Fijians 
would pool their capital together, cut out the middlemen, control their own enterprise, 
and reinvest the profits in a company.130 Banana was a particularly suitable choice 
because it was farmed up and down the country by a large number of Fijians. The 
trade had begun to flourish in the West of Viti Levu in the mid 1890s under the 
                                                 
123 See Ratu Jope Naucabalavu’s minute of 25 November 1909, in CSO 07/4889. Apolosi’s eldest 
brother Kiniviliame, appears to have been a regular companion on his extensive journeys and later 
became one of his most trusted associates. Apolosi also formed an important friendship with Patemo 
Vainitoma and TikikoTuwai, the two well educated sons of the former Roko Tui Ba, Ratu Nemani 
Driu. 
124 See CSO 07/4889 in particular. This file contains several letters that are principally about a dispute 
involving his brother Josevata Kunagado Nawai. However, they allude to Apolosi’s movements. 
125 Ratu Sukuna was the son of Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi and had been educated at Wanganui, Auckland, 
and Oxford. He was to become one of Apolosi Nawai’s fiercest adversaries. 
126 See Ratu Sukuna’s Memo to the Secretary for Native Affairs of 12 March 1917, in CSO 17/2286. 
For studies of other indigenous trading companies in the Pacific Region that later evolved into protest 
movements, see Couper, 1968; and Hempenstall and Rutherford, 1984. 
127 See report of Tongan Company activities in the Fiji Times, 5 October 1910. 
128 Macnaught, 1979: 174. 
129 Scarr, 1984: 136. 
130 Macnaught, 1982: 78. 
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initiative of the Fiji Banana and Produce Company.131 Banana farming quickly spread 
to other regions including Nadroga, Navosa, Colo, Navua, Waidina, Naitasiri, and 
Tailevu. By the turn of the century it had become Fiji’s second largest export earner 
(behind sugar) with New Zealand as its main overseas market.132
 
Typically, European traders would seek the support of district chiefs or resident 
magistrates133 to enter into contracts with local landowners and secure a steady supply 
of bananas. The going rate for landowners was around five to six pence per bunch but 
by 1900, competition between middlemen was so fierce that the price rose to around 
nine pence per bunch with Fijian growers playing one trader against another to 
maximise their income.134 An irate Managing Director of the Fiji Banana and Produce 
Agency complained to the Government that even when he contracted trees instead of 
bunches, “unprincipled traders” would approach individual farmers and offer them a 
better price for the contracted trees.135 The early 1900s saw a steady increase in the 
performance of the industry culminating in a veritable boom in 1913 and 1914. In his 
address to the Legislative Council in 1915, Governor Sweet-Escott proudly reported: 
 
The banana industry shows remarkable vitality, and the export of bananas in 
1914 not only exceeded in quantity the export of any previous year, but the 
declared value amounted to £201,938, or £33,689 more than the declared 
value of bananas exported in 1913, when the value was higher than in any 
other previous year.136
 
No mention was made however, of the probable cause of this upsurge, the success of 
the Viti Kabani. 
 
                                                 
131 When Apolosi Nawai was ten years old, his Nadi hometown had become a major centre for the 
cultivation and trade of banana. See CSO 95/4050. 
132 Official papers relating to the banana trade confirm that Fiji bananas captured the bulk of the 
Australian market and threatened the existence of the Queensland banana industry. Fiji bananas were 
considered better than Queensland bananas and were produced more cheaply. See the im Thurn Papers 
MS2/42. 
133 Some of these magistrates like Joske were also involved in the export of bananas. 
134 See Assistant Commissioner Colo West to Acting CS, 16 March 1900, CSO 00/1148. 
135 Lazarus to CS, 11 September 1906, CSO 06/4344. 
136 Paper 1: “Governor’s Address to the Fiji Legislative Council.” in JFLC, June 1915. 12. 
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Apolosi Nawai and his associates had been particularly active in 1913, moving from 
village to village in many parts of the country. They solicited people and chiefs to buy 
shares in the company. At stake was control of the selling and shipping of banana and 
the general marketing of Fijian produce.137 Taro cake became the modus operandi: a 
demand for progress, improvement, and more tangible returns for the ordinary 
person’s labour and resources. The membership drive met with immediate success 
and representatives of the company were received with great enthusiasm by villagers 
around the country.138 In the province of Bua in Vanua Levu, villagers saw the arrival 
of Kabani agents as an opportunity to reclaim the large tracts of land that had been 
leased during Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi’s term as Roko Tui Bua. On the island of Nayau 
in the Lau Group the company was given copra.139 Some villages in Colo East gave 
their bananas for free while villages in Ra gifted them with their entire tax money.140
 
The support in Colo and Ra was partly inspired by the suggestion never denied by 
Apolosi Nawai, that the twin gods of Nakauvadra, Nacirikaumoli and Nakausabaria, 
were the spiritual force behind the company. Apolosi himself possessed mana which 
one colonial official described as “an unusual gift of speech, even for a Fijian, great 
persuasive powers, and thorough knowledge of native character and instinct for 
playing upon the credulity of his audience”.141 Apolosi certainly beamed with 
invulnerability and as someone later testified, “once Apolosi opened his mouth your 
mind was no longer your own”.142 In the eyes of many inhabitants in Ra and Colo, 
this was reminiscent of Navosavakadua and Tuka.143 Not surprisingly, the rebuilt 
Tuka village of Drauniivi became the Ra centre of the Viti Kabani and Taivesi 
Mamaqarua, the village’s turaga ni koro, its local manager.144
 
                                                 
137 Acting Attorney-General to SS, 16 April 1917, CO 83/136. PRO. 
138 See for instance, details of Kabani activities and meetings in Wainimala in Joni Kuruduadua to CS, 
10 February 1914, CSO 14/1974. 
139 Finau to CS, 18 February 1914, CSO 14/2413. 
140 Macnaught, 1978: 176. 
141 Islay McOwan to SS, 28 June 1930, CO 83/190/13. PRO. 
142 Cited in Macnaught, 1982: 87. 
143 Joni Kuruduadua to CS, 10 February 1914, CSO 14/1974. 
144 District Commissioner Ra to CS, 9 October 1914, CSO 14/8968. See also District Commissioner Ra 
to CS, 10 December 1914, CSO 14/10837. 
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Alongside the commercial aims and spiritual aura of the company, and the confidence 
and daring of its leader, was the rallying call “Fiji for the Fijians”.145 The Government 
became aware of this political dimension when it received in January 1914 a letter 
from the retired Native Stipendiary Magistrate for Colo East, Jone Koroduadua. The 
message contained a warning that the company intended to return all lands alienated 
to Europeans before Cession to their original owners, that the Kabani’s stores would 
remain open and all others would be closed, the government taxes would be 
abolished, and that Europeans would be driven out of Fiji.146 As several colonial 
officials conceded, it was impossible to verify with any certitude whether Apolosi 
Nawai himself was at the source of these ideas.147 They were resigned in January 
1914, to the issuing of a warning against the company through its Fijian language 
publication Na Mata.148 The significance of these preliminary reports about the 
movement, is that no single agenda or meaning defined the Kabani, and Nawai had 
very little control over the manner in which disparate Fijian communities appropriated 
his vision. 
 
In this respect it is significant that Nawai chose Draubuta for the inaugural meeting of 
the Kabani in April 1914. Not only had he received a blessing from the Tora Dreketi, 
Ratu Manoa Suguta mentioned above in relation to the Tailevu rising, to operate in 
the locality, but the Kabani also benefited from Draubuta’s ideal geographical 
location on the banks of the Rewa River. This river carried all traffic of bananas from 
the upper reaches of the Wainibuka and Wainimala rivers, through the interior of Colo 
East and Naitasiri, and parts of Tailevu and Rewa. The tributary that ran past the 
village led North to Kaba Point and formed an entry and exit point for traffic from the 
Lau and Lomaiviti Groups and provided access to Beqa and Kadavu in the South (see 
Map 13). 
 
Sandwiched between such powerful neighbours as Bau and Rewa, Tokatoka was well 
versed in self-preservation. In the wake of recent discontent in Tokatoka villages 
                                                 
145 See Corrie’s report, dated 14 April 1930, CO 83/190/13 on the legal status of Apolosi Nawai. See 
also CSO 14/6755 for a statement by Ratu Vakatotovo, chief of Bau and supporter of the company, 
which claims that that the Kabani was “of Fijians only and for Fijians only”. 
146 Joni Kuruduadua to CS, 10 February 1914, CSO 14/1974. 
147 See the Attorney General’s minute of 28 May 1914 in CSO 14/4758; a similar remark was made by 
Corrie in his 14 April 1930 report, on the legal status of Apolosi Nawai. CO 83/190/13. PRO. 
148 Macnaught, 1978: 176. 
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about government policy and Bauan governance, Nawai also stood to gain from the 
district’s subsequent attempts to reassert its independence. Decisively, Nawai could 
also count on the support of Ro Lutunauga Tuisawau, the recently dismissed Roko 
Tui Rewa, but still the most powerful chief of Rewa province. 
 
Surrounded by several of these significant chiefs (none were employed by 
Government), Nawai had acquired enough credibility to hold the meeting at Draubuta, 
to request the attendance of all the Bulis in the area, and to repudiate the circular letter 
sent out by the new Native Commissioner, K. J. Allardyce, forbidding the Bulis from 
attending.149 Nawai and Tabaiwalu countered the Commissioner’s order by stating 
that the meeting was “none of his business”, that there was no law in Fiji against the 
collection of money or the formation of companies, and that Allardyce’s letter was 
therefore “a very foolish one”.150 The open defiance of such a high-ranking colonial 
official was almost unheard of. Allardyce responded by calling for Apolosi Nawai’s 
deportation under Ordinance XX of 1887.151 On this occasion, the Attorney General’s 
ruling was that none of the evidence provided by Allardyce proved that Nawai was 
inciting the people to resist duly constituted authority or that he was using undue 
threats of violence towards others to coerce them into complying with his demands.152
 
Nawai had exposed a fundamental contradiction in the Government’s Fijian policy. 
He seized on the schism created on the one hand by the Government’s strict 
enforcement of indirect rule through the oppressive rule of commoners by their chiefs, 
and its belated support for individual Fijian enterprise on the other. For instance, 
Governor Sweet-Escott shared the view of his immediate predecessors, im Thurn and 
May, that the communal system had a paralysing influence on individual effort and 
ambition, and that it should be broken down.153 Like several prominent colonists, he 
thought that the Company was a positive development for the colony, and one that 
would integrate Fijians in the market economy. He thus allowed the meeting to take 
place. Those in Government circles who wanted Nawai’s immediate arrest and 
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deportation154 had to be satisfied with another circular issued after the meeting of the 
Bose Vakaturaga “warning natives against Avolosi, Tabaiwalu and others”.155
 
The opinion among the powerful European business community was also divided. As 
mentioned above, some among them had lobbied government for years seeking an 
end to the numerous restrictions on the employment of Fijians as labourers, and on the 
sale of native lands. Such powerful men as the merchant J. M. Hedstrom, the lawyer 
R. Crompton, and the financier J. B. Turner, regarded the Viti Kabani (or the Fiji 
Produce Agency as it was also known) as an awakening which could lead to the much 
sought after deregulation of the labour and land markets.156 Others, including the 
prominent traders A. J. Mackay, H. Taylor, H. MacIntosh, W. H. Cuthbert, and 
Brough, joined Nawai as directors of the Company hoping to cash in on a substantial 
increase of cash crop supply throughout the country. 
 
However, other colonists like the Serua trader George Barrow, wrote to the Colonial 
Secretary to express contempt for the views of his peers and dismay for the 
Government’s lack of decisiveness and foresight in the matter of the growing 
influence of the Viti Kabani among Fijians. He feared that if nothing was done, a 
racial war could be imminent.157 In his words, the Fiji Produce Agency was, “a 
malignant cancer in the native body politic, which is daily and hourly eating deeper 
and deeper into the vitals of native loyalty and orderliness”.158
 
Barrow also attacked the position of the superintendent of the Methodist Church, 
Reverend Arthur J. Small for welcoming the Kabani because of its supposedly “social 
and progressive evolutionary character”.159 Rev. Small’s view is interesting 
considering that the Methodist Church experienced many defections from 1913 
onwards, attributed by Thornley to the activities of the Viti Kabani and to widespread 
disaffection with mission rituals such as the ‘vakamisioneri’ (the annual collection of 
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money for the Church).160 For Barrow however, the movement did not represent 
evolutionary development but a return to “dark and pagan customs of the past”. It 
meant “disaster for the Church, and, on account of the animosity fomented against 
whites and white government, it means disaster to the State”.161 Hence, if the Kabani 
improved the prospects of some colonists, it helped project the fears of others. 
 
Among Fijians themselves, Nawai also made adroit use of the internally divisive 
nature of the chiefly system. The “system”, now firmly in place, had rewarded some 
chiefs and punished, alienated, neglected or otherwise excluded others. In the latter, 
Apolosi Nawai found powerful allies. The support of collaborator chiefs was always 
likely to be more convoluted, even if the Kabani aimed at indigenous advancement. 
The few chiefs who sympathised with Nawai’s objectives risked losing their job and 
with it, their administrative power. When the Bose met on 20 May 1914, the gravity 
with which the administration regarded the Viti Kabani was immediately apparent. 
Apolosi and the activities of the company formed the first two items on the meeting’s 
agenda. The chiefs were highly critical of the Roko Tui Tailevu, Ratu Joni 
Madraiwiwi, for allowing the Draubuta meeting to go ahead. He replied that there was 
nothing much he could do because people desisted from obeying his instructions. The 
meeting resolved to prohibit the collection of money for the company.162
 
By then however, the Kabani has collected sufficient funds to recruit skilled personnel 
overseas and to secure the services of persons committed to the company’s aims and 
ready to assist in its management. Albert and Stella Spencer, a well-travelled young 
couple from Melbourne, arrived in September 1914 to assist with the work of the 
company.163 Oral testimony also recalls the appointment by the Kabani of Mr Dalton, 
an African-American teacher for its school at Draubuta.164 Nawai’s long friendship 
with the Suva merchant Kanaiya Lal Tillak also suggests that there was no ethnic 
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monopoly on those who supported the company or conversely, those who stood 
against it. 
 
For much of 1914, the Kabani defied the government and continued to build its 
network, raising its profile and collecting funds. Money was levied from each district 
and one pound was gathered from each individual wishing to join the company.165 
Within a year of its inaugural meeting, the Kabani had raised £1050 through the issue 
of close to 6,500 shares.166 The commitment to the aims of the company in some 
districts was such that some villagers preferred burying their bananas rather than sell 
their produce to Europeans offering cash on the spot. Many of village and leading 
district chiefs were suspected of secretly supporting this undeclared boycott.167
 
In January 1915 another bose of the Viti Company was held over two weeks at 
Draubuta. It was attended by three to four thousand people168 thereby dispelling any 
lingering doubts as to the magnitude of the movement. What followed was a period 
during which as the local saying goes, ‘the grass could never grow green in 
Draubuta’.169 People from all over Fiji converged on the village for business and 
meetings of all sorts. A flagpole was erected in the middle of the village on the end of 
which the Kabani’s flag was hoisted. The pole could be seen from as far as the 
Naitasiri hills and was said to act as a beacon to pedestrians at any time of the day or 
night.170
 
Apolosi used this meeting to challenge the authority of European directors who had 
within the last year tried to exclude him from the board of directors and to expose the 
discriminatory Articles of Association that prevented all Fijians from being company 
directors. Resolution 11 proposed that Apolosi be the chairman of the company and 
resolution 12 resolved to buy out existing directors.171 The bose also recommended 
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that “we natives should make our own contracts” with “the idea of keeping our lands 
in our own hands and all the produce therefrom”. It was also agreed that the Kabani 
should aim to open a store “in every locality”, and that “there should be no more 
dealings with Europeans”.172 A native shipbuilding yard was to be built in each 
province and the company was to have its own Police and Church.173 In the 
meantime, all money collected for the Church, should be administered by the 
company. It was also proposed that European preachers should be done away with 
entirely. Yet, the institution of the Church remained central to the fortunes of the 
Kabani and many village churches served as the communal focal point for Kabani 
persuasion and organisation.174
 
As the meeting progressed, the company rhetoric took on a more explicitly political 
character. It was proposed that lala (obligation to serve the chief and participate in 
unpaid communal work) and church levies be abolished to free ordinary Fijians from 
their excessive communal obligations. The meeting also resolved that Government 
directed work in towns and villages should be abolished. Ratu Bola was appointed 
“head of police” and it was decided to pension Ratu Lutunauga Tuisawau and Ratu 
Jone Tabaiwalu.175 The Kabani was clearly moving from commercial enterprise to 
political organisation and acquiring the characteristics of a separate and rival Fijian 
administration. 
 
The deliberations of the meeting were widely reported in the local press though often 
with great scorn and sarcasm. The pressure on Sweet-Escott was mounting not just 
because of heightened anxieties amongst the European population but mainly because 
of the Kabani’s challenge to the authority of the official Native Administration.176 For 
instance, a month after the meeting, the Buli for Colo North reported that one of the 
Kabani’s men in the area, Asesela Delai, ordered that all work resembling lala be 
stopped. This represented a direct attack on government-appointed officials. Delai 
declared further that no member of the Viti Kabani was allowed to participate in 
house building. “If anyone is not in the company”, he announced, “let him go and 
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build houses”. Road upkeep, payment of provincial rates and other such work for 
government, chiefs, or church was re-channelled into production for the Kabani. As 
the dismayed Buli reported, “now there is not one left, all are members of the 
company, I only am outside the Company”.177 In several of these inland areas 
(Wainimala and Navosa in particular), meke said to be seditious were also composed 
and rumours began to circulate that Great Britain was losing the war to Germany.178
 
From about this point, a change occurred and the government went on the offensive 
against Nawai and the Kabani. March 1915 saw the arrest and sensational trial of 
Stella Spencer, accused of slapping a Fijian. This trial is well documented by 
Heartfield (2003) and need not be retold in detail. Essentially, Nawai and the 
Spencers had gone up to the Suva suburb of Toorak to persuade one of Viliame 
Ralali’s tenants, Naibuka, to join the Viti Kabani. Ralali was a native medical 
practitioner and a loyal government employee. After an argument, he accused Mrs 
Spencer of having ulterior motives in calling on Naibuka and of being romantically 
involved with him. He called her a bad woman and she reacted by slapping him. 
 
The prosecution of Stella Spencer was therefore motivated less by a desire to protect 
Fijians than by one to protect whites from other whites and punish those Europeans 
who failed to observe the policy of separation from natives.179 As Heartfield remarks, 
that Spencer was tried at all for assaulting a Fijian was remarkable for numerous 
gruesome assaults on non-whites by whites were an everyday occurrence and only a 
minute proportion of them were ever prosecuted.180 As the prosecuting lawyer Robert 
Crompton argued in his closing submission: 
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I admit that it is not a part of my duty to show that this woman is what I think 
she is. But in this Colony it is the Duty of every white man and every white 
woman to be very, very careful of this manner in which they associate with the 
natives. A woman who goes about with natives, making love to them – a 
woman like that is an absolute danger to the community … she is … acting in 
a way that is a disgrace to her colour.181
 
The Government also targeted ordinary members of the Kabani. There was a sudden 
increase in the number of reported cases of talaidredre (disobedience to chiefs). A 
number of these cases involved individuals’ refusal to answer summonses to weed the 
Buli’s garden.182 As Heartfield explains, enforcing weeding was not a symbolic 
punishment, but an important part of the organisation of communal production by fiat, 
alongside house-building, collective food preparation, and the entertainment and 
accommodation of village guests.183 Kabani members’ refusal to obey summonses 
was however symptomatic of the spread of disobedience among the rank and file. The 
government’s attempts to quell this growing insubordination reflected its own 
determination to attack the movement at the grassroots and its attempt at restoring and 
tightening discipline and respect for government-appointed chiefs in the villages. 
 
The offensive continued with the arrest of Apolosi Nawai on 19 May 1915. Earlier in 
the month, Nawai had travelled to the Yasawa Islands to gather support for the 
company and collect copra. The company flag was hoisted as an emblem of his power 
and authority in the area. Before he could leave Yaqeta Island, a police detachment 
arrived with a warrant for his arrest. Following a tense stand-off, the police retreated 
only to return with reinforcements and intercept Nawai’s fleet of cutters near the 
mouth of the Ba River.184 Nawai was charged with resisting arrest and embezzling 
Viti Kabani funds and sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment with hard labour. 
Twenty-four others in Nawai’s entourage were also arrested. His brother Kiniviliame 
and six others received lighter sentences.185
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 During his time in gaol, the Kabani continued to operate under the leadership of Joeli 
Cava of Vuci in Tokatoka, Tikiko Tuwai, and several of his chiefly allies. At a 
meeting in the Nadi district of Sabeto on 6 December 1915, a group of these chiefs 
with Tuwai attending as clerk, discussed the Government’s latest plans to acquire 
native lands and expressed surprise that the administration allowed some chiefs to 
“give or sell some of our lands which do not personally belong to them”.186 In a letter 
to the Governor, they expressed the wish to retain land in native hands for the purpose 
of their own development “to help ourselves” through the planting of banana, yaqona, 
and for pasturage. The letter was signed by leading chiefs from provinces and districts 
as diverse as Rewa, Nadroga, Verata, Moturiki, Sabeto, Nawaka, Namataku, 
Tokatoka, Noco, Nayau, Dama and Nayavu.187
 
Ordinary people too continued to voice their objections to Government policy, 
particularly on land issues. Rijiate and 129 others from the Rewa, Tailevu and 
Naitasiri provinces wrote to the Acting Governor on 18 December 1915 with a list of 
grievances containing twenty-seven points. They mainly expressed concern about the 
way land was appropriated by third parties and the manner in which Government 
seemed to collude in the forced acquisition of land from unwilling landowners. They 
were also critical of the Rokos in the Council of Chiefs for not consulting the people 
about important decisions pertaining to the lease and sale of land, and asked that the 
Government honour its obligations enshrined in the Deed of Cession.188 Thus in spite 
of reports from the Mission House in Suva, claiming that “the great majority of the 
Fijians are extremely loyal to Great Britain”,189 the evidence indicates that a 
substantial part of the population remained disaffected and supportive of the Viti 
Kabani. Weeks suggests that far from damaging his reputation, Nawai’s internment 
enhanced his standing as a popular hero especially among Fijian commoners.190
 
Nawai was released on 30 September 1916 after serving the full term of his sentence. 
A month later he was in Draubuta where he inspected the guard of honour of 120 
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schoolchildren all neatly dressed in the European uniform prescribed by the Kabani. 
This inspection challenged official colonial rituals which were accorded only to the 
highest officials in the land. Macnaught suggests that the adoption of the school 
uniform was meant as an outward sign of internal progress towards a modern way of 
life.191 Nawai himself generally dressed in “European” clothes and encouraged his 
supporters to do the same. Sameness and difference as instruments in the contest for 
power, were therefore invoked in different situations for different outcomes. 
 
Although Nawai was keen to affirm certain particularities of “Fijianness” in terms of 
indigeneity and therefore difference, he was also determined to nullify the 
particularities of racial difference through the imposition of ‘native dress’. When he 
turned up at the Suva Town Hall for the Kabani’s 1915 AGM in a black car, and 
attired in a well-fitting tussore silk suit made for him by Peapes of Sydney192 he was 
not merely playing on Fijians’ acute sense of decorum. Nawai was subverting notions 
of racial hierarchies and segregation that clothed the native body. In doing so, he was 
simultaneously and publicly displaying his parity with his powerful European 
opponents. Indeed, as conveyed by the chief police magistrate of the time, Fijians in 
the audience received Nawai as if he had been the governor himself.193
 
The Viti Kabani’s school in Draubuta was the first to be founded for the secondary 
education of ordinary Fijian boys and girls which was not run by the Church or the 
Government. The pupils had a uniform, the girls wearing high-heeled shoes and long 
white stockings. The children were taught in English by Tikiko Tuwai and Mr Dalton. 
There was also school song.194 Nawai sought to collaborate with the Wesleyan 
mission in his endeavour to establish a Kabani school in every village of the colony. 
But his overtures to the mission were rejected.195 The Wesleyan Church had suffered 
“a huge financial loss” as a consequence of Fijians transferring to the Kabani the 
contributions which they would ordinarily have given to the mission.196 Lelean 
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himself felt that the activities of the company had “dulled [the people’s] spirituality 
and blunted their affection for the lotu”.197
 
Little is known of Mr Dalton and several questions remain unanswered about his 
recruitment. The appointment of this African-American teacher coincides with the 
currency in Fiji of the model of education used by Booker T. Washington at the 
Tuskegee Institute for the advancement of African-Americans.198 It is unclear whether 
Mr Dalton was recruited from Tuskegee, whether he shared Washington’s vision, 
whether Nawai was advised of the wisdom of such an appointment, or whether the 
Kabani thought African-Americans best placed to understand the predicament of 
ordinary Fijians. 
 
There is little doubt however, that education played a central role in the Kabani’s 
vision for the advancement of ordinary Fijians. The Kabani’s intended to create its 
own education system and to extend it throughout the colony.199 This proposition was 
put to the next public meeting of the Viti Kabani200 which took place on 7 December 
1916 in the large Colo East village of Lutu. An estimated 5449 people from all over 
Fiji descended on the village to attend the Kabani’s Bose ko Viti (Council of Fiji). 
Here, Nawai was accorded a traditional ceremony of welcome including the 
presentation of numerous tabua normally reserved for the highest ranking chiefs.201
 
Little is known about the resolutions of this meeting other than that company officers, 
managers, town chiefs and clerks were appointed for almost every province in Fiji. 
Men with typewriters took the minutes of the meeting like the Hansard reporters in 
the Legislative Council202 In the words of a Fijian constable who testified later, “it 
was exactly like a government meeting. There were Chief Constables, Magistrates, 
Doctors, just as if Apolosi was founding a government that might become something 
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terrible … one question I wish to ask about Apolosi, if everybody salutes him as they 
do what is the use of the Government?”203
 
The Kabani was assuming proportions far more threatening to the state and its 
institutions than its commercial complexion had first suggested. Hence, though the 
Lutu meeting closed on 20 December in an atmosphere of celebration and hope,204 the 
Government was determined not to let the euphoria last. In the first months of 1917, 
the administration sought advice from the Attorney-General about how it might 
successfully wind up the Kabani’s operations. Because the law in Fiji was the same as 
in England, the reply was that unless the Company got into difficulties, it would not 
be possible to get it wound up compulsorily. The government was encouraged to “put 
up” a creditor and encourage him to take legal action against the company. In the 
present climate however, the attorney-general counselled that the likelihood of finding 
such a person was improbable.205
 
The Government decided to change the law instead, and drafted the Native 
Companies Bill, modelled on Nigeria’s criminal code and its chapter on “Unlawful 
Societies”. This gave the government wide powers to deregister indigenous 
companies as well as to intervene in their affairs and wind up their operations.206 This 
it did purportedly “to protect the natives from being exploited by an unscrupulous 
native syndicate”,207 though there is little doubt that the primary intention was to 
place a permanent check on the Kabani’s growing political and economic power. An 
accountant was appointed to look through the company books but he concluded that 
there was no way of knowing the extent of the company’s operations or what 
happened to the proceeds. He reported however, that between January and April 1917, 
Apolosi had received in his own name over three thousand pounds in banana and 
copra.208 He found no evidence of fraud through which Nawai could be successfully 
prosecuted and it was therefore to Nawai’s political speeches that the government 
turned in the hope of securing a conviction. 
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In March 1917, Nawai was summoned to a meeting with Ratu Sukuna and other 
government officials to answer questions about his activities and about his loyalty to 
the government. Nawai had already pledged his loyalty to the governor whom he 
urged not to believe the “evil stories” that were being spread about the Kabani.209 In a 
diplomatic offensive, the Kabani donated thirty pounds to Lady Escott’s Fund for war 
wounded soldiers210 and Nawai visited Reverend Lelean, the influential head of the 
Davuilevu Training College to inform him of his vision for the betterment of ordinary 
Fijians.211
 
Ratu Sukuna had little respect for Nawai and his work. After all Nawai was regarded 
as a commoner (in spite of his birth in the chiefly mataqali of Navatulevu), and he 
hailed from the West, a region that Ratu Sukuna regarded with contempt.212 Referring 
to the popularity of the Kabani in the West and interior of Viti Levu, his report stated 
unequivocally that “the more backward the people the more pronounced is the hold of 
the Viti Company”.213 Besides, Ratu Sukuna’s philosophy was that the Fijian ethos 
was built around obedience and respect for authority. The people needed little more 
than strong and enlightened leadership from their chiefs.214 As Scarr put it, while 
Apolosi thought in companies and shares, Ratu Sukuna talked of tradition and 
communal work.215 The cleavage between commoner and chief, West and East, 
commercial enterprise and chiefly autocracy, individual self-advancement and 
communal obligation, modernism and traditionalism, was dramatised in this meeting 
of two different Fijian worlds. Both claimed to act in the best interests of the people, 
and yet both were principally preoccupied with protecting their own. Ratu Sukuna 
however, could count on the coercive arm of the colonial state, and soon after the 
meeting, he called for Nawai’s deportation under Ordinance III of 1887.216
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Ratu Sukuna was supported by all government-appointed Rokos and Bulis. Tired of 
the widespread dissension that reigned in their districts and provinces, and of the 
gradual erosion of their authority by Kabani officers, Fijian officials began to 
complain to headquarters about the lack of executive support.217 Nawai had accused 
them of leasing land too cheaply and of doing so only for their own personal benefit. 
He also criticised them for forcing their people to work for the benefit of the church, 
chiefs and state rather than for their own comfort.218 Such attacks on chiefs’ 
privileges undermined their authority in every corner of the colony. At the Bose 
Vakaturaga of 30 May 1917, chiefs from each of the provinces took turn to protest 
about the disruptive effect that the Kabani was having on the day-to-day running of 
their affairs. The Roko Tui Macuata reported, 
 
I have visited every village. The people are well and prosperous, and well-off 
for food. The heavy rains have interfered with road work. The only trouble is 
the Viti Company but there are no members. They have overseers and a 
manager, but no officer. They have interfered with collection of taxes in 
Namuka by ordering all copra to be shipped to the Company. They also levy 
money in some of the villages. It is as though there were two Governments.219 
(Emphasis added) 
 
Reports from the other provinces followed in quick succession. The Roko Tui Tailevu 
remarked that 
 
The only thing that is disturbing my province is the Viti Company. It has 
many members who go all over the place, and they have a turaga-ni-koro in 
nearly every village, and an officer. This interferes with the work of the 
authorised officials.220
 
The Roko Tui Lau expressed concern about the spread of the Company in his usually 
quiet backwaters of the archipelago: 
 
                                                 
217 Ratu Sukuna to Secretary for Native Affairs, 12 March 1917, CSO 17/2286. 
218 Scarr, 1984: 135. 
219 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” Suva, 1917. 17. 
220 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1917. 16. 
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The Company has people at Cicia and Nayau. The only people at Cicia who 
are not members are Buli Cicia and the turaga-ni-koro of Tarukua. At Nayau 
all except the Buli's son are members. They are a trouble because they have 
three turaga-ni-koro, three ovisa-ni-tikina and three ovisa-ni-koro. They 
impede local administration. I ask that something be decided about them in 
this Council.221
 
The central island group of Lomaiviti was not spared either. The despairing Buli 
revealed to his embarrassment that the district had agreed to collect £500 for a motor 
ambulance for the War, but that very little money had been collected owing to the 
Kabani preventing anyone from subscribing.222
 
While the company was not so influential in Bua, the Roko Tui reported that anyone 
found to be trading with stores without the consent of the company was fined. Saolo 
Village in Nadi district collected money to send to Apolosi who, they said, had 
promised to get back the land leased to the Government under Ratu Joni 
Madraiwiwi’s term. In Ra, the Roko Tui reported that: 
 
In 1915, a flag-staff of the Viti Company was erected at Drauniivi. I went to 
cut it down. A Mrs Spencer came with Kini, Apolosi’s brother, to hold a 
meeting at Nanukuloa and I sent them away. I have since received instructions 
to go slow and watch them. They are now doing a great deal of surreptitious 
work in the province. I beg for some strong measures against them.223
 
But it was in the relatively more independent western and interior parts of the group 
that the Kabani was most popular. The Commissioner’s representative in Colo East 
warned that the company was exceptionally strong in the area, that it had an 
administrative structure with a manager, overseers, turaga-ni-koro and ovisa-ni-koro 
and clerks in almost all villages. Apolosi was a frequent visitor, and the people 
                                                 
221 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1917. 18. Cicia’s support for the Kabani can be attributed to its 
people’s long history of conflict with and resentment for the Mago Island Company which owned large 
tracts of Cicia land. See CSO 08/3835 and Chapter Four of this thesis. 
222 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1917. 28. 
223 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1917. 21. 
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seemed to devote all their time and money to the Kabani.224 And while disorder was 
rife in Colo North too, everything seemed altogether out of hand in Colo West where 
in the words of Buli Magodro, Ratu Tevita Lewaravu: 
 
The Viti Company is stronger, I fancy in our province than in any other. It 
gives immense trouble to native administration and communal work. Our 
young men leave their villages for this Company and prosecutions fail to deter 
them.225
 
This emphatic and unanimous call from Fijian chiefs for the winding down of the 
Kabani and the removal of its leader Apolosi Nawai, is indicative of the considerable 
threat to the chiefs and the system of indirect rule that the movement posed. His 
removal became necessary if as Weeks contends, the collaborative arrangements 
between the crown and the chiefly hierarchy of Fiji was to survive.226
 
The opportunity to exile Nawai came on 31 August 1917 at a meeting in Tavua where 
Nawai was reported to have spoken the words: “koi au na meca ni matanitu, au na 
tamata kaukauwa”: “I am the enemy of the government, I am the strong man.”227 This 
was adjudged by two government officials in the crowd to have been seditious and 
was reported as thus to the Governor. Macnaught argues that it is highly unlikely that 
Nawai would have dropped his guard and uttered such words in the presence of the 
officials, and that he was probably framed.228 Nawai again pleaded his innocence with 
the Governor but to no avail,229 and in November 1917, Sweet-Escott on executive 
authority, exiled Nawai without trial to the district of Itutiu in Rotuma for a term of 
seven years. With his elimination, the movement was also effectively terminated. This 
was not the end of Apolosi Nawai’s colourful life as a rebel230 but the next phase of 
his long battle with the authorities falls outside the scope of this study. 
                                                 
224 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1917. 25. 
225 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1917. 27. 
226 Weeks: 27. 
227 Cited in Macnaught, 1979: 185. 
228 Macnaught, 1979: 185. 
229 Nawai to Governor, 27 November 1917, enclosed in Sweet-Escott to CO, 7 Decmeber 1917, CO 
83/139. Cited in Macnaught, 1979: 185. 
230 Nawai spent twenty-four years of his life in confinement. Apolosi Nawai died from the disease 
philariasis on Yanuca island (off Taveuni) on 15 April 1946. See his death certificate “A Vola ni Mate” 




The Viti Kabani was an expression of long standing grievances and disaffection. 
While there are no direct links between the Seaqaqa War, the Movement for 
Federation, and the Viti Kabani, they all reveal a history of multiple and widespread 
dissatisfaction with local and colonial authority. Some of the discontent had its roots 
in ill-advised colonial territorial demarcations, disappointment with the bypassing of 
important local chiefs in the appointment of government officials, excessive tax 
burdens and chiefly exactions, the increasing regimentation of village life, and fear of 
land alienation. Various combinations of these factors had found expression in 
Seaqaqa and were later manifested in the Movement for Federation and the 
insubordination of Sawakasa and Tokatoka. These earlier forms of organised 
resistance cast the Fijian social, political, and economic landscape as a fractured and 
disparate ensemble which local and colonial authorities had difficulties in managing. 
They were important precursors to the Viti Kabani and indicate a continuum which 
makes the emergence and popularity of the Kabani less surprising. They reveal the 
Kabani movement to have been more than a random explosion of discontent. By 
1913, the conditions on the ground had ripened sufficiently for Apolosi Nawai and his 
charisma to shape the Viti Kabani into the largest resistance movement of Fiji’s 
colonial era. 
 
While Apolosi Nawai provided an avenue for the expression of the powerless in a 
world that suffocated innovation or initiative from below, he was no Robin Hood. It 
can be argued that Nawai spent too much on himself too early in the campaign 
thereby allowing his detractors to call for his exclusion on behalf of the ordinary 
“dupes” he had mislead.231 This is the position taken by most commentators. 
Macnaught in particular, suggests that Apolosi Nawai exercised his power as 
Managing Director in a way that was “far more autocratic, overbearing and selfish 
than were the chiefs he professed to despise”. He adds that “the Viti Company and its 
managing director became in the end a decadent parody of the Administration and the 
                                                 
231 Islay McOwan to SS, 28 June 1930, CO 83/190/13. PRO. 
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Supreme Chief, and equally impotent as a vehicle of economic progress”.232 
Macnaught provides no evidence to support these conclusions but, conversely, there 
exists little evidence to prove that the Kabani did in fact achieve its goal of 
redistributing power and income more equitably among Fijians who had invested in 
the company.233 This can be attributed partly to his premature exit from the 
commercial life of the colony. Nawai was in effective control of the Kabani for two 
years, the first of which was spent largely raising the necessary funds for it to operate 
effectively. It is unreasonable to expect that significant dividends could be paid so 
soon after the formation of the company. Since the Kabani did not keep regular books, 
it is unwise to speculate about how the money was received or spent. 
 
It is telling however that in Fiji’s official narratives and rituals of remembrance, there 
is no room for Apolosi Nawai or the Kabani. Little if any allusion to Apolosi Nawai 
or the Viti Kabani is ever made in school textbooks or media outlets. By contrast, 
Fiji’s greatest collaborator chief, Ratu Sukuna, continues to feature prominently on 
numerous landmarks such as parks, schools, statues, buildings, street names, and a 
public holiday. One is more likely to find Nawai’s name etched in the popular 
consciousness referred to by James Scott as the “hidden transcript”.234 Among the 
masses he is regarded as an underworld hero. He continues to inspire awe and 
wonderment though more for the occult powers he claimed in the mid to late 1920s 
than for the political and commercial activities of the 1910s. 
 
Whether he was a brave social bandit, divinely ordained, or corrupt entrepreneur, may 
not have mattered to disenfranchised Fijians who supported the movement. Perhaps 
more important than these considerations, was the simple promise of hope, 
opportunity, and empowerment that the Kabani offered. Whether this took a concrete 
material form, or an abstract sense of liberation, or a combination of both, is to 
speculate on the essence of the subaltern psyche and warrants a different approach 
than is possible here. 
 
                                                 
232 Macnaught, 1979: 190. 
233 For instance, complaints were received from Nailaga in Ba, about company officials helping 
themselves to the food that was intended to feed local communities, further stressing villagers in the 
process. Resolution VI of Nailaga District Council Meeting, 10 November 1915, CSO 15/10290. See 
also CSO 14/3370 and 14/3571 about intimidating tactics used by the Kabani to collect funds. 
234 Scott, 1990: 227. 
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Finally, although Nawai was on friendly terms with a number of Indian migrants in 
Fiji, he failed to capitalise on the possibilities of making common cause with them.235 
The presence in the colony of thousands of overworked, ill-treated, and disaffected 
labourers who shared a parallel though distinctive experience of disenfranchisement 
and alienation did not, it would seem, occur to Nawai as a potentially decisive ally. In 
articulating his rhetoric too strictly in racial terms, Nawai rather uncritically adopted 
colonial constructs and failed to see the potential that lay in more horizontal class 
based collaboration. Admittedly, the opportunities for forming such an alliance were 
very limited as shall be apparent now that we turn our attention to the struggles of 
Fiji’s plantation labourers. 
                                                 
235 Apolosi Nawai also failed to seek the support of women other than in a token or gratuitous way. 
Such broad-based movements as the Viti Kabani seldom address other kinds of power imbalances 
within subordinate groups. No Fijian woman emerged from the movement with any prominence. 
Women’s participation in resistance is discussed in Chapter Seven. 
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Chapter Four 
Organised Plantation Protest 
 
This chapter examines the forms of organised protest used by labourers on Fiji’s 
plantations. After briefly setting the context within which Fiji’s labour relations 
emerged after 1874, a number of organised plantation based strikes, riots, marches, 
petitions, and other formal manifestations of resistance are examined. The emphasis 
on “organised resistance” is needed to differentiate between the relatively rare but 
often spectacular moments of plantation protest, and the myriad other kinds of 
“everyday” forms of resistance which are the subject of Chapter Six. The following 
survey is intended to shed light on the complex web of factors that caused labourers to 
protest formally against plantation and colonial authorities, the frequency with which 
they did so, the form that these demonstrations took, and the outcomes that they 
produced. They are also intended to test the theory that labourers in Fiji pursued non-
resistance as a strategy of survival.1 The key organising principle of the chapter is 
chronological rather than thematic or typological. This strategy is used for the purpose 
of accounting for the evolution and recession of patterns across time. References to 
similarities and uniqueness, causes and motivations, types and themes, places and 




Aside from dealing with the insurgency that brewed in the hills, Arthur Gordon faced 
another daunting task when he took control of government in 1875. Like any 
governor, Gordon was expected to render his colony profitable to the British Empire 
and to run it at minimal cost to the British Government and its metropolitan taxpayers. 
To make the economy viable, Gordon needed to raise revenue locally to fund his own 
administration, attract offshore investment for capital growth, and find a steady 
                                                 
1 See in particular Brij Lal, “‘Nonresistance’ on Fiji Plantations: The Fiji Indian Experience, 1879-
1920.” in Plantation Workers: Resistance and Accommodation. Brij Lal, Doug Munto, and Edward 
Beechert (eds.) Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993. 187-218. 
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supply of cheap labour. However, aside from a £100,000 loan from the Colonial 
Office which Gordon had secured,2 the government was “terribly poor”3 and his task 
was complicated by a massive fall in cotton prices4 which had seen almost half of 
Fiji’s 3000 Europeans repatriate to Australia and New Zealand between 1872 and 
1875.5 The exodus is significant for it indicated a profound disillusionment among 
European migrants for the prospect of making a living in Fiji and it deprived the new 
administration of their cash and entrepreneurial spirit. Yet, if issues of investment and 
public revenue are important, it is with the question of labour that this chapter is 
ultimately concerned. 
 
Considerable historiographical discussion has already taken place about Gordon’s 
reasons for confining Fijian labourers to their villages to produce tax in food, and for 
seeking Indian indentured labourers to make up for the shortfall in plantation labour.6 
It must be noted however, that Fijians were not sheltered or marginalized from 
economic participation as is often assumed7 They continued to constitute a vital part 
of the economic mainstream.8 Their communal confinement also buttressed the power 
of their chiefs who, in containing this potentially dangerous political mass, ensured 
the cheap, orderly, and separate administration of the Fijian people. 
                                                 
2 Gordon to Carnarvon, 21 June 1876. Records of Private and Public Life, II: 46. 
3 Lady Gordon to Lady Ryan, 4 August 1876. Records of Private and Public Life, II: 129. 
4 This was mainly sparked by the recovery of the American South and the collapse of the French 
market during and after the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). 
5 Ken Gillion, Fiji’s Indian Migrants: A History to the End of Indenture in 1920. Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1962. 3. 
6 See among others Ken Gillion, Fiji’s Indian Migrants: A History to the End of Indenture in 1920. 
Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1962; Shiu Prasad, Indian Indentured Workers in Fiji. Suva: 
South Pacific Social Sciences Association and UNDP, 1975; Ahmed Ali, Girmit: The Indenture 
Experience in Fiji. Bulletin of the Fiji Museum 5, 1979; Vijay Mishra, (ed.) Rama’s Banishment: A 
Centenary Tribute to the Fiji Indians 1879-1979. Auckland: Heinemann, 1979; Ahmed Ali, Plantation 
to Politics: Studies on Fiji Indians. Suva: University of the South Pacific and Fiji Times, 1980; Vijay 
Naidu, The Violence of Indenture. Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1980; Michael Moynagh, 
Brown or White? A History of the Fiji Sugar Industry, 1873- 1973. Canberra: The Australian National 
University, 1981; Brij Lal, Girmitiyas: The Origins of the Fiji Indians. Canberra: Journal of Pacific 
History, 1983; Bruce Knapman, Fiji’s Economic History, 1874-1939: Studies of Capitalist Colonial 
Development. Canberra: ANU, 1987; William Sutherland, Beyond the Politics of Race: An Alternative 
History of Fiji to 1992. Canberra: ANU, 1992. Brij Lal, (ed.) Crossing the Kala Pani: A Documentary 
History of Indian Indenture in Fiji. Canberra and Suva: ANU and Fiji Museum, 1998; and Brij Lal, 
Chalo Jahaji: On a Journey Through Indenture in Fiji. Canberra and Suva: ANU and Fiji Museum, 
2000. 
7 Gillion 1962 and Ali 1980. A certain popular view which is currently circulating in Fiji, suggests that 
it was the exploitation and hard work of Indian labourers which allowed Fijians to live a relatively 
peaceful, unobtrusive, uncomplicated life during colonial rule. I seek to demonstrate in the next chapter 
that Fijians worked very hard in the villages and their life was anything but restful or peaceful. 
8 This will be demonstrated in greater detail in the next chapter. 
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 In resisting the hiring of Fijians as plantation labourers, Gordon was also keen to put a 
halt to the excesses of the system which had seen the depopulation of villages, 
districts, some islands (as in the Yasawas), in the large provinces of Ba and Ra.9 This 
exodus placed great pressure on those villagers who stayed behind, accentuating 
social dislocation and increasing the potential for unrest. As Rev. F. Langham of the 
Wesleyan Mission decried in a letter to Gordon: 
 
If the able-bodied men are absent from the district, the dissatisfaction said to 
exist already among those who have to meet the tax assessed upon the 
province will doubtless be increased, as they will, I presume, be called upon to 
make up the difference between the 1 pound paid by those who go from the 
province and the tax at which they are assessed.10
 
Further, as Langham explained, the absence of men from the villages forced children 
to be used as cover for the shortage and to miss school. The lack of marriageable men 
from affected provinces also caused a decline in the population of the districts.11  
 
Gordon hardly needed convincing. He wanted these men in their villages, working 
under the leadership of their chiefs in communal tax gardens. Legislation was duly 
passed requiring the permission of Bulis before Fijians could be engaged as labourers. 
Even if many continued to evade the laws to find work on plantations, Gordon’s new 
policy put a severe check on Fijians’ capability to leave and planters’ ability to recruit 
them. His decision to prohibit the sale of any native land only aggravated the labour 
shortage. With their land secure, Fijians had less reason to seek the meagre wages and 
ill-treatment that prevailed on many European estates,12 except to escape the drudgery 
of communal life. By the end of the 1870s therefore, Fijians had generally become 
unemployable as plantation labour. 
 
                                                 
9 Gordon remarked that as things stood, “the services of the entire male population of whole districts 
had been in effect sold to European planters in other and distant islands.” Gordon, Records of Private 
and Public Life, I: 201. See also Eastgate to Gordon, 25 August 1876. Records of Private and Public 
Life, II: 141-2, 144. 
10 Langham to Gordon, 11 December 1876. Records of Private and Public Life, II: 237. 
11 Langham to Gordon, 11 December 1876. Records of Private and Public Life, II: 237. 
12 CSO 78/1748. Thurston to Gordon, 25 November 1878. 
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To supplement Fijian labour, Fiji had long benefited from Melanesian labourers. They 
came mainly from Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, although it was those from 
Kiribati and Tokelau that gave them a generic “Polynesian” tag.13 Most came for 
three-year contracts and were employed principally on the cotton and coconut 
plantations. This “Polynesian” traffic however was tainted with “abuse and 
atrocities”,14 and Gordon was expected to curb such excesses for they had been used 
as a major justification for the British takeover at Cession. 
 
Pressure on the Governor also came from the Wesleyan Church for whom the scheme 
lacked sufficient legal safeguard for the protection of labourers. In a letter to Gordon, 
the Reverend Lorimer Fison pointed out that plantation inspections were almost 
farcical. Whenever such visits occurred, “plantations put on their holiday garb”, and 
inspectors fraternised openly with planters. A labourer who had cause to complain 
against his employer was, as Fison put it, “not likely to expect impartial justice from 
the man whom he sees eating at his master’s table”.15 Fiji’s poor reputation was also 
exacerbated by the better wages that Melanesian workers were now offered in 
Queensland, New Caledonia and Samoa.16
 
Hence, by mid 1877, the all-absorbing question which seemed “to supersede every 
other consideration”, as the Fiji Times described it, was “that of the labour supply”.17 
As it often did, the Fiji Times claimed to speak for Europeans or “the producing class” 
of the colony, and while they were by no means a homogenous group, Europeans 
generally regarded themselves as the key to Fiji’s economic progress. The planters 
owned all of Fiji’s 600 odd plantations18 but would not work the land themselves. Yet 
they would not offer working conditions that were acceptable either to the 
government or to prospective Fijian or Melanesian labourers. They regarded it the 
                                                 
13 For more detailed discussions of labour in the Pacific, see among others Labour in the South Pacific. 
Clive Moore, Jackie Leckie and Doug Munro (eds.). Townsville, Qld.: James Cook University of 
Northern Queensland, 1990. 
14 R. A. Derrick identifies such atrocities as the main cause for the intervention of the British 
Government and the annexation of Fiji by Great Britain. See also Gillion, 1962: 2, and Brij Lal, 
Girmitiyas: The Origins of the Fiji Indians. Canberra: Journal of Pacific History, 1983. 36. 
15 Fison to Gordon, 16 September 1875. Records of Private and Public Life, I: 508-9. This lack of 
judicial protection was to remain a recurring source of grief for labourers of all origin until the end of 
the indenture system in 1919. 
16 Gillion, 1962: 12. 
17 Fiji Times, 19 May 1877. 
18 Chandra Jayawardena, “Social Contours of an Indian Labour Force during the Indenture Period in 
Fiji.” in Rama’s Banishment. Vijay Mishra (ed.) London: Heinemann, 1979. 42. 
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government’s duty to find them a source of cheap, “coloured” manual labour on 
which to build their prosperity. 
 
The merits of importing labour from India had been discussed in Government circles 
for some time and Gordon was known to favour the idea following his experience 
with such schemes in Mauritius and Trinidad. In 1877 therefore, Gordon announced 
his plan to bring in East Indian labour under a system of indenture.19 Although his 
plan was initially opposed by planters who preferred a revitalisation of the 
“Polynesian” labour trade, Gordon persisted and on 15 May 1879, the Leonidas 
arrived in Levuka from Calcutta with the first 463 indentured labourers.20 Owing to 
the planter boycott of Indian labour, the government was forced to hire the labourers 
and for some time it looked like the scheme would end prematurely. Certainly no 
further shipments arrived for another three years.21
 
However, the government had been active on another front and in May 1880, 
Thurston secured the long-term commitment of the Colonial Sugar Refining (CSR) 
Company of Sydney to mill sugar in Fiji.22 This agreement guaranteed a substantial 
infusion of capital in sugar production and the survival of Gordon’s new labour 
scheme. When it commenced operation in Fiji, the CSR immediately hired the bulk of 
the Leonidas labourers. They worked on the CSR’s first sugar mill which was built on 
the Rewa River and prepared the land for cultivation in time for the 1882 crushing 
season. Buoyed by the prospect of selling their cane to such a large enterprise and 
impressed by the work output of the immigrants, the planters broke their boycott and 
in June 1882, the Berar arrived with the second group of Indian indentured 
labourers.23
 
The CSR quickly established itself as the biggest employer of indentured labour. In 
1883 the company expanded its operations on the Western side of the island by 
                                                 
19 Despatch 120, Gordon to Carnarvon, 14 November 1877. CSO Despatches. See also Royal Fiji 
Gazette, July 1877. 
20 “List of Passengers: Leonidas 15 May 1879.” NAF. 
21 “List of Ships: Indian Immigrants.” NAF. 
22 Sugar cane had been grown for commercial purposes since the early 1860s and several small mills 
were already operating in various parts of Fiji. 
23 See Appendix G in Gillion, 1962 for the “List of Ships, Dates of Arrival and Registered Numbers of 
Immigrants” from 1879 to 1916. 212-4. 
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building a mill at Ba. By 1884 when Fiji began to feel the effects of the worldwide 
depression, the CSR was not only buying out bankrupt farmers, it was also hiring 
almost half of the colony’s 3995 Indian immigrant labourers.24 By 1885 the CSR 
Company had invested more than £500,000 and the government began to conceive of 
its own survival in terms of this single company’s success. MacGregor25 wrote to 
Gordon that “were the affairs of the Colonial Sugar Company to become crooked, the 
Colony would utterly collapse”.26 Only four companies survived the depression27 of 
which the CSR came through as the most powerful. In 1890, it was decided to 
relocate one of the CSR’s Australian mills to Labasa (on the Northern side of Vanua 











Map 15: Main Sugar Plantation Centres: 1879-1920. 
                                                 
24 “Indian Immigration Report for 1884.” Cited in a footnote in Gillion: 74. 
25 William MacGregor came to Fiji with Gordon in 1875 and served in the colonial administration first 
as the chief medical officer and then in several other senior administrative positions until 1888 when he 
was appointed Governor of British New Guinea. For more biographical details see R. B. Joyce, Sir 
William MacGregor. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1971. 
26 MacGregor to Gordon, 21 January 1886 in Stanmore Papers, B. M. 49203. Cited in Gillion, 1962: 
78. Lal (1993) has also demonstrated how the dominance of the CSR in Fiji accentuated the affinity of 
interests that already existed between planters and the colonial state. 
27 These four companies were the CSR, the Fiji Sugar Company operating in Navua, The Chalmers 
Brothers company in Penang in Ra, and the Holmhurst Estate in Taveuni owned by the Bank of New 
Zealand Estates Company. 
28 This had become necessary because of Queensland’s new laws prohibiting the employment of 
coloured labour. 
29 Gillion, 1962: 79. 
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 Under the agreement or girmit, as this contract was popularly known, indentured 
labourers (girmitiyas) were provided with an optional free return passage to India 
after the completion of two five-year terms of indenture or a return at their own 
expense after the first five years. They were paid a wage of one shilling a day. They 
were to work for nine hours each weekday and five hours on Saturday. The 
regulations further stipulated that each labourer was to perform task work and that one 
task was the equivalent of six hours of steady work for men and four and a half hours 
of work for women. Most were expected to complete one task per day. Each adult 
immigrant received rations according to a scale provided by the Government at a cost 
of four pence. Children under twelve years of age received half portions for free. 
Immigrants were also given free accommodation and free medical care in case of 
illness.30 Forty women were to be hired for every hundred men, ostensibly to 
encourage permanent familial settlement in Fiji. Most were recruited from Bihar and 
Uttar Pradesh31 although a significant number were recruited from South India and 
the Punjab from 1903 onward.32
 
Migrants had many reasons for registering as indentured labourers and embarking on 
the long passage across the Kala Pani (Black Water),33 but few were prepared for the 
reality that awaited them in Fiji. On arrival they were immediately subjected to a host 
of penal sanctions and employment conditions which earned Fiji and the indentured 
experience the label “narak” or hell. The Immigration Ordinance provided for the 
prosecution of anyone charged with desertion, unlawful absence from work, refusal to 
complete a task, using insulting language, inciting another immigrant to desist from 
work, causing damage to property, selling or buying rations from another immigrant, 
unlawfully harbouring an immigrant, and disobedience.34 These were so meticulously 
enforced on the plantations, that from 1884 onwards more than a third of all labourers 
could expect to be prosecuted during their period of indenture35 and more than four 
                                                 
30 See Appendix F, “Conditions of Service and Terms of Agreement” provided for intending Emigrants 
in Gillion, 1962: 210-2. 
31 Lal, 2004a: 79. 
32 Paper 25: “Annual Report on Indian Immigration for 1903.” in JFLC, 1904.  
33 These reasons are well documented in Lal, 1983 and 2004a. 
34 Paper 25: “Annual Report on Indian Immigration for 1885.” in JFLC, 1887. 16. 
35 These figures are derived from the Annual Reports on Indian Immigration from 1884 to 1919. 
 183
fifths charged with offences could expect to be summarily convicted.36 In some years 
(such as 1886) and in some locations (such as Labasa) the number of prosecutions 
exceeded the number of immigrants. These prosecutions were profitable to plantation 
owners for apart from intimidating workers, they also resulted in the extension of the 
term of indenture to make up for the labourer’s absence from work. 
 
When they arrived on their respective plantations, labourers entered an isolated 
insular space with a distinctive way of life where violence, the threat of punishment 
and control were a way of life.37 A strict hierarchy of power was enforced, employers 
ruling with near impunity38 and using their power to extract maximum work (often 
with brutal efficiency), and to suppress any resistance. For the duration of the term of 
indenture, the migrant occupied the lowest layer of the plantation hierarchy. This 
he/she did not only in terms of his/her class as a labourer but also as a racial type. 
While they came from varying origins, castes, religions, language groups and ethnic 
backgrounds, their common bondage on the plantation turned these girmitiyas into 
one racial underclass: the Indian coolie. This class and racial categorisation and the 
animal imagery that emanated from it further blunted, as Kelley shows, any sensitivity 
to violence on the plantation.39
 
Drawing on Goffman’s work, Beckford has described the plantation as a “total 
institution”, “omnipotent and omnipresent in the lives of those living within its 
confines”.40 Claudia Knapman writes of Fiji plantations that they became cultural 
institutions “with a distinctive way of life, producing even ‘a state of mind’ but where 
ultimate control rested upon physical force.41 Although the plantation in Fiji was no 
panopticon, everything in its organisational structure, division of labour, physical 
boundaries, regulation about movement, housing arrangements, and timetabling, was 
                                                 
36 The latter figures are taken from Norman Etherington’s article “The Gendering of Indirect Rule: 
Criminal Law and Colonial Fiji, 1875-1900.” in Journal of Pacific History. 31: 1, 1996. 49. 
37 For a discussion of the world of indenture see among others Totaram Sanadhya, My twenty-one years 
in the Fiji Islands. John Kelly and Uttra Kumari Singh (trans. and eds.). Suva: Fiji Museum, 1991b; 
Gillion, 1962; Shiu Prasad’s Indian Indentured Workers in Fiji. Suva: South Pacific Social Sciences 
Association and UNDP, 1975; Ali, 1979; Naidu, 1980; Kelly, 1991a; and Lal, 2000. 
38 Knapman: 154. 
39 Kelly, 1991b: 17, 27, 179. 
40 George Beckford, Persistent Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. 55. See also Erving 
Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates. Chicago: 
Aldine Publishing Company, 1961. 
41 Knapman: 154. 
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designed to maximise discipline, control and production. These structural, spatial and 
temporal arrangements added an institutional element to the physical violence wielded 
by plantation authorities. For instance, the plantations were usually laid out in such a 
way that the most powerful individual, the owner or manager, lived on a hill 
overlooking the rest of the estate for supervision and surveillance.42 His immediate 
subordinates occupied less spacious houses lower on the hills while the labourers 
were housed in quarters at the lowest level reflecting their social status and production 
function. 
 
While Gillion describes labourers’ lodgings as better than what they could expect in 
India,43 the “coolie lines” or barracks which became their ‘home’ for five to ten years 
were too small, too congested, and too unhygienic for the kind of work they were 
expected to perform. Typically, the lines contained eight rooms on each side,44 each 
lodging three single men or a family of four. There was no floor nor windows and as 
Gillion describes, with “firewood, field tools, cooking utensils and wet clothes 
cluttered about, smoke, soot, spilt food, flies and mosquitoes, perhaps fowls … and … 
a fire-place as well, living conditions were neither comfortable nor sanitary”. There 
was no privacy for family life and in sum “the lines were crowded, dirty and ugly”.45 
The labourers were woken up at three or four o’clock in the morning and by six they 
were at work on the plantations. 
 
Out on the fields, the labourers usually worked in ‘gangs’ under a sardar.46 Sardars 
reported to an overseer who allotted tasks for the day which on a sugar plantation 
consisted mainly of digging or clearing drains, planting, weeding and trashing, 
cutting, carrying and loading cane, shovel ploughing, holing and relieving.47 What 
constituted a fair task was often the most contentious issue for labourers and 
                                                 
42 See the old CSR living quarters situated on various hills in Nadi, Lautoka, Ba, and Labasa. One of 
Naidu’s informants recounted how the Kulambar or overseer would “spy on us from his house on the 
hill through his binoculars.” Naidu: 45. 
43 Gillion, 1962: 106. 
44 The size of these rooms was ten feet by seven feet until 1908 when the statutory size was increased 
to ten feet by twelve feet. See Gillion, 1962: 104. 
45 Gillion, 1962: 105. C. F. Andrews and W. W. Pearson reported in 1915 that the lines were “more like 
stables than human dwellings”, that they acted as “an apprenticeship for vice” where the “morals of the 
poultry yard” were fostered. C. F. Andrews and W. W. Pearson, “Report on Indentured Labour in Fiji: 
An Independent Enquiry.” Calcutta: February 1916. 27, 31. Naidu’s informants remember the lines 
variously as brothels, horse stables, pigs’ sties, and dog kennels. See Naidu: 32. 
46 Urdu word meaning immediate supervisor and usually spelt “sirdar” in colonial records. 
47 Foster to Agent General, 28 November 1887, CSO 87/1377. 
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employers alike. Overseers and managers were given considerable latitude in deciding 
the amount of work that could be expected of an immigrant in six hours of steady 
work. Because there existed no clear guidelines, tasking was left open to abuse and 
overtasking became one of the most enduring sources of complaint of the indenture 
era. 
 
Labourers who were overtasked could seldom complete their day’s work. This 
allowed managers to withhold wages. This practice was common in the Rewa region 
from 1885 onwards as Walter Carew reported: 
 
Unless a man completes a whole task a day he receives no pay whatever and is 
moreover summoned to Court and prosecuted for doing no work. Thus a man 
earning /9 a day and /4 ½ for Saturday would be charged with 5 ½ days 
absence … when he had actually performed more than four full days work. 
The 4 / 1 ½ would be confiscated by the employer, the labourer would be 
liable to a fine of 18/ or 3 months with hard labour and the magistrate would 
be compelled to order an extension of indenture for 5 ½ days. … For the past 
three years, or ever since Indians were placed there and during this period a 
great deal of money must have fallen into the pockets of the Rewa Sugar Co 
Lt by these illegal and most cruel iniquitous proceedings.48
 
Withholding wages accentuated a vicious cycle of poverty. With less money to buy 
rations, labourers’ diet deteriorated, prompting illness and further absenteeism, which 
led to further loss of wages, more fines and extra extensions of indenture. In this 
environment, the threat of disease and death always lurked and often preyed on the 
labourer. This was graphically described by the girmitiya Totaram Sanadhya in his 
account of his twenty-one years as an immigrant in Fiji (1893-1914).49 Sanadhya’s 
narrative also hints at a sense of helplessness and hopelessness that formed in the 
labourers’ psyche in the face of the overwhelming power and control of plantation 
authorities: 
 
                                                 
48 Carew to CS, 25 January 1887, CSO 87/202. 
49 Totaram Sanadhya, My Twenty-One Years in the Fiji Islands. John Kelly and Uttra Kumari Singh 
(trans. and eds. Suva: Fiji Museum, 1991. 
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The company does not give leave, and remember that to run away and 
complain without taking leave is to send yourself to jail. … How can we make 
a complaint? What kind of complaint can be made about those at whose place 
one certainly has to work for five years? Today we complain, tomorrow they 
will kick us with shoes, and give us more difficult work, write a shilling in the 
register and give us six pence. This is the consequence of our complaints.50
 
If a labourer dared take the matter to court by making a formal complaint, he/she 
would have to induce witnesses to appear on his/her behalf, lose a couple of days’ 
pay, arouse the overseer’s resentment and expose his/her companions (not to mention 
him/herself) to victimization from the sardar and the overseer.51 When action against 
sardars was successful, some overseers publicly refunded them their fines to 
undermine attempts at prosecuting any plantation authority.52 Charges against 
employers thus rarely resulted in punishment severe enough to deter further abuse. 
Such disappointments were disillusioning and discouraged labourers from reporting 
abuses.53
 
There are other reasons why labourers concluded that protest did not pay. Because 
protest was usually channelled through the courts, immigrants’ capacity to use the 
justice system effectively was a major consideration in the decision to lodge 
complaints or lay charges. As Kelly points out, many immigrants could not speak 
English and therefore relied on interpreters who played a key role in misleading and 
misrepresenting matters to and from them.54 Employers on the other hand enjoyed an 
extraordinary advantage in delivering effective testimony. They possessed a thorough 
understanding of the legal process, how to work it to their advantage and how to trap 
unsuspecting labourers in the subtleties of legal semantics.55 This is reflected in the 
statistical data provided by the Indian Immigration Reports. It indicates for instance 
that while employers secured eighty-two percent of the charges they laid, the courts 
upheld only thirty-five percent of labourers’ complaints against their employers for 
                                                 
50 Sanadhya: 77. 
51 Prasad: 23. 
52 Sergeant Lynch to Agent-General for Immigration, 9 September 1899, CSO 99/4215. 
53 Jane Harvey, “Naraini’s Story.” in Lal, 2000: 344. 
54 Kelly, 1991b: 188. We shall see in the Chapter Six that not all interpreters supported employers and 
that some used their positions to assist the cause of labourers. 
55 Kelly, 1991b: 199. 
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breaches of the labour regulations. Employers laid almost 10,000 complaints before 
the courts between 1890 and 1897, while labourers lodged only 311 during the same 
period. This disparity helps to explain the labourer’s reluctance to use judicial 
channels in claiming redress.56 Not until Manilal Doctor57 arrived in Fiji in 1912, 
were Indian immigrants represented by someone who could match their adversaries in 
the command and use of legal language and process. With such overwhelming odds, it 
is not surprising that overt action against plantation authorities appeared futile. 
 
There is general agreement among historians that in this suppressive environment, 
labourers mounted few organised protests.58 The rarity of large organised labour 
strikes is not confined to Fiji and shares similarities with Queensland plantations.59 
While Moore has described this lack of resistance in Queensland as a pragmatic 
“counterculture of survival”,60 Lal explains it in Fiji in terms of “non-resistance”.61 
Lal’s principal argument is that for many immigrants, the key to an untroublesome 
future lay in complying with the wishes of the overseers and sardars, not in creating 
trouble for them.62 Immigrants’ responses to the violence of indenture were thus 
informed by practical considerations. When they had worked out that the legal 
apparatus of the state was used to buttress the power of employers rather than defend 
labourers against the abuses of the system, immigrants lost faith in the law, and 
personal survival and individual achievement became more pragmatic goals for 
surviving plantation life.63
 
Lal attributes the paucity of protest to other factors as well, which militated against 
the organising of labourers and reduced the possibilities among them for the 
emergence of strong leaders or effective collective action. Among these are the 
                                                 
56 Doug Munro, “Introduction.” in Munro, Lal and Beechert (eds.), 1993: 16. 
57 Manilal Doctor was the first non-European lawyer to be admitted to the Fiji bar. Until his arrival, all 
judges, lawyers, and assessors involved in courts of justice were “whites”, most of whom felt that 
European law and order would be diminished, if an individual European, as representative of their 
civilization, was punished publicly for transgressing against it. See Kelly, 1991b: 180-1. 
58 See Naidu, 1980; Munro, 1993; Lal, 2000: 167; and Matthew Ryan, “The Labasa Strike, 1907.” in 
Lal, 2000: 350. 
59 See Adrian Graves, Cane and Labour: The Political Economy of the Queensland Sugar Industry, 
1862-1906. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993. 210-1. 
60 See Clive Moore, “The Counterculture of Survival: Melanesians in the Mackay district 1865-1906.” 
in Munro, Lal and Beechert (eds.), 1993: 69-100. 
61 See Lal, 1993: 187-216. 
62 Lal, 2000: 178. 
63 Lal, 2000: 169. 
 188
diverse social and cultural backgrounds from which labourers came and which tended 
to divide rather than unite them. They spoke different tongues, worshipped a 
multitude of different gods, and occupied different positions in the social structure. 
Labourers had different reasons, motivations and aspirations for coming to Fiji (or in 
the case of Fijian labourers, for leaving their provinces), and encountered different 
experiences on their plantations.64 For example, many among the labourers were 
sojourners who calculated that saving money and abiding by the rules would be the 
most effective way of getting through their period of indenture.65
 
Lal’s research also shows that most migrants were young men under the age of 
twenty-six, untutored and unskilled in deeper political and cultural matters. This made 
them unsuited for leadership roles. They had little formal education which placed 
them at a considerable disadvantage when articulating their grievances. Furthermore, 
the few labourers who showed signs of leadership were either co-opted into the 
management structure of the plantation as sardars, or were moved to other estates to 
prevent them from becoming too influential among their peers. Immigration officials 
were often asked by planters to split up immigrants from the same districts of origin 
to prevent the possibility of ‘ganging’. As Lal points out, breaking up old connections 
rendered labourers more amenable to plantation control.66
 
Their dispersal on plantations separated by rugged terrain made communication very 
difficult and further complicated attempts at collective action. As Kelley points out, 
their resources were fragmentary, complex, and incoherent, and colonial authorities 
were constantly depriving them of any political space.67 As one ex-indentured man 
conceded: “we were in a hopeless and a helpless state in this place hence I could do 
nothing.”68
 
One further reason for the lack of collective action was the failure of labourers to 
unite across ethnic groups and to coordinate their struggle in terms of their class. 
Fijian and Melanesian labourers suffered from similar exploitation as Indians did, 
                                                 
64 Lal, 2000: 168. 
65 Lal, 2000: 169. 
66 Lal, 2000: 171. 
67 Kelly, 1991a: xii. 
68 Abdul Aziz in Ahmed Ali, 1979: 16. 
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even if they lived in different ‘lines’ and worked in different parts of the production 
process. This racial division of labour encouraged suspicion and rivalry and intra-
labour inter-ethnic conflict. Hence, as we shall see, the first labour riots were not 
aimed at the employers but at other ethnic groups of workers. 
 
These are all compelling reasons for non-resistance. But Lal acknowledges that even 
if seeking redress was fraught with difficulties, labourers did not simply accept their 
treatment without question or retaliation. He cites the 1886 march on Suva by 
Koronivia labourers, the violent strike by Punjabis in Labasa in 1907, and the twin 
general strikes of 1920 and 1921 as particularly prominent moments of labour protest 
in Fiji’s early colonial history.69 Kelly agrees when he points out that the critical 
factor in the experience of indenture is that while girmitiyas were made into “coolies” 
and “labour units”, they did not become what their owners imagined them to be.70 
This chapter now proceeds to examine overt plantation protest in Fiji. 
 
The First Strikes and Riots: 1881-1884 
 
The influx of Indian labourers caused a major transformation of labour relations on 
Fiji’s plantations. In the beginning, there were few remarkable instances of labour 
unrest involving Indian immigrants. After all, only 450 labourers were employed and 
they were well dispersed. One incident at Vunicibicibi (C. L. Sahl plantation) in 1881 
required the removal of Indian immigrants until the manager was dismissed. The 
incident caused the government to instruct stipendiary magistrates to visit each 
plantation once every six months.71 The arrival of more Indian migrants in 1882 
increased pressure on the immigration department’s lone inspector and the 
government was soon forced to create new positions. 
 
                                                 
69 Lal: 1992: 80-3; Lal, 1993: 197-199, Lal, 2000: 189. 
70 Kelly, 1991a: 42. 
71 The details regarding this case can be found in CSO files 81/1300 and 81/1354. 
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Map 16: Plantations on the Rewa River: 1882-1920. 
 
In November 1882, Baulevu and Muaniweni Indian immigrants went on strike to 
complain about working conditions on their respective plantations. They were 
dissatisfied with existing rules about rations, and complained about excessive work 
and insufficient wages. The dispute was resolved amicably and the labourers returned 
to work without being charged.72 This strike is important because it suggests that it 
did not take long for immigrants to organise after arriving in the colony. It also 
indicates that some strikes ended peacefully. Such strikes are less spectacular and 
consequently do not feature prominently in Fiji’s colonial records or its history of 
labour protest.  
 
More spectacular were the ‘race’ riots which erupted in Rewa, the region with the 
heaviest concentration of labourers. These confrontations between labourers of 
different ethnic groups were more likely to occur than direct attacks on plantation 
authorities. For instance, in November of 1882 Fijians and Polynesians got severely 
manhandled by Indian labourers following an insult to an Indian by a Polynesian. 
                                                 
72 Taylor to CS, 4 December 1882, CSO 82/2839. 
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Groups of labourers sought out their weapons and an indiscriminate attack ensued.73 
On 24 July 1883, an affray between Indian and Fijian men erupted after an Indian 
woman was heard screaming in the barracks of Fijian labourers. Newly landed 
immigrants of the Poonah at Nausori Plantation, having heard the cry, burst in and 
beat several of the Fijians. The latter painted their faces black and retaliated early the 
next morning seriously injuring at least twenty-five of the Indian workers in their 
lines.74 This story and several others about the conditions of Indian immigrants in Fiji 
found their way into Indian papers causing much consternation.75
 
These ethnic riots highlight two substantial points about labour protest in Fiji. The 
first is that immigrants’ letters to India were an effective instrument with which to 
raise awareness about their plight. Some of these stories raised public ire and put 
pressure on the Indian Government to ask questions of its Fiji counterpart. In response 
to the increased potential for volatility that existed in Rewa as a result of the increased 
concentration of labour, the Government appointed one of its most experienced men, 
Walter Carew, to be the new stipendiary magistrate in the province.76 He immediately 
warned that reports such as those reaching the Indian press, if multiplied indefinitely, 
would prove prejudicial to recruiting for this colony.77 His prediction was not entirely 
misplaced. It may have taken almost forty years for the Indian Government to ban the 
recruitment of indentured labourers for work in Fiji, but when it did, it was due at 
least partly to the pressure created by numerous stories and years of abuse suffered by 
girmitiyas, and the outraged Indian public’s demands for it to be stopped. This is 
discussed further in Chapter Six. 
 
                                                 
73 Taylor to CS, 4 December 1882, CSO 82/2839. 
74 Carew to CS, 1 August 1883, CSO 83/2141. 
75 This story was published in the India Daily News, 27 October 1883. The report read: “A Madras 
contemporary has received the following information in a private letter from Fiji, dated 8th September. 
The Fijians are very warlike: on the least provocation, they turn out with their war-clubs and axes … 
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found in Carew to CS, 19 January 1884, CSO 84/150. 
76 Carew took up his appointment on 1 January 1883, in addition to his other responsibilities as a 
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Colo East. MS 105 – 8: Letters, 1880-1882. Carew Papers. Hocken Library, Dunedin. 
77 Carew to CS, 19 January 1884, CSO 84/150. 
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In June 1884 Government troops had to be brought in the neighbourhood of a Rewa 
plantation where Fijian and Indian men had attacked each other over the rape of an 
Indian woman.78 Fights often took place as the result of challenges based on the 
infringement of perceived vested rights with regard to women.79 Commenting on 
these rivalries, Carew wrote “Fijians and Indians regard each other with unconcealed 
contempt and disgust. The Indians never by any chance speak of the Fijians other than 
as “Jangalis” the meaning of which is understood and deeply resented by them all to a 
man.” He described Fijians as “proud and arrogant” regarding all others as “vulagis”. 
For their part, Solomon Islanders never seemed “to be so happy as when fighting and 
are chiefly distinguishable by their personal insolence to all around including 
Europeans”.80 Ethnicity became the defining characteristic of labourers’ identity, 
shrouding in the process important intra-ethnic differences and inter-ethnic 
similarities. 
 
Placing large concentrations of different ethnic groups alongside each other but 
keeping them apart in all other matters of plantation life, proved a hindrance to the 
emergence of class consciousness and facilitated the propagation of ethnic 
consciousness. Ethnic riots therefore tended to deflect attention away from class 
antagonism and shielded employers from a cross-ethnic anti-capital alliance. As 
Graves has remarked in relation to Queensland plantations, the division of labourers 
along ethnic lines “promoted ethnic cohesion in the interests of production, but it also 
facilitated the exploitation of inter-ethnic tensions to the same end. … Stratification 
on the plantation, therefore, was not simply a reflection of the production relations 
found in it, it was a functional reflection of the production process.”81 While ethnic 
tension was useful to capital because it inhibited the formation of a broad cross-ethnic 
labour opposition, managers in Fiji did not overtly fuel ethnic conflicts. When they 
occurred, such riots caused considerable irritation for employers because of the time 
and production that was lost to injuries and court proceedings. 
 
                                                 
78 Carew to CS, 1 July 1884, CSO 84/1405. 
79 Paper 23: “Annual Report on Polynesian Immigration for 1884.” in JFLC, 1886. 25. Women’s 
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Rewa and the Spirit of Insubordination: 1884-1887. 
 
From 1884, labour relations entered a critical period. Gillion has noted that there was 
a marked deterioration in the treatment of indentured labourers after 1884.82 But 
worsening relations on the plantations had already begun in 1884. In September 1884 
for instance, Vuda and Nalotawa labourers working at Nausori wrote to the Native 
Commissioner to complain among other things that they were ill-fed. Sixty Vuda men 
were being fed one bag of Kumala (sweet potato) for a day’s meal.83 Figures indicate 
that in 1884, thirty-nine percent of all girmitiyas could expect to be prosecuted for 
breaches of the labour laws. The worsening global recession aggravated matters quite 
dramatically. In 1885, the total number of charges and convictions against Indian 
immigrants, was between three and four times as great as the previous year, and 
between six and seven times as great as in 1883.84 By 1886 there were 8853 charges 
for a population of 5237 indentured immigrants. According to the Agent-General of 
Immigrants, Henry Anson, this situation was so bad, it was without parallel in any 
other British colony.85 Three quarters of these cases were from plantations in the 
Rewa region, the largest and most important labour district of the colony.86
 
After returning from Colo in January 1886, where he had been busy trying to contain 
the outbreak of Tuka, Carew was faced with more reports of labour unrest in the 
Rewa plantations. This was a setting different from Colo where the conflict had been 
about precedence, autonomy, land, religion, and intra-Fijian rivalries. In Rewa, the 
struggle was over food, wages, living conditions in the coolie lines, task work, and the 
violence of overseers in the fields. The tension was particularly acute in Navuso and 
Koronivia. In February 1886, 300 labourers went on strike for overtasking. 
Overtasking was a consequence of the Depression. As Durutalo points out, the fall in 
commodity prices between 1883 and 1887 threatened the profitability of the CSR and 
                                                 
82 Gillion, 1962: 79. This tendency for planters to exert strong-handed authority during times of 
economic recession is also alluded to by Munro, 1993: 17. 
83 Letter of complaint by Nalotawa and Vuda labourers to Native Commissioner, 14 September 1884, 
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other planters, and they sought to transfer the burden of costs to the immigrants.87 
Work expected per task was gradually increased on all plantations and the 
withholding of wages became more common. Overseers began competing to see who 
could get “the maximum amount of work done for minimum amount of pay”.88 “My 
own conviction” reported Carew, “is that employers systematically ignore that portion 
of the law which fixes a task as that amount of work “that can be performed by any 
ordinary able bodied adult immigrant in six hours working steadily at such work”.89
 
After unsuccessfully attempting to attack the manager in the fields, the Navuso 
strikers crossed the Rewa River to Naduruloulou, the government station, armed with 
heavy hoes and attempted to see Carew about their grievances. They came back the 
following day in boats and again attempted to land in Naduruloulou where two of 
their leaders had been incarcerated. They tried to persuade Carew to accept a payment 
in fines for their release. But the Fijian police prevented them from landing and the 
strikers were forced down stream to Nausori. Unable to land, they returned to Navuso 
and were back at work the next day. Carew’s refusal to fine the two leaders and to 
incarcerate them instead, signals an important departure from normal practice and 
indicates the government’s hardening position against labour protest. 
 
Prior to 1886, magistrates had been happy to accept payment in fines for labour 
infractions. In response, labourers had organised a special fund out of which were 
paid the fines inflicted for desertion, absence from work, non-completion of task, and 
such like offences against the Immigration laws. Acting Agent-General of 
Immigration Bolton Corney complained to the Colonial Secretary that this fund 
appeared to give immigrants the confidence to be contemptuous of the punishment of 
labour laws and to cultivate “a spirit of antagonism towards, not only their employers, 
but towards the official authorities of the districts in which they reside”.90 The 
existence of the fund gave offending labourers some influence over the nature of their 
punishment. For instance, it gave them the power if they so wished to go back to work 
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immediately on the payment of a fine instead of spending days in gaol. Gaol time was 
resented by many immigrants because the period of indenture was automatically 
extended by the number of days spent away from the plantation. The fund also 
reflects their organisational capability and attests to the spirit of solidarity which 
existed among them. This spirit of comradeship and the fund that symbolised it led 
Bolton Corney to suspect “the presence of a socialist element among the immigrants 
… which threatens to set at nought the legally constituted authority and thwart the 
ends of justice”.91 To neutralise labourers’ communal monetary capability, the 
administration advised magistrates to withdraw the option of fines and to impose 
mandatory gaol terms. 
 
Three months after the Navuso “emeute”,92 matters got out of hand at Koronivia. 
Carew was expecting trouble and wrote, “for a long time past it has been my opinion 
and I believe that of many others in this district that the only law known at Koronivia 
is the law of the “stick” and the “boots” aided by the free use of much coarse 
profanity”.93 Such lawlessness on the plantation had already resulted on 6 December 
1885 in an attack on the overseer Gaspard.94 The attack was led by Debi, the former 
sardar and supported by the labourers who wanted him reinstated. Labour relations on 
the estate had deteriorated steadily since the arrival of two Creole overseers, Tarbe 
and Gaspard from Mauritius in 1885. They both spoke Hindustani fluently although 
as the labourers complained, they used it to abuse them.95 Like overseers on other 
plantations, they had steadily increased the quantity of work done in one task. 
Labourers found themselves increasingly incapable of completing these revised tasks 
and as a consequence were losing substantial portions of their earnings. It became to 
the “pecuniary advantage of the plantation” as Carew reported, “that the men should 
never finish a task of work and I attribute their low rate of earning and the many 
serious disturbances at Koronivia to this system”.96
 
In February, labourers from the Ra coast protested to Carew that Mr Mune, the 
manager of the Rewa Sugar Company at Koronivia, had not paid them their wages 
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93 Carew to CS, 6 March 1886, CSO 86/551. 
94 Fiji Times, 30 January 1886. 
95 Report by Carruthers on the Koronivia Strike, 13 May 1886, CSO 86/987. 
96 Carew to CS, 25 January 1887, CSO 87/202. 
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and that his son had been ill-treating them.97 Carew wrote in his monthly report that 
Mune was in the habit of flouting the law in the face of magistrates, and boasting of 
the thrashings he administered to his labourers.98 His son was abusive and constantly 
kicked and beat the men.99 In the end, they were forced to return to their villages 
because being so badly fed and paid, they would have starved had they waited for 
their court case against the management to be heard. Being hungry, ill-treated, 
overworked, and having wages withheld was a shared experience that permeated life 
on the plantations across gender and ethnic lines. But where Fijian labourers could 
refuse to continue working under such conditions and retreat or escape back to their 
villages, other immigrant labourers were confined to the plantation for the length of 
their contract period. Initially the labourers responded by trying to sabotage the 
Koronivia mill.100 However, by the end of April the situation was such that the 
labourers adopted an organised and confrontational approach. 
 
On Monday 3 May 1886, Koronivia’s gang of shovel men marched around to other 
gangs in the various parts of the estate notifying them of their decision to stop work. 
The other gangs responded with surprising unanimity. From Koronivia, the labourers 
walked ten miles and converged on Suva at the Immigration Office. Reports differ as 
to the exact number of labourers involved. Acting Agent-General Bolton Corney 
reported that forty of them turned up at the office carrying spades, hoes, knives and 
other implements. They complained that they were not getting enough to eat and that 
they were overworked. Corney replied that it was against the rules to come and 
complain with these instruments in their hands, and that complaints should be made to 
the magistrate. The labourers protested that they could not lay their complains with an 
inspector because they had never seen one and that the magistrate would not listen to 
them.101 After being promised that their grievances would be addressed and that an 
inspector would be despatched to the plantation, the labourers were escorted by police 
back to Koronivia. 
 
                                                 
97 Carew to CS, 6 March 1886, CSO 86/551. 
98 Carew to CS, 6 March 1886, CSO 86/551. 
99 Terms such as “bloody vuakas” and “bokolas” were highly offensive to these proud Nalawa men. 
100 Fiji Times, 3 March 1886. 
101 Corney to CS, 14 May 1886, CSO 86/1107. 
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The next day however, they refused to turn out when called out by Mune and the 
overseers. On Wednesday 5 May, Mune brought 133 labourers from Koronivia 
plantation to Carew’s station at Naduruloulou in a punt. The labourers had refused to 
work for the third consecutive day and were in a state of open mutiny. Carew agreed 
to see eleven of their representatives. They complained about being overtasked and 
repeated the grievances presented to the Agent-General. Carew advised them to return 
to Koronivia and wait for the arrival of an inspector. But the labourers refused to 
leave and Carew had four of the men arrested and locked up. The others were ordered 
back under guard on board their punt. The arrest nearly produced a violent riot with 
the labourers remaining on the boats shaking sticks and their fists at the police. They 
had hoped to secure the release of Debi and now appeared ready to rush the gaol to 
rescue their other companions. The altercation lasted about ten minutes before the 
police could restore control. Six labourers succeeded in jumping overboard and swam 
ashore but were immediately arrested. The rest returned to Koronivia under police 
escort.102
 
Back in Koronivia, the labourers at once started back to Suva but were intercepted by 
Mune and several were locked up in the plantation hospital. The others were sent back 
to their lines but by evening a group of seventy of them got away and headed to Suva. 
Many carried with them summonses signed by Carew and delivered to them by Tarbe 
for failing to complete their tasks in the month of April. The labourers again sought 
relief from the Agent-General who again promised to send an inspector to look into 
the matter. Subagent Carruthers arrived on the plantation on 13 May and instructed 
labourers to select three spokespersons to meet with him. Among other things, 
Carruthers was informed that two “drivers”,103 Mahadeo and Bucha, were at the 
source of much of the trouble. The two sardars had joined the Creole overseers to beat 
labourers and prevent the older and more likeable Debi from being reinstated. 
Carruthers then visited the plantation where he found the workers “sullen and 
unwilling” and their living quarters in “filthy and unhealthy condition”. He noted that 
                                                 
102 See several reports in file CSO 86/987 for the official version of these disturbances. 
103 A driver’s main task was to regulate the work rhythm of the workers to a level which met the 
production goals of the plantation. Graves: 122. 
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many of the labourers on the estate were so poor that they could not earn enough to 
buy rations.104
 
Lal writes that in Fiji, the colonial government rarely took its role as trustee of 
indentured labourers’ rights seriously.105 In spite of being witness to these disturbing 
scenes and of representing a government agency charged with the welfare of the 
immigrants, Carruthers’ report admonished the manager and urged that discipline and 
punishment should be stepped up to prevent a recurrence of the disorder. Under no 
circumstances should groups of a hundred men ever march off their estate in such an 
unceremonious fashion.106 He saw the strike as the most serious disturbance to have 
occurred with Indian immigrants and a symptom of the growth of “a very unpleasant 
state of matter”.107 Nor was this feeling confined to Koronivia: “I fear that there will 
be before long similar trouble at the Nausori mill unless a sudden check be 
applied.”108 This view was endorsed by Bolton Corney who agreed that such “unruly 
assemblies” were becoming too common and that “a law must be drawn up to punish 
those who engage in such activities”.109 The Chief Police Magistrate agreed. He 
warned that the whole commotion had caused great excitement on the river and that 
unless it was promptly and severely dealt with, it would spread to other plantations.110 
Reflecting on the strike with gravity and unease, Carew observed that with the 
number of Indian immigrants on the Rewa River now so great, “if this spirit of 
insubordination becomes general among them serious consequences may follow”.111 
“Spirit of insubordination” was used with increasing frequency by officials when 
referring to the spread of discontent on the Rewa plantations.112
 
To quell this spirit, Ordinance XIV of 1886113 was drafted by Acting-Governor, J. B. 
Thurston and passed into law in July 1886. He insisted that the law had become 
necessary for a number of reasons. It was meant to meet the not infrequent violent 
                                                 
104 Carruthers to Agent General, 13 May 1886, CSO 86/987. 
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112 See minutes and draft reports in CSO 86/987 and in CSO 86/1107. 
113 Ordinance XIV is described in detail in the Agent General’s Draft of the Indian Immigration Report 
for 1886 in CSO 87/3061. 
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assaults with knives and other tools, upon overseers; the intimidating visits made by 
labourers to managers’ houses; and to prevent visits made to the Agent General’s 
office in Suva by large numbers of men carrying weapons.114 The ordinance was 
described as “Draconian” by an official of the Colonial Office in London115 and 
would probably have been fiercely contested by Henry Anson, the Agent-General, 
had he been in Fiji at the time of its enactment. The ordinance increased the penalty 
for absence from work or non-completion of work without lawful excuse, with an 
extension of one day for each day’s absence and each day for which a committal to 
prison was ordered. The punishment for desertion was also increased and a provision 
for extension of indenture for the period of desertion. Provisions for imprisonment 
without the option of fines were also integrated. But the most important clause was 
the prohibition for a body of more than five immigrants to absent themselves without 
leave for the purpose of making a complaint.116 This was a major victory for 
employers for it rendered organized mass collective action by labourers virtually 
impossible. It also underlines the point that mass protest was occurring. 
 
A further point of satisfaction among officials was the performance of the Fijian 
police in protecting the authorities and subduing the protesters. This is a pattern that 
was to repeat itself for most of Fiji’s colonial history. In Chapter One, we saw that 
Gordon had refrained from using European soldiers to fight in Colo for fear that the 
conflict would become a war between ‘whites’ and blacks’. By 1886, the great 
majority of policemen were indigenous Fijians although a few Indians had also been 
recruited. The effect of sending Fijian policemen and special constables to suppress 
Indian strikers was twofold. First, it gave these conflicts a racial complexion in which 
Europeans appeared to be disinterested, composed, and mature observers. Secondly, 
because the basic antagonistic relationship between capital and labour took on a 
‘racial’ form, Fijian and Polynesian labourers were effectively dissuaded from 
supporting the strikes. It can be inferred from Thurston’s timing in requesting rifles 
for the Rewa Rifle Association from the Secretary of State117 that, had the labour 
                                                 
114 Despatch 62, Thurston to SS, 31 July 1888. CSO Despatches. 
115 Cited in Gillion, 1962: 83. 
116 The terms of this Ordinance are taken from the Agent-General’s draft report on Indian Immigration 
for 1886 in CSO 87/3061. 
117 Despatch 43, Thurston to SS, 15 April 1886. CSO Despatches. 
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unrest spun out of control, a force of armed European auxiliaries would have been 
mobilised to quash the rebellion. 
 
While Ordinance XIV of 1886 may have reduced open protest, it did not remove any 
of the underlying causes. Chapter Six will discuss how plantation resistance after 
1886 was driven mainly underground, into the realm of everyday resistance. Yet, the 
ordinance could not prevent several further open protests from breaking out. Within a 
few months of its promulgation, the new ordinance was to be severely tested. This 
time however, the labourers found an ally in the form of Henry Anson, the Agent-
General for Immigration. Gillion described Anson as “extremely zealous in the 
protection of immigrants” and “highly unpopular with employers”.118 He had also 
antagonised some government officials by criticising the tendency for magistrates in 
the sugar districts to hold court at planters’ houses.119 His most serious concern was 
the task system which calculated a fair task on the performance of the most able 
labourers rather than on a reasonable amount of work expected of an average 
worker.120 In a letter to the colonial secretary, he expressed his despair: “There are 
perhaps 300 or 400 or more immigrants in the colony who while willing to do 5 ½ 
tasks are yet physically incapable of doing more than 2 ½ or 3 or 4 tasks. Are these 
men to starve?”121 One of his subagents reported that by November 1886, almost fifty 
percent of the tasks in Koronivia could not be completed and that Mune refused to 
pay those labourers who could not finish them.122 The more able-bodied workers were 
afraid to finish their tasks for fear that they would get more the next day. This was 
contributing to a severe impoverishment of labourers, increased absenteeism, and 
infinite complaints which he received from everyone he chose to speak to.123 Another 
subagent reported in 1887 that only eight percent of the men who worked at 
Koronivia were either willing or able to earn the minimum statutory wage. Such 
figures, he concluded, warranted the continual employment of an inspector whose 
whole attention should be given to tasking.124 Instead, it was the Immigration 
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119 Minute by Henry Anson, 1 May 1885 in CSO 85/1084 containing a monthly report by W. L. 
Allardyce SM Navua to CS, 18 April 1885. 
120 Draft Report on Indian Immigration for 1886, enclosed in CSO 87/3061. 
121 Anson to CS, 28 February 1887, CSO 87/443. 
122 Curruthers to Agent General, 26 February 1887, CSO 87/443. 
123 Curruthers to Agent General, 26 February 1887, CSO 87/443. 
124 Forster to CS, 19 October 1887, CSO 87/2481. 
 201
Department which suffered cuts in staffing rendering the policing of tasking and 
detection of other plantation abuses even more difficult. 
 
If some plantations were notorious for their poor management, as Koronivia was, 
other plantations enjoyed better relations with their employees. The level of 
discontent tended to vary from plantation to plantation depending on management 
style, terrain, origin of labourers, and general industrial relations. For instance, when 
CSR mill-hands at Viria went on strike in October 1886 for increased wages for night 
work, the management entered in talks with the strikers and the dispute was resolved 
without further consequences.125
 
This strike does not feature prominently in the history of labour protest in Fiji mainly 
because it did not boil over into a mass protest. It is less noticeable because a 
successful compromise was reached between workers and management. Such 
peaceful resolutions generate less publicity, fewer reports and less documentation, and 
are therefore less conspicuous in the archives. But they point to the occasional success 
that workers had with management in negotiating improvements to their working and 
living conditions. 
 
However, if the CSR compromised in Viria, it was not as conciliatory on its Nausori 
plantation where its labourers were overworked, underpaid, and frightened by a gun-
wielding, trigger happy overseer.126 On the evening of 6 April 1887, about 130 
labourers from the plantation appeared at the Agent-General’s Suva residence.127 The 
whole body of immigrants was “quiet and respectful” and five of them were selected 
to see Anson the next day. The manager of the plantation was called in to discuss the 
grievances with the labourers’ representatives but he protested angrily at Anson’s 
willingness to indulge the strikers. He took down the names of the representatives, 
stormed out, and returned to Nausori. Keen to establish the grounds for the labourers’ 
complaints before the case was tried, Anson instructed Forster, his trusted 
subordinate, to attend the court sitting involving the marchers and not to stay with any 
                                                 
125 Curruthers to Agent General, 11 November 1886, CSO 87/443. 
126 Anson to CS, 4 May 1887, CSO 87/921. See also Fiji Times, 9 April 1887. 
127 Henry Anson had returned from leave on 17 March 1887. See Fiji Blue Book for 1887. 
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of the employers as was commonly the case.128 However, the Immigration 
Department did not have a boat and on the day of the hearing,129 Forster was stuck on 
the wrong side of the river, unable to attend court. Six representatives of the marchers 
were duly convicted under Ordinance XIV of 1886 and sentenced to two months hard 
labour without the option of a fine by Joske standing in for Carew as stipendiary 
magistrate in Rewa. The CSR had won another important victory. Anson was appalled 
for he had promised the men a fair hearing.130
 
The rift between Anson and Thurston attests to the division in official ranks about the 
most effective ways of managing resistance. Their relationship quickly deteriorated 
into a major conflict about the appropriate role of the Agent-General and the extent to 
which he should be supporting the cause of immigrant labourers. Thurston thought 
that these sorts of tumults could degenerate into disturbances that would have made a 
major disturbance in Trinidad in 1885 appear trifling in comparison.131 He also 
accused Anson of providing avenues and even encouraging immigrants to lay 
complaints against employers while abstaining to provide employers with similar 
assistance.132 After all, in Thurston’s view, Indians were in Fiji to be “a working 
population and nothing more”.133 Anson on the other hand, described the whole affair 
as “a travesty of justice”,134 and published the most damning report of Indian 
Immigration of his or any other term. The report highlighted excessive mortality rates 
among immigrants, exceedingly high prosecutions, overtasking, and non-payment of 
wages as particularly worrying. However, neither the Indian Government nor the 
Colonial Office responded to the report with any concern and Anson found himself 
further isolated by the colonial establishment. By the end of 1887, Thurston had 
managed to squeeze him out of Fiji by restructuring the Immigration Department and 
merging the positions of Agent-General and Receiver-General.135 Anson was replaced 
by H. G. C. Emberson and within the space of six months, Thurston had effectively 
purged his administration of two formidable opponents: Navosavakadua and Anson. 
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 The removal of Anson, however, did not end organised protest and labourers 
continued to fight their own battles in the immediate vicinity of their plantations. 
There were several more strikes although most were sporadic and easily contained. 
On 28 October 1887 for instance, all but a few labourers from the New Zealand Sugar 
Refining Company’s branch plantation of Varoko in Ba, turned out armed with gun 
barrels, Fijian clubs, and hoe handles and refused work. The main grievance was 
over-tasking although there also appears to have been some quarrel over the 
appointment of a new sardar.136 Like the first Koronivia strike, it seems that the 
labourers tried to get their man into the key position of sardar against the 
management’s choice. This was important for the sardar determined to a large extent 
the kind of work rhythm and ethic that prevailed in the fields.137 In this case, the 
ringleaders were arrested within an hour of the disturbance and the protest petered out 
without any success for its initiators. In that same month a similar strike broke out on 
the island of Taveuni where ten Indian immigrant labourers with a grievance 
regarding a task went in a body to the house of the manager, carrying their tools with 
them. The manager listened to their complaints and on examination reduced the task 
they objected to and a peaceful resolution appeared to have been reached. However, 
some labourers refused to return to work and tried to induce others to continue the 
strike. As in Ba, the ringleaders were arrested and prosecuted and the rest returned to 
work.138
 
 “The Governor and Native Commissioner Don’t Hold Here”: Mago 
Island, 1887-1889. 
 
The late 1880s also produced a number of strikes by Fijian labourers. Because they 
did not usually work alongside Indian labourers, their actions appear to have an ethnic 
character. However, their grievances were essentially the same as those of their Indian 
counterparts and their methods of protesting reflect occupational rather than ethnic 
characteristics. Strikes by Fijian labourers were largely, though not solely, confined to 
plantation islands such as Mago. Plantation islands generated a peculiar dynamic 
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137 The pivotal position of sardar is discussed in more detail at the end of the chapter. 
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because labourers were cut off from the rest of the world. The smallness, isolation and 
insular nature of the islands, and the absence of other non-labour communities, often 
gave managers exceptional power. Labourers could not run away or seek the 
protection of nearby village communities, nor could they appeal to their chiefs, 
sympathetic magistrates, inspectors, or missionaries as they might have on the larger 
islands. In such a setting, labourers were largely susceptible to the vagaries of 
managers. In this regard, the Mago Island Estate Company had acquired notable 
notoriety. 
 
Organised protest erupted on Mago in October 1887 where some 200 Fijian labourers 
from Macuata, Tailevu, Kadavu, and Lau (Cicia and Totoya) stopped work after 
hearing that their rations would be halved. Earlier in the year on 18th June 1887, the 
same men had written to the Native Commissioner to complain about insufficient and 
bad food, unpaid work, work on Sundays, broken promises, and being forbidden to 
raise any grievance with the manager, Mr Borron.139 If the government acted on their 
official complaint, the labourers did not feel its reparatory effects. The October strike 
was caused by an overflow of maltreatment which pushed these labourers beyond 
their maximum threshold of tolerance. They produced the same list of grievances 
which had been raised in June and refused to return to work even after the 
management reversed its decision.140 However, the strikers appeared to operate on 
provincial lines rather than as a homogenous ethnic block, and when the Kadavu and 
Macuata men agreed to return to work, those from Tailevu (about fifty of them) were 
soon compelled to do likewise.141
 
More trouble erupted on the island in January of the following year, because a group 
of Kadavu labourers who were due passage back to their home island were forcibly 
detained by Borron and refused any wages.142 The government’s attention to the row 
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was drawn when Borron wrote to the Colonial Secretary to complain that the strike 
was spreading among other Fijian labourers.143 Upon investigation, Borron was found 
at fault and instructed to pay the men their full wages and to provide them with 
transport home as required by law.144 Any salutary effect that the ruling had on 
employment relations on the island were short-lived. In August 1888, another strike 
took place, this time over the dismissal of one of the gang leaders. The man, Eremasi, 
was supported by forty-two of his fellow Cakaudrove labourers who refused to work 
until his reinstatement. The strike lasted for two weeks and on this occasion, the 
workers’ demands were met by the management.145
 
Letters of complaint by labourers indentured to the Estate continued to flow to Suva 
with some regularity.146 Some, such as the following, were addressed directly to the 
paramount chief of the province from where the labourers originated: 
 
Sir we write to you the Chief about our work at Mago, because we your men 
are overcome by our work; there are many places in which there is work but 
there is no place like this. We are in a very pitiable state. … Since Mr Reid has 
been in charge we have been wretched, we are dismissed from work at 10 
o’clock at night, we are caused much pain, we sleep badly and feed badly and 
also live in discomfort. … When we are dismissed at night we all sleep we 
cannot eat and this has caused much sickness amongst us. Another thing. 
When it rains we work all day and this causes sickness. … Another thing we 
feel injured about. The whip, we are constantly beaten, we are overcome by it. 
We are beaten till night. … We report to you the chief that we are overcome 
by flogging. Flogging goes on from morn till night and we have all suffered. 
… Eight of us were taken to the office and they shut the doors and they then 
flogged them, there were tremendous wales [sic] from this flogging, the whole 
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of their bodies were injured by it. … We are flogged for nothing. Another 
thing for which were are to be pitied is that we are fed upon China bananas.147
 
In 1895, a whole group of labourers escaped from Mago and sailed to Totoya 
following further abuse. The two men who carried their letter of complaint to Suva 
were arrested on arrival in the capital. The order was signed by the stipendiary 
magistrate for Lau, Mr Swayne, whose collusion with Borron on all previous 
occasions had convinced the workers of the futility of seeking justice through the 
courts. The pointless act of following official channels was made known to them in 
the most unambiguous language. Borron was reported to have dismissed their claims 
by exclaiming, “the Governor and Native Commissioner don’t hold here”.148
 
The letter of complaint against the company was signed by eighty-seven labourers and 
was addressed to the Governor himself. It described how the men were woken by the 
lali (Fijian drum) at four am and returned from work at eight pm and how the sick 
were neglected and forced to work. It continued: 
 
We have not seen any rations for which we signed. No yams, dalo, Tavioca, 
Tivoli and “we are in want of food”. The meat supplied to us makes us ill and 
when we eat it we are sick and have pains in our stomachs. Nothing is good 
here. … On the 5th of August, the S.M. Lau visited Mago; we went to report 
this matter to him and he said to us “you go outside”; he said he didn’t want to 
hear our reports and we then came outside. There is no other place to go to to 
seek aid and it is our wish that we should have rest from Government house. 
This is our report.149
 
Aside from the trouble on Mago, Fijian labourers were also involved in industrial 
action in Rewa where, between 1886 and 1889, the tension between the management 
and labourers (of both ethnic groups) of the Koronivia plantation showed little signs 
of abating. Another short-lived strike by indentured immigrants in February 1888 
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again prompted by overtasking150 was followed by another sit-in, this time by 
Cakaudrove labourers in May 1889 after they were repeatedly “kicked, struck and 
sworn at” by Mune’s son. They refused to turn up at work and stayed in their lines 
where they smoked tobacco instead.151 A few months later it was the turn of Kadavu 
labourers to complain of ill-treatment at Koronivia. They wrote that they were 
“treated like pigs”, overtasked, ill fed, ill housed, without even mats or blankets to 
sleep on.152 Complaining against Mr Mune in February of 1895, Nalawa labourers at 
Koronivia revealed that nothing much had changed in the ten years since trouble had 
first arisen. The basis of their grievance was the same as the first Indian labourers. It 
was about overtasking, insufficient recovery time between periods of intense work, 
work on Saturday afternoons and Sundays, foul language, beatings, insufficient food, 
insufficient time to prepare food, and the coercion of the sick into work. In summing 
up the state of affairs on the plantation, a despondent Neori Navenatu, leader of the 
gang, uttered “working here is as bad as being in hell”.153
 
The Lull Before the Storm: 1890-1895. 
 
Other than the resurgence of Tuka in the interior of Ra in 1890 and 1891, the only 
disturbances of note in the early to mid 1890s were two strikes in 1890. The first was 
the strike, referred to in Chapter Three, of Fijian dockworkers at Suva’s Queen’s 
Wharf, and masterminded by the Tui Suva, Ratu Avorosa.154 The second was also led 
by a chief and involved labourers from Sabeto (Nadi) and Cakaudrove on Baulevu 
Estate in Rewa in December 1890. The Sabeto chief had been dismissed of the 
leadership of his gang of workers after going to Suva to lay a complaint against the 
estate management. His was the fourth such visit to Suva in the previous few months 
by deputations of Fijian labourers from various Rewa plantations to lay complaints 
with the Native Office.155 The nature of complaints, like most others, related to basic 
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practical issues such as the lack of or insufficient number of mats provided for 
workers to sleep on, insufficient and occasionally rotten food rations, excessive cold 
in the lines, overtasking, being forced to work in the rain, being sent to work when ill, 
and the constant striking and kicking of labourers by Mr Storck the overseer.156 The 
complaint was corroborated by a letter from the Cakaudrove labourers also 
complaining about the treatment they received from Mr Storck. The dispute was 
resolved when, in accordance with common practice, the overseer was transferred to 
another plantation.157
 
The steady stream of labour turbulence on Fiji’s plantations between 1886 and the 
early 1890s suggests therefore that the “most salutary effect” of Ordinance XIV of 
1886 that Bolton Corney wished for, had only been partially realised. The assertion by 
employers and administrators that tougher laws would improve industrial relations,158 
is therefore disputable. The period between 1886, and 1888 was certainly one of the 
most turbulent on Fiji’s plantations. 
 
From the early 1890s to the mid 1890s, organised protest went into decline. The are 
several reasons for this decline. Ordinance XIV may have, as Corney and Thurston 
claimed, eventually had a deterrent effect. The imprisonment or transfer of leaders to 
other plantations also weakened labourers’ organisational capability.159 The fund that 
may have otherwise bailed them out became obsolete with the increased propensity of 
magistrates to deny convicted labourers the option of paying a fine. Demoralisation 
may have set in after the relative failure of open protests. Such protest depended on 
numbers and a show of force and the authorities usually countered with greater 
coercive force and more effective manipulation of legal instruments. The gradual 
phasing out of Fijian labour on plantations160 also caused the frequency of protest to 
decrease. In such conditions, indentured labourers may have calculated that covert 
                                                 
156 Unsigned letter by Koronivia labourers to Allardyce, 9 December 1890, enclosed in CSO 90/3563. 
157 Minute by Carew, 22 December 1890 in CSO 90/3563. 
158 Paper 38: “Annual Report on Indian Immigration for 1886.” in JFLC, 1887. 14. See also Despatch 
114, Thurston to SS, 18 December 1888. 
159 See among others a request from the Manager of the CSR in Ba to transfer to other plantations, 
several indentured immigrants suspected of creating disturbances, 15 April 1893, CSO 93/1766. See 
also CSO 00/4758 for the transfer of labourers who had testified against a European police sergeant in 
Labasa. 
160 Gillion has estimated that by 1894, Fijians were no longer a factor in the plantation labour market. 
1962: 77. 
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everyday forms of resistance were more effective in achieving their goals.161 This 
aspect of resistance is examined in Chapter Six. 
 
It is tempting to speculate that the lack of organised protest between the early and 
mid-1890s was due to the improvement of relations between labourers and their 
employers. The evidence however, suggests to the contrary, that conditions on Fiji’s 
plantations deteriorated markedly during this period. Gillion observed that between 
1891 and 1894, more than one quarter of the Indian immigrants died or were 
repatriated as incapable within their five-year term of service.162 The Government 
claimed that these excessive mortality rates were caused by a deterioration in the 
quality of Indian recruits.163 In reality the high death rate in the 1890s can be 
attributed to the deterioration of conditions on Fiji plantations. Poor drinking water, 
cramped conditions, shared latrines, flies, insufficient food (especially protein), humid 
living quarters, and inadequate medical care all contributed to excessive deaths. 
Anaemia, diarrhoea and dysentery, all diseases related to living conditions, were 
consistently the chief causes of death among immigrants.164 This was compounded by 
the retrenchment of the Immigration Department and the paucity of plantation 
inspections which rendered labourers even more isolated and vulnerable.165 As will be 
discussed in Chapter Six, in this climate, organised resistance gave way among many 
immigrants to despair and death. It also encouraged others to turn to each other for 
comfort and support, and to their religion for inspiration and hope. 
 
                                                 
161 The early 1890s is characterised by the paucity of open protests. Grievances were usually expressed 
through the form of letters of complaint. See for instance CSO 92/1916 being a complaint from Ra and 
Tailevu labourers about being overworked, overtasked, kicked and punched, and the bad treatment 
given to the sick. See also CSO 93/985 containing a similar letter of complaint by Fijian labourers at 
Matei in Taveuni. One notable exception was a visit to Carew in February 1893, by twenty Muaniweni 
labourers, who moved as a body to complain against insufficient pay, overtasking, extortion and bad 
treatment by their sardar. Carew to CS, 28 February 1893, CSO 93/830. 
162 Gillion, 1962: 91. 
163 Paper 24: “Annual Report on Indian Immigration for 1894.” in JFLC, 1895. 
164 See Papers 24 and 20, being the Annual Reports on Indian Immigration for 1894 and 1895 in JFLC, 
1895 and 1896 respectively. 
165 See complaints by Immigration officials about lack of personnel to inspect plantations and planters 
purposely desisting from entering details about wages, tasking, etc. in Indian Immigration Reports 
1887, 1888, and 1889. 
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A Virtual Civil War: Labasa 1895-1907 
 
However, the opening by the CSR of a new sugar estate in Labasa in 1892 introduced 
a new front in industrial relations in Fiji. Its location on Northern Vanua Levu made it 
more isolated than most other plantations. This remoteness made the Macuata 
plantation community more insular than its counterparts in Viti Levu. Much like the 
labourers on Mago and other plantation islands, labourers in Labasa became 
particularly vulnerable to the whims of plantation authorities. Inspections were rare 
and so was the likelihood of drawing attention to abuse. 
 
The first indication of looming trouble surfaced in 1895 when Labasa eclipsed all 
other estates in the number of penal sanctions recorded against immigrants. Where the 
rest of the colony averaged one charge for every two adult immigrants, Labasa 
recorded almost one charge per adult.166 By comparison, all charges laid by Labasa 
immigrants against the management for non-payment of wages were dismissed, 
further underscoring the futility of using the justice system to obtain redress. In this 
setting, relations quickly deteriorated so that, as Gillion described it, the area was in a 
state of virtual “civil war” until 1903.167
 
In challenging plantation authorities, Labasa labourers used the same methods that 
their Viti Levu counterparts had previously employed. For instance, on 18 December 
1895, a sardar named Chotey Khan led his gang of some forty labourers to stop work 
and complain that their tasks were too great. They turned up at the station with their 
knives and hoes and refused to leave when ordered to return to work or to send their 
representatives. Fijian constables and prisoners were sent for and the immigrants were 
gradually forced down the road and back to their lines. The Buli Labasa was 
instructed by the stipendiary magistrate to recruit thirty extra men to act as 
reinforcements if the matter got out of hand.168
 
                                                 
166 Paper 20: “Annual Report on Indian Immigration for 1895.” in JFLC, 1896. 27. 
167 Gillion, 1962: 115. 
168 SM Macuata to CS, 19 December 1895, CSO 95/4836. 
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The tension was somewhat defused by an increase of personnel attached to the Agent-
General’s office. 169 Inspectors were able to travel to Labasa to hear labourers’ 
grievances and to successfully prosecute a number of sardars and overseers.170 In 
1896, the number of charges against adult immigrants in the district dropped by about 
twenty percent to seventy-seven percent of the indentured population.171 However, 
these measures had come too late. By 1896, a deep-seated antagonism had taken root 
prompting one nervous government official to minute that, in his opinion, serious 
trouble was brewing among Labasa’s immigrant labourers. He advised that all cases 
involving Labasa immigrants should receive the maximum penalty.172 The 
community braced itself and the attitudes hardened. Some sardars were so afraid of 
Mr Hughes, the plantation manager, that they drove their labourers to the limit, often 
suffering tragic consequences themselves.173 On 13 July 1896, fourteen labourers who 
were serving time in the local gaol, stopped work to protest against the quality and 
quantity of food given to them. They were led by a man accused of conspiring to kill 
an overseer. That evening the sergeant in charge of the gaol (a modest grass hut) was 
attacked by two men with hoes. Others broke the wall of the gaol but could not escape 
from the compound and were arrested.174
 
The following year, resident inspectors were posted to Ba and Labasa in an attempt to 
tighten supervision. But many of these inspectors were former CSR overseers. Agent-
General Coates was of the opinion that: 
 
in Fiji the only persons competent to fill the post of an Inspector are those who 
have had experience as Overseers or Managers on cane plantations and of 
these undoubtedly the best men are those who have served for a number of 
years in the employment of the CSR Coy Ltd.175
 
                                                 
169 Paper 20: “Annual Report on Indian Immigration for 1895.” in JFLC, 1896. 28. 
170 SM Macuata to CS, 25 June 1896, CSO 96/2269. 
171 Paper 23: “Annual Report on Indian Immigration for 1897.” in JFLC, 1898. 20. 
172 SM Macuata to CS, 25 June 1896, CSO 96/2269. 
173 SM Macuata to CS, 25 June 1896, CSO 96/2269. 
174 SM Macuata to CS, 15 July 1896, CSO 96/2495. 
175 Undated memorandum in Paper 44. MS 2, im Thurn Papers. NAF. 
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Labourers had no confidence in them,176 and relations did not improve. By 1898, the 
number of charges per indentured immigrant in the Labasa district was back above the 
ninety percent mark. Pitched battles between labourers, sardars and overseers were 
fought in the fields177 and the incidence of assaults of overseers on immigrants and 
vice-versa continued to be a source of concern for the Department of Immigration.178 
In 1900, immigrant labourers brought thirty-two cases of assault against sardars and 
overseers, or more than half of the total number of such cases against employers for 
the entire colony.179 The culture of violence continued to reign in the district with 
accusations and counter-accusations between plantation managers and inspectors 
about who was to blame for it.180 On their part, the labourers created a fund (similar 
to the Rewa fund) to which they contributed six pence per week to help those who 
were fined or sent to gaol. As one immigrant recalled: 
 
We took the view that if Europeans oppressed us we could combine and hit 
them and from this fund we paid the fines. We also agreed that if we were sent 
to jail for this type of things we should serve our sentence. From the money 
collected we paid the wages of the person who hit a European and was sent to 
jail.181
 
The transfer of overseers to other plantations (or their departure from the country 
altogether), and the imprisonment of immigrant leaders or their transfer to other 
plantations merely suppressed the symptoms without removing the causes. Even court 
interpreters and constables who testified against employers were sent to other parts of 
the colony.182
 
The climate of fear, intimidation, hostility, and brutality that pervaded the Labasa 
plantation community produced a strike in 1907 described by Matthew Ryan as “an 
                                                 
176 Gillion, 1962: 111. 
177 See for instance inspector of immigrants Russell’s report on the riot at Naleba estate in Labasa. 16 
March 1898, in CSO 98/1448. 
178 Statistics taken from the Annual Reports on Indian Immigration from 1899 to 1903 indicate that 
Macuata consistently ranked highest in the number of assaults committed by overseers on immigrants 
and vice-versa. 
179 Paper 28: “Annual Report on Indian Immigration for 1900.” in JFLC, 1901. 25. 
180 See CSO files 02/4411 and 05/3029 in particular. 
181 Rahim Buksh in Girmit: A Centenary Anthology 1879-1979. Suva: Ministry of Information, 1979. 
45. 
182 See SM Macuata to Acting CS, 8 December 1900, CSO 00/4758. 
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unprecedented occurrence in the history of Indian indenture in Fiji”.183 Ryan’s is the 
only detailed study of any plantation strike during Fiji’s indenture period. He refers to 
the 1907 Labasa strike as constituting “the most significant and sustained challenge to 
the indentured labor system by Indian immigrants”.184 Ryan attributes substantial 
significance to the Punjab origin of most of the strikers. Punjabis began arriving in 
Fiji in greater numbers in the later 1890s and peaking in 1903.185 They had a 
reputation for being strong and hard working but by 1901 that reputation had turned to 
notoriety, with employers and administrators regarding them as “intractable and prone 
to violence and conspiracy” and less amenable to discipline than others.186 A common 
place of origin and a spirit of brotherhood forged in the Indian depots and on the 
ocean journey to Fiji, fostered among Punjabis “an unusual degree of solidarity and 
determination” which caught both plantation and colonial authorities off their 
guard.187 Their “inner strength and social cohesiveness”, Ryan argues, gave Punjabis 
an edge over their fellow South Indian and Uttar Pradesh labourers which the 
government and plantation management struggled to contain.188 Another group of 
strikers were Pathans, also noted in India for their long history of resistance to British 
invasion. Plantation management considered them to be “notoriously treacherous”,189 
while the local magistrate regarded them as “naturally turbulent and troublesome”.190
 
If cultural factors are important elements of resistance, so are the specific historical, 
geographical factors and the plantation culture that prevailed in Labasa. Like previous 
strikes, workers’ grievances in Labasa had been manifest long before they threw 
down their spades and walked across to the courthouse. They had raised objections 
about the nature of their work at least two months prior to the strike, complaining that 
they had been misled by recruiters who had promised them Government work. They 
had also complained that they received too little or no money, lacked proper food, and 
that they worked for long hours under undue violence.191 They reiterated these 
                                                 
183 Ryan: 360. 
184 Ryan: 350. 
185 Lal, 2004: 83. 
186 Paper 20: “Annual Report on Indian Immigration for 1901.” in JFLC, 1902. 10. 
187 Ryan: 351. 
188 Ryan: 361. 
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grievances to Russell on 6 April 1907 and again a week later, adding that their rations 
contained no flour and that they would rather suffer punishment than work for the 
company.192 On Monday 15 April, they turned up at the courthouse in a group of 
about sixty and respectfully demanded to see Dr. Brough, the stipendiary magistrate. 
They were warned that they were breaking the law and advised to select five 
representatives to discuss the matter.193
 
The labourers returned to their lines but the dispute remained unresolved and the 
strike continued. The strikers remained in the lines where they ate sugar cane and 
collected money from other sympathetic labourers and members of the ‘free’ Indian 
community.194 With pressure mounting, overseers asked for police protection, and 
Russell advised Brough to call for extra police. Owing to escalating tensions and a 
strike by twenty-five South Indians a few weeks prior, police patrols were armed with 
rifles and side arms.195 The Buli Labasa was asked to supply extra manpower to cover 
police shortage and his men turned up with blackened faces, knives and axes. As this 
was contravening the law, they were told to wash their faces and return with spears 
and clubs instead.196 On Friday 19th, they were deployed with nine armed policemen 
to the lines to arrest ten of the strikers who were accused of assaulting two labourers 
who had gone back to work.197 The police, their Fijian escort, and the arrested men 
were followed all the way back to the courthouse by all remaining strikers (about 
forty of them), who upon arrival demanded the release of their companions. Brough 
promised a fair trial the next day, and urged the rest to return to their lines. Led by the 
inexperienced inspector Boldero, the constabulary escorted the men back but on 
arrival at the lines, tensions boiled over and the police fired into the crowd of strikers. 
Three labourers were wounded.198
 
The situation was brought under control with the arrival of the mill Manager, Mr 
Duncan, but Brough decided that evening to have all strikers, their leaders and the 
wounded sent to Suva aboard the Clyde. He thought there were too many of them in 
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the province, that they communicated too freely and acted too easily together, that 
they were “naturally turbulent and troublesome”, and that it would be best if they 
broken into small bodies and transferred out of Labasa to other districts.199 This was 
strongly opposed by Duncan who stood to lose more time and manpower at a time 
when it was becoming increasingly difficult to find emigrants in India for indenture in 
Fiji.200 He argued in vain that if the unrest continued, the local rifle club could be 
called upon to contain it.201 Eventually, the strikers refused to be separated and 
Duncan conceded defeat. 
 
The strikers were brought to the island of Nukulau, off the Suva coast, which 
functioned as the quarantine station for arriving Indian labourers. The government 
renewed its attempts to convince the strikers to accept a deal which would see charges 
dropped if the strikers agreed to be dispersed to separate plantations. However, the 
strikers stuck to their original demands for government employment and insisted on 
staying together. On 12 May, the government decided to use force and twenty 
policemen armed with truncheons were sent on board the Ranadi to Nukulau to break 
up the strike. While they were having lunch, those eating inside the barracks were 
locked up and those who had stayed outside were rounded up and forced onto the 
ship. Eventually, amid much protest and several altercations, the strikers were 
effectively separated. They were dispersed to Rewa, Ba, Lautoka and a few more 
were returned to Labasa.202 The strike was broken and the collective power of the 
Punjabis was effectively neutralised. 
 
The pattern of violence and brutality which followed the development of the Macuata 
plantations in the 1890s was repeated in Lautoka where in 1900, the CSR decided to 
build the largest sugar mill in the Southern Hemisphere.203 Lautoka soon overtook 
Macuata as the most turbulent labour district in Fiji with frequent attacks on 
immigrants by employers and vice-versa. Governor im Thurn was forced to allocate 
extra funds to boost judicial and police resources in the area in an effort to combat 
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these crimes and the widespread anxiety they caused.204 Many of the new immigrants 
to Lautoka and subsidiary plantations in Nadi came from South India but the nature of 
their complaints were similar to that of the Punjabis in Labasa. In 1903, a group of 
them gave the Lautoka stipendiary magistrate “infinite trouble” for refusing to 
perform task work for the CSR Company: 
 
One man produced the Agreement signed by the coolie in India and stated that 
there was nothing in the Tamil translation about task work. He also stated that 
the work which would be required of them was not properly explained to them 
before leaving. I had subsequently to somewhat severely punish some of these 
people for absolutely refusing to work.205
 
It appears therefore, that the ‘clustering’ of labourers from similar regions, or from the 
same ships, produced a particular kind of solidarity which was used to mount coherent 
challenges. It also suggests that the development of new sugar centres created a 
particularly harsh working environment which invariably led to antagonism and 
violence between employers and labourers. This pattern was repeated in the Sigatoka 
area in the 1910s with the development of the Olosara and other plantations. 
 
However, no other strike of the Labasa magnitude was to take place during the 
remainder of Fiji’s indenture period. This can be attributed to several factors. The Fiji 
Census Reports indicate that the CSR and other surviving companies raised the 
number of overseers on Fiji’s plantations from forty-nine in 1901 to 133 in 1911.206 It 
can be inferred from these figures that, aside from extending their operations in Fiji, 
these companies sought to strengthen the coercive arm of their plantations and further 
minimize the potential for labour protest. This attempt to fortify employer ascendancy 
was offset on the one hand, by the continual use by labourers of alternative means of 
protesting, and on the other by a general mobilization of anti-indenture forces both in 
Fiji and India discussed in Chapter Six. 
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The evidence presented above allows a number of deductions to be made. The first is 
that, labourers of all backgrounds shared a common experience of exploitation. They 
endured violence and abuse up to a certain threshold, beyond which they refused to 
work. Labourers were constantly tested by their employers about the degree of 
physical and mental abuse that was tolerable before the delicate balance between 
suppression and submission became too traumatic to endure. Fiji’s labourers protested 
against the conditions under which they worked. In contesting plantation power, they 
fought over very practical matters such as insufficient or rotten food rations, excessive 
work, physical violence and verbal abuse, and unfair remuneration. These are not 
revolutionary ideals and labourers’ organised protests produced no revolutionary 
outcomes. As Ryan correctly points out about the 1907 strikers, labourers were 
neither protesting against the colonial government nor against the indenture system 
per se.207
 
Most labourers simply wanted to survive and get on with their lives without attracting 
trouble. As Bhikhari told a Ba court in a case to transfer troublesome labourers from 
Varoko: “I am a quiet man and wish to live at peace with my neighbours. I am willing 
to swear I know nothing more than I tell you.”208 Because of the exploitative and 
violent conditions under which they were forced to live and work, and because legal 
justice was so readily denied to them, labourers had few practical choices: Submit, 
cooperate, resist by covert means, protest openly or, as happened most often, various 
combinations of all four. 
 
When they protested openly, Fiji’s plantation labourers moved in groups as small as 
ten, and as large as 300. Much depended on the specific characteristics of the 
plantation itself and much, though not all, was contingent on the exercise of power. 
These included factors such as the geographic and cultural origin of labourers, the 
kinship they formed in depots and during the ocean voyage, the leadership provided, 
their relationship with employers, the extent of coercive power wielded by planters, 
the kind of mediation provided by sardars, the proximity of plantations to Suva, the 
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frequency of visits by inspectors, the protection they received from the law, the 
employers and stipendiary magistrates’ willingness to enforce it, the influence exerted 
by forces outside the confines of the plantation sphere, their own personal motives, 
their calculations about past success and failure, as well as an estimate of the 
consequences of their actions. These variables combine to produce an untidy and 
highly fractured terrain of power and resistance to which was added the complexities 
of everyday forms of resistance, discussed in Chapter Six. These fragmentations help 
to underline the argument presented in this thesis that while resistance is pervasive in 
all power systems, it is heterogenous rather than homogenous, variable rather than 
uniform and entirely context-specific. 
 
Historians of labour in Fiji including Gillion, Lal, Ali, Naidu, and Ryan, generally 
accept that there were few organised protests on Fiji’s plantations and that when they 
occurred they were comparatively minor and short-lived. The evidence presented in 
this chapter tends to support these views. The strikes of 1886 and 1907 are generally 
given more attention, perhaps because they were more spectacular. By focussing on 
shorter and smaller strikes, this study reveals however, that strikes were numerous and 
widespread both over time and space. Magnifying the lesser events may have a 
distorting effect, but then so may the frequent practice of ignoring them. Exploring 
the smaller and less spectacular strikes unveils a much more combative work force 
than Fiji is normally credited with. Labourers appear more enterprising, deliberate and 
motivated in contesting power and furthering their interests than has been previously 
assumed. It also reveals that while some plantations enjoyed good relations between 
employers and employees and produced only isolated incidents, others such as 
Koronivia, Mago, and Labasa were notoriously bad and produced sustained and 
recurring conflicts. 
 
Much of the historiography has focussed on the specificities of Indian indentured 
protest. The evidence provided here suggests that ethnicity did not determine the form 
or incidence of resistance. Indians, Fijians, and Melanesians suffered from the same 
sorts of beatings, the same long hours in the fields, the same verbal abuse, the same 
foul and unhygienic housing, the same kinds of overtasking, and the same trouble in 
getting their wages paid. In the end, although they were often separated and rarely 
worked alongside each other, their response was remarkably similar. Thus, in the 
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same way that there was no ethnic monopoly on power, there was no ethnic monopoly 
on protest either. 
 
However, because ethnicity was the dominant organising principle of plantations (as it 
was of the colony), labourers were placed on their plantation’s racial grid and divided 
accordingly. They were accorded different treatment too. As Bolton Corney explained 
earlier in 1886: 
 
It must be borne in mind that the studied and deliberate vice of the lead class 
of Indian immigrants is of a very different nature from the unsophisticated 
delinquencies of a child of nature such as a Fijian, or a Polynesian immigrant: 
and requires a different treatment.209
 
Many labourers internalised these divisions and, conceiving themselves as different 
from others, rarely made common cause against the same opponent. For instance, 
Fijians from Cakaudrove or other provinces forged an identity based on parochial 
understandings about their identity, and preferred their own collective bargaining to a 
wider Fijian or even multi-ethnic labour alliance against a common oppressor. The 
same applies to immigrant workers from India and Melanesia. This intra and inter-
ethnic parochialism greatly inhibited the potential for broader class-based protest. 
 
Another factor which played a hand in discouraging inter-ethnic collaboration was the 
terror brought to bear by the management and district officials in using Fijian 
villagers as a reserve army against labour unrest. The willingness of local Fijian chiefs 
to collude with magistrates and managers in providing extra coercive force for the 
suppression of labour protests further eroded the possibilities for ordinary Fijians and 
indentured Indian labourers to act with rather than against each other. The fact that the 
police were predominantly Fijian only served to reinforce suspicions. 
 
The gradual phasing out of Fijian and then Melanesian labour did not help either.210 
Although a few chiefs benefited directly from the recruitment of villagers by planters, 
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most of them persistently protested against their men leaving the provinces to find 
work on plantations. They resented the hiring of villagers for it undermined their 
power, caused numerous social problems, and impeded efforts to collect the 
mandatory produce tax. Ultimately though, Fijian labourers possessed one major 
advantage over their Indian and Melanesian counterparts. They owned land. This was 
their capital and security and it allowed them to envisage their future after indenture 
with some degree of optimism. Most Indians and many Melanesians labourers elected 
to stay in Fiji after their period of indenture, but acquiring capital and finding security 
in their daily lives proved to be a long and arduous process. 
 
Last in our discussion is the critical but often ambivalent role played by sardars in 
plantation resistance. They have been described by Ali as “the lynchpin of the 
system”.211 Lal refers to them as the “ultimate collaborators” who were chosen for 
their unquestioning loyalty and willingness to serve the plantation management.212 
Lal adds that leadership was exercised by sardars but only to sustain the power of the 
plantation owners and they often turned out to be the labourers’ worst enemy.213 Stop-
works in Baulevu and Navuso in 1898 and the large strike in Lobau near Navua in 
1909 were specifically organised to protest against particular sardars and the workers 
only agreed to return to work once their sardar had been removed by the company.214 
Again this suggests that European managers and overseers did not have a monopoly 
over the plantation’s terror mechanisms. Sardars worked in an environment where 
their capacity to obtain maximum production at minimum cost to the company was 
expected and occasionally rewarded with continuous employment. Those who failed 
to perform could expect to be cast back in the fields.215 Hence, if the company needed 
extensions to labourers’ terms of indenture, sardars were under pressure to deliver. 
When excessive force was used and charges laid by labourers, sardar could often 
depend on a sympathetic hearing from magistrates, light penalties, and occasionally to 
have their fines publicly repaid by managers. It was therefore in the interests of 
sardars to serve their employers faithfully because their own position of relative 
power and influence over their subordinates depended on it. 
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 Yet, as Chakrabarty has expressed in the context of the jute mill workers of Bengal, 
sardars occupied a “grey zone” between management and labour. Gillion points out 
that the sardar’s own safety often depended on “his skill in playing off factions 
against each other and in retaining the support of selected immigrants who, in return 
for preferential treatment acted as bodyguards and executors of punishment”.216 Early 
in the chapter we saw that striking labourers were occasionally organised and 
supported by them.217 These isolated instances continued throughout the period of 
indenture.218 When they were not directly implicated in protests, sardars could be 
called on to use their influence to secure jobs in the mills, although payment of a bribe 
was usually expected for such favours.219 Labourers could also call on court 
interpreters to assist them with court cases or to secure government jobs. These were 
important intermediaries who from time to time chose for their own reasons to fight 
alongside their wretched compatriots. 
 
Hence, if resistance appeared fragmented and tentative, power systems were also 
fragmentary and subject to infiltration or manipulation by the subalterns. There is 
general agreement that plantations in Fiji were run on the cheap and that there was no 
extended apparatus to suppress plantation revolts. This gives added weight to the 
argument that power on Fiji’s plantations was susceptible to internal weakness and 
external challenge. The CSR and other companies never had sufficient manpower, 
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report on the strike at Koronivia in May 1886, indicates that immigrants could use the influence of 
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disciplinary capability, cohesive harmony or coercive potency, to have the measure of 
girmitiyas or to block out all their avenues of contestatory action. Plantations were not 
miniature panopticons nor were they an open terrain for unfettered physical and 
economic domination. Rather, they were sites of multiple contestations where the 
wretched of the earth who made it their temporary homes, consistently circumvented 




Everyday Resistance in the Villages 
 
Having dealt with organised resistance in previous chapters, I now turn to those 
covert, non-momentous, and unspectacular actions through which ordinary people 
sought to subvert authority in their day-to-day lives. Here again the objective is to 
interrupt the dominant story lines and plots that historically privileged the lives of the 
powerful, and to place in their midst the voices and stories of history’s underground – 
those characters and utterances that have always been there but not immediately 
visible or audible. In this chapter therefore, the large conflagrations are replaced by 
“ordinary” forms of struggle. This requires the retrieval of disregarded stories, the 
recovery of non-canonical sources, and the rereading of official documents. This 
chapter is an exploration of the ways in which ordinary villagers engaged with various 
forms of authority at the village level. Among them are the consistent grumbling of 
villagers about their chiefs’ abuse of power, the transformation of the ancient 
luveniwai ritual into a subversive pastime by village youths, tax evasion, village 
absenteeism, the boycott of the registration of land titles, the manipulation of religious 
rivalries by villagers to evade communal chores and obligations, and the attempts of 
people to use education as a means of breaking free of the cycle of chiefly exaction, 
tax work and agricultural labour. The evidence presented in this chapter is intended to 
test the plausibility of Ali’s commonly held view that “Fijian loyalty to authority was 
generally unquestioning”,1 and to ascertain what sorts of options were available to 
villagers who did not wish to conform or follow the fate reserved for them by their 
chiefs and administrators. 
 
Everyday Resistance in the Villages 
 
The common image of Fijians under colonial rule, wrote the Fijian historian Simione 
Durutalo, “as that of a people complacently if sluggishly following where the chiefs 
and administrators led them is a false one”.2 Although Durutalo did not provide 
empirical data, the archive produces considerable evidence to substantiate his claim. 
In the early years of colonial rule, Gordon’s administration devoted much of its time 
                                                 
1 Ali, 1980: 137. 
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to consolidate the authority of Fijian chiefs and to the institutionalisation of a separate 
Fijian administration. When he convoked the first council of chiefs meeting at Draiba 
in Ovalau in September 1875, Gordon chose to rule Fijians through their chiefs. The 
annual Bose Vakaturaga, or meeting of the council of chiefs, became the platform for 
consultation and collaboration between government and chiefs, from which emerged a 
chiefly “system” which gave chiefs state recognised power to rule over their people. 
Among the first decisions that the chiefs took at the first Bose Vakaturaga in 1875 
was to retain their existing privileges and to legislate against disobedience to chiefs. 
 
By further empowering Fijian chiefs, Gordon hoped to gain the support of key 
powerbrokers, use them as a valuable source of intelligence to gauge the mood of the 
masses, and thus weaken the potential for race-based antagonism. Explaining his 
rationale to a group of planters in Taveuni, Gordon stated that the chiefs were to act as 
 
a safety-valve to many a grievance that might otherwise rankle and swell to 
dangerous proportions; as a touchstone of feeling of the utmost value in 
gauging the tendencies of the native mind; and as a most powerful auxiliary in 
carrying out the wishes of the Government. With the aid of the Bose vaka 
Turaga the Governor can without effort do in native matters whatever he 
pleases. Without it the management of those affairs would be a matter of the 
extremest difficulty.3
 
The primary axis of conflict between Fijians and European settlers and officials was 
thus deflected to take the form of a localised conflict between chief and commoner. In 
becoming the visible face of the Government at the local level, the chief also became 
the primary enforcer of the new law and order. As the principal organiser and 
collector of taxes, the chief opened himself to confrontation with his people. This was 
a penalty most chiefs were willing to pay, for the benefits of cooperation outweighed 
the consequences of non-cooperation. 
 
In return for their collaboration, chiefs received official recognition in the form of 
titles and an official salary, and they retained pre-Cession privileges such as lala. Lala 
                                                                                                                                            
2 Durutalo, 1985a: 243. 
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consisted of the appropriation by chiefs of the labour and material wealth of 
commoners such as house-building, gardening, work, supplying visitors with food, 
cutting and building canoes, supplying turtle, and making mats, masi cloth and other 
articles.4 The new colonial version of lala allowed chiefs to retain command of labour 
for their own or for colonial purposes but without the obligation to reciprocate in kind 
as was previously required in pre-Cession practice.5 As Chapelle explains, “these 
privileges were worth keeping and the way to keep them was to carry out orders from 
above and send in reports that as far as possible, the administration would be pleased 
to read”.6 Government also profited directly from lala because it provided readily 
available unpaid labour for public works. 
 
Having their traditional authority complemented with administrative authority, it has 
been argued that Fijian chiefs functioned as the crucial link in the chain of 
containment and the stable and effective control over the indigenous population.7 
However, in the early years of colonial rule the evidence suggests that chiefs could 
not function as an all-powerful oppressive or unified class. Power was fluid and their 
ability to enforce it was circumscribed by a number of factors including their 
tendency to extort excessive services, goods and money from commoners. These 
actions undermined their position and came under attack from numerous quarters8 
including, tellingly, the people themselves. 
 
The Murmurings of the People 
 
The manner in which ordinary people chose to express their dissent took a variety of 
forms. In previous chapters, we noted the discontent felt in the interior of Viti Levu 
(Colo War) and parts of Ra (early Tuka) with the process by which sovereignty had 
been surrendered to Great Britain. Yet in other areas, especially on the coast, people 
seemed more receptive to the changes and the opportunities that were presented by 
                                                                                                                                            
3 Gordon, Records of Private and Public Life, II: 207. 
4 Durutalo, 1985a: 251. 
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6 Anthony Chapelle, “Land and Race in Fiji: The Administration of Sir Everard im Thurn, 1904 – 
1910.” PhD Dissertation. Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1975. 57. 
7 Sutherland, 1992: 27. 
8 Speaking at the 1877 meeting of the Bose Vakaturaga, the Roko Tui Rewa complained that “it is clear 
that all white men hate us Fijians who hold appointments under the Government, whether they 
themselves hold appointments or not”. “Proceedings of a Native Council,” Rewa, 1877. 3. 
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modifications in the organisation of power. They adopted a “wait and see” stance and 
sought out any benefits that could be gained from this transitional period. 
 
The post-Cession transition entailed uncertainty, hesitancy, and limitations in the 
exercise of power. Resources were scarce and the ability of the colonial 
administration to enforce its new legitimacy was tentative, and its visibility and 
coercive capability were weak. Those chiefs who worked for the administration took 
their time to settle into their new roles and only gradually came to terms with their 
new responsibilities. The indeterminacy of authority which ensued, presented 
ordinary village men and women with an opportunity to work this power vacuum to 
their advantage. 
 
Objection to chiefly abuses of lala was not long in surfacing. When the Bose 
Vakaturaga met again in 1876, complaints had been received about lala and the 
inability of people to pay both taxes to the government and lala to the chiefs. Ma’afu 
was quick to dismiss these complaints as the work of “bad natives of low origin” and 
Europeans “in the habit of writing what is not true”.9 But this criticism of chiefly 
practices was not isolated. The Roko Tui Ba reported that in some villages the people 
were disobedient and did not respect the Bulis.10 As the ears and eyes of Fiji’s eighty-
four districts, the bulis occupied a strategic position in the surveillance of the 
populace and the enforcement of discipline and control. Their regular reports to the 
Governor formed an extensive database of intelligence on the general state of affairs 
among the Fijian population. Because of the central role in the government’s network 
of intelligence and surveillance, any public defiance of the Buli undermined not only 
the government’s capability to enforce its order in the area, it also affected its 
reputation among the people. 
 
In 1877 a whole raft of regulations aimed at tightening and increasing the 
regimentation of village life, came into force. People were to obey and respect their 
chiefs and magistrates “in all things lawful according to their customs”, effectively 
                                                 
9 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” Waikava, 1876. 23. 
10 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1876. 28. 
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making disobedience to chiefs a legal offence.11 Regulation 5 of June 1878 prevented 
absence from villages for periods of more than three months and regulated every 
aspect of village life from gardening hours, type of crops to grow, care of the children, 
registration, house-building, labour contracts and movement in and out of villages, to 
“tattooing” and useless dogs. A long list of fines for non-conformity was added with 
almost all offences being punishable by imprisonment.12 Writing several years later, 
Brewster remarked that “the Fijians were tied hand and foot by all sorts of 
enactments”.13 This regimentation became more refined with time. 
 
Yet, legislation could not stem the growing disquiet about chiefly rule. At the 1878 
Bose, the chiefs lamented that in the past, “we had a name in the land, but this day 
men and their positions are ignored”.14 It was reported that some people who took a 
thorough dislike to their Buli were organizing ‘Ridi-bati-ni tai’ or openly defying him 
by deserting their village en masse to settle in some other village.15 The Roko Tui 
Bua complained that as many as one thousand men in his province used all sorts of 
excuses to evade tax work.16 In Tailevu, regular complaints were made by the people 
to the native stipendiary magistrate that they were overburdened with work.17
 
In 1879, Bulis complained that it was impossible to work because people were 
“questioning the authority of the chiefs to make laws”,18 and would not listen to 
them.19 In Ra, the Roko Tui reported that individuals who wanted to evade taxes were 
in the habit of running away to another province and to claim they were from there. 
The Nasoqo people, for instance, claimed to be from Nadrau to avoid paying taxes in 
Ra.20 And in Nakelo (Tailevu), many people joined the Catholic school in the belief 
that Catholic students did not have to do tax work.21
 
                                                 
11 See Regulation 3.3 of 17 May 1877. Regulations of the Native Regulation Board: 1877-1882. 
London: Harrison and Sons, 1883. 16. 
12 See Regulation 5 1878 in Regulations of the Native Regulation Board: 1877-1882. 38-9. 
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14 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” Bua, 1878. Cited in Scarr, 1980: 55. 
15 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1878. 13. 
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17 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1878. 25. 
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19 See Buli Qaliyalatina’s remarks in “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1879. 26. 
20 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1879. 19. Nadrau was exempt from paying tax along with all 
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Any doubt as to whether these incidents were isolated came to rest when in 1880, the 
council agreed to address the persistent and growing “murmurings of the people”.22 
The 1880 Bose began as all others did with a report of the state of affairs in each of 
the provinces. Before long, however, the discussion turned to the rise in “insolence 
and disobedience” among the young and more particularly, the murmuring and 
grumbling of the people.23 Grumbling, as Scott argues, stops short of insubordination 
– to which it is a prudent alternative. It is an attempt by the subordinate to bring the 
pressure of discontent to bear on elites.24 Among other things, the chiefs were accused 
of accumulating excessive wealth.25
 
The Bose resolved to convene a special gathering where “the voice from the land” 
would be heard and this accusation substantiated.26 When the Bose reconvened, the 
report of the special Bulis’ meeting confirmed that there was “a great deal of 
murmuring, and that many of the people were not prosperous and were 
discontented”.27 As for the cause of the murmuring, the reply was “very many”. The 
people said the work of the Government was at the bottom of it. Some blamed tax-
making and the keeping of roads. Others complained that serving the Government, the 
chief, the village, the missionary and the work of the church, left them overburdened 
with little time for their own work, and “tired and pained”.28 In their murmurings, the 
people asked why the promise made at Cession of rest, peace and plenty had not 
come: 
 
We were told that if we became Christians we should have peace and quiet, 
that with it would come rest, but that rest never came. It is the very opposite in 
this age. There is an increase of work, an increase of fatigue, and an increase 
of oppression.29
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From the island of Kadavu, to the Western district of Nadi, and the province of 
Cakaudrove in Vanua Levu, the cry was the same. As the Buli of Wainikeli 
(Cakaudrove) testified: 
 
Our people are burdened with work, and they are much tired with the amount 
of tax appointed to us. … I do not think our people will complain unless they 
have good cause, but it is often little matters which create dissatisfaction and 
murmuring amongst the people. The changes of this age are often not good. 
We go to do a work for the Roko Tui, and we are unable to find a house in 
which we may eat. In the house of the Buli, in the house of the chief of the 
town, there seems to be no room, and we suffer from want of food. It is such 
matters as these that our people talk and murmur about. We are the chief’s 
people, we do his bidding and are pleased, and rejoice greatly therein; but the 
chief must do his portion. He must meet us as his people, and not as his 
labourers. If he would keep our goodwill.30
 
One young Buli (from Tokatoka) who had lost his people’s goodwill reported, 
 
They say they despise me, and are bad-minded towards me, because I push to 
have the tax made, to have corn planted, and cotton; and the planting of sugar-
cane has been a kind of warfare. … These matters I have reported to the Roko 
Tui, and it is only because of his assistance that I am able to live at all in my 
district.31
 
In neighbouring Tai, the Buli warned that the district was in an evil state: 
 
Our people are not in a good condition in this age. By day they do their work 
in the preparation of the tax, and matters belonging to the town. At night they 
do their own work, their planting and such like. Now, this has been greatly 
increasing, and our people are thoroughly tired since the introduction of the 
planting of sugar-cane. The work is heavy and is not well managed. The place 
                                                 
30 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1880. 42. 
31 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1880. 43. 
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is away at Wailevu [Rewa River]; we live on the coast. It is done, but our 
individual work and the work of our district is not done.32
 
The common grievance across the populace was overwork. The normalisation of lala 
and the added burden of taxes affected the time and energy that people previously 
used to meet their everyday needs. Tax for the state, lala for the chief, and time for 
the Church seemed to overtake all other matters of village life. 
 
The Buli’s meeting at the Bose Vakaturaga of 1880 was remarkable in two senses. 
First it indicated the chiefs’ willingness for self-criticism. They recognised that their 
people were disenchanted and chose to address the problem by consultation. This 
degree of openness suggests that the chiefs were keen to serve their people wisely and 
selflessly. This was their opportunity to collectively define their role in the new 
regime and they were surprisingly tolerant of criticism and candid in their assessment 
of each other’s performance, competence and leadership. One native stipendiary 
magistrate for instance openly contested the Buli Navatu’s report on the state of 
affairs in his district: 
 
Buli Navatu’s report is untrue when he says there is no evil mindedness 
amongst his people. I have heard it, and much of it. One day some of his 
people came to me and reported that they were discontented, and evil-minded 
towards their Buli; on account of his conduct and treatment of them 
individually.33
 
Chiefs who did not act in the best interests of their people or “caused them much pain 
and displeasure” could expect serious censure and even deportation as was 
experienced by the Bulis of the western districts of Sabeto and Vuda.34 Yet, this 
criticism did not extend to the more powerful chiefs in the Bose whose own abuse of 
power was generally left unpunished. This led one undaunted magistrate from 
Macuata to remark in 1885, 
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 it would appear as if the law had two sides: some are punished, some are not. 
This applies to all Fiji. The law says that all are equal before the law: - rich 
and poor, high and low. It is not so among us. Some are judged, some escape, 
and the people of the land are wondering.35
 
Secondly, if class consciousness among Fiji’s chiefs was in its formative stage, the 
1880 Bose reflected the people’s ability to discern opportunities for change and use 
this transitional stage to work their agenda into the deliberations of the powerful. The 
meeting signalled that people’s loyalties and obedience could not be taken for 
granted, that they wished their voices to be heard, and their concerns addressed. In 
this case, the combination of avarice by certain chiefs and the new tax regime had 
reached a threshold beyond which the people were not willing to compromise. 
 
Murmurings about their chiefs’ excessive exaction, oppression, and malpractices 
caused the matter to be brought up repeatedly through the early 1880s.36 In 1881, 
Governor Des Voeux admitted the problem by referring chiefs to the murmurings of 
the people in his address to his first Bose in charge and rebuked some of them for 
their undue exaction.37 In 1884 however, the Government defended the chiefs and 
reaffirmed the vital role they played in controlling the Fijian masses. Addressing 
those who wished to break the power of chiefs, Thurston questioned how they 
proposed to rule Fijians and preserve order without them (chiefs). “The chiefs,” he 
told his detractors, “represent the army and navy, and practically the police of the 
country”.38
 
Yet, regular reports of discontent continued to reach the Bose and in May 1885, as 
Navosavakadua organised his movement in the Northern and interior districts of Viti 
Levu, Jonacani Dabea, the Native Stipendiary Magistrate for Rewa, warned that the 
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discontent caused by excessive village, tax, mission and chiefly work was becoming 
disquieting. Grumbling, he cautioned, was not discernable in the comfort of 
Provincial or District councils where chiefs might hope to manage it. Rather, it was 




Dabea was well informed for in that year, luveniwai, a long surviving and evolved 
cultural ritual that had evolved from pre-contact times, found credence especially 
among young people partly as a distraction from daily humdrum but also as a way of 
rebelling against village authorities. Stories about luveniwai rarely enter public 
discourse nowadays and few can explain what it means and what it once stood for. 
This is not surprising given that it was one of several indigenous practices that the 
colonial government, the Church and the chiefs tried to suppress particularly from the 
mid 1880s. Adherents of luveniwai themselves concealed their activities to avoid 
detection and therefore left few traces. While secrecy and anonymity made luveniwai 
ideal for everyday cultural resistance, it also complicates retrieval by contemporary 
historians.40
 
Luveniwai was a rite of invulnerability in which the participants, having persuaded 
themselves that a luveniwai (little god) had entered their body, presented themselves 
to the vuniduvu (priest)41 “to be struck on the top of the abdomen, believing that if the 
god was in them, they could not be wounded by the axe, or spear, or musket, 
whichever might be used”.42 However, the meaning and practice of luveniwai evolved 
considerably over time, with important variations from place to place. The first 
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1905, CSO 05/303. 
 233
missionary accounts of luveniwai speak of it in tolerant terms “though it encouraged 
idleness, leading to neglect of the cultivation of crops”.43
 
Joske,44 the resident Stipendary Magistrate for Colo East and later Colo North where 
the practice was most common, translated luveniwai literally as “Water Baby” or 
“Child of the Water”. Reflecting on its meaning in the specific context of the interior 
of Viti Levu in the mid 1880s, Joske wrote that luveniwai was 
 
a pastime for the young people, forming a sort of junior republic … opposed 
to the restrictions and restraints of the seniors, who, as they attained old age, 
found it convenient to forget how they too had kicked against the pricks of 
authority. It had all the mysteries of a secret society, with occult signs and 
ceremonial so delightful to juvenile minds. In their eyes it constituted a sort of 
Freemasonry, jealously to be guarded, which made it extremely difficult to 
find out what it really was. It was composed mostly of minor chiefs and young 
people of restless dispositions eager to make themselves important.45
 
The only noteworthy academic study of luveniwai is Martha Kaplan’s 1989 article 
“Luve Ni Wai as the British Saw It: Constructions of Custom and Disorder in 
Colonial Fiji”46 in which she argues that the rites and practices of luveniwai were 
integral moments in the ritual system of nineteenth century Fijian war culture.47 That 
is, warriors performed these rites publicly and sometimes openly as they challenged 
their enemies before battle. Kaplan writes that in nineteenth century Fiji, “these 
practices were hardly rebellious. They were integral to warfare, investing young men 
with warrior attributes and creating great invulnerable warriors.”48 Her argument is 
that it was British colonial rule after Cession in 1874 that in criminalizing the 
practice, re-classified luveniwai as disorderly behaviour.49
 
                                                 
43 Williams: 239. 
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49 Kaplan, 1989: 351. 
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This thesis proposes instead, that while the British certainly constructed and 
criminalized relatively harmless practices which they often misunderstood, luveniwai 
did in fact evolve in the decades after Cession into a rebellious and secretive form of 
resistance against authority and caused considerable alarm among members of the 
new power regime of the colony. That is, if the British were constructing disorder, a 
large number of discontented, overworked, and increasingly defiant ordinary Fijians 
were engineering it. The many village and provincial chiefs and the new class of 
administrators whose role it was to enforce compliance with the colonial order, to 
extract work and taxes from their subordinate communities and to variously detect, 
place under surveillance, police, and punish transgression, had good reason to find 
luveniwai dangerous. 
 
Luveniwai provided people with an ideal forum for the expression of their discontent. 
As it evolved in the 1880s, it took on a more cultural, secretive, and anonymous form 
and offered possibilities to defy and subvert colonial, chiefly and Christian edicts. 
Describing luveniwai in 1882, the Reverend William Lindsay thought of it as a 
“seemingly harmless craze”. Yet he also warned that it could easily become “the germ 
of future evil, not only to the Church but also to the State”.50 Missionaries, as Thomas 
points out, had created an entire social geography of stations and circuits which 
imposed new temporal regimes of work, leisure, celebration, and worship.51 These 
regimes reflected the power of the Church in the most minute of local affairs. Gordon 
recognised this fact soon after his arrival in the Colony: 
 
[T]hat for which I was most unprepared, for I had heard least about it and do 
not think its political significance had been hitherto fully appreciated is the 
really wonderful organisation of the Wesleyan body here. I know nothing 
equal to it except the Jesuits. In every village there is a “lotu” teacher. The 
different links of superior administration are admirably fitted on to one 
another and finally the Head at Navuloa has at his command a perfect 
machinery which enables him to know down to the minutest detail all that is 
doing in every part of the islands. His statistics and information are far grander 
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than those which the government can obtain and his power is real, absolute 
and in constant exercise.52
 
While Gordon’s assessment of the power wielded by the Wesleyan mission and its 
chairman had some merit, in reality the hegemony of the Church was continually 
punctured both by internal inconsistencies and external challenges. The disciplinary 
effects of Methodism were only incompletely and unevenly administered and even as 
it was used as an instrument of pacification and control and welcomed as such by 
many people, it was also challenged by indigenous religious practices such as 
luveniwai. By prohibiting tattooing, hair cutting between sexes, wearing flowers in the 
hair, traditional swimming games, nocturnal dances, and other such practices,53 the 
Wesleyans had significantly reduced the avenues by which young people could 
entertain and enjoy themselves. And by imposing the strictest of moral codes in the 
villages, it opened itself to defiance especially from its younger members. 
 
By 1884, the disruptive side of luveniwai was serious enough for Governor Des 
Voeux to alert chiefs to the potential threat it posed to public order. On the occasion 
of the Bose Vakaturaga in Naiserelagi, Ra, he asked the assembled chiefs to discuss 
the problem with a view to legislating against it. On this occasion, the chiefs opted to 
control the practice within the existing framework of the Fijian administration 
because they saw such practices as “things of the land” that ought to be punished in 
the provinces.54
 
In 1885 however, luveniwai took a permanent foothold in the central province of 
Naitasiri. The chief of Serea (then Fiji’s largest village) and another from Waikalou, 
with a large delegation of elders from both villages, approached Joske and informed 
him that all the young men and boys including the son and heir of Tui Serea, were 
practising luveniwai and were altogether out of hand. They requested his assistance in 
restraining the youths. Joske harangued the culprits and pointed out “the enormity of 
their offence”. Rather than greeting Joske with a conciliatory gesture, the youths 
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54 Resolution XI. “Proceedings of a Native Council,” Naiserelagi, 1884. 
 236
remained steadfast and united in their defiance. Pita, the ringleader, responded to 
Joske with a “rude and inflammatory speech”.55 Such a public contravention of the 
normal ritual of subordination was extraordinary. Stupefied, Joske responded by 
instructing the sergeant to clap the handcuffs on him and to march the whole gang, 
some forty-four in number, down to Vunidawa. There they were locked in the 
courthouse because there was not enough room in the provincial jail.56
 
The miscreants were publicly flogged in the hope that this visible form of punishment 
would serve to deter future breaches. Joske’s immediate superior in Colo concurred. 
Carew was well aware of luveniwai’s mass appeal and revolutionary potential. He 
regarded luveniwai as “most pernicious and to be put down, if possible”57 and he 
chastised the “young fellows” in the administration who treated the matter lightly. 
Reporting on the outcome of the Serea trial, he added “the practice of luve ni wai as 
carried out at Soloira in plain speech means nothing less than sedition preparing for 
rebellion”.58
 
The following year, the Native Commissioner issued a questionnaire to all provincial 
officials asking them for information and their opinion about the nature and threat 
posed by luveniwai. Most chiefs replied that the practice was evil, immoral, that it 
gave people confidence in their own strength, that it was used to stir rebellion, that it 
was anti-government and anti-church.59 Most of them believed like Ratu Epeli 
Nailatikau, Roko Tui of Tailevu, that: 
 
It is of no use in the land. It breaks the laws of religion, despises the chiefs, 
does not respect the work of the government, causes disturbances and 
sometimes brings about fighting. Another thing about those who practise this – 
they are insolent, conceited, black, “via Kaukauwa” and lying, they solicit 
women, are boasters and also indolent.60
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 What was new for the chiefs was its transmission through meke (songs and dances). 
While some meke were considered “good and lawful” and were regularly performed 
at missionary and other general meetings, the luveniwai meke were, as Waisake 
Tuisese, Turaga ni Koro of Waikalou testified, “bad because distasteful to religion 
and government. People who practise them do it in opposition to government and 
religion. The youths who go in for it are extremely insolent and defiant to us old 
men.”61 Had it been an armed rebellion, a military repost could have swiftly dealt 
with the rising. But the Government was ill-equipped to deal with a secretive 
movement that used poetry and dance as its weapons. The key to luveniwai’s appeal 
was thus its ability to be deceptively innocuous. 
 
In the context of popular discontent, poetry, dance, song, and other such constitutive 
parts of the evolving fabric of luveniwai, cannot be assumed to have been politically 
neutral. They functioned at least partly as accessories to subversion. In a context such 
as Colo where a sense of loss, insecurity and injustice prevailed, luveniwai provided 
an opportunity to reconstitute an independent social space where participants could 
feel insulated from control and surveillance, protected from identification and 
prosecution, sheltered from retribution, and free to plot against authority. 
 
This oral setting yielded a fertile ground on which cultural expressions of dissent 
could thrive. Scott has argued that the great bulk of lower-class cultural expression 
has typically taken an oral rather than written form. Oral traditions, he says, “due 
simply to their means of transmission, offer a kind of seclusion, control, and even 
anonymity that make them ideal vehicles for cultural resistance”.62 Like gossip and 
rumour, the folk song’s origins are quickly and safely lost. As he observes, this makes 
the human voice irrepressible.63
 
Efforts to criminalize and punish luveniwai were thus mostly unsuccessful. For 
instance, during his trial in 1885, a vuniduvu from the village of Serea assured Joske 
that his only crime was to have learnt songs, dances and other rites of the custom in 
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the depths of the forest from a handsome little veli (fairy).64 To compound the 
administration’s woes, it was almost impossible to verify the seditious nature of meke 
because as Joske’s informants put it, “the youths call their Luveniwai mekes by the 
names of old mekes in order to confound the uninitiated”.65The seriousness with 
which the administration treated the matter is underlined by William Allardyce’s 
warning in March 1887, that luveniwai would lead “at any moment to excesses of a 
very dangerous nature”.66
 
By mid-1887, it was clear to all in Serea that the youths had never ceased dancing the 
meke for which they had been punished in 1885. Nobody could ascertain when they 
had recommenced or the exact meke that were being performed. The outcome 
however, was the same. Chiefs and elders were being defied and the prisoners who 
had been charged for the burning of Joske’s new quarters the previous December 
were openly insolent and insubordinate to him and other officers at the Vunidawa 
government station. They blackened their faces, a sign of hostility, and deliberately 
absented themselves from evening parade. They were also engaged in ‘mock’ praying 
“for the ruin of the provincial authorities who had imprisoned them”.67 Commenting 
on the latest outbreak, Carew wrote “when Fijians abandon the pretence of religion 
they abandon at the same time the pretence of loyalty to the Government”.68 As it had 
been in 1885, the hierarchical equilibrium was restored69 with the public flogging of 
Colo East’s most prominent vuniduvu, Kalodonu (thirty-nine lashes), his solitary 
confinement, and the imprisonment of his followers under the new laws criminalizing 
“luveniwai, kalourere and like practices”.70
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 The trouble in Serea was symptomatic of wider discontent. In 1888, the murmuring of 
the people returned to the agenda of the Bose Vakaturaga. After the customary reports 
from each province, several chiefs were condemned by Ratu Jone Colata, Bauan chief 
and Native Stipendiary Magistrate for Tailevu, for overstating the extent to which 
peace and satisfaction reigned in their districts and provinces. “The worst of it”, he 
claimed, “is that some of the chiefs, who on visiting Suva give a flourishing account 
of their own administration, are, all the time, murmured against by their people”.71 He 
was supported by the Roko Tui Ra, Ratu Tevita Rasuraki, who remarked that “if we 
were sincere in our expressions and ruled our people justly, they would not complain 
so often. … The whole matter rests with some of you, Chiefs, who are in the habit of 
continually making levies. Cease to do so.”72 In the province of Cakaudrove, Jone 
Masinamo, the Native Stipendiary Magistrate argued that taxes were not so much the 
cause of complaint as poverty was. Some people in his province had “nothing on them 
but banana leaves”.73 He resumed his criticism of chiefs in the official Fijian language 
newspaper Na Mata where he asked why people should continue giving when they 
received so little in return.74 Other chiefs were not so tolerant. Irritated by the whole 
matter, the Roko Tui Nadroga, exclaimed “it is useless our discussing the murmurings 
of the people, we can never prevent them”.75
 
At the next meeting in Suva, the chiefs were urged by Thurston to do more to put 
down luveniwai. Many adherents of luveniwai had remained undeterred. It had 
become rampant in several provinces.76 In Colo East for instance, the people had 
profited from Joske’s temporary secondment as acting commissioner of neighbouring 
Colo West in 1889, and forged an even more virulent strand of the custom. In 
northern Viti Levu, luveniwai conflated itself with Tuka, and threatened to develop 
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into a full-blown rebellion against chiefly, Christian and British authority. Among its 
latest recruits, luveniwai counted a number of government employees. The Buli of 
Nadrau who had been an ally of the government during the Colo War of 1876, had 
become a “tevoro” (devil), the term used to label those who shunned Christianity. At 
Narokorokoyawa, luveniwai was led by the district vakatawa (scribe). When Joske 
returned from Colo West, the vakatawa proposed that their transgression could be 
overlooked in return for ‘free’ work on nearby roads to make up for their offence.77 
On the other hand, in the Serua province luveniwai was responsible for a number of 
assaults on another symbol of the colonial order: the constabulary.78 The rest of the 
country was not immune to the sweeping appeal of luveniwai. Numerous reports were 
received by the Colonial Secretary’s Office (CSO) from all parts of the archipelago 
including one from the capital, Suva, and another advising the Colonial Secretary’s 
Office that luveniwai had infiltrated the prison walls at Fort Carnarvon and was being 
preached to inmates.79
 
The most common means of punishing luveniwai was by way of flogging and 
imprisonment. However, in a departure from standard practice, Joske tried a different 
approach. To eliminate luveniwai or at least co-opt it in a way that minimized its 
competition, Joske set up cricket clubs in several Colo East villages. This, it was 
hoped would eliminate the clandestine element of luveniwai, and bring social 
interaction under closer scrutiny. Cricket would create a new, more controlled social 
space where the attention of young people could be diverted from malevolent 
behaviour to a more formal, regularized, and regimented use of their time. As the 
epitome of British values, cricket would foster gentlemanly conduct, respect, 
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discipline, moderation, uniformity and order where luveniwai was breeding disorder 
and insubordination. 
 
The initiative was promptly turned on its head and an enquiry into the operation of 
these clubs revealed that they had become 
 
sorts of guilds, with books, registers, codes of signals, etc., and that the badges 
were for the captain, or elder of the guild, as he was called, for the secretary, 
for the treasurer, for the chief of the outer circle and for the chief of the inner 
circle. The two latter were for the arrangement of the internal economy and the 
external policy; in fact, Home Secretary and Secretary for Foreign Affairs.80
 
As he later admitted, Joske’s blueprint for efficient pacification had been thoroughly 
undermined by the subjects whose behaviour he tried to reform.81 His suspicions that 
the clubs had metamorphosed and were now acting as a cloak for luveniwai, were 
promptly confirmed. In one district, he wrote, “the members decided to emancipate 
themselves from the thrall of British rule. With a sincere imitation of it they elected a 
Governor, Chief Justice, Chief Secretary, and a host of other officials.”82
 
There are various possibilities for interpreting this appropriation of cricket and British 
bureaucratic rituals. It could for instance, reflect an attempt to mock. In the Colo 
context however, it is plausible to see it as audacious mimicry that served subversive 
ends and openly but non-violently challenged colonial and chiefly systems of ranking 
and ordering. Members of cricket clubs cum luveniwai cells adopted terms and 
categories of the colonial order so as to subvert them. British sports clubs which were 
used in the colonies at least partly to help in the inculcation of the new colonial order, 
were thus effectively reconfigured to become Fijian cultural instruments by which to 
express and disseminate dissent. 
 
The resourcefulness and versatility of luveniwai, and its simultaneous appropriation 
and inversion of the colonial order is remarkably similar to the contraventions of 
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Navosavakadua and Tuka. In some places, Tuka was an adjunct to luveniwai and in 
some cases, the two fused together.83 Yet, the relationship between luveniwai and 
Tuka was never going to last. Tuka arose out of a specific religious, cultural and 
geographic locality among the Vatukaloko people at the foot of the mystic 
Nakauvadra Range. It derived much of its vigour from the charisma and vision of its 
leader, Navosavakadua. Luveniwai on the other hand had no distinct locus of origin 
and was more amenable to adaptation and appropriation in other contexts. It had no 
formal organisation or manifesto, more discreet leaders, less hierarchy, more 
intimacy, and safer possibilities for free expression. It had no publicly declared 
agenda to refuse compliance and therefore did not breach the normative order of 
domination to the extent that Tuka did. The ideological warfare was more circumspect 
because participants wished to keep their activities more concealed and coded. Tuka 
required a more intimidating kind of militancy and demanded a more hazardous 
commitment. By contrast, luveniwai’s appeal lay more in its festive character. 
 
It is difficult to affirm with certainty, the factors that led to the suppression of 
luveniwai. The practice was still common in the earlier parts of the twentieth century. 
Efforts to suppress the practice in 1903 for instance, led several villages to threaten to 
secede from Methodism if they were reported to the Government. To compound 
matters, two Wesleyan teachers were implicated in this resurgence.84 What is certain 
however, is that the rigorous enforcement of the new laws, a marked increase in the 
surveillance of village activities and the rapid transformation of Fijian village life 
after the late 1880s and early 1890s, all produced changes in the practice and effects 
of luveniwai. Together, these factors combined to cause the gradual decline of the 
practice and impede its detection. 
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Compared to the sustained groundswell of protest and dissent which characterised the 
1880s, the 1890s produced a more random and sporadic form of everyday resistance. 
This may be attributable to the deterrent effect that the unceremonious crushing of 
Tuka in 1891 had on the general population. It may also be due to the gradual 
consolidation of the colonial power and the routinization of ordinary people’s lives. It 
can also be attributed to the severe decline in the Fijian population which was 
symptomatic to some degree of demoralisation among many ordinary people. 
 
Among the most mundane but subversive of protests was the choice made by 
hundreds of individuals to walk away from their villages and from the authority of 
their chiefs. Macnaught describes village absenteeism as “a running sore in Fijian 
society” because it represented the indifference of individuals to the demands of 
traditional authority.85 Simply put, the people of the land traditionally functioned as 
the power of the chief. If the people left the villages, much of the power wielded by 
the chief left with them. Absenteeism found chiefs increasingly unable to meet their 
tax quotas, while the depletion of able-bodied men also seriously undercut the 
material basis of their power.86
 
Numerous attempts to tighten legislation and to police the movement of people had 
since the late 1870s failed to curb these private transgressions. For instance, hundreds 
of individuals worked the system to their “minimum disadvantage”, as Hobsbawm put 
it,87 by returning to their village on the fifty-ninth day of their absence (or a day 
before they could be charged for a breach of the law), only to depart again the next 
day for a successive period of fifty-nine days.88  
 
Flight from villages became an increasingly common phenomenon throughout the 
1880s raising the ire of chiefs at every council meeting. In 1881, the Roko Tui Ba 
reported that “all those at Nakalawaca who were married fled, leaving their wives, 
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Why? Because they were against sugar-cane planting.”89 If leaving women and 
children to feed and clothe themselves as best they could created a rural problem, it 
also produced an urban one. 
 
By the mid 1880s, the Fijian male population in Suva had grown to such a number 
that it caused some malaise within the town’s European residents. The growing Fijian 
community comprised mainly male absconders and the runaways from all provinces 
they harboured. All were united in their efforts to evade tribal obligations and taxes.90 
Repeated attempts to repatriate them had failed91 and in 1887, Governor Mitchell 
voiced his fear that this concentration of Fijian males created “an idle body which in 
time will become dangerous to society”.92 Hence, even if they formed a useful source 
of casual labour for public and other works in close proximity of the administrative 
centre, it was not in the interests of the administration or its chiefs to allow this rural 
to urban flow to continue and discussion about how to combat absenteeism loomed 
high on the agenda of practically every Bose Vakaturaga until the 1920s.93
 
In 1892 for instance, the Bose Vakaturaga declared its satisfaction with the existing 
state of things and claimed that people were “happy and contented”.94 However, it 
also heard of the increased propensity of women to move about the country, indulging 
in gossiping, smoking tobacco, drinking yaqona and other things “hurtful” to them. 
The men too were reported to be going about the country in a disorderly fashion, 
sailing in boats from one district to another, or idling in Suva and Levuka where they 
could escape paying taxes. In addition, the villages were said to be “a disgrace to the 
people”, and as a result of all this, children were dying in increasing numbers.95
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Some of the evidence suggests that many individuals used the opportunities for 
personal advancement offered by rival denominations to leave their villages. The 
1894 Bose in Suva heard a long discussion about the large number of men and women 
who, according to the chiefs, joined religious institutions to evade communal burdens. 
Jonacani Dabea maintained that “many of them only run away and say they have 
received a ‘call’ as an excuse for going”.96 At the May 1896 Bose in Bua, there were 
renewed complaints about Catholics absenting themselves for several weeks for 
religious festivals and neglecting their communal obligations.97 This religious 
dimension of resistance is discussed further below. 
 
Village absenteeism, even if it was unspectacular, was certainly one of the most 
enduring aspects of everyday resistance. Contestation of chiefly rule was marked far 
less by open confrontations than by the path of least resistance offered by wilful 
evasion and non-compliance. As McCreery has shown in relation to Native Indian 
labourers in Guatemala, subaltern groups, “because they were not foolish … chose 
those modes of resistance most effective to their purposes and least likely to bring 
down upon themselves the devastating violence of the state”.98 In Fiji, as in the 
Malaysian examples cited by Scott, there rarely were riots, demonstrations, arson, 
organised social banditry, open violence, popular leadership, elaborate ideologies, or 
ambitious revolutionary goals.99
 
Yet in their multiplied effects, these individual votes of no-confidence undermined 
colonial rule by weakening the chiefs’ capability to wield their power. This spirit of 
independence among young adults and their apparent indifference to the authority of 
their chiefs caused colonial officials much anxiety. As Thurston wrote in a 
confidential despatch to the colonial office, Fijian commoners were asserting 
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themselves too rapidly. They were shaking off their obedience to chiefs “not only in 
respect of what may be wrong on the Chief’s part, but also in respect of what it is 
right for the Chief to order or forbid”.100 Speaking about the Nakelo fracas of 1897 
(referred to in Chapter Three), David Wilkinson agreed that young Fijians had 
recently acquired “a very strong disposition to see how far the Courts and authorities 




Another of these sporadic types of everyday resistance was tax evasion. Fijians’ 
experience of pre-Cession taxation had been negative. When they did not pay their 
tax, their nets, mats, and axes, were confiscated and most offenders were arrested and 
sold into servitude on plantations “merely for the crime of being too poor, after 
disposing of their all, to pay their tax in full”.102 In this fashion, as we saw in previous 
chapters, whole districts had been decimated of their able-bodied men. Gordon was 
aware of this problem, and opted for a graduated taxation system, where a tax in 
produce was calculated according to “the amount of population, the nature and 
productiveness of the soil, and the degree of civilisation which the province had 
attained”.103 The effect of this produce tax on village life however, was to turn 
villagers into an agricultural collective oriented primarily at production for the state. 
 
For the first few years, Fijian produce taxation accounted for the government’s largest 
source of revenue after customs’ duties.104 But while it was profitable to the 
government, few of the benefits of their hard work ever seemed to trickle down to 
ordinary Fijians. The bulk of the income went into the government’s revenue and paid 
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for the salaries of colonial officials, the public education of European children, and 
other colonial public works of little consequence to ordinary villagers.105
 
Other problems caused widespread discontent. At the beginning, some chiefs used 
their position to trade the tax and kept the proceeds. In some places, the government 
had failed to assign enough boats for the collection of the taxes and much produce 
was left to rot in full view of the people who had spent much time and energy to 
grow, weed and harvest these large quantities of crops.106 Transporting the tax 
produce to collection points was also much maligned. In Gau for instance, men, 
women and children were required to carry copra and other heavy baskets of taxes for 
up to twenty miles over mountainous terrain to the designated point of delivery. Many 
refused to do so and were charged and convicted of talaidredre (disobedience).107 
Later, when tax refunds accrued, some chiefs used their traditional status to keep for 
themselves money that should have been redistributed for the welfare of their 
people.108 In their combined effect, these factors caused much of the popular 
discontent which found expression in the murmuring of the people through the 1880s. 
 
Some tax evasion had very specific local geographical and historical roots and was 
not specifically anti-administration. In some cases for instance, the tax quota was too 
great for the size of the land and the fertility of the soil. This led some villagers on 
small outer islands (often with the backing of their chiefs), to steal coconuts from 
nearby plantations to meet their tax quotas.109 Some provinces with small populations 
and resources were too heavily taxed, with too few individuals having to shoulder too 
high a burden.110 In other districts, people felt that taxes should be paid to them in 
accordance with indigenous custom, as compensation for their goodwill. As Carew 
explained, “they cannot and will not understand that having agreed to give their 
                                                 
105 Durutalo, 1985a: 214. 
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country … they should also have to pay taxes. The payment should they think be the 
other way.”111
 
Sometimes, tax evasion took the form of retribution for perceived pre-Cession 
wrongs. Such occurrences reflected long-standing rivalries and involved the aggrieved 
party deliberately undermining the usurper by evading or consuming the tax. In 1890 
for instance, Ratu Epeli Nailatikau (Roko Tui of Tailevu) complained bitterly that the 
“impudent” and “conceited” Verata chiefs and their people were causing him much 
trouble. Notwithstanding the neglect they showed for governmental duties and 
communal obligations, they actively desisted from tax work. Not only were they 
refusing to take the first fruit of the cane crop to him at Bau, but they left in large 
numbers to work in the Yasawas and Koro at the very time that their taxes were due. 
In defiance of all authority, they also drank their yaqona tax crop.112 This 
impertinence of Verata towards its Bauan neighbour continued through to the 1910s 
when the Ratu mai Verata, Ratu Peni Ravoka, declared himself (and Verata) 
independent even of the King.113 As we saw in Chapter Three however, the most 
spectacular rejection of the Gordon-Thurston tax regime was the 1894 Seaqaqa War. 
 
For the most part however, opposition to tax work in the late nineteenth century 
tended to be expressed through murmuring, grumbling and evasion. After Thurston’s 
death in 1897, tax evasion however gave way to tax refusal. It is difficult to identify 
the precise cause of this break. It is likely that Fijians endured Thurston’s tax regime 
because they generally trusted his leadership. His death and the new tax regime 
proposed by his successor, spurred long-standing discontent about tax work to 
surface.114 The distant location of some tax plantations was particularly irksome. 
Villagers resented the long periods of dislocation they had to spend away from home 
sometimes without appropriate food and accommodation. Deprived of the able-bodied 
men, the burden of village subsistence, care for the young and other duties fell on 
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women.115 The returns they acquired from government after such a heavy investment 
of time and effort compared poorly with the social costs. 
 
Although Governor O’Brien made sanitation the centrepiece of his Fijian policy and 
pressed for better efficiency in tax production, collection and refunds, his 
achievements on that front116 must be tempered by the resentment they created. 
O’Brien’s policies entailed much more visible, vigorous and forceful intervention and 
interference in the day to day affairs of Fijian villages. This was widely resented, not 
the least by the chiefs whose power was being eroded by “new white men [who] have 
taken charge of our affairs”.117 People gradually withdrew the willingness to 
collaborate that Thurston had been so dependent on and insisted that more congenial 
ways of meeting their needs be found. In some cases the unease led to insubordination 
and even mutiny. The Mali people in Macuata proclaimed that they would rather go to 
jail than continue to work their tax fields near Labasa. Through their Buli and Turaga 
ni Koro, they lodged a serious protest: 
 
This district of ours of Mali is an island a little distance from the shore … but 
our cane is on the mainland and here we frequently repair for a month at a 
time leaving our wives and children behind us and with no one to take care of 
them or to plant for us. As a consequence we are suffering from a scarcity of 
food and have neither peace nor rest, the peace and plenty which we have 
enjoyed under government rule are no more. … [O]ur cane work is done 
against our will and under compulsion.118
 
In a similar case, thirty-four men from Nausori were charged and convicted for 
talaidredre after refusing to work on a road without getting paid. In his defence, one 
of the men said 
 
It is true that we are unwilling to work on the roads. If we must work on the 
roads then let us work on the roads as prisoners, for then we shall be fed and 
                                                 
115 See CSO files 00/321, 00/293, 00/308, and 00/561 about complaints already alluded to in Chapter 
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116 See his farewell speech in the Western Pacific Herald, 20 July 1901. 6. 
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have but one master, but when we are free and work on the roads we have 
many masters and are always hungry.119
 
Road-building without remuneration and other such frequent abuses prompted Rev. 
William Slade to accuse the Government of “dipping its hand too deeply in Fijians’ 
purse”.120 He further accused the Government of ruling by fear, of being tyrannical, 
and of preying on the easiest victim – ordinary Fijian villagers.121 Slade calculated 
that indigenous Fijians were taxed nearly forty percent of their gross income while 
others in the colony were exempt from this special taxation. As a result, he wrote, the 
“greatest discontent” was felt in large parts of the country, even if this discontent was 
“mostly voiceless.122 This climate of unrest and dissatisfaction explains at least partly 
the extensive support that ordinary Fijians, and several chiefs, gave for the New 
Zealand Federation Movement at the turn of the century (discussed in Chapter Three). 
 
When he took over the reins of government in 1902, Henry Jackson was immediately 
advised by Rev. Arthur Small, chairman of the Wesleyan Mission, of the discontent 
that prevailed among Fijians throughout the group. It was caused in his opinion “by 
the almost incessant round of communal and other duties” which left them too little 
time for self-betterment. If allowed to persist, this widespread feeling of unrest would 
prove “disastrous for all concerned”.123 Jackson supported the gradual phasing out of 
the produce tax and its replacement by a coin tax. The unpopular European provincial 
inspectors were withdrawn and for a time this seemed to have an appeasing effect on 
the populace. 
 
There is evidence however, that at the local level, tax-related transgressions continued 
unabated. For instance, half of all cases appearing before the provincial court in 
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Macuata in 1908 were heard for breaches of the native tax regulations.124 One factor 
which makes it difficult to estimate the extent of resistance to taxation in the first 
decade of the twentieth century, is the stifling of the voices of chiefs caused by the 
discontinuation of the Bose Vakaturaga. Jackson’s successor as Governor, im Thurn 
decided to replace consultation with a more direct administrative style. Many insights 
into ordinary village affairs and the mood of ordinary people previously conveyed 
freely at these meetings were thenceforth lost. 
 
The Boycott of Land Registration 
 
It is also likely that during this period, fears about land alienation replaced taxation as 
the primary source of anxiety among ordinary Fijians. Land had always been a 
contentious issue. Some of Gordon’s earliest initiatives after arriving in the colony, 
were to find a uniform Fijian system of land tenure (through the Bose Vakaturaga), to 
sort through hundreds of pre-Cession land claims, legislating against any further 
alienation of native lands (through the Land Claims Commission), and from 1880 to 
define and register native land ownership (through the Native Lands Commission). 
These initiatives set in motion a process that led to the formation of a uniform system 
of land tenure in Fiji and transformed almost all ordinary Fijians into permanent 
landowners.125
 
Commissions, as Kaplan points out, were probably the pre-eminent ritual-political 
means by which the British tried to establish authority and order in colonial Fiji. 
Commissions set terms and relations of authority among all participants and 
routinized colonial power “in ways well beyond what any use of force might have 
accomplished”.126 The focus of this section lies less in how land commissions 
routinized colonial power in Fiji and more in the variety of ways in which they were 
undermined and subverted by ordinary people. It will show that ordinary Fijian 
villagers were very cautious and often intensely suspicious of the Native Lands 
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Commission (NLC) and that they often actively obstructed the commissioners and 
those charged with the surveying, marking and registration of the land. 
 
The first sittings of the NLC failed miserably. Fijians simply failed to respond and no 
submissions were received.127 Many Fijians did not support the Commission because 
of their previous experience with the earlier Land Claims Commission (1875-1882). 
Many of them felt that they had been cheated out of substantial portions of their land 
and feared that the new Commission would do more of the same.128 Settlers and their 
lawyers had a quasi monopoly over the interpretation of the law, and this was widely 
resented. At the 1878 Bose Vakaturaga the Roko Tui Bua assured the colonial 
officials in attendance that there was no problem in participating in the commission. 
“The evil” however, was that the lawyers made it so complicated and intricate.129 
Hence, the chiefs recognised the value of a commission in resolving their own 
existing disputes, between each other and with settlers, avoiding future ones, and 
guaranteeing the long term security of this asset. But they were apprehensive about 
the advantage that settlers had in swaying the Commission. 
 
This fear was justified. Gordon for instance, was “horrified” by some of the 
Commission’s adjudications in the fertile districts of Sigatoka. Writing to Carew, he 
expressed his fear that if the Lands Claims Commission chairman Williamson’s 
reports were to be accepted and “the Sigatoka in its lower course is to become 
European land, and its occupants expelled”, the administration would be faced with 
another war and in his opinion “a most unjust one”.130 The Commission also failed to 
compensate Fijians for the guns which they were now instructed to surrender to the 
state. As their chiefs argued, these guns had been received in return for large tracts of 
land: “If the guns are now taken away, the land should also be returned”.131
 
Hence, the Land Claims Commission’s record of adjudications and award of 
compensation inspired little confidence among Fijians in the wisdom of trusting the 
new Native Lands Commission and participating in the registration of their lands. 
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Writing in March 1878, Carew took the liberty to impress on the Governor that in the 
matter of their lands, “considerable excitement and dismay” prevailed in the minds of 
ordinary Fijians.132 By 1881, a silent but effective boycott of the Commission’s work 
had become apparent. Asked to explain why their people refused to collaborate with 
the Commission, the chiefs replied: 
 
our people did not understand the meaning and object of what was being done. 
Now that is clear, and all are desirous of persevering with the work. Still it 
would be best, we think, that there should be as little hurry about it as possible. 
It is important and weighty to our people; and if they do not understand it as it 
proceeds there will be probably murmuring, and fresh difficulties may only 
arise.133
 
Whether they understood the process or not, Fijians continued to thwart land 
registration, rendering the Commission’s work virtually meaningless. In 1886, a 
group of Fijian men confronted a government surveyor in Rewa, beat off his 
Polynesian labourers and uprooted the survey pegs.134 By 1889, as Carew put it, 
Fijians were clearly “determined that nothing shall be final as far as land boundaries 
are concerned”.135 The incidence of people who “wilfully, designedly, and with intent 
to defraud, interfered with and altered the boundaries of native lands” or simply 
pulled survey pegs, became frequent enough to warrant Regulation 1 of 1889 making 
such sabotage unlawful.136
 
The failure of the first commission led to the convocation of a second commission in 
1892 whose term of reference was “to turn over any land not utilised by chiefs or 
tribes to the state”.137 Under Wilkinson’s chairmanship, the commissioners were 
given greater powers but managed only marginal gains. Because progress was so 
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slow, Thurston again implored the chiefs in 1894 to have their people register their 
lands.138 Six months earlier, he had been forced to enact a new ordinance to stop the 
ongoing obstruction of surveyors appointed by commissioners to enter and survey 
native land. Those who tampered with or removed any mark or surveying equipment 
would thereafter be liable to six months imprisonment with hard labour.139 Further 
amendments were again needed in 1897 following concern about the contemptuous 
manner in which Commissioners were treated during sittings. In the same year, 
trouble erupted in Nakelo over the presence of CSR surveyors. As Wilkinson put it in 
his report on the disturbance, had it not been for the intervention of the Rev. W. A. 
Heighway, the leading surveyor “with his paraphernalia would without doubt have 
been thrown into the river”.140
 
Surveyors and the instruments by which they named, tamed, marked out and mapped 
the land, were regular targets of retribution. They represented the means by which 
colonisation advanced physically on the ground. As Byrnes has argued in relation to 
the role of surveyors in the colonisation of New Zealand, they were “charged with 
extending the boundaries of empire” and “operated literally at the cutting edge of 
colonisation”. She adds that surveyors, more than most other groups, explored and 
evaluated the resources of the colony and transformed ‘space’ into ‘place’. 141 In Fiji 
however, British ‘space’ was already ‘place’ to Fijians. The boundaries may have 
been fluid but they were firmly rooted in people’s conceptual world. As Williamson, 
the first chair of the Land Claims Commission had observed, “every inch of Fiji has 
an owner. Every parcel or tract of land has a name and the boundaries are defined and 
well known.”142 On this (Nakelo) and other occasions when they obstructed 
surveyors, Fijians struck at the physical instruments by which their conceptual sense 
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of ‘place’ was being attacked. These were mostly non-violent and anonymous tactics 
but they were very costly and disruptive. 
 
Interestingly, Wilkinson commented on several other sources of discontent which all 
seemed to converge in the Nakelo agitation. Two districts in the vicinity complained 
that “scheming” and “nefarious” Bauan chiefs were “browbeating them into 
acquiescence with the scheme of despoiling them of their lands”. Others in the area 
had a more general complaint against their own chiefs, whom they accused of being 
“always on the lookout for ‘plunder’, scheming for their own advantage only”. “Our 
chiefs,” they said, “in olden times oppressed us, oppressed us sore, But they always 
conserved our land right, but to day our chiefs join with Govt. officials to dispoil [sic] 
us of those rights”.143 One Nakelo man added: 
 
Ah Sir if the Governor could only hear our conversations in our homes, at 
night with our families, he would know the truth of our “rarawa, kei nai 
balebale ni neimame tiko vakaca” irritation, and the meaning of our perplexity 
and discontent.144
 
It was the confluence of these various streams of discontent that formed the basis of 
support for the Federation Movement. Ironically, had the movement succeeded, 
Fijians would have probably lost the secure inalienable status of their lands. Fijians 
lost that status in any case between 1905 and 1907 through a series of amendments 
which Governor im Thurn used to overturn Gordon’s land laws. 
 
im Thurn’s principal aim was “to ensure the actual release, by every available means, 
of as much native land as possible for development by European settlers”.145 To 
achieve this goal, im Thurn constituted a Lands Department which, he hoped, would 
oversee the individualization of native titles. This tactic had often been used in other 
colonies as an effective way to achieve a rapid transfer of native land to European 
settlers.146 He also attacked the conventional interpretation of the Deed of Cession as 
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a document that charged the state with the protection of Fijian lands. Targeting 
Wilkinson in particular, im Thurn suggested instead that the chiefs had ceded all land 
and that any surplus land not used by them should automatically belong to the 
Crown.147
 
However, declaring all surplus lands the property of the Crown and replacing 
communal with individual ownership, did not automatically translate into actual 
transactions or land acquisition. Whether land was surplus or legitimately owned was 
a matter which had yet to be determined. Land still needed to be identified which 
presupposed that the claims of would-be owners needed to be heard. This evoked the 
notoriously slow process of land registration, over which the Native Lands 
Commission could only claim limited success after twenty-five years of trying. 
 
It is in this context that the long undeclared boycott of registration in the late 
nineteenth century acquires its foremost significance. The boycott had slowed the 
process of registration long enough that im Thurn and his supporters in the settler 
community did not have a sufficient pool of legally defined lands and owners with 
which to engineer the purchase of enough land. Had people chosen to collaborate 
more readily with the Commission in the 1880s and 1890s, the pool of registered 
lands available on the market in 1905 may have been sufficient to render the process 
of selling Fijian land irreversible. 
 
Similarly, the release of surplus lands had been painstakingly slow, convoluted and 
ultimately futile. The effort had yielded a few parcels of mostly isolated, rugged and 
infertile land. Aware as he was of this problem, im Thurn chose to co-opt a few 
influential chiefs, Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi and Ratu Kadavulevu in particular in his 
scheme. While this strategy delivered the desired outcome, it also attracted stiff 
opposition as discussed in Chapter Three. 
 
The policy of individualizing land title was not resisted by all Fijians. Some regarded 
current practices as outmoded and restrictive, and were cautiously optimistic that the 
changes would advance their personal development. However, within two years 
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(1905-1907), as acres of Fiji’s best agricultural land passed into the hands of settlers, 
the mood soon changed from guarded optimism to outspoken pessimism. One 
contributor to Na Mata in September 1907, condemned the policy outright, saying 
that the chiefs were taking all the money from the sale of lands, spending it, getting 
drunk, with the result that both the land and the money were lost.148
 
In addition, in choosing to work with some chiefs but not others, im Thurn offended a 
number of them and lost their support. When he was instructed by the home 
Government in 1908 to seek the views of the indigenous people in relation to his land 
policies,149 im Thurn was faced with the prospect of consulting the Bose Vakaturaga, 
a body whose use he had discarded earlier in his tenure. Having alienated many of 
them, it is unlikely that he would have received the chiefs’ support,150 and when 
Arthur Gordon intervened in the House of Lords to have the new laws repealed,151 im 
Thurn’s project came to a premature end. Outside agency, although less prominent 
than it was for indentured labourers, had come to play a critical role in counter-
balancing colonial power and supporting Fijian struggles to retain control of their land 
assets. 
 
im Thurn’s experiments with native land intensified the suspicion and scepticism with 
which Fijians regarded any exercise in land registration. Governor May’s attempts to 
resurrect the Native Lands Commission in 1911 led to a renewed though undeclared 
campaign of impeding surveyors and sabotaging survey pegs.152 Byrnes writes that 
when surveyors planted pegs in the ground, it symbolised an explicit act of 
possession. This was often regarded by indigenous landowners as an overt challenge 
on their property and sovereignty.153 In this light, the removal of pegs by villagers can 
be viewed as a deliberate, and like most popular acts of defiance, a clandestine 
rejection of the Crown’s attempts to appropriate their land. 
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 In particular localities, the activities of landowners were highly coordinated. Meetings 
would often be called before the sitting of the Commission, at which landowners 
would arrange what was to be told and what was to be concealed from the 
Commission. The chairman of the NLC reported in 1914 that Fijians did not welcome 
the Commission because they stood to lose much and gain little from the exercise. 
They therefore resorted to “every possible means to conceal the truth”.154 A 
substantial source of revenue could be lost or gained depending on landowners’ 
ability to influence arbitration. 
 
In the Ba province for instance, where the greater part of the sugar industry was now 
based, the investigations of the Commission in 1913 and 1914 were remarkably 
difficult. Landowners resented any measure that threatened the source of income they 
were now accustomed to from the lease of their land to Indian farmers. The result 
was, “an organised resistance to investigation by means of carefully prearranged 
suppression of inconvenient truths, accompanied in most cases by a somewhat 
grotesque fabrication of palpable untruths by which the parties hope to improve their 
position”.155 Much evidence which had been previously given to the Commission in 
the form of oral history was now deemed dubious, forcing weeks of prior work to be 
disregarded and the process started over. Charges for perjury were difficult to lay 
given the “traditional” and oral nature of the testimony, and hence the presentation of 
divergent truths, or “fraud” as the commissioners described them, brought little ill 
consequence for the perpetrators. These sorts of obstructions in Ba were such that it 
took the Commission eighteen months to complete its work in the area.156
 
Another common tactic used by landowners, was to delay proceedings for as long as 
possible by opting not to turn up at sittings or by neglecting to mark the boundaries of 
their lands. The Government reacted with an ordinance which proclaimed that “any 
tribe refusing to make a submission [would] be deemed not to own any land”.157 It is 
unlikely that the Government enforced the law with any conviction for in his report 
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for 1917, the Commissioner of Lands explained with much despair and frustration 
that numerous petty acts of sabotage continued to impede the Commission’s work: 
 
I regret to have to report that the progress has again been seriously retarded by 
the attitude of the native land owners, who for weeks together have refused to 
attend to point out tribal boundaries to the surveyors. No less than one 
hundred and sixty – one working days were lost in this manner and of course it 
has affected the cost of the work done.158 (Emphasis in original) 
 
It is worth remembering that at this time thousands of ordinary Fijians chose quietly 
but actively to support the Viti Kabani and thus partake in the colony’s largest popular 




Some officials blamed the Roman Catholic mission for the unrest. The Roman 
Catholic Church had long been on the receiving end of attacks by the political and 
Wesleyan establishment of the colony. As early as 1881, Thurston considered the 
disruptive influence of Roman Catholicism to be so great that he feared for the 
stability and welfare of the Colony. He accused priests of engendering feelings of 
hatred and of exciting disobedience among villagers.159 Among the long list of 
charges against them, the “priests of Rome” were also accused by the Wesleyan 
mission of fanning “smouldering discontent into a flame,” of fomenting “a spirit 
antagonistic to law and order”, of reviving old quarrels, and of “preaching 
disobedience and even revolt” in the hope of acquiring new adherents.160 They were 
                                                 
158 Paper 58: “Lands Department: Report by the Commissioner of Lands for 1917. in JFLC, 1918. 2. 
For a similar example see Paper 14: “Report of the Chairman of the Native Lands Commission.” in 
JFLC, 1917. 
159 Cited in Scarr, 1980: 90. 
160 See Minutes and Journals of the Fiji District Annual Synod 1874-1892 and 1891-1907. F/4/A and B. 
Methodist Missionary Society of Australasia. Fiji District. See also Appendix to Minutes of the Annual 
Meeting of the Fiji District Committee begun at Viwa 12 October 1888 and Navuloa 9 October 1889. 
Methodist Missionary Society of Australasia. Fiji District. For numerous other such references to the 
threat of Roman Catholicism in the various districts of the colony, see the Circuit Reports from 1888 to 
1899of the Methodist Church. F/6. Methodist Missionary Society of Australasia. Fiji District. For 
Roman Catholic records of such accusations, see Gallais’s letter to the CS, 11 February 1890, and 
Gallais to Vidal, 12 April 1890. Roman Catholic Mission, Fiji: Correspondence with Government and 
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also accused by village and district chiefs of variously obstructing work, upsetting 
good order, disturbing the unity of village life, encouraging the lazy and disaffected, 
condoning the non-payment of government tax, and more generally of being at the 
origin of disturbances to the peace.161 Writing in 1891 in the wake of the resurgence 
of Tuka in the Ra region, Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi estimated that the activities of the 
Roman Catholic mission were more harmful to the colony than those of Tuka: 
 
Roman Catholicism is doing more harm: It endeavours to withdraw allegiance 
of the people from the chiefs. Its leaders continually look for and accept the 
first fruits that are payable to chiefs only. Its agents have endeavoured to 
relieve prisoners from gaol, have caused unseemly wrangling among native 
officers, have been concerned, several times, in the withdrawal of children 
from their natural guardians so that they might imbibe its doctrines, like the 
disciples of the “Tuka” they teach that “there is no salvation outside the 
Church. … Votaries accord to the Head priest forms of respect due alone to 
the Queen or her representative, and in the service of this “religion” leave their 
communal duties undone. They remove women from their communities and 
shut them up where they are not available as wives and mothers … These 
things amount to a very substantial form of “vakatubuca”.162
 
Priests fervently denied these allegations and protested that Roman Catholics were 
being persecuted. In a letter to the Colonial Secretary, Father Gallais defended Roman 
Catholic doctrine and stated unequivocally that “a Catholic who is not respectful of 
the established law is in fact a bad Catholic, because he should know that any regular 
authority comes from God himself”.163
 
                                                 
161 See the accusations by the Buli Nailega as reported by Carew, 19 October 1889, CSO 89/2980. See 
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90/2013; and Thomson to Governor, 21 April 1890, CSO 90/1061. 
162 Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi report on the revival of Tuka in the Nalawa district, 15 March, 1891, CSO 
91/1133. 
163 Gallais to CS, 11 February 1890. Roman Catholic Mission, Fiji: Correspondence with Government 
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The rivalry is important because in between the accusations and counter-accusations 
that opposing priests hurled at each other, the presence of a rival denomination 
provided an alternative for people to express their dissatisfaction with the 
government, their chief or the mission. I do not deny that there were important 
doctrinal, cultural, and practical reasons for choosing Roman Catholicism, but like 
Tuka, Catholicism represented a different kind of political and religious entity which 
seemed to exist quasi-independently from the Wesleyan-colonial alliance. It gave 
people the option of contemplating an existence beyond the confines of established 
religious and secular authority while still remaining within the legitimizing force of 
Christianity.164 This caused all sorts of complications for the management of people. 
Expressing his frustration at the 1879 Bose Vakaturaga, the Roko Tui Ba explained: 
 
Is it not a capital sin that there should be two religions – that when one is 
vexed or put out for having been reprimanded, one can flee to the Catholics 
and become of their religion at once, or, if a Catholic, do the reverse?165
 
This view was supported by other chiefs in the Bose who feared that such “light-
minded” conversions would challenge their authority.166 Their concern was shared by 
Carew who despaired at the ease with which people evaded their communal work by 
simply joining the rival denomination:  
 
Catholics have far too many Holy Days besides Sundays – this interferes 
altogether with public work. They go over to the Catholics to get away from 
their chiefs and from communal work of all descriptions.167
 
                                                 
164 The increased defection from Methodism to Seventh Day Adventism was also accelerated by the 
“Number 8 Movement” of Sailosi Nagusolevu that swept through the Northern and inland district of 
Viti Levu in 1918. Nagusolevu linked his vision of the overthrow of Fiji’s colonial government, the 
Methodist Mission, and Britain’s surrender to Germany with the prophecies of Navosavakadua and the 
administrative and economic aims of the Viti Kabani. Sailosi Nagusolevu and his movement are 
discussed by Nicholas Thomas in In Oceania: Visions, Artefacts, Histories. Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1997. 50-67. See also Andrew Thornley, 1979: 155, 197-8. 
165 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” Bau, 1879. 20. 
166 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1879. 20. 
167 See Carew’s minute in Resident Commissioner Colo East to CS, 19 October 1889, CSO 89/2980. 
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By 1893, Thurston was positively hostile to the Roman Catholic Mission and its head 
Monseigneur Vidal. He accused Vidal of enticing Fijians with the following 
invitation: 
 
Come over to us and we will give you protection against the chiefs. Join us 
and we will stand between you and every obligation under which you lie.168
 
He also accused Father Rougier, a priest stationed in Rewa, of inviting former Tuka 
votaries to join Roman Catholicism because the mission was “free from any control 
and could ‘veitalia’ that is, do anything it pleased”. Rougier appealed to them to be 
“big minded”, to set their chiefs at defiance and to be afraid of nothing. 169 This, 
Thurston claimed was a menace to the public peace because it tended to appeal to 
those who were “inimical to the Government” and provided a refuge for the 
discontented and disorderly.170 He added that “if the natives at large come to believe 
that there is any authority superior, or even equal, to that of the Queen and the 
“Matanitu”, government by moral suasion in this colony will cease to exist”.171 The 
Government was therefore clearly annoyed by the influence, authority and 
independence which the Roman Catholic Mission enjoyed in the colony. It was also 
worried about the kind of convert that the Church was attracting, and the potential for 
subversion and even secession that existed. 
 
When the Seventh Day Adventists (SDAs) entered the fray in the 1890s, they added 
another dimension to Fiji’s religious landscape. One of their first converts was the 
influential but rebellious Tui Suva, Ratu Avorosa who, as we noted in Chapter Three 
had already played a role in the Federation movement and other land claims in 
Tailevu. Among his first deeds as an SDA convert, Ratu Avorosa distinguished 
himself by washing the feet of commoners in his village at Suvavou.172 Commenting 
on the popularity of the Adventists in Colo, Brewster wrote, “although its introducers 
were good, homely men, who led the most exemplary lives, it proved a veritable 
causer of strife and another Cave of Adullam”. This was in no small part due to a 
                                                 
168 Despatch 84, Thurston to SS, 19 October 1893. CSO Despatches. NAF. 
169 Despatch 84, Thurston to SS, 19 October 1893. 
170 Despatch 84, Thurston to SS, 19 October 1893. 
171 Despatch 84, Thurston to SS, 19 October 1893. 
172 Thornley, 1979: 195. 
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large number of those opposed and punished by the Government or the rival 
Wesleyan and Roman Catholic authorities, flocking to the new body.173
 
By 1904, the SDA Church was making progress in Ra and the Northern interior of 
Viti Levu after receiving unlimited access to the villages from Ratu Joni 
Madraiwiwi.174 When the Vatukaloko deportees returned from their exile in Kadavu, 
many of them became SDAs. The conversions continued through the 1910s and by 
the 1921 census, many areas of Colo and Ra had adopted Roman Catholicism or 
Seventh Day Adventism as their preferred creed. For instance, in the rebellious 
district of Navatusila only thirty-one out of 259 villagers were Methodists. The whole 
of Nadrau was SDA. In neighbouring Savatu, the majority were SDAs. One quarter of 
the district of Nasau was SDA. In some villages such as Naloto in Naboubuco, the 
proportion of Methodists, Roman Catholics and SDAs was almost equal. The districts 
of Nailega and Noemalu also had significant non-Methodist populations. Hence if the 
overwhelming majority of coastal villages in Viti Levu were Methodist, a large 
proportion of interior villages were either Roman Catholic or SDA.175
 
There is little coincidence in the prevalence of Roman Catholicism and Seventh Day 
Adventism in those areas where the Government and its affinity with the Wesleyan 
Church and Eastern chiefs was most resented. Some villages such as Drauniivi and 
areas such as Ra with a strong history of opposition to the colonial order chose to 
remain mainly within the Wesleyan fold. In the case of Drauniivi, as Kaplan argues, 
this strategic decision was taken to equip their customary and land claims with a 
greater degree of legitimacy, and to help challenge and overturn their political, 
economic and spatial dispossession from within the governing political and religious 
institutions.176
 
Moreover, Methodism, was not a religious monolith and neither were its missionaries 
a homogenous group. While the Wesleyan Church was close to the chiefs and the 
Government, some of its missionaries acted in support of ordinary people against the 
exactions of their chiefs and the Government. As we have seen, several were opposed 
                                                 
173 Brewster, 1922: 141. 
174 Thornley, 1979: 196. 
175 Fiji Census Report, 1921: 14-17. 
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to chiefly lala. They were also actively engaged against unscrupulous traders and 
labour recruiters. They raised their concern about such problems as poverty and other 
social and economic ills which made some villagers so destitute that they could no 
longer attend church.177
 
In this matter, the Reverend William Slade was one of the government’s staunchest 
opponents. Rev. Slade distinguished himself by his frequent attacks on the tax regime 
and his support for Federation with New Zealand. He denounced the Government’s 
native policy for stifling individual enterprise: 
 
In Fiji, a young man who feels the village boundaries to be too strait for him 
and has aspirations and ambitions to attain to something beyond the rank of 
mere hewer of weed or drawer of water, is met at the outset by an inflexible 
communal system that holds him in relentless grip.178
 
By regulating “every detail of native life” through the multiplication of Ordinances, 
the ordinary Fijian had been hedged round “like the spikes in regulus barrel”.179 Fijian 
chiefs were the principal enforcers of this system and often abused it. They took 
advantage of the 1877 regulation IX relating to vakatubuca or “evil speaking” and 
talaidredre to punish anyone who did not agree or disobeyed them. In Kadavu for 
instance, two men from Nabukelevu were punished by fine and imprisonment for 
refusing to prepare yaqona for two petty chiefs from neighbouring Daviqele 
village.180 On the same island, a Buli proceeded against two men for talaidredre after 
they spent ten shillings of their money earned while working for a year in Viti Levu. 
They were punished because the Buli had earmarked the money to be used for 
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building a church.181 These excesses led one official to call for the people to be 
“saved from their chiefs”.182 There was therefore little incentive for villagers to stay. 
 
Slade was also critical of the policy of amalgamating villages. The only purpose 
which it served, he claimed, was to free up land for lease to foreigners. He demanded 
to know why the chiefs who opposed amalgamation were charged with 
“vakatubuca”.183 From the government’s perspective, the purpose of amalgamation of 
so many villages was to ease administration and for hygienic reasons. Nicholas 
Thomas has argued that the public health and sanitary programmes between 1876 and 
1920, were a form of social engineering which allowed Britain to rule Fiji without 
violent repression. The amalgamation of such a large number of villages functioned to 
create an orderly, accessible and visible village while simultaneously reducing the 
potential for disorder. It allowed the process to appear as an operation of welfare 
rather than conquest.184 This is particularly noticeable when reading through the 
“Report of the Commission on the Decrease of the Native Population.”185
 
However, the evidence suggests that there was little resistance to village 
amalgamation.186 In fact, many of the practical recommendations of the Commission 
on the Decrease of the Native Population had already been discussed by the chiefs in 
several previous Bose Vakaturaga, and measures to improve the health and life 
expectancy of villagers were already being implemented in the villages by villagers 
themselves.187 While the Report was a typical case of colonial intent to intervene in 
the lives of ordinary people, its impact in the villages was severely diluted. 
 
Moreover, while the administration may have wished to enhance its power, 
surveillance mechanism, and disciplinary effects, the impetus to move often came 
from the people themselves. They had their own agenda. Some wanted to move 
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because they knew better sites.188 Some wished to move because they disliked an 
official.189 Some wished to move to join a different district with which they had 
stronger historical and cultural connections.190 Some wanted to evade paying taxes.191 
Some wanted to move because of internal village disputes or harassment.192 Some 
simply moved out of religious conviction.193 Hence, while Slade (and Thomas) was 
sensitive to the designs of power, he may have underestimated the willingness of 
ordinary villagers to participate in the sanitation exercise, by subverting and 




Reverend Slade was also critical of the Government’s policy on the education of 
Fijians. So much of the individual’s time was required for tax work that their demands 
for education were often refused. “To educate the Fijian”, he wrote, meant “to 
promote discontent, because when the eyes of the natives are opened, and they are 
able to compare their condition with the other races in Fiji, they naturally become 
dissatisfied”.194
 
Slade had good reason to attack the government on its educational record among the 
Fijian populace. Had formal education been left solely in the hands of the colonial 
administration, very few, of Fiji’s people would have received anything more than 
elementary schooling. While Ordinance 15 of 1877 stipulated that all children 
between the ages of six and twelve were to attend school,195 the state itself provided 
no assistance in the education of these children. Instead the Government relied 
exclusively on the missions to provide this service. More than thirty years later, when 
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the long promised Education Commission sat in 1909, the Headmaster of the newly 
constituted Queen Victoria School tabled a severe indictment of the government’s 
record on education. Of ten other British colonies generally similar to Fiji (including 
Mauritius, British Guiana, Barbados, Cyprus, British Honduras, and Gold Coast), Fiji 
rated the lowest both in terms of the percentage of its revenue spent on education (1.3 
%) and of its spending on education per head of population (less than five pence.)196 
Of that, only a tiny fraction was spent on the education of the sons of Fijian chiefs at 
the Queen Victoria School and nothing at all on the education of Indian children.197
 
After thirty-five years of colonial rule, the government did not have an Education 
Department. It could boast two public schools reserved for Europeans (and “well-
behaved and respectable half-castes”198) two failed technical schools for Fijian boys, 
and one school recently established to cater for the secondary education of the sons of 
Fijian chiefs. During this period, the burden of providing basic formal education in 
the colony had fallen entirely on the shoulders of the missions.199 In 1909, the 
Methodist mission had one of its 1,041 schools in almost every village of the 
archipelago with 912 teachers, 1171 pupil-teachers, and 17,695 students. The Catholic 
mission had 159 schools, with 225 teachers, and 1750 students.200 School was mostly 
conducted in the village church, the teacher’s salary was mostly paid for by the 
voluntary contributions of the villagers, and the curriculum consisted of various 
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combinations of reading, writing, maths, geography, drill English, history, scripture 
studies, elementary book-keeping, elementary agriculture, and elementary science.201
 
The government’s lack of interest in the education of non-Europeans in Fiji reflected 
the dominant view held by administrators and business leaders that “black races” were 
naturally suited for agriculture and nothing else.202 A good cross-section of these 
views is contained in the Report of the 1909 Education Commission. Speaking in his 
capacity as the Deputy Native Commissioner, W. A. Scott declared that “speaking 
generally, there is at present no scope in the Colony for highly-educated natives”.203 
A. G. Ross, another commissioner who was in correspondence with the celebrated 
African-American intellectual Booker T. Washington about the education of 
Fijians,204 believed that practical agricultural and industrial training were the most 
appropriate for Fijians. The headmaster of QVS concurred. In a minute regarding 
Education in the British Empire, he wrote: 
 
In my opinion there is always a danger in giving anything more than an 
elementary literary education, except in a very limited number of cases, to 
native races.205
 
Hence, ordinary Fijians faced considerable opposition to any education that would 
give them the means of breaking the cycle of communal and agricultural labour. 
 
Because their chiefs were better placed in the administrative structure of the colony, it 
was through them that Fijian educational aspirations were first channelled. The chiefs 
understood education to be a potent instrument with which they could secure and 
improve their status and that of their immediate families. They responded by taking 
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initiatives that reflected their own interests. In this endeavour, they were widely 
supported by the administration. In their letter to the Queen after the 1879 Bose 
Vakaturaga, they made their desire for an industrial school known to the 
administration.206 Within two years, a technical school was opened at Yanawai in 
Bua, Vanua Levu, where about a hundred students came every year to learn carpentry, 
mechanics and agriculture. By the mid 1880s the number of students began to decline 
ostensibly because it was too far from the new capital and only accessible by boat.207 
However, most of the students were the sons of Bulis, and it is likely that the students 
and their fathers had other aspirations in mind than careers in agriculture or boat-
building. 
 
In 1890, the chiefs asked the Governor for more schools to educate young people 
beyond the elementary standard of mission schools where students could learn 
English.208 The request was repeated at the next Bose in 1892, with renewed emphasis 
on English as the medium of instruction and a call for the school to be located close to 
Suva. A suitable site for the new school was duly found in 1894 at Naikorokoro near 
Veisari, nine miles out of Suva. In approving the school, Thurston told the chiefs that 
this school would be used to train “young men of intelligence and good family” for 
Government work and in the duties of Buli, Turaga-ni-lewa, Turaga-ni-koro, 
Provincial Secretaries, officers and so forth. They would be taught English and 
technical subjects.209 In the end, the school prioritised the learning of carpentry and 
boat-building, and suffered the same fate as the Yanawai school. By 1900 it was 
closed and the chiefs proposed a new school.210
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 At the Bose Vakaturaga of 1902, they resolved that a high school, rather than a 
technical school, be built for Fijians with the money raised for a memorial to the 
Queen.211 They did not wish for any teaching in trade but rather that only those 
subjects that were taught in English public schools and colleges be taught at the 
school. In his budget address for 1905, Governor im Thurn announced the building of 
a school at Nasinu (just outside Suva) for “the young generation of Fijians in order 
that, as far as is desirable, they may imbibe European rather than Fijian habits of 
thought and work and - what is to my mind not the least important item - 
language”.212 However the school was to be restricted to the sons of chiefs. im Thurn 
believed that there were two classes of Fijians and that so far as these performed two 
different functions – “the chiefs as thinkers and overseers, the commoners as manual 
labourers,” he recommended that a different education was desirable for each class.213
 
Queen Victoria School was completed in 1906 and admitted its first intake the 
following year. An average of two students per province (and three for the more 
populous provinces) were selected by the Native Commissioner and the Rokos of 
each province and took classes in hygiene, agriculture, type-writing and shorthand 
and telegraphy for employment in branches of the Public Service and the Native 
Department. At first, only a fraction of the students were the sons of chiefs. However, 
under the insistence of the headmaster, this policy was soon reversed and by 1910 
only the sons of chiefs were admitted: 
 
After three years’ experience I have come to the conclusion that as a general 
rule a chief's son is far more intelligent than the son of a commoner, and that it 
will always be to the advantage of the Government to admit a chief’s son in 
preference to another. Many of these boys will become Rokos and Bulis and 
as such will be able to repay the Government for the training that they have 
received at Queen Victoria School.214
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 With Queen Victoria School, the chiefs acquired the means by which to perpetuate 
their hold over the key administrative positions in Fijian affairs. It was a milestone not 
so much in Fijian as in elite development and consolidation.  
 
Throughout this period, commoners were largely left to fend for themselves. As we 
saw earlier in the chapter, ordinary people had quickly realised that in the evolving 
world of British colonial rule, education was one of the means by which they could 
acquire greater control over their own future and that, beyond the elementary 
education provided by the village mission schools, they would have to seek and find it 
through their own efforts. Some chose to shape their own destinies and left their 
villages in search of the educational opportunities made available by the technical and 
theological training schools at the Methodist stations of Navuloa and Davuilevu and 
the Catholic stations at Cawaci on Ovalau and Naililili in Rewa. This accounts partly 
for the “very large” number of people who were “irregularly” absent from their 
villages as previously discussed.215
 
Davuilevu functioned increasingly like an augmented secondary school and a tertiary 
institution. It contained a theological college for ministry, a training institute for 
native teachers and a secondary school for young Fijian men desiring a higher 
education. However, the instruction was entirely in Fijian. The Roman Catholics, on 
the other hand, taught in English in bigger schools with well-trained expatriate staff 
and good boarding facilities. For these reasons, Thornley has remarked, many parents 
sacrificed denominational loyalty for educational opportunity and ‘yielded up’ their 
children to the priest.216 With the additional three schools from the Seventh Day 
Adventist mission,217 this competition created more opportunities for ambitious 
commoners to break out of the cycle of village-based communal obligations. 
 
Yet, those who remained in the villages also made substantial sacrifices for the 
education of their children. Children were usually encouraged to attend school and 
only when the demands of tax work, chiefly lala, or plantation labour became 
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217 The SDA mission ran schools in Bureta, Ovalau, Ra, and Suvavou. 
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excessive, did school attendance decline. Some chiefs led the way in the promotion of 
provincial education and in the absence of any support from the Government, the 
people responded by producing excess taxes and freed up large blocks of land for the 
establishment and running of these provincial schools. The most successful of these 
schools were established in Natuatuacoko (Fort Carnarvon) in Colo West after the 
1876 Colo War, Lakeba in Lau where the enterprising headmaster A. M. Hocart used 
a distinctly Fijian curriculum, and Nanukuloa in Ra at the initiative of Ratu Joni 
Madraiwiwi.218
 
The determination with which Fijians sought out the advantages of education did not 
go unnoticed. In his 1907 address to the Fiji Legislative Council, im Thurn observed, 
“it sometimes seems to me that the natives appreciate the advantages of education 
more than do some of the European residents”.219 Apolosi Nawai and his supporters 
were certainly aware of such advantages, when they embarked on their scheme to set 
up a network of Viti Kabani schools throughout the country previously discussed in 
Chapter Three. 
 
One of the striking and recurring motifs of the battle for education was the insistence 
and emphasis on the teaching of English. The process by which English became 
synonymous with power has its roots embedded in the Government’s administration 
of the law. From the beginning, the colonial courts took centre stage in the 
adjudication of right and wrong between Europeans and non-Europeans and the 
former’s quasi monopoly of English placed them at a considerable advantage over the 
latter.220 In this setting the position of interpreter, almost always occupied by a 
European official, was particularly powerful. Many Fijians came to dread interpreters 
and feared their power to mislead the court and thus determine the outcome of cases. 
This was particularly so in the early years when European magistrates were seldom 
fluent enough in the Fijian language to determine the veracity of the interpreter’s 
translations. Considerable anxiety was caused and much disquiet ensued when the 
                                                 
218 See Paper 37, M.S. 2, Sir Everard im Thurn Papers. NAF; see also Education Commission Report: 
29, 125-6. 
219 Paper 24: “His Excellency's Message to the Legislative Council.” in JFLC, 1907. 
220 For an example of a report on a court case where the leader of a group of Fijian labourers, tried to 
address the court in English and was barred from doing so and told to speak Fijian instead, see Borron 
to CS, 4 February 1888 in CSO 88/466. 
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stakes were high, as in the adjudication of pre-Cession land claims. Speaking on the 
matter at the 1880 Bose Vakaturaga, Ratu Maika testified: 
 
I know other cases where a Native has given an explanation of a native 
custom, most important to the subject, and has been told by the interpreter to 
shut up, that nobody understands Fijian customs, or that this is not the age for 
them. … Many of the evils complained of about the land enquiry, I believe are 
more to be attributed to the interpreters than to the gentlemen who are 
conducting the enquiry.221
 
English was the language of power. It has been argued that the English language was 
used as an instrument of imperialism to establish mental and cultural control over the 
colonised.222 While I am sympathetic with it, very little direct evidence exists to 
support this view in the first forty years of British rule in Fiji. On the other hand, there 
is much evidence to suggest that rather than impose English as a form of mental 
colonisation, the Government and the missions, except the Roman Catholics, adopted 
a deliberate policy of withholding the teaching of English from the non-European 
population. The English language thus became an important site of contestation 
between the colonised who viewed it as the means to secure their own advancement, 
and the authorities, who viewed it as an instrument of power to be preserved for 
Europeans only. 
 
Representing the latter view, E. W. Fenner, Manager for the CSR in Fiji, told the 
Education Commission that “to teach English to Fijians as a whole would, in my 
opinion, be a great mistake as it would only tend to make them despise manual labour 
which, after all, must be the source of livelihood of most natives”.223 Joske agreed. 
Calling on his twenty-five years of experience in the administration of Fijians, he 
claimed that those “natives” who spoke English were unreliable.224 Expressing a 
different opinion, J. V. Thompson, principal of Queen Victoria School, held that in 
                                                 
221 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1880. 12. See also Resolution 4 of the 1879 Bose Vakaturaga 
when the matter was first raised and brought to the attention of the Governor. “Proceedings of a Native 
Council,” 1879. 77. 
222 Ngugi wa Thiongo, Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature. New 
Hampshire: Heinemann, 1986. 
223 Education Commission Report: 91. 
224 Education Commission Report: 92. 
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teaching English at his school, Fijians were gradually being “anglicised” and this 
would help them become more useful members of the community. Knowledge of the 
language would literally give them something to think about: 
 
It is unreasonable to expect to find thinkers among the Fijians in their present 
state, and I have little doubt that when they are alone they think of “Maistly 
nothin”; but if a knowledge of English becomes general and they are able to 
read for themselves, they will have something to think about.225
 
These views were expressed in the highest echelons of the administration. Speaking 
about his policy on Education in 1911, Governor Henry May explained in his first 
meeting with the chiefs that Fijians should be instructed in methods of agriculture, the 
care and management of cattle, carpentering, and the elements of building 
construction. While he agreed that English could be taught, the emphasis of Fijian 
education should be placed on those subjects that he thought would be most suited for 
the development of the agricultural resources of the colony.226
 
The place of women in this problematic is inconclusive. This is because, while there 
is some evidence about the objectives of the missions and Government in educating 
Fijian girls,227 very little is known of the objectives of these girls and their 
communities in supporting their education. An even greater silence prevails over the 
early education of Indian girls. As we will see in Chapter Seven, this archival silence 
is due in part to the traditional exclusion of women and their voices from the records. 
It is also due to the fact that with a few exceptions, the post-elementary education of 
girls was not deemed necessary until after our period of study. Hence, this important 
aspect of education is mentioned as a signpost in the hope that it will lead to a more 
comprehensive and conclusive study in the future. 
                                                 
225 Education Commission Report: 124. 
226 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1911. 3. 
227 Reference to women leaving their villages to attend religious training institutions has already been 
made. For other documents treating with the early education of girls in Fiji, see the Report of the 
Commission on Decrease of the Native Population 1893 (page 125 especially); See also references to 
the education of girls in the Education Commission of 1909; For a short history of the well-regarded 
Matavelo School for girls in Nailaga, Ba which was established by Reverend Slade, see M/150/L in the 
Second Series of Miscellaneous files in the Methodist Church Records. Methodist Missionary Society 
of Australasia. Fiji District; See also CSO 98/3498 and CSO 98/3755 regarding the establishment of 
 275
 In their totality therefore, the efforts of ordinary villagers to acquire greater self-
determination through education beyond elementary school, bore very little visible 
signs of success. At the end of our period of study, ordinary Fijians remained a largely 
semi-literate population denied the means of participating in the social, political and 




The evidence presented in this chapter supports the view that ordinary people, even 
when they were marginalized, retain considerable agency to fashion their lives in 
ways not entirely controlled by the dominant. While their actions may not seem 
spectacular or revolutionary, they displace the unified image of Fiji and Fijians as 
obedient, submissive beings living an idyllic life under the supervision of chiefs and 
the tutelage of benevolent colonial officials. 
 
We can also conclude that contestation was not restricted to those exceptional 
moments of popular explosion as were the Colo and Seaqaqa wars, Tuka, the 
plantation strikes and riots, and the organised grassroots movements of the early 
twentieth century. Much of their battle was fought in the distinct political 
environment which lay in the vicinity of their villages. There, they navigated between 
that immense political terrain that Scott says, lies between quiescence and revolt.228
 
In that space, they confronted those charged with their immediate coercion: their own 
chiefs.229 For the most part, this confrontation took the form of non-compliance and 
evasion. People took flight to evade communal obligations including tax work and 
lala, or joined undeclared boycotts such as that which rendered the Native Lands 
Commission’s work so difficult. While a few were impromptu and spontaneous, most 
were preoccupied with the practical matter of surviving in an often hostile 
environment. 
                                                                                                                                            
the school; for the threat to the Wesleyan mission posed by the opening of an SDA girls school at 
Natewa Bay in Vanua Levu, see Thornley, 1979: 200. 
228 Scott, 1990: 199. 
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 Success depended on the adoption of tactics that were beyond the gaze of the 
powerful. This was necessary to avoid detection and punishment. Clandestine and 
anonymous activities such as the removal of survey pegs were therefore well suited to 
the circumstances of the discontented. Occasionally however, everyday resistance 
took on a more public manifestation as did the resurgence of luveniwai rituals of 
invulnerability. At other times, it formed the basis for larger popular movements to 
emerge as was the case for the Federation Movement and the Viti Kabani. 
 
The inconsistencies and divisions that existed between the main Christian 
denominations and between secular and religious authorities, produced multiple 
avenues for people to variously question, contest and occasionally reject the designs 
of the powerful and to inject into that space, their own ambitions. Some found such an 
avenue in the education provided by the missions, which furnished a few enterprising 
individuals with the powerful means with which to break out of the perpetual cycle of 
subservience and agricultural labour. 
 
There were also shifts across time. While people exploited the avenues created by the 
transitional period of the 1870s and 1880s, they became more circumspect in the 
1890s when village life became more regimented and colonial rule more routinized. 
Yet, when pressure mounted on their land in the early twentieth century, people 
regrouped and defended this most vital of resources. Everyday resistance in Fiji was 
therefore shaped as much by space as it was by time. 
 
The extent to which everyday resistance in the villages was similar and yet different 
from the plantation world is the subject of the next chapter. It is to the insurgent 
stories of those who formed the underclass of the plantation that we now turn. 
                                                                                                                                            
229 Not all chiefs were resisted all the time. Some chiefs supported the rebellious actions of their people 
and occasionally provided leadership. Their role in leading resistance is important and deserves more 
space than is available here. 
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Chapter Six 
Everyday Resistance on the Plantations 
 
The prevailing wisdom about organised resistance on Fiji’s plantations, as we saw in 
Chapter Four, is that it was rare. In this chapter, a window is opened into the everyday 
world of Fiji’s plantation microcosm to examine the everyday forms of resistance that 
labourers used in-between large conflagrations. For reasons identified in the previous 
chapter, it is impossible to reproduce here the entirety of the spectrum of experiences 
that was spawned by the indentured system. The focal point of the chapter is the 
plantation labourer and that fragment of his and her experience that defied authority. 
Because the bulk of labourers on Fiji’s plantation were Indian indentured immigrants, 
the discussion examines the particularity of their everyday lives and forms of protests. 
Beginning with the spectacular forms of retributive violence which labourers used 
against plantation authorities, the discussion explores physical violence as the point at 
which resistance was forced outside “normal channels” by aggrieved labourers against 
their immediate superiors, against other girmitiyas, and against themselves. This 
section is followed by an examination of various “weapons of the weak”1 such as 
evasion, absenteeism, desertion, sabotage, and petitions. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of the role of religion and education as instruments by which labourers 
contested the fate of perpetual bondage reserved for them by managerial and 
government authorities. 
 
Violence and Retributive Justice 
 
The violence of indenture is well documented in Fiji’s historiography. 2 All studies 
have shown Fiji’s plantations to be sites of extraordinary physical violence where 
numerous murders, attempted murders, assaults, suicides, rapes, etc., were actually or 
potentially a part of everyday life. They also indicate that violence was not the 
unilateral prerogative of plantation authorities, but that it permeated the lives of all 
                                                 
1 See Scott, 1985. 
2 Gillion, 1962; Ali, 1979, 1980; Naidu, 1980; Shameem, 1990; Kelly, 1991a and 1991b; and Lal, 
2000. 
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irrespective of their place in the hierarchy often resulting in tragic consequences for 
both employees and employers. 
 
In the absence of a comprehensive study of attacks by labourers against their 
employers, it is difficult to differentiate between violence which functioned as 
resistance and violence which was committed as crime. Some statistical evidence 
about the frequency and type of labourer violence can be derived from the Annual 
Reports for Indian Immigration. However, these statistics tend to reflect reported 
violence (or violence which resulted in legal proceedings) rather than actual violence 
in the seclusion of plantations. Other sources of information including Supreme Court 
records, press reports, and stipendiary magistrates’ monthly reports of cases brought 
forward in their districts, tend to represent Indian labourers’ violence as irrational, 
instinctual, brutal, ruthless, animal-like and motivated mainly by jealousy.3
 
The newspapers, the Fiji Times and the Western Pacific Herald were particularly 
conspicuous in this regard. In their reports of labour attacks on employers, the motive 
of the defendants was often lost in copious details of the assault, and long 
transcriptions of the testimony of victims and prosecution witnesses. For instance, in 
March 1901 Bhola and Dilla both indentured labourers at Vunisamaloa in Ba severely 
wounded their sardar, Sultan. The Western Pacific Herald began its coverage with a 
lengthy report of the wounds sustained by the sardar followed by the victim’s 
testimony supported by European witnesses. A passing remark was the only 
acknowledgement of the defendants’ complaints about overtasking and assaults on 
their persons prior to the attack.4 Earlier that year, sixteen labourers from Vuo 
plantation in Labasa attacked their overseer, J. M. Kemmis. In its report of the case, 
the Western Pacific Herald again highlighted the testimony of European witnesses, 
detailing the assault itself and the physical injuries sustained by the victim, but 
leaving the motive for the attack to speculation. It is only as a brief aside in a long 
transcription of the prosecution’s case to establish the presence of one of the 
assailants at the site of the attack, that motive is established for the attack and a 
                                                 
3 Representing the views of many colonial officials, the Agent-General for Immigration Arthur Robert 
Coates attributed the high incidence of crime among indentured immigrants to “mere brute animalism”. 
See Coates’ minute of 25 February 1913 in CSO 13/1626. 
4 Western Pacific Herald, 13 July 1901. 
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labourer is cited as having overheard that some of the defendants were unable to 
complete their tasks and were fearful of going to gaol.5
 
As partial as they may be, these sources reveal several interesting patterns. The first is 
that violent acts of retaliation were often driven by an outraged sense of injustice. 
Attacks on overseers and sardars were often committed in public view with the full 
knowledge of the likely consequences. Reporting in 1893 on the preponderance of 
such attacks on the plantations, sub-agent John Forster wrote: 
 
There is no firing through windows or shooting from behind a hedge or blowing 
up, and they are committed in broad daylight with generally available witnesses 
of them. Under any ordinary rules as to human conduct or motives these 
circumstances would be held to indicate a sense of injustice as the probable 
moving impulse.6
 
Other testimony suggests that much of the violence perpetrated by labourers against 
their employers or against their peers was retributive. Writing about this subject in 
1903, J. W. Davidson reported of indentured immigrants that “if redress and revenge 
is not promptly sought with the ever-handy working-knife or cutlass, the man will be 
apt to brood his wrongs and nurse his wrath until his feelings are relieved by an act of 
violence upon the object or objects of his resentment, or upon himself”.7 Commenting 
on his experience ministering to indentured labourers in the Rewa Region, the 
Reverend J. W. Burton wrote in similar vein: “It frequently happens that the coolie 
takes the law into his own hands and tries the edge of his cane knife upon the skull of 
the English overseer.”8 Being an overseer on Fiji’s plantation, he added, was a 
hazardous occupation “open to very serious dangers”, and the loss of life in the form 
of the violence from the coolies was “surprisingly great”. 9 Recounting one particular 
                                                 
5 Western Pacific Herald, 13 April 1901. In the same period, see among other similar reports of attacks 
on overseers and sardars: The Fiji Times, 30 September 1899; Western Pacific Herald, 30 July 1901; 
Fiji Times 30 November 1901; Fiji Times, 11 December 1901; Fiji Times 9 April 1902; Fiji Times, 5 
July 1902; Fiji Times, 9 July 1902; Fiji Times, 10 December 1902; Fiji Times, 13 December 1902. See 
also John D. Kelly’s study of press reports of indenture violence for the year 1912 in his essay “Fiji 
Indians and the Law, 1912.” in Sanadhya, 1991. 
6 Minute from subagent Forster to Agent-General for Immigration, 11 September 1893, CSO 93/3121. 
7 Paper 20: “Annual Report on Indian Immigration for 1902.” in JFLC, 1903. 19-20. 
8 John Wear Burton, The Fiji of Today. London: C. H. Kelly, 1910. 269. 
9 Burton: 287. 
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case, Burton described how a brutal overseer who had “outraged” an Indian woman 
was set upon by her fellow labourers and “literally chopped into pieces”. Having 
taken their revenge, they “went to the gallows in the most nonchalant manner”.10
 
Secondly, because they personalised the coercive element of the production process, 
overseers and sardars were the most likely target of retribution by labourers. 
Retributive violence often occurred in response to beatings, abusive language, 
extortion, overtasking, meddling with women labourers (this is discussed in greater 
detail in the next chapter), or rape.11 These are the same grievances that lay at the 
origin of the strikes and boycotts already discussed in Chapter Four. In this sense, 
retributive violence acted as a complement of organised forms of resistance. 
 
A third characteristic of this violence is that it occurred as a consequence of the 
dynamics that prevailed on particular plantations. While such dynamics arose under 
the same oppressive system of indenture, they varied greatly from plantation to 
plantation. Attacks on overseers and sardars occurred at regular intervals throughout 
the period of indenture but they occurred because labourers had specific grievances 
against specific overseers or sardars.12 These were not attacks on colonialism or the 
                                                 
10 Burton: 294. 
11 See among others, SM Rewa’s monthly report for September: Case no 550 was against a labourer 
who attacked the overseer Warbrook with a knife on Vunimaca plantation, CSO 84/2140. He had been 
beaten several times by Warbrook for having used abusive language towards him; SM Rewa’s monthly 
report for November about three labourers’ attempt to murder sardar Dharma on Nakoroqaqa 
plantation, CSO 85/3101; SM Rewa’s monthly report for December about fourteen labourers from 
Koronivia on a charge of attempting to murder their overseer, CSO 86/45; SM Rewa’s report for the 
month of January, especially case 89 brought by an overseer of the Rewa Sugar Company plantation of 
Uluicalia against thirteen immigrants for an assault and battery charge committed on him out in the 
field, and case 123 against an Indian for threatening to “do” an overseer at the court house, CSO 
87/236; reported assaults on overseers in Ba and Navuso in the Fiji Times, 20 April 1887; the report of 
a dual attack on an overseer and a sardar at Korociriciri, Western Pacific Herald, 30 July 1901; from 
the Agent-General Immigration regarding overseer violence in Labasa and five men beating up an 
overseer and surrendering themselves at once to custody, CSO 02/4411; the murder of Alexander 
Coutts, overseer in Labasa, CSO 05/559; an attack on A. H. Witherow by Fijian labourers, the Fiji 
Times, 30 November 1901; SM Rewa reporting on more trouble at Navuso. An indentured woman 
accuses overseers and sardar of rape and attempted rape. They are shut up in the coolie lines and 
assaulted by labourers. On this occasion the head sardar sides with the labourers, CSO 06/4850; a 
shooting affray at Navua: members of the rifle club are brought in to help kill Gujraj Singh who has 
killed Karem Singh and Robert Prider, an overseer. He also intended to kill the SM Navua, 08/2223; 
the murder of the overseer Benjamin Hall, 21 August 1908, on Esivo plantation in Lautoka, CSO 
08/4050; Naikorokoro labourers engage in retaliatory beatings against their sardar mostly for extortion, 
CSO 08/5171; the assault by labourers on their sardar in Navua after overtasking, extortion and 
attempted rape, CSO 08/4431; the attempted combined assault on an overseer at Baulevu and 
subsequent drowning of the attackers, CSO 08/6913. 
12 The evidence suggests that Indian sardars were just as likely to use force against labourers as their 
European superiors. For statistical evidence, see the Annual Reports on Indian Immigration for 1900 
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indenture system per se, but on individuals in retaliation for specific acts. Hence, the 
gradual increase in Labasa in the number of cases of assault by immigrants against 
those in authority and the upsurge of murders from 1895 onwards is closely connected 
to the development in Labasa of a new sugar estate and mill, and the accompanying 
culture of brutality and violence that arose. In 1900 there were thirty-two cases of 
assault against overseers and sardars in Labasa. By 1902 that number had jumped to 
fifty-three.13
 
The individual character of overseers was also an important factor. For instance, the 
arrival of the overseer H. B. Burn on Wailevu estate in Labasa at the beginning of 
1902 triggered, in the Agent-General’s opinion, “more trouble and more court cases 
there than in the entire previous two years”. Burn worked in partnership with the 
sardar, Chattar Bhuj, and bred more trouble on the estate than on any other estate of 
the CSR. While some Wailevu labourers endured their misery, several chose desertion 
and a few others assaulted him. They later killed Alexander Coutts, another Labasa 
overseer. This is important because it indicates that labourers were more likely to use 
retributive violence on overseers who treated them violently. Such cases usually 
involved a small group of men seeking revenge and believing that “what is sauce for 
the goose is sauce for the gander”.14
 
Fourthly, because the state frequently renounced its responsibility to protect them, 
labourers were forced to take the law into their own hands. When this resulted in 
violence, labourers often stamped their revenge on the overseer or sardar’s body. In 
justifying Section 5 of Ordinance XIV of 1886 to the Secretary of State, Thurston 
explained that it was intended to meet “the not infrequent violent assaults with knives 
and other tools, upon overseers”.15 Dismembering the body of the despised employer 
appears to have been intended to remove his ability to ever inflict physical pain again. 
                                                                                                                                            
(page 25) and 1910 (page 18). There was no ethnic discrimination in the application of managerial 
terror. Neither was ethnicity a consideration in labourers’ retaliations. 
13 For statistical evidence, see Annual Reports on Indian Immigration 1895-1905. 
14 For Burn’s record of violence in Labasa, see Agent-General Immigration to CS, 29 September 1902, 
CSO 02/4411; also Manager CSR (Fiji) to CS, 6 February 1905, CSO 05/559, regarding the murder of 
Alexander Coutts; and Inspector of Immigrants (Labasa) to CS, 8 July 1905, CSO 05/3029, regarding 
assaults on immigrants by sardars. For press coverage of Labasa labourers’ assaults on Burn, see the 
Fiji Times, 10 December 1902, and 13 December 1902. 
15 Despatch 62, Thurston to SS, 31 July 1888. CSO Despatches to the SS. 
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One girmitiya, Abdul Aziz, recalled how he and a number of his peers became “fed 
up with of a sirdar and chopped off his hand”.16
 
In his study of jute mill workers in Bengal (1890-1940), Chakrabarty shows that 
managerial power in India worked more through physical force and spectacle than by 
the foucauldian mechanisms of control by discipline and the routinization of work.17 
The same applies to Fiji’s plantation microcosm. In addition, however, if the 
application of power was spectacular in the form of its violence, when the labourer 
struck back it was displayed in the same spectacular fashion.18 The men who attacked 
Kemmis in the case cited above, did so with sticks and hoe handles. It caused him 
extensive injuries which among other things prevented him from ever riding again. 
They broke his arm as did those who attacked Sultan the sardar from Vunisamaloa. In 
both cases the intention was to maim or to physically impair their employer and 
neither Kemmis nor Sultan were able to use their arms to inflict pain again.19
 
Labourers tolerated a great deal of employer violence before deciding to retaliate. As 
Aziz recalled, he would have killed an overseer for committing an outrage against the 
women in his care but could do nothing: “we were in a hopeless and helpless state in 
this place hence I could do nothing”.20 However, even within the generally 
unacceptable system of forced labour in which they were held, labourers participated 
in the process of demarcating the limits of acceptable treatment they were willing to 
endure before they retaliated. Recounting his experience of indenture, the old 
girmitiya Narsamma attested: 
 
If we tried to run away before the beating ended, the sahib’s wrath would 
increase. The sahib would never forget and the beating would follow the next 
day. … [the] beating stopped after we showed signs of pain and suffering. … 
Some Indians who were strongly built frequently helped us to finish the task. In 
the presence of such stronger people, the sahib dared not touch us. He knew 
                                                 
16 See Girmit: A Centenary Anthology 1879-1979. 53. 
17 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Rethinking Working Class History: Bengal 1890-1940. Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1989. 170. 
18 See press reports already cited above. 
19 Western Pacific Herald, 13 April 1901, and 13 July 1901. 
20 Girmit: 53. 
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how in the past stronger immigrants snatched the whip from either the sahib’s or 
sardar’s hand and beat him back.21  
 
Potential and actual retribution by labourers appear to have been significant deterrents 
against excessive force and abuse by employers. Writing about his life as an overseer 
on Fiji’s plantations, Walter Gill wrote: “inexperienced as I then was, I was learning 
that when he was driven to a state of sufficient desperation the humble coolie would 
strike back”.22 One of the first things that he learnt in the field was not to fool around 
with a coolie’s money: 
 
Generations of having only a few pice between him and starvation had taught 
him that his earnings were about the only thing in life worth fighting for. One 
mistake, two, and I could feel the mob’s vibrations. A few more and I could 
have a riot on my hands.23
 
Another striking characteristic of plantation violence is the propensity of indentured 
labourers to lash out at other labourers rather than to attack their immediate superiors. 
For instance, the bulk of murders in Labasa in the decade from 1895 to 1905 were not 
committed against overseers or sardars but against indentured women. Kelly’s study 
for instance, suggests that rather than confront the agents of their misfortune – 
sardars, overseers and plantation managers – aggrieved labourers most often targeted 
women and rivals for women. Kelly suggests that girmitiya displaced their aggression 
and hatred of overseers and indenture and attacked women because they were weak 
and not overseers because they were powerful.24 He adds: 
 
While whites from their position of control, and with interests in “feral” 
novelties, responded to their own demographic imbalance by pursuing women 
of other races, the Indian men competed among themselves for the same women 
the whites were freely appropriating. … Competition led to beatings and threats, 
and while overseers and sardars could bully the coolies with impunity, direct 
counterthreats often landed coolies in prison, or left them paying large fines, 
                                                 
21 Prasad: 26-7. 
22 Walter Gill, Turn North-East at the Tombstone. Adelaide: Rigby, 1970. 30. 
23 Gill: 53. 
24 Kelly, 1991b: 164. 
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bound over to keep the peace. The coolies could not control the sardars and 
overseers, so they tried to control the women.25
 
The inability to defend oneself or members of one’s family against the abuses of 
domination, forms an immense field of emotional, moral, and psychological violence. 
“There is no system of domination,” writes Scott, “that does not produce its own 
routine harvest of insults and injury to human dignity”.26 In Fiji many overseers were 
accused of openly soliciting the wives of labourers. The enactment of new legislation 
in 1891 against the common practice of “enticing away” wives from their husbands,27 
was aimed at reducing the number of attacks on women caused by the shortage of 
women on plantations. However, there is little evidence that the violence stopped. On 
the contrary, the figures show that from 1895 the overwhelming majority of murders 
and a large proportion of unlawful wounding were committed against women. In that 
year, six of the seven reported murders of Indian immigrants were of women.28 This 
suggests that some men were pushed beyond their threshold of tolerance when they 
lost their public claim to a woman and chose to kill and face execution rather than to 
continue to live with a burden of loss and humiliation. A more detailed discussion of 
the gendered aspects of resistance is dealt with in the next chapter. 
 
While some labourers attacked and murdered their sardars and overseers, others took 
their own lives. Lal writes that in Fiji suicide was both “a cry of despair and an act of 
protest directed ultimately at the principles and ethics of the indenture system itself.’29 
Naidu has shown that between 1890 and 1919, 206 immigrant men and twenty-three 
women committed suicide, the highest rate of all British colonies where Indians 
lived.30
 
Admittedly, not all suicide was committed as a mark of rejection or protest. Victims 
of suicide did not usually leave testimonies about their motives. Official reports 
                                                 
25 Kelly, 1991b: 176. See also Mani, 1998 for the long tradition of men trying to control women in 
Indian history. 
26 Scott, 1990: 37. 
27 This legislation is cited in Paper 20: “Annual Report on Indian Immigration for 1891.” in JFLC, 
1892. 
28 This trend continued for well over ten years with nine homicides recorded in 1910, seven victims of 
which were women. See the Annual Reports for Indian Immigration 1895-1910. 
29 Lal, 2000: 18. 
30 Naidu: 71. 
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attributed the high suicide rate to cultural factors such as jilted love, jealousy over 
women, disagreements with sardars about tasking, desertions, or to mental instability 
and deficiency.31 None of these reports admit to the high correlation between the 
decision that some labourers took to end their own lives and the violence of indenture, 
the relentless pace of work, the humiliations, the fears of prison and violence, the 
hunger, and loneliness. Totaram Sanadhya’s testimony is useful in this regard: 
 
Overseers commit outrages against us whenever they like. Many of our brothers 
there make a noose and hang themselves, from fear of hard work, and from fears 
of jail, and the blows of overseers. Not many days ago several Madrasis at a 
plantation in Navua hanged themselves for this reason.32
 
The combination of fear, pain, displacement, hopelessness and helplessness created a 
profoundly alienating situation which, in some circumstances, made death more 
attractive than life. Sanadhya himself appears to have contemplated suicide. In his 
story “The Haunted Line”, he ponders the worthiness of living a life without hope. 
Resisting the temptation to take his own life, Sanadhya contends that his mother 
entrusted his body “to the protection of God for use in her old age”. Even if by his 
wish the time of his body had come to an end, he had no authority to destroy it: “I am 
a man. God has sent me into this world to fight for life.”33 Showing similar spirit, 




Managerial violence did not automatically provoke retributive violence. Most 
labourers survived indenture without resorting to violence. When formal avenues for 
raising grievances were removed or rendered futile, labourers continued to seek 
survival rather than revenge. They feigned illness, absented themselves from work, 
deserted, or vented their frustrations on the crops and tools of their employers. 
                                                 
31 See among others Paper 57: “Annual Report on Indian Immigration for 1913.” in JFLC, 1914. See a 
report by the inspector of immigrants about a South Indian labourer’s attempt to take his own life after 
a row with a sardar, CSO 05/3029. 
32 Sanadhya: 43. Lal, 2000 and Naidu, 1980 have both attributed the preponderance of suicides among 
South Indians to their greater social dislocation, homesickness, suffering social oppression from North 
Indians, and working in newer plantations isolated from the main centres and rarely visited by 
inspectors. 
33 Sanadhya: 125. 
 286
Throughout history, as Scott has observed, one of the most frequent and effective 
responses by ordinary people to oppression has been “avoidance protest”. Evasion and 
desertion, he writes, have “always proved more attractive than the risk of open 
confrontation”.34 In Fiji, plantation workers responded in the same way. 
 
Because they had homes to escape to and possibilities of subsisting off their own 
lands, Fijian labourers found evasion more attractive and less consequential than 
physical attacks on their employers.35 Commenting on the character of hundreds of 
Colo labourers who were hired on plantations, Brewster recalled that they seemed 
“fairly amenable to their master”. Yet, they also worried and harried the overseers “to 
the utmost of their ability”.36 He observed “a curious mixture of extreme veneration 
and latent covert insolence in the Fijian”.37 Fijian labourers could afford to be 
annoying and insolent towards their employers. As Thurston explained: 
 
[N]o Fijian will go from home to be worked from morning ‘till night upon paltry 
pay, indifferent fare, and frequently anything but wild treatment, if he can avoid 
doing so. The cultivation of his own land is much more attractive to a Fijian 
than that of a stranger’s land 100 miles away.38
 
Land functioned as a source of security and protection which made Fijian labourers 
less vulnerable than immigrant labourers who had nowhere to go. As landowners, 
Fijian labourers were therefore less amenable to control and their continued 
employment on plantations less desirable. Besides, they were needed in the villages to 
prop up the power of their chiefs and to produce taxes for the government. In this 
light, the decision of the colonial administration to confine Fijians to their villages and 
bring indentured labourers from India, had less to do with the prevailing wisdom that 
Fijians had “no taste for sustained effort”39 and more with the consolidation and good 
                                                 
34 Scott, 1985: 245. 
35 Only one example of Fijian labourers’ physical attack on an overseer was retrieved from the archive. 
It involved labourers employed in Rewa who attacked A. H. Witherow, and seriously injured him. See 
Fiji Times, 30 November 1901. 
36 Brewster, 1922: 150. 
37 Brewster, 1922: 151. 
38 Thurston to Gordon, 25 November 1878, CSO 78/1748. 
39 Derrick, 1950: 169. 
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workings of indirect rule. By 1894 as Gillion suggests, Fijians were no longer a factor 
on Fiji’s plantations.40
 
The preferred form of resistance by imported labourers was to deliberately absent 
themselves from work. Burton observed Indian indentured labourers as having “an 
innate genius for dodging work and … [bringing] an almost infinite amount of 
cunning to bear upon the art”.41 However, there were many reasons other than  protest 
for labourers to stay away from work. For instance, labourers were often forced to 
stay in the lines because they suffered from debilitating ailments, such as anaemia, 
diarrhoea, or syphilis.42 The high number of convictions for absence from work also 
reflects the propensity of employers to bring charges against their labourers to 
intimidate and control them. Among the large number of cases involving unlawful 
absence from work, it is therefore difficult to identify what proportion of them 
occurred as a deliberate attempt by labourers to obstruct production. 
 
In the mid 1880s when the indentured system was still in its early stages, undefined 
absence from work had become one of the major obstacles to production. In 1884, for 
instance, one in five labourers was absent from work for undefined reasons.43 In 
1885, the persistence of unlawful absences was attributed to the “somewhat growing 
tendency on the part of a limited number of dissatisfied, dissipated, and vicious 
coolies to desert from indentured service in order to indulge in gambling, prostitution, 
or seclusion and idleness”.44 Close to 2,600 immigrants, or about half of the total 
number of Indian indentured labourers, were prosecuted for unlawful absence.45 
Through 1886, only fifty-four percent to sixty-five percent of the total indentured 
labour force turned out daily to work.46
 
                                                 
40 Gillion, 1962: 77. 
41 Burton: 288. 
42 For an explanation that absence from work in Fiji was mainly caused by sickness, see Forster to 
Agent-General for Immigration, 28 November 1887, CSO 87/1377. 
43 Paper 25: “Annual Report of Indian Immigration for 1885.” in JFLC, 1885. 13. 
44 Paper 25: “Annual Report of Indian Immigration for 1885.” in JFLC, 1885. 13. 
45 Paper 25: “Annual Report of Indian Immigration for 1885.” in JFLC, 1885. 16. Useful figures and 
comparisons between Rewa and Ba plantations, between indentured labourers from different ships, and 
between rates of absence in Fiji and Mauritius plantations are furnished in CSO 86/1107. 
46 Despatch 62, Thurston to SS, 31 July 1888. CSO Despatches to the SS. 
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When set in the context of the economic downturn and worsening labour practices 
already discussed in Chapter Four, these figures suggest that a large number of 
labourers could not cope with the rhythm and rigours of plantation work and stayed 
away. The portion of them who did so out of protest is impossible to determine. Yet, 
that some did is undeniable. Writing to the Colonial Secretary, the manager of the 
Rewa Sugar Company complained that “for some time back and now there appears to 
exist a combination amongst the Indian Indentured labourers on this and other 
plantations to resist all efforts to get them to work”.47 The inconvenience caused by 
labourers in repeatedly absenting themselves was a greater loss to the employer than 
the punishment of two shillings meted out to the offending labourer. Knowing the 
reluctance of employers to prosecute such minor cases before the courts, one official 
remarked that “coolies will confidently take two days absence from work”.48 
Labourers could therefore repeat their offence with tolerable security with the added 
option of falling back on their collective fund, should they want to avoid jail terms. 
 
It was in this context that Ordinance XIV of 1886, already mentioned in Chapter Four, 
was enacted. It was meant just as much to prevent organized resistance as to put an 
end to the cumulative disruptive effects of thousands49 of labourers’ non-fulfilment 
and absence from work. Even if it failed to eradicate evasion altogether, the ordinance 
had a noticeable impact on the frequency of violations of labour laws. The number of 
offences for unlawful absence fell from 7,121 in 1886 (for a total immigrant 
population of 6,341) to just 1,814 in 1887 (for a total immigrant population of 
6,193).50 The number of such offences declined progressively as the new sanctions 
kept labourers disorganized and forced them to seek other avenues through which to 
channel their grievances.51 The lengthening of indenture for time spent in gaol and the 
adoption of a stricter regime of work in prisons also helped deter further breaches. 
 
                                                 
47 Manager Rewa Sugar Company to CS, 3 March 1886, CSO 86/481. 
48 Agent-General for Immigration to CS, 19 March 1886, CSO 86/1107. 
49 In 1886, there were 7,121 cases of unlawful absence for a total immigrant population of 6,341. 
50 See Paper 29: “Annual Report on Indian Immigration for 1887.” in JFLC, 1888. 12. The number of 
offences for desertion also fell to 162 and continued to decline thereafter. 
51 An important exception was the Northern sugar centre of Labasa which from 1895 experienced a 
major surge in such offences. See Chapter Four. 
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Until then, gaol terms had been an attractive alternative to plantation toil. The work 
was not as difficult and the food sufficient.52 Those who chose prison knew that at the 
Suva gaol they could escape incarceration by paying their fine to the gaoler and then 
earning money in the Capital, during the term of their sentence. Because there was no 
agent for planters in Suva, many immigrants stayed on in Suva after their term and 
lived with free immigrants.53 A similar strategy was used by labourers on Mago 
Island. In February 1886, Basil Thomson, then Stipendiary Magistrate of the Lau 
Group, prosecuted fifty-four cases involving indentured immigrants from the Mago 
Island plantation. On conviction, each labourer refused to pay his/her fine opting for 
gaol instead. This was in spite of the existence of a communal fund which could have 
been used to avoid gaol time. The labourers chose gaol time because they knew that 
there was not enough space at the Lomaloma gaol to lock them up permanently. They 
could expect less work, and more free time to enjoy the sedative effects of yaqona.54
 
Fijian labourers mounted similar campaigns of attrition. For instance, in November 
1887, a group of Fijian labourers effectively paralysed work on the Rakiraki 
plantation at Penang. Work slowed to such an extent that Chalmers, the plantation 
manager, could see “ruin staring him in the face”.55 In addition, rails were tampered 
with and pieces of iron were concealed in railway trucks which, had they not been 
detected, could have caused considerable damage to the mill. By December, Chalmers 
had obtained convictions of various kinds for sixty-six of his eighty-one men, but he 
was left with only a handful of labourers with which to do all the work.56 Such acts of 
petty disobedience were therefore more injurious to the employer than mass 
demonstrations. 
 
                                                 
52 Subagent Carruthers to CS, 13 May 1886, CSO 86/987. 
53 Acting Agent-General to CS, 19 March 1886, CSO 86/1107. 
54 Thomson to CS, 6 March 1886, CSO 86/524. Elsewhere, Thomson described the Nadroga gaol in the 
following terms: “The gaol existed only in name. The prisoners lived in a house without doors and 
were in the habit of returning to their villages from Saturday to Monday every week. The Gaoler lived 
in a different town, and seldom visited the Gaol, while there were no warrants nor other documents 
connected with the detention of the prisoners; nor could I find any traces of public or provincial work 
that they had done.” Thomson to CS, 22 June 1885, CSO 85/1679. 
55 Chalmers to CS, 19 November 1887, CSO 87/3348. 
56 Chalmers to CS, 19 November 1887, CSO 87/3348. 
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For their part, “Polynesian”57 labourers featured much more prominently in the death-
rates than in offences against labour laws. The rate of mortality was particularly bad 
in the Southern regions of Rewa and Navua where in 1884 nearly one third of all 
“Polynesians” died. The opening of new land for sugar, the concentration of large 
numbers of men in cramped lines, and the wet climate forced these men to focus their 
attention on survival rather than seeking redress. The acting Agent-General wrote in 
his report for 1884 that “the Polynesian is in most cases too shy, too untutored, and 
too submissive, to openly resent such treatment”.58 There were only 106 violations of 
the labour laws by 6,125 Melanesians in the colony in 1884. By comparison, 4,152 
Indian labourers committed 1500 offences against the same laws in the same period.59 
It is difficult to account for such a disparity. Aside from the cultural reasons given by 
the administration, it is possible that employers conceived of separate ethnic groups as 
deserving different treatment and thus entered into different employment relations 
with them. Consequently, employers may have had different expectations about the 
amount and type of work that Melanesians were supposed to do and how they should 
be treated if they failed to complete their tasks. 
 
In 1891, three ordinances were passed which were generally intended to improve the 
living and working conditions of immigrants. Among others, they strengthened the 
power of immigration officers to protect immigrants. More time was set aside for 
meals, a per diem was allocated to labourers for attending court, and special 
provisions were made for the protection of women.60 These comprehensive 
ordinances formed the basic legal framework of indenture thereafter although as Lal 
points out, in practice the ideals enshrined in the legislation varied considerably from 
the realities which confronted labourers in the field.61 Still when considered together, 
the repressive ordinance of 1886 and the protective ones of 1891 help to explain why 
indentured immigrants turned to other means of obtaining redress in subsequent years. 
                                                 
57 Most “Polynesian” labourers in Fiji were ethnically Melanesian and came from Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu. See Moore, Munro and Leckie, 1990. 
58 “Annual Report on Polynesian Immigration for 1884.” 12. Paper 44, MS 2, im Thurn Papers. NAF. 
59 “Annual Report on Polynesian Immigration for 1884.” 23. im Thurn Papers. 
60 Paper 20: “Annual Report on Indian Immigration for 1891.” in JFLC, 1892. It is important to note 
however, that not all the provisions in the legislation were intended to protect the interests of labourers. 
For instance, section 227 of Ordinance 1 provides for the compulsory transfer of immigrants suspected 
of disturbing the peace to other plantations. Such provisions were aimed at negating or breaking 
effective collaboration among immigrants and removing dangerous leadership. 
61 Lal, 2000: 175. 
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 Desertion was one such device used by labourers to avoid the violent excesses of 
plantation life. Desertion was particularly attractive to discontented Fijian labourers. 
They could leave their plantations and return to their villages.62 However, for Indian 
and Polynesia labourers, this was a risky proposition. As immigrants, they were 
regarded as strangers and could not simply melt into the indigenous population. Some 
were prepared to take the risk and in 1885 some ninety-four Indian immigrant 
labourers were reported to have deserted. By the end of 1886, this figure had tripled to 
272 with Rewa providing three quarters of all offenders.63 Many deserters went to 
Suva where they sought refuge with free immigrants. Others were received into Fijian 
villages. Joske reported in 1888 that many Indian “vagrants” were living in Colo and 
that he was having difficulties identifying who was free and who was a deserter. Colo 
Fijians, he wrote, had a predilection for them for they helped to enliven the dull 
monotony of Fijian village life.64
 
Desertion subsided in the wake of the legislative changes of 1886 (see Chapter Four) 
reaching an all time low in the late 1890s. However, the construction of a new mill in 
Lautoka and the arrival of large numbers of South Indian labourers caused the number 
of desertions to rise from a mere twenty-one in 1899 to 283 in 1903 and 324 in 
1905.65 Desertions continued to plague the industry into the 1910s.66 Many deserted 
their estates to find more lucrative employment and induced others to follow suit. One 
irritated planter and member of the Legislative Council complained: 
 
I had a man who deserted for twelve months. At the end of that time he asked 
for his free paper. He told me that he was able to earn 2s. a day as a free 
labourer – and he told the other men on the plantation – and within four weeks 
                                                 
62 Carew to CS, 6 March 1886, CSO 86/551. 
63 See the Annual Indian Immigration Reports for 1885 and 1886. Pages 16 and 17 respectively. 
64 Joske to CS, 3 July 1888, CSO 88/2154. 
65 See Reports on Indian Immigration for the years 1899, 1903 and 1905 in JFLC, 1900, 1904 and 1906 
(papers 24, 25 and 24) respectively. 
66 For desertion into Fijian villages see CSO 2667/05 and 3340/05. For the growing problem of 
desertion from plantations see CSO 07/5021 and Paper 39: “Report of the Fiji Constabulary for the 
Year 1910.” in JFLC, 1911. For reports of groups of Indians setting off across Viti Levu by foot in the 
hope of reaching India, see Gillion, 1962: 127. 
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there were any number of desertions from that plantation although there had 
been very few before.67
 
But labourers who remained on their plantations devised other tricks to deceive 
overseers and finish their excessive tasks on time. As Hausildhar recalled, they 
purposely missed some furrows while planting sugar cane: “Without resorting to these 
small tricks, one would never complete the task and therefore forfeit the wages in 
fines or even end up in prison.”68
 
Getting back at the employer could also take the form of sabotage. Under the cover of 
darkness labourers could damage the cane crop by trampling on it, drop pieces of iron 
in the train trucks carrying the cane to the mill, place stones on or tamper with railway 
tracks, damage plantation machinery and implements, throw farming equipment into 
the river, set fire to standing crops and other property, and other such acts. As an 
official pointed out, such transgressions could be easily carried out and cause 
considerable cost without the agents ever being traced and punished.69
 
To escape the physical and mental pains of plantation life, some labourers sought the 
relief of drugs. Indian hemp or “ganjah” was introduced in the colony in 1882 through 
the Berar or Poonah ships and by early 1885 it was so widely used that stipendiary 
magistrates began pushing for its prohibition.70 According to the Report on Indian 
Immigration for 1886, ganjah was cultivated “until it was to be found in nearly every 
district in which coolies were employed”. Fijians began to take it as well and 
productivity on plantations was considered to be severely affected by its abuse.71 
When ganjah was banned, labourers bought opium from European storekeepers.72 
                                                 
67 See the third session of the Fiji Legislative Council Debates for 1910 in JFLC, 1910. 
68 Cited in Naidu: 36. 
69 Sub-inspector Wager to CS, 21 June 1908, CSO 08/2912. Among other examples of sabotage see 
Subagent Carruthers to CS, 13 May 1886, CSO 86/987; Forster to Agent-General, 28 November 1887, 
CSO 87/1377; Chalmers to CS, 14 November 1887, CSO 87/3347; Chalmers to CS, 29 November 
1887, CSO 87/3657; Paper 24: “Annual Report on Indian Immigration for 1894.” in JFLC, 1895; and a 
report in the Fiji Times, 18 December 1901. 
70 Carew to CS, 2 March 1885, CSO 85/632. 
71 Paper 38: “Annual Report on Indian Immigration for 1886.” in JFLC, 1887. 18. 
72 Native Commissioner to CS, 10 July 99, CSO 99/3108. Ganjah reappeared in the early 1900s and 
necessitated a tightening of the laws and increased punishments. See Paper 24: “Annual Report on 
Indian Immigration for 1905.” in JFLC, 1906. Drug related cases in the magistrate courts were also 
reported in the Fiji Times and Western Pacific Herald. 
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Others adopted the yaqona-drinking habits of their Fijian neighbours. This is captured 
in the words of an anonymous Navua songwriter: 
 
Oh! My beloved 
I cannot leave yaqona 
I left my country 
And left my caste 
Left behind my parents 
But I cannot leave yaqona 
The thrilling drug of this island 
Which I drink the whole night.73
 
Some took to alcohol. On public holidays, as the former Girmitya Jhagru explained, 
“the intoxicated people would challenge their enemies, swear about the sirdar and 
sahib, fight among themselves and then retire to their homes”.74 Most however, 
would simply sit around in the evenings and gather strength from their collective 
grief. They talked about such problems as the sardar’s extortions, but preferred not to 
meddle further for fear of being implicated.75 These evening get-togethers were weak 
social sanctions and did not venture beyond the established normative framework. 
They were prudent assertions in conditions where power and likely violent repression 
made open or planned acts of retaliation too dangerous. As Scott observes about 
gossip, these informal gatherings allowed resistance to occur under the safe disguise 
of compliance.76
 
Disguised compliance was a vital part of the labourer’s resistance arsenal. 
Management was always keen to cultivate informers and collaborators so that even in 
the nocturnal confines of dilapidated lines, it was not safe to plot resistance. This 
difficulty is well captured by the girmitya Shiulagni, a woman of Vunivau, Labasa, 
who testified: 
 
                                                 
73 Cited in Jogindar Singh Kanwal, A Hundred Years of Hindi in Fiji. Suva: Fiji Teachers Union, 1980. 
40. 
74 Cited in Prasad: 28. 
75 See Govind Singh’s testimony in Girmit, 1979: 44. 
76 Scott, 1985: 282. 
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We were always told by the kulambar (overseer) about the arrival of the 
inspector, but he would never let us give a fair account of ourselves to him. 
Before the inspector arrived, the kulambar would come to us in the field, 
assemble us all, look at us with red fiery eyes, stare at some complaining type of 
people and begin: “The inspector will be here one of these days. He will ask you 
some questions and then will be gone. If you report anything against your bosses 
(meaning the sardar and himself), we will come to know it. You know, we 
white men can find out things quickly. But before we can find out, your sardar 
will find out about your reports. He has got friends among you. You should be 
able to guess what the outcome will be if you pinch the serpent. You have to 
work under me all the time. Don’t spoil your chances of survival in five 
minutes’ talk!” After he was gone, the sardar would begin his harangue, 
“you’ve heard the sahib. He is right. You have to live and the only good way to 
live is to obey your superiors. The inspector will just write down your report but 
will do nothing. He might only advise us, but who has got the key to your 
future? WE. Now move to your sections of work.77 (Italicised emphasis added) 
 
In this climate of fear and the multiple possibilities for group and class fragmentation, 
that solidarity was fostered at all was an achievement. Solidarity was especially 
forged on the ships that brought labourers to Fiji. These bonds of jahaji bhai 
(brotherly relationship) replaced kin and caste groups from India,78 a few of which 
survived on the plantations. Hugh Tinker writes of jahaji bhais that “they never forgot 
the ship which brought them over, and they never forgot the men they were shackled 
to. The shipboard relationship took on the quality of a blood relationship, which no 
subsequent divergence erased.”79 As a pre-emptive measure, labourers from the same 
ship were often scattered among different plantations. The few who kept their jahaji 
bhai bonds were better organised and occasionally succeeded in having vicious 
employers removed.80
 
                                                 
77 Cited in Prasad: 19. 
78 Naidu: 29. 
79 Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery. Oxford University Press, London, 1974. 142. 
80 For an example of Jahaji Bhai solidarity, see Manager Vancouver Company to CS, 5 January 1909, 
CSO 09/446. On this occasion the collective action forced the sardar off the Lobau plantation near 
Navua. However, the inspector of immigrants in the district subsequently recommended the break-up 
and transfer of these former shipmates and they were dispersed to separate plantations. See also the role 
of Pathan and Punjabi Jahaji Bhais in the 1907 Labasa strike already discussed in Chapter Four. 
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Gambling represented a different kind of problem for the authorities. Gambling per se 
was not threatening but its potential for generating deviance, its relative insulation 
from surveillance, and its capacity to bring people together in unauthorized assembly 
were enough to cause administrators some concern. In November 1908, the 
stipendiary magistrate of Lautoka reported with alarm that: 
 
A very large amount of gambling goes on amongst Indian labour upon the 
estates, and they choose all sorts of places for the indulgence, to escape notice of 
the Police. Sometimes it is in the middle of a cane field, again on the upper 
staging in the Mill, near the roof. A large amount of trouble arises out of 
gambling – assaults, larcenies and quarrels with the women whom they often 




In his work on the indigenous peasant workers of Guatemala, McCreery has observed 
that “by far the most common mode of resistance was the undramatic but often 
effective petition of rights and grievances, of which the indigenous population filed 
thousands. … For the authorities who received these petitions, they represented no 
small problem and could rarely be ignored with impunity.”82 In Fiji, while petitioning 
was the preferred mode of complaint used by indigenous Fijians, the evidence 
suggests that Indian labourers were much more sceptical about the effectiveness of 
this course of action. Their doubts were steeped in their experience of the justice 
system which was heavily prejudiced in the employers’ favour and had helped secure 
for employers convictions for eighty-two percent of the charges they laid, compared 
to the thirty-five percent success rate of labourers against their employers.83 As 
Munro observes, 
 
Not only did employers enjoy a higher success but they laid far more complaints 
before the courts – almost 10,000 between 1890 and 1897, for example, as 
                                                 
81 Excerpt from SM Lautoka’s Report for the Month of November, enclosed in CSO 08/6545, Agent-
General to CS, 18 December 1908. 
82 David McCreery, “Hegemony and Repression in Rural Guatemala, 1871-1940.” in Munro, Lal and 
Beechert, 1993: 228-9. 
83 Munro, 1993: 16. 
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against 311 by laborers during the same period, which indicates the latter’s 
sense of futility in attempting to go through judicial channels.84
 
By contrast, Fijians could expect to have their grievances heard and acted on. Fijian 
labourers were often led by chiefs or sons of chiefs who were literate, well versed in 
the workings of the administration, and well connected. They had several channels 
through which to seek support. If the local European stipendiary magistrate did not 
respond, they could notify the native stipendiary magistrate, the local Wesleyan 
teacher or missionary, or their own Buli or Roko. They could also write to the Native 
Commissioner or even send their letters directly to the Governor. Through the Deed 
of Cession, the administration felt an obligation to respond to the grievances of 
indigenous Fijians. By contrast, Indians were largely regarded as units of production 
whose only raison d'être was to work the land. 
 
Petitions from Fijian labourers were usually a last resort, written only after long 
periods of inhuman treatment, overtasking, unpaid work, work on Sundays, 
insufficient or bad food, unhygienic lodgings, poor sanitary conditions and 
insufficient medical care. The response was usually speedy and resulted in token 
sanctions against the employer. Petitions were particularly numerous in plantation 
islands such as Mago or isolated plantations such as Wainunu in Bua. This was due to 
the inaccessible nature of these places, the infrequent visit of plantation inspectors, 
and the difficulty of contacting the authorities or running away. In Mago, the manager 
Borron forbade his labourers from complaining. His close relationship with the 
Stipendiary Magistrate of Lau prompted some desperate petitioners to carry their 
letter of complaint all the way to Suva.85
 
The same situation arose in Bureta, Ovalau where three Malaita labourers absconded 
on one of the plantation boats to lay a complaint in Suva. This drastic measure to get 
the ear of the government and the Agent-General for Immigration was taken after 
their complaints were repeatedly ignored by the stipendiary magistrate in Levuka. For 
some time they and their co-workers had been forced to work on Sundays and had not 
been paid for it. They had not been fed meat for several weeks, and had suffered from 
                                                 
84 Munro, 1993: 16. 
85 Petition by eighty-seven labourers on Mago Island Estate, 7 August 1895, CSO 95/3256. 
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insufficient food. They were regularly beaten, and complained that the plantation 
authorities showed no respect for the government or its laws. The sick were forced to 
work even in the rain, and no one was allowed to wander beyond the plantation 
boundaries even in their own time. On both occasions the men were arrested on order 
of the respective stipendiary magistrates but later released after the object of their 
travel and the condition of their employment were revealed. Agent-General Coates 
noted that “had these men not come to Suva, the illegality to which they were 
subjected would have continued”.86
 
The intention of these petitions was therefore reformative rather than revolutionary. 
They were the instruments provided by the state for labourers to voice their 
grievances. They were largely ineffective because of the considerable overlap 
between the interests of the state and those of large plantation owners, and because 
aggrieved workers only used them as a last resort. As such, petitions worked only at 
punishing the most extreme of employer abuses. Those who chose to voice their 
grievances through this official outlet, did so to survive indenture rather than to 
overthrow or transform it. 
 
Religion and Indenture 
 
In confronting the daily violence of indenture, labourers were not without help. The 
role of religion looms large as a source of strength both to survive and to challenge 
the excesses of the strong against the weak. This is illustrated in the Christian 
campaigns of such missionaries as J. W. Burton to reform indenture and by Hannah 
                                                 
86 Agent-General for Immigration to CS, 25 September 1894, CSO 94/3490. For more examples of 
petitions please refer to the following: CSO 90/894: Koronivia labourers (natives of Kadavu) 
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Dudley and C. F. Andrews to end it. It is even more evident in the inspiration drawn 
by labourers from their own Indian religious texts, symbolism, and practices. 
 
In the early years of indenture, neither the Wesleyan nor the Catholic mission paid 
much attention to the immigrant population. They were regarded as an unfortunate, 
expansive, and cumbersome appendix to the principal task of converting and 
strengthening Christian influence among Fijians. It was not until the number of 
immigrants was so large, their disregard for the Sabbath so damaging that it 
undermined its observation among Fijians, and their sexual relations so offensive to 
Victorian ideals of propriety and righteousness, that the mission began to agitate for a 
representative from India to begin to minister to Indians in Fiji. From 1891 when 
work started on the construction of the new sugar mill in Labasa, the Fiji District of 
the Methodist Church began to anticipate a large increase in the number of indentured 
labourers, and its annual synod began to make persistent calls to the parent body, the 
Methodist Missionary Society of Australasia, to find and finance someone to minister 
to indentured labourers.87 With the exception of the Indian catechist John Williams 
who worked from 1892 to 1894 in the Suva and Rewa region, these calls went 
unanswered. Williams lacked support from the missionaries and when he returned to 
India the Rewa Circuit Report sounded another note of alarm: 
 
Possibilities of the gravest danger lie in the fact that many hundreds of heathen 
men differing in colour, in capabilities, in tastes, in language, in aspirations, in 
beliefs, are flowing constantly into Fiji and are being brought into daily 
relationship with an aboriginal race, which has itself only recently stepped out 
of a cruel and barbarous heathenism.88
 
In 1896, the Reverend Worrall put together a scheme for the conversion of thousands 
of Indian immigrants. But his scheme demanded a substantial increase in the size of 
                                                 
87 F/4/A & B, Minutes and Journals of the Fiji District Annual Synod 1874-1892 and 1891-1907. See 
the Appendix to Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Fiji District Committee at Rewa, 28 October, 
1891. 
88 F/6/1894, Rewa Circuit Report. Methodist Missionary Society of Australasia. Fiji District. 
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the mission staff and other additional resources which the Australasian mission board 
could not approve, and his plan failed to clear the first hurdle.89
 
Missionaries specially assigned to minister to indentured labourers did not arrive until 
1897. Confronted by the moral and physical brutality of the system, their sense of 
morality was immediately and profoundly shaken. The first of them was Hannah 
Dudley, an Australian Methodist, whose work among labourers and their families 
gained her much respect among her peers. She spent relatively less time on 
evangelical work and more on the day-to-day needs of the community. On Sundays, 
she could be seen visiting the local gaol and hospital taking separate men’s and 
women’s services in each location. She was also a regular visitor to Indian homes and, 
with her fluent knowledge of Hindustani, became a trusted friend especially among 
women.90 Her reports on the status of Indians in Fiji and her public condemnation of 
indenture were most influential and provided opponents of indenture with much 
needed ammunition. In a letter published in India, she exclaimed: 
 
I beseech of you not to be satisfied with any reforms to the system of 
indentured labour. I beg of you not to cease to use your influence against this 
iniquitous system till it be utterly abolished.91
 
Perhaps the most celebrated missionary who worked among indentured labourers in 
Fiji was the Anglican Reverend Charles Freer Andrews. Andrews was sent to Fiji by 
Mahatma Gandhi to enquire into the status of Indians in Fiji and made three separate 
visits (the first two in 1915 and 1917).92 Unlike the official Indian commissioners 
Chimman Lal and McNeill who met labourers in the presence of company officials in 
1913,93 Andrews lived among the labourers in the lines and drew his conclusions 
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from first-hand experience. After his first visit together with W. W. Pearson in 1915, 
they wrote somewhat moralistically: 
 
We cannot forget our first sight of the coolie ‘lines’ in Fiji. The looks on the 
faces of the men and the women alike told one unmistakable tale of vice. The 
sight of young children in such surroundings was unbearable to us. And, again 
and again, as we went from one plantation to another, we saw the same 
unmistakable look. It told us of a moral disease which was eating into the 
heart and life of the people.94
 
Andrews and Pearson met a wide cross-section of the community including industry 
leaders and warned employers and government officials that the mood in India had 
changed and that the abuses of the system would no longer be tolerated. In a speech to 
the Fiji Planters’ Association Executive Committee, Andrews informed them that 
“every part of India has awakened” and that “the question of freedom and self-respect 
is now a bigger question than anything else”.95 His judgement was well founded and 
like Dudley’s, these reports had important repercussions. They galvanized public 
opinion in India against indenture, and mobilised opposition among sympathetic trade 
unions and women’s groups in Australia and New Zealand.96 They produced much 
negative publicity for the Fiji Government and the CSR and affected labour supply to 
Fiji. They also placed yet more pressure on the Home and Indian Governments to 
abolish indenture. A year after the publication of the Andrews and Pearson report, 
Gandhi decided that the issue was suitable for his first trial in India of Satyagraha, the 
form of non-violent resistance that he had previously used with such effectiveness in 
South Africa. He announced that ships would be picketed unless the system was 
ended. By July 1917, the Government of India announced the immediate abolition of 
the indentured system.97
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If Dudley and Andrews were effective in bringing the abuses and injustice of the 
system to a wider international audience and thus helped in the dismantling of 
indenture, they also left important local legacies. They appear to have both gained the 
love and trust of the immigrants with whom they came into contact. Dudley founded 
an orphanage in Nausori and a school in Suva while Andrews founded a school in 
Nadi and another in Suva.98 If the majority of those who knew her referred to Dudley 
as “Mai” (Mother)99 many others conferred on Andrews the title of “Dinbandhu” 
(Friend of the Poor).100 The Catholic Mission too did much for the education of 
Indian children and its Marist brothers were outspoken believers in multi-cultural 
education.101 By 1900, they ran the largest multi-cultural school in the colony at 
Toorak in Suva. 
 
Other sympathetic missionaries such as the Reverend J. W. Burton, deplored the 
excesses of the system but sought reforms rather than abolition. Burton believed in the 
moral superiority of Christianity and was active in the proselytism of indentured 
labourers in Rewa, where he created the “Indian Circuit” of the Methodist Church in 
1902 and promoted and distributed Christian literature. He also developed some 
lasting friendships with the immigrants.102 Totaram Sanadhya remembered with 
fondness his time spent in the company of the Reverend: 
 
The door of his house was always open to our people. Burton would visit the 
workers in the fields and shed tears at their plight. Burton wrote The Fiji of 
Today, where he has painted a true picture of our plight, but he published it 
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only after leaving Fiji. He was savagely attacked by the local whites and the 
Planters Association even petitioned the governor to prosecute Burton and 
confiscate the book. But they failed. Rev. Burton was the first person in Fiji to 
raise his voice against the indenture system.103
 
However, while workers recognised the friendship and care of such missionaries at a 
time when few others were on their side, they feared and resisted the evangelical drive 
that formed the primary purpose of mission work. Commenting on her work in 1898, 
Dudley explained to the synod the reluctance of parents of Indian children in sending 
their children to school. They feared that their children’s affection would be won over 
and that they would be induced to become Christians: 
 
Children attend school for a few months and then are taken away by their 
parents for fear of their becoming Christians. To become a Christian is to them 
to become something exceedingly contemptible. … An Indian in becoming a 
Christian they believe ceases to be an Indian; he … breaks other Hindu 
religious laws the doing of which is considered by them far more heinous than 
any violation of the moral code.104
 
At the end of 1898, she could count only one Indian convert in the entire district.105 
Supporting Dudley, and commenting on the specific difficulties of mission work 
among Indians, the Reverend Howard Nolan noted: 
 
The difficulties of the work are of a totally different character from that which 
confronted the earlier missionaries to the Fijians. The Indian has an old 
religion – will quote his sacred books – and is supported by a thousand subtle 
influences and considerations by which he is prepared to combat the teaching 
and object to the reception of Christianity. These are difficulties which are far 
greater than the savagery of a cannibal people. The difficulties are again 
increased by … their objections to Christianity arising out of the in-
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consistencies of many white people with whom they are more immediately 
connected.106
 
Such inconsistencies became the subject of debate between Burton and Totaram 
Sanadhya. Reminiscing about his discussions with the Reverend, Sanadhya asked 
somewhat rhetorically: 
 
You call them Christians? How can that be when these people treat their 
workers like animals and skin them alive? Their cruelty knows no bounds. 
They pay them a pittance. Look at the atrocities they commit against our 
women. And yet in a court of law they take the oath on the Bible and deny 
their evil deeds. Does baptism wash away all their evil deeds?107
 
These contradictions in the theory and practice of Christianity allowed many Indians 
to reassert the essential goodness of their own faith in Hinduism or Islam. As Totaram 
argued, baptism in the Christian faith did not really matter as long as one followed the 
path that served humankind, the path of righteousness. All this he said “has been 
preached by our sages long before Christianity”.108 These Christian missionaries, as 
renegade members of the dominant society, came to represent to the colonial and 
Christian establishment, a greater danger than their small number might suggest. It 
also broke the semblance of homogeneity, unity and prestige which European elites 
tried to display. 
 
Hinduism and Islam: “It was our religion that saved us.” 
 
Andrews and Pearson conceived the cause of the degradation and moral bankruptcy of 
the indentured labourer to be the breakdown of religion. Dismayed at the lack of 
religious vitality, they concluded that “everything that could be recognised as Hindu 
has departed, and with this, the religious spirit has departed too”.109 In a separate 
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paper for the Acting Governor of Fiji, in which Andrews sought to advise the 
government on the central position of religion in the lives of Hindus, he wrote: 
 
With the Hindu, it has been rightly said, the whole round of life, from birth 
and even before birth, to death and even after death, is one perpetual act of 
religion. … This religious sense among the Indian people, ever welling up in 
their lives, has been the sap in the tree of Hindu civilisation.110
 
He believed somewhat romantically that in Fiji the sap of this tree was drying up. He 
advised the Governor that until religion was re-established in the hearts of the people, 
the basis of Hindu social life in Fiji would continue to be radically unsound.111 While 
there is no doubt that religion played a vital role in anchoring the lives of indentured 
labourers, Andrews’ sombre opinion about the spiritual impoverishment of Hindus 
seems overstated. 
 
Burton often despaired at his failure to convert Indians and attributed this difficulty to 
the steadfast observance and dedication that Indians had for their religious beliefs. 
One of the immigrants responded to Burton’s overtures by telling him rather bluntly: 
“The chances of your becoming a Hindu are much greater than those of my becoming 
a Christian.”112 Burton believed that the devout strength of immigrants in their faiths 
was born out of their long and pre-eminently religious history “more religious even 
than that of the Jews. Possibly they still are the most naturally religious people on 
earth”.113 Burton conceded that while the British might boast literary giants like 
Shakespeare, Shelley and Browning, Indians need not lower their heads as long as the 
Vedas, the Ramayana, the Bhagavat Gita, and the Mahabharta remained. He 
concluded that on the basis of this religious foundation, “they are a people who cannot 
be patronised by the European” and that as a consequence “the Indian is predisposed 
to question everything the white man says”.114
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There is also ample evidence recorded among Girmitiyas to suggest that it was 
religion which enabled Hindus and Muslims to survive indenture. One of them, Gafur, 
famously affirmed that “it was our religion that saved us”.115 Lotan remarked: 
 
Indenture was very harsh but nonetheless Hindus and Muslims retained their 
religion, without it they would not have survived or retained their identity.116
 
Most girmitiya who spoke of their time of indenture recalled that religion provided 
them with a sense of belonging, solace, relief, purpose, and strength. In the absence of 
formal places of worship, some performed their religious rites in their rooms and 
invited others to join them. In the evenings, Muslims invited Hindus to their Koran 
readings and Muslims attended readings of the Ramayana. Differences in religion did 
not hinder worship. Rather, they seemed to enrich the spiritual lives of the labourers 
with different faiths feeding off each other. Speaking about how they spent their 
weekends Samjhawan recalled: 
 
From mid-day Saturday and all day Sunday we had a break. Some people used 
to sing and dance or read their Khatas and it was in this way that we spent our 
leisure. We were not educated and did not have very much knowledge about 
these rituals which when performed made us happy. A katha was usually said 
by somebody amongst the group who made himself a pundit and was accepted 
as such. When the katha used to take place everybody would sit quietly and 
listen and then sweets would be distributed; afterwards everybody would have 
a meal before returning to their own lines. … In those days nobody was a 
Muslim, a Hindu or a Brahmin or anything else. They were all one.117
 
Whether Muslim or Hindu, “they all used to live like one big family”, confirmed 
Debi: “During their Eid festivals Muslims took the view that nobody invited anyone 
and all were welcome to come and eat at their place.”118
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Festivals: Inverting the Symbolic Order 
 
Girmitiyas came from a land full of festivals,119 some of which they reproduced on 
arrival in Fiji. The Muslim Tazia festival120 was particularly popular and labourers 
irrespective of their religion, busied themselves building tazia edifices and converged 
on the town. This was followed by much merry-making, wrestling for sport, and 
music for entertainment.121 The Hindu festival Deepawali was celebrated likewise. 
Remembering such occasions with fondness, Jhagru recalled, “we invited our jahaji 
bhais (ship-mates) and other friends, read Ramayana, distributed sweets, sent some 
sweets, curry and puri … to sahibs whom we liked, and lit candles”.122
 
The same festive spirit prevailed during Holi, the primary Hindu festival during 
indenture. Often, especially in the smaller settlements, the two festivals of Tazia and 
Holi were combined to produce a “Hindu-Mohammadan mixture”.123 During Holi, 
the labourers “visited every house, sang songs, played drums, and ate delicacies 
offered by the head of the household. Even adversaries would forget about their 
enmity and join us in celebration.”124 But Holi was not simply, as one Christian 
missionary assumed, “little more than a squirting of red dye over the clothes of their 
fellows and insulting in obscene manner the female portion of the community”.125 
Holi was also a ritual of inversion which dramatised the harsh hierarchies of the 
plantation world. As Kelly and Kaplan have suggested, the sprays of blood-red fluid, 
were also used by women to bespatter men, and by “coolie” labourers to mark the 
estate’s oppressive sardars and overseers. And as they cast their troubles into the 
bonfires, the labourers symbolically burned away evil and saved the virtuous.126
 
Another Hindu festival with important symbolic significance was Ram Lila. The ten-
day festival dramatised the story of Ram, the Hindu god and king. The staging of his 
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exile, the abduction of his wife Sita, and the re-enactment of Ram’s defeat of Ravan 
allowed the participants to celebrate one of the great stories of the triumph of good 
over evil. When it started in Labasa in 1902, one Girmitiya recalled, “people from far 
and wide would come with their families and stay for days at the place of celebration 
in Bulileka”.127 Hindus had little difficulty in identifying with Ram, exiled as they 
were, tormented by plantation authorities, with women as the regular targets of 
aggression. The burning of huge effigies of Ravan brought the festival to a climax. 
Read in the colonial context as Kelly and Kaplan do, it is not difficult to conceive of 
the Ramayana as a key political metaphor, that the epic was used as a moral weapon 
against indenture, and that “it was the immorality of the indenture system that was 
burned with the demonic image”.128
 
Kelly has argued further that religion functioned among Fiji-Indians as the basis and 
tool for counter-hegemonic discourse and action.129 There exists little evidence that 
labourers consciously used religious festivals to subvert and challenge the plantation 
order. Yet, festivals were some of the rare occasions when labourers could publicly 
display and affirm the historical, religious and cultural antecedence and legitimacy of 
their heritage. In their capacity to function as a counter-symbolic force, Tazia, Holi, 
and Ram Lila allowed labourers to cast their own symbolic universe against the 
plantation universe. They were a show of cultural and ethical strength, and religious 
unity in an overwhelmingly hostile environment. 
 
Festivals were also the most popular events in the otherwise negligible social calendar 
of plantation life. Initially neither the companies nor the Government took any interest 
in these religious spectacles. With time however, and as they grew in size and 
frequency, these gatherings began to threaten the establishment. In 1888 an 
application for permission to celebrate Tazia led to the fear that the congregation “of 
all the Indian ruffians Mohammedan and otherwise” would, as it had in Trinidad, 
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result in unrest that could endanger “public peace” and lead to loss of life.130 The 
same fear was repeated the following year by C. H. Irvine in whose opinion, the 
festival would lead to “bloodshed and civil disturbance”. The Governor responded by 
allowing the celebration to carry on but he refused to let the procession through the 
town.131 It was this potential to destabilise that really worried the plantation and 
government administrations. These were after all, large autonomous gatherings in 
which the subordinate class took centre stage and broke the seemingly endless display 




In the everydayness of their lives, smaller religious gatherings were more important 
than the grand spectacles of festivals. Prayer meetings usually took place in the 
evenings where a pundit or a maulvi132 would lead scripture readings of religious 
books including the Ramayana, the Gita, the Brijvilas, and the Dev-pooja.133 In the 
first decade of the new century there were six religious texts circulating in Rewa 
while Navua had thirty-two and Ba forty-one.134 Sanadhya was asked to assist A. M. 
Brozniak, the principal storekeeper in Nausori, to help him order copies of religious 
books from India. When they arrived, they were sold out within two weeks.135 A few 
who could read and knew a bit about religion became pundits or maulvis and led 
religious teaching.136 The result of this multifarious religious hybrid often resulted in 
a mysticism that preached, as Lal explains, “the fundamental oneness of humanity and 
the principle of equality and brotherhood among all”.137 As Kanwal explains, these 
small gatherings also resonated to the sound of bhajans (devotional songs) in which 
labourers would “sing out” the worries in their lives: 
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Sometimes they used empty biscuit tins or cut hollows in soft wood from the 
bush and use them to produce the sound of the dholak, khanjri, and kartal. 
Thus the bleak and congested rooms in the coolie lines used to echo with loud 
musical sounds, songs, fun and laughter.138
 
During this time of spiritual, religious, physical, geographical, and psychological 
estrangement, these regular but informal religious meetings, even if they seldom 
carried the insignia or authority of a trained Indian priesthood, provided labourers 
with the fragments to form a flexible safety shield against the dehumanising daily 
grind of plantation work and the ambitious designs of Christian proselytism. It was 
one way by which labourers resisted becoming what their masters had in mind for 
them, and retained their humanity. Hence, while the colonial and plantation 
hierarchies may have exercised overall control over labourers’ bodies, their space, 
their time, and the laws that legalised this power, they could never quite control the 
symbolic capital of the Indian community as it manifested itself in their religions. 
 
After the turn of the century, a number of visiting religious figures from India sent to 
“uplift” the Indian community in Fiji, saw the gradual strengthening of religious 
tutelage and observation and brought Indians in Fiji in closer contact with political 
developments in India. From this time onwards, religious and political awakening 
among immigrants worked more explicitly in tandem. Of the religious missions that 
came to Fiji, the most militant were the promoters of the Arya Samaj faith. Founded 
in Bombay in 1875 by Swami Dayanand Saraswati, the Arya Samaj combined 
spiritual guidance with an explicit commitment to worldly social and political 
action.139 They moved into Fiji with ambitions to transform the soft-spoken and self-
effacing labourer into a new assertive and militant Hindu. 
 
From its humble beginnings in 1904 in Samabula, the Samaj rose to become in 
Kelly’s words, “the most articulate and popular anti-colonial Indian force” in the 
1920s riding a wave of success from school-building to newspaper publishing, and 
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spearheading the formation of Hindu political and cultural organisations.140 In the 
beginning, the Government had been quick to realise the subversive threat posed by 
the Arya Samaj and its members were soon placed under surveillance. The intensity 
of surveillance depended mostly on the degree of political tension in Fiji and India. 
For instance, following a series of political disturbances in India in 1908 and 1909, 
the Fiji Government became convinced that moves were afoot among Indians in Fiji 
to gather support for the nationalist movement in India. Then, fearing that a rising 
among the Lautoka immigrants was imminent, the sub-inspector of the town was 
instructed to send Indian constables in disguise to meetings of immigrants. In his 
report, he wrote: 
 
I do not think that the meetings were specially convened. It seemed to me that 
they were the usual Saturday and Sunday night meetings where the “Ramain” 
is read, Indian matters were discussed afterwards and the newspapers read and 
a collection taken up. I heard nothing of a revolutionary nature at any of the 
meetings I attended. … Most of the Indians seemed ignorant of the cause of 
the trouble in India and wanted to know what it was.141
 
Nevertheless, the Inspector General collected a series of newspapers which were by 
now arriving from India on a regular basis and forwarded them to the Agent-General 
for Immigration to peruse for seditious articles. Indar Narayan, a prominent leader of 
the Arya Samaj was closely followed. All his mail was opened by the administration 
and carefully screened for any political content that was “likely to cause ill-feeling to 
the Government”.142 On this occasion, the government could not find any 
incriminating evidence to detain the Samaj leaders and halt their activities. Tact and 
subtlety were vital to the survival of the Samaj’s enterprise. The government’s 
inability to eliminate the Arya Samaj may also have been due to the Samaj’s 
preference for involvement in grassroots educational development rather than in 
institutional politics. The Arya Samaj politics were embedded not so much in 
pamphlets or overt political action but deep in their philosophy of education. 
Fundamental to this philosophy was enlightenment and liberation through education 
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and in these early years, the Arya Samaj campaign in Fiji was dominated as much by 




As Andrews and Pearson remarked in their 1915 Report, “it would be hardly an 
exaggeration to state that the policy of the Government of Fiji with regard to Indian 
education has been, up till quite recently, one of almost complete neglect”.144 They 
highlighted the incongruous case of rates being collected from Indian ratepayers for 
public school purposes, without permission being given to the children of these rate-
payers to enter a public school.145
 
As it was for the education of ordinary Fijians, the education of Indian immigrants in 
the colony was regarded by some as a threat to public order.146 The strongest 
opposition to any education being given to Indians came from the sugar companies. 
They feared that education would take labourers away from their main purpose of 
tilling the soil, and thus make him ‘spoilt’ for labour purposes. In a letter to the Acting 
Colonial Secretary, Mr Duncan the Manager of the Vancouver-Fiji Sugar Company, 
expressed a similar fear: 
 
We most emphatically do not require an Indian community of highly educated 
labourers, with the attendant troubles which the ‘baboo’ class has brought to 
the Indian Government teaching and preaching sedition and looking generally 
for immediate treatment on a parity with educated Europeans accustomed to 
self government for many centuries. We require agriculturalists only and the 
education provided by the Colony (or planter) should for that reason be but 
elementary, and in as far as possible, technical on these lines.147
 
Mr D. J. Solomon, former chairman of the Levuka School Board agreed that “to 
educate an Indian is to create inducement for crime”.148 A debate emerged between 
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the missions on one side and employers and the government on the other, about which 
was the more dangerous to the colony: an enlightened or an unenlightened 
population?149
 
The missionaries and the government held different conceptions of the implications of 
education. Led by the Marist Brothers and the Wesleyan Reverend Richard Piper 
whose Navua school accepted all ethnic groups, the missions argued that a Christian 
education could neutralise the threat of disorder. Brother Claudius proposed that “it is 
only by education that the child can learn love of work, honesty, submission, order, 
etc. It is by it that he respects the law and parental authority.”150 With the moral 
guidance of the missions, he believed that Fijians and Indians would turn into 
obedient subjects and “very serviceable” citizens.151 His superior concurred. 
Commenting more specifically about Indians, Bishop Vidal submitted that: 
 
They should be educated according to Christian principles of education: unless 
prompt action is taken in the matter, they will become a menace, as they 
actually are a disgrace, to the Colony. Supreme Court statistics speak for 
themselves. And yet the Marist Brothers have amply demonstrated that even 
Indians of the class sent to Fiji can be successfully taught and are susceptible 
of sound education.152
 
Reverend Piper’s contribution to the debate was cast in a somewhat similar vein. 
Commenting on the role of education in rescuing Britain from its own history of 
barbarism and cannibalism, he pleaded that the people of Fiji should not function as 
mere human machines for the production of wealth and that they too should benefit 
from the intellectual and moral uplifting value of education. He advised that a 
decidedly moral and Christian education would have the most salutary effect: 
 
the primary object of educating Indians will be to make them better citizens 
and reduce their average of criminality which, at present, is alarmingly high. 
The danger is that of all education a purely secular one will place sharper and 
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more formidable weapons in the hands of those whose moral and religious 
sanctions are lamentably weak, but whose predilections to theft, deceit, 
duplicity, conspiracy, rapine and murder are terribly real and strong.153
 
In his submission the Agent-General of Immigration advised the Education 
Commission that education could be used to mould Indians into a group of law-
abiding citizens. Keeping education from them would “through ignorance or 
discontent” make of them “a race of helots regarded with suspicion and a menace to 
the public order”.154
 
A similar rift split supporters and opponents of educating Indian immigrants in the 
English language. Those who were staunchly opposed to the instruction of English to 
Indians, as E. W. Fenner (Manager for the CSR in Fiji) was, considered that 
 
Indian children should be taught by teachers of Indian nationality at various 
centres, and, in my opinion, no attempt should be made to proselytise them or 
to teach them English. Professed Christianity and knowledge of English are 
almost invariably associated with rascality in the classes of Indians that come 
to Fiji.155
 
W. A. Scott was just as contemptuous of Indian education as he was of Fijian 
education: 
 
I am not in sympathy with teaching Indians English. I consider the class of 
Indians in this Colony to be agriculturalists, and I think they should be 
confined as much as possible to that sphere of usefulness.156
 
In thirty years of indenture, Indians had generally been deprived of all formal 
education. Until the mid 1890s one must presume that literacy was acquired in rare 
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and isolated cases in somewhat similar fashion to that described by the Girmitiya 
Lakhpat: 
 
In the evenings after people had washed, those who could read did some 
reading. Sometimes married men who could not read or write would come 
with a slate to those who could, asking to be taught to read and write. We were 
keen to read and write because we wanted to learn to read our religious books 
like the Ramayana.157
 
It was not unusual for them to learn to read and write from Fijians.158 Yet, the core 
inspiration for early education among immigrants remained religious. Lal observes 
that the Mandalis and other small places of prayer and worship gradually grew to 
become small centres of learning and eventually formed the focal points for the 
development of a sense of community.159
 
In 1894, the first signs of more organised attempts to establish schools among “free” 
immigrants became apparent in the main southern districts of Rewa, Suva and 
Navua.160 These were probably similar to the small “backyard” schools that Andrews 
and Pearson found on their visit to Fiji some twenty years later. These were temporary 
arrangements that filled the educational void left by the negligence of the government 
and the sugar companies. None of these early initiatives resulted in the establishment 
of permanent schools but they testify to the awareness of immigrants of the power of 
knowledge and of their determination to make education work for them. They 
contributed eagerly in money and enthusiasm but were let down by the lack of 
suitably qualified teachers and the indifferent attitude of their employers and the 
administration. The lack of institutional support is well illustrated by David Ramsay’s 
1896 attempt to open and conduct a school for twenty-five Indian students in 
Cumming Street in Suva. A man of advanced age, Ramsay pleaded with the 
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government to subsidise his project but he was turned down and the school did not 
eventuate.161
 
The late 1890s saw the establishment of the Marist Brothers’ cosmopolitan school in 
Toorak to cater for all “coloured” students and Dudley’s Wesleyan schools in Suva 
and Nausori. As we saw in the previous section, these schools were regarded with 
suspicion by Hindus and Muslims. They preferred to establish their own schools and 
wanted teachers from India who were competent in Hindi, Urdu, religious education, 
and English. This was articulated most clearly by Totaram Sanadhya: 
 
In Fiji, there are missionary schools, but to send children to study in this kind 
of school is to make them Christian. Therefore it is necessary for some man, 
who is literate in Hindi and also knows English to go from India and open a 
school to make our brothers educated.162
 
Sanadhya had been at the forefront of efforts by the immigrant community to petition 
the government into providing schools for the education of Indians. In 1910, his name 
was the first of more than 200 signatures by Indian men and women requesting the 
government for schools so that “all of us and our progeny may be turned into true and 
peaceful settlers”.163 At the time, only 9.4 % of Indians were literate compared to 52.8 
% of Fijians, 54 % of Half-castes,164 58 % of Rotumans, and 86.5 % of Europeans.165 
Increased public interest in India about the welfare of their compatriots in the colonies 
put the Government of India under greater obligation to intervene and demand from 
governments and employers in the colonies where Indians were settled that basic 
education be provided.166 Criticism also came from within Fiji’s administrative 
structure, with the Education Commission pointing out that the facilities offered for 
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the education of Indian children compared most unfavourably with those offered to 
others. It recommended that employers of indentured labour provide school buildings 
at centres designated by the government for the education of the children of 
indentured labourers, and that the government assist by providing teachers and 
salaries.167 The recommendations requiring employers to provide school buildings 
were passed into law in 1912, but provision for state aid to schools was not legislated 
until 1916. 
 
The companies responded by negotiating with the Methodist mission to provide 
Christian education at the new schools. While some individuals on both sides of the 
partnership were opposed to these arrangements, the sugar companies and the mission 
had a mutual interest in providing Christian education. The companies knew that 
labourers would resist sending their children to such schools. Labourers would rather 
keep their children home than risk their conversion to Christianity. The companies 
could also count on the competence of the missions in recruiting the “right” teachers 
from India. The companies were confident that the missions would be even better 
placed than the government in watching Indian teachers so closely “that it would be 
extremely difficult if not impossible for the latter to undermine authority or preach or 
teach discontent or sedition”.168
 
This arrangement permitted the mission to continue its evangelical drive among 
Indians in the hope to establish among them a more permanent Christian influence. 
This pact and the government’s complicity in it, came under severe criticism in the 
Andrews and Pearson Report as “a very serious infringement of the principle of 
religious neutrality”.169 Not until 1916, when the grant-in aid scheme came into 
effect, were Indians able to run their own schools. By then, the roots and nature of the 
contest, and the organisation of power in the colony was such that it ensured children 
in Fiji would receive a distinctively ethnic education. 
 
In this regard, the Arya Samaj played an important role. When it entered the fray at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, the Samaj quickly established itself as an 
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outspoken vehicle for the awakening of Indian religious and political sensitivities in 
Fiji. It was the first organised attempt to mobilise indentured labourers and “free” 
settlers around a sense of moral and human right. To educate Indian settlers into 
political consciousness, the Arya Samaj had recourse to three main avenues: their 
religious philosophy, the media and school instruction. Through their religious 
philosophy, the Arya Samaj contested the European monopoly on “virtue” and 
“civilization”. They reversed the dominant symbolic order to present colonialism as a 
violent, immoral and evil system set against the virtue, honour and righteousness of 
the higher Hindu moral order. Their imported newspapers and pamphlets, followed 
later by their own publication of the Fiji Samachar, functioned as a vital conduit by 
which Indians in Fiji became sensitive to the rhetoric being used in India to counter 
colonial rule. Finally, the Samaj mounted an effective challenge in the area of 
education where they competed successfully with mission schools from the late 1910s 
to the late 1920s, nurturing in the process, as Kelly has shown, a crop of articulate 
men effective in colonial legal and speech genres and favourable to the nationalist 
cause in India and political parity in Fiji.170 With this combined approach, the Arya 
Samaj attacked the barriers that were placed in the way of Indian progress and 
replaced them with instruments of emancipation. Yet, in spite of its progressive 
agenda,171 the Samaj’s singular concern for Indians as an ethnic and religious entity 
caused it to participate in, rather than resist, the construction and strengthening of the 
colonial demarcations of race. 
 
In the midst of these larger political manoeuvrings, ordinary indentured and ‘free’ 
Indians continued to seek out schooling the way they always did, in the most humble 
settings. In Nadi, Andrews and Pearson discovered a small school, 
 
which was being held in a stable, behind a small store, with about a dozen 
small boys learning English from a Hindu woman. This woman had learned 
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English at a Mission School in the Madras Presidency before coming out to 
Fiji, under indenture, some 12 years ago.172
 
Near Ba, they found another small school with twenty boys learning English from an 
aged maulvi. There were probably several other such “backyard” schools173 where the 
seeds of future empowerment continued to be sown and where labourers cultivated 
the possibilities of finding occupations beyond agricultural production. In this 
exercise, the emphasis on literacy in English was as marked for Indians as it was for 
Fijians. 
 
The perception that knowledge of English was akin to political power, was 
dramatically reinforced in 1912 with the introduction of a literacy law that made 
reading and writing in English a criterion for voting eligibility in municipal elections. 
This literacy test effectively excluded thousands of Indians from their only franchise. 
Justifying the law, the Fiji Times suggested that only white candidates were 
competent enough for formal political participation: 
 
It is one of the elementary rules of civilization that the educated and enlightened 
shall represent, lead, and govern for the uneducated and entirely ignorant, in all 
matters requiring thought and intelligence.174
 
It thus became politically expedient for the colonial establishment and the European 
community to deprive Indians from learning English, and deny them their only 
opportunity to participate in politics. News about the test triggered an uproar in India 
and prompted Andrews to warn representatives of Fiji’s business community, several 
of whose members were implicated in the drafting of the law, that Indian public 
opinion would not stand for it.175 The Indian Government was forced to intervene and 
in 1916, the Fiji Government responded by introducing a new Letters Patent 
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providing for the nomination of one Indian member to the Legislative Council.176 
Literacy in English was thus the site of pronounced contestation between those in the 
European establishment who sought to monopolise it, and those in the wider general 
populace who saw it as a means of achieving their own social, economic and political 
advancement. 
 
In this respect the arrival of Manilal Doctor177 in Fiji on 4 September 1912, has been 
described as an event of “fundamental importance”.178 An in-depth discussion of the 
significance of Manilal in challenging the plantation and colonial establishment 
between 1912 and 1920 requires more space than is available here. However, a 
number of observations need to be made. From the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the plight of immigrants in Fiji had received increasing coverage in India 
where public pressure forced the Indian Government to demand more protective 
intervention from its Fijian counterpart. A London-educated lawyer, Manilal was sent 
to Fiji by Mahatma Gandhi in response to a request by prominent members of the 
Indian community.179 The large crowd which congregated to welcome him at the 
wharf on his arrival in Fiji, attests to the value that ordinary Indians placed on his 
presence.180 Three days after his arrival hundreds more turned up at Naselai including 
“a large number of Fijians” who danced meke in his honour and presented him with 
mats.181 Sanadhya estimated that six or seven hundred Fijians had gathered to 
formally welcome Manilal. In his speech to Manilal, their spokesman reportedly said: 
“Here there is great need for educated people like you, and may God make you and 
your brothers live long. You should think of us as your brothers.”182
 
Manilal was admitted to the Fiji bar on 29 October 1912, breaking the monopoly of 
European lawyers on the legal system. Indian immigrants could now count on, speak 
with, and trust their own lawyer without depending, as Kelly remarks, on “the 
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uncertain vehicles of foreign language and the white lawyers’ methods”.183 With 
Manilal’s leadership, the law court was transformed from a site where plantation and 
colonial power enjoyed comparative advantage into one where attacks on the system 
could be launched.184 Manilal backed up his success in court with petitions and letters 
to the government seeking improved conditions for Indian immigrants. His efforts 
also resulted in 1915 in the elimination of the state’s power to imprison individuals 
for labour offences. New provisions were also made for the education of indentured 
labourers’ children.185 Manilal also founded The Indian Settler in 1917 which he used 
for political consciousness raising. 
 
Manilal’s popularity among immigrants grew to such an extent that in 1916, when the 
new Letters Patent arrived, he was widely regarded as the front-runner for the lone 
Indian seat on the Fiji Legislative Council. Conscious of the danger posed by Manilal, 
the government chose instead to appoint Badri Maharaj, a farmer from Ra. This did 
not deter Manilal or his Gandhi-trained wife Jaikumari from organising Fiji’s first 
general strike in January and February 1920.186 By then, the legal nature of the 
challenge on the colonial establishment had assumed a political character and fearful 
of Manilal and Jaikumari’s growing power, the decision was taken by the government 
to deport them from Fiji. 
 
Under Manilal’s influence, resistance to plantation and colonial authorities 
experienced a significant shift. Aside from boycotts and an enhanced effort to initiate 
educational advancement, the 1920s would challenge colonial and plantation 
dominance, as Gillion points out, in the form of political organization and agitation, 




In the end, as Kelly points out, what is remarkable is not so much that girmitiyas 
resisted capitalism or that they organised strikes and other labour protests but that, 
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while they were turned into “coolies” and transformed into “labour units”, they 
refused to become what their owners imagined them to be.188 Viewed in tandem, 
Chapters Four and Six reveal that labourers created considerable space for themselves 
and actively challenged the system that oppressed them. 
 
Labourers primarily sought survival. When they attacked the production process they 
did so by absenting themselves, slowing down, sabotaging, and deserting. 
Occasionally they retaliated against their employers by physically assaulting, 
maiming, and in exceptional cases, murdering them. Labourers demarcated some 
space within which they set limits to their own subjugation and employers were only 
ever able to have partial control over them. There were indisputably significant 
possibilities for negotiation, compromise, harmonization, and collaboration which 
took place within this space. These formed an essential part of the strategies so 
essential for survival. Resistance forms a fragment of this broad spectrum of the 
everyday experience of indenture but it helps to counter claims that girmitiya were 
all-dependent on their employers for the necessities of life,189 that they were a ‘lost 
people’,190 or victims who fatalistically accepted their fate. While they seldom 
exercised the right to appeal to higher authority because such actions were often 
futile, they were combative in other ways and survived in large measure by the 
strength of their own will, and by seeking and creating other avenues through which 
to contest their working conditions, improve their lives and in the image of the 
inspirational mythological figure Rama, survive their banishment. Religious 
symbolism and the stories of the triumph of good over evil, were ideal means by 
which colonialism’s own symbolic order could be confronted and where alternative 
visions of the world could be kept alive. 
 
It can also be ascertained that in those early colonial days, education was generally 
used as a means of control by the administration. If education was largely withheld 
from ordinary people, the most enterprising among them continued to seek and find 
other means by which to acquire the knowledge, language and skills they needed for 
their personal advancement. This was not a conscious act of concientisaçao as 
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proposed by Paulo Freire in his discussions of the pedagogy of the oppressed or the 
mental decolonisation advocated by post-colonial critics in the wake of later 
independence movements.191 Rather it was aimed at the much more modest and 
tangible goal of attaining a greater measure of personal choice and control over their 
destinies. But it was powerful enough to reflect labourers’ rejection of the fate of 
physical labour and perpetual agricultural production which was reserved for them by 
the colonial elite. We can now proceed to examine the kinds of spaces that women 
created to contest Fiji’s colonial, indigenous, and plantation patriarchies. 
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In this chapter, an effort is made to find traces of the complex world of Fiji women 
and the aspects of their resistance that lie embedded in colonial texts. The aim is to 
find out if, how, and under what circumstances women created and used opportunities 
to question and confront colonial and patriarchal power in the various spheres of their 
existence. This is a difficult task because the lives of indigenous and migrant women 
were recorded mainly through the lenses of European and Fijian male elites. Women 
lived mainly around their households and their own written accounts of that 
experience are almost non-existent. This historiographical male bias and the lack of 
records written by women, make an accurate profile of their worlds particularly 
difficult to reconstruct. Even so, for the Pacific, Bronwen Douglas has demonstrated 
that it is possible to decode traces of indigenous female actions and presence even 
when the archives seem so intransigent.1 In Fiji, such a decentred reading necessitates 
a preparedness to evoke different questions, periodisations, protagonists and 
narratives. It also demands a reading of past circumstances that privileges the private 
over the public world, reproduction over production, and the personal over the 
political. Two kinds of records are available for this task. The first is the seemingly 
haphazard intervention of women in the colonial record by way of individual acts 
which required the notification of the colonial secretary’s office. The second is the 
more generalised reporting (such as the 1896 Report of the Commission on the 
Decrease of the Native Population2) in which women were discussed as a broad entity 
in need of special attention by the colonial state.3 This chapter juxtaposes these 
sources in two broad sections representing two major groups of women whose 
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experience of colonialism was similar but separate. The first group of women is 
overwhelmingly indigenous Fijian and was largely confined to the villages while the 
second is overwhelmingly indentured from India and was confined to plantations. 
 
Women in the Villages 
 
Village women in Fiji have traditionally been represented as ‘beasts of burden’.4 
Images of a submissive, passive, ever toiling, ignorant, duty-bound, morally 
vulnerable woman abound. The following description of Fijian women in the Report 
of the Commission on Decrease of the Native Population sums up the prevailing view: 
 
Fijian women, being from ancient tradition and practice regarded as mere 
chattels and slaves, submit to a life of hardship and hard work. They cook, 
fish, gather and carry firewood, draw water, dig and carry home the food from 
the plantations, weed gardens, and plait mats for which they have gathered and 
prepared the material, make and mend nets, and manufacture pottery. They 
also do much work in connection with solevus (festivals) and boses (councils) 
in providing presents of native cloth and other native goods; and perform a 
score of other duties from which they have no escape and little respite.5
 
According to the report, Fijian men conceived of a good wife as “a yalewa dau tei, 
dau qoli, dau cakacaka,” which translates as “a woman who always plants, always 
fishes, and always works”.6 The household and the garden may have been the primary 
sites where a sense of personhood, loyalty, obedience, duty, order, morality, sexuality, 
and an ethic of work could be cultivated. But it was precisely in these domestic 
spheres that village women mounted their most important challenges and fought their 
main battles. 
 
In Chapter Five, it was argued that the transfer of power after Cession created a 
sufficient degree of uncertainty or “abnormality” for a temporary power vacuum to 
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emerge and for ordinary people to avail themselves of the opportunity to seek change 
and their own advancement. Women were particularly prominent in this endeavour. 
The evidence presented below suggests that village women were especially active in 
matters of marriage, fertility, and movement out of villages. In these ventures they 
faced their fathers, husbands, and chiefs, and a formidable adversary in the shape of 
the Bose Vakaturaga. 
 
The early meetings of the Bose indicate that the chiefs were keen to revoke several of 
the liberties that might have accrued to women from a change of Fijian customary 
law. Gradually women’s participation in the decision-making process of the Bose 
were withdrawn,7 their freedom to drink yaqona was curbed,8 and their rights to land 
(which had been variable from place to place) were expropriated and secured ‘for men 
only’.9 Strict rules about sex were also adopted and any hint of impropriety could 
result in severe punishment. In one extreme case, a Seaqaqa woman was attacked by 
the village men after a Tikina Council had decided that women who committed 
adultery and ran away into the bush should be pursued by men and suffer tokatokai 
(gang-rape).10 The men were sent to Suva to be publicly flogged but the 
administration was faced with the dilemma of punishing men who were responding to 
the orders and authority of a government-appointed council. Most of the time 
however, women who broke the colony’s stringent adultery and fornication laws, 
served time in the vicinity of their homes plaiting mats and performing other 
community work, laboured on public works, or suffered the public humiliation of 
having their hair cut short.11
 
Marriage 
One of the most striking aspects of the early years of the Bose Vakaturaga is the 
unusually long and recurring discussions about marriage. In 1877, chiefs and native 
magistrates acknowledged that the new laws were helping eliminate “the evils arising 
                                                 
7 In his opening address of the 1881 Bose, Governor Des Voeux notified the assembled chiefs that 
women were now forbidden from the meeting because they increased logistical problems and because 
their presence was “as a rule neither good for them nor conducive to the main object of the meeting”. 
“Proceedings of a Native Council,” Nailaga, 1881. 9. At least one prominent chief protested against the 
decision and requested that women be allowed to attend. 29. 
8 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” Naiserelagi, 1884. 29. 
9 “Proceedings of a Native Council, Bua, 1878. 53. 
10 See Eastgate to CS, 3 May 1878, CSO 78/646; and Heffernan to CS, 16 March 1885, CSO 85/802. 
11 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1878. 5. 
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from the bad state of marriage customs and regulations in former times”.12 This was 
helped in large measure by the provisions for divorce now provided by British law 
which some women were availing themselves of to free themselves from ill-assorted 
marriages.13 In the years that followed, however, the number of applications for 
divorce rose and concern grew that too many women were now using this law to live 
independent lives and that this was beginning to have an adverse effect on the health 
of the indigenous population. For instance, in 1883 a special sitting was arranged 
during the Bose to inquire into the escalating rate of divorce. The meeting resolved to 
increase the fee for divorce certificates in the hope that this would act as a deterrent.14 
In his response to the resolution, the Governor replied that there would be less divorce 
if women were better treated by their husbands: 
 
The sight which is not uncommon in Fiji, such as, that of a man carrying 
nothing, and a woman following with a heavy burden, is not a pleasant one to 
well-wishers of your race, not merely as being itself an evil, but as indicating 
so much as to the subjection of women.15
 
This highlighted the often disparate views held by government and chiefs on the 
rightful treatment of women. Both sought to control women but they had different 
views as to how it should be done. 
 
Rosalind O’Hanlon’s work on Colonial India speaks of British law extending the 
power of Indian men over women in the rights to divorce and remarriage and in the 
control of women’s numbers.16 In Fiji however, this aspect of the new colonial code 
of law appears to have worked in women’s favour. Many Fijian women seized the 
opportunities offered by the new laws to variously decline, refuse, undermine, or 
terminate marriage and thus loosen the power of customary practices that previously 
                                                 
12 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1877. 4. 
13 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” Rewa, 1877. 4. 
14 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1883. 27. 
15 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1883. 38. However, the increase in divorce fee was later enacted 
in Native Regulation 2 of March 1888. Regulations of the Native Regulation Board: 1887-1895. Suva: 
Government Printer, 1898. 
16 Rosalind O’Hanlon, “Issues of Widowhood: Gender and Resistance in Colonial Western India.” in 
Contesting Power: Resistance and Everyday Social Relations in South Asia. Douglas Haynes and Gyan 
Prakash (eds.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. 75. 
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tied them to their husbands, relatives and villages. For instance, at the 1880 Bose, a 
distressed Roko Tui Ba exclaimed: 
 
How can the population increase when the people refuse to marry? In some 
towns it is reported that there is a large number of marriageable women, and 
that they positively refuse to be married to anybody.17
 
The refusal to marry was one of the ways by which women retained their 
independence. In some provinces, such as Nadroga, women chose to remain spinsters 
because their Buli objected to them marrying in other districts.18 While the chiefs 
wished women to marry in greater number few of them approved of women marrying 
outside their province. Such marriages would entail a certain degree of freedom of 
movement, and such movement was incompatible with their determination to keep 
people in their villages. The practice of women marrying outside the province was 
therefore judged to be “contrary to the ways of the land”.19 Two Magodro women 
who had left their district to marry in Dawasamu were ordered by the Bose to go back 
to their district.20 On this occasion the women defied the edict and refused to leave 
Tailevu. 
 
At the 1887 Bose, the Roko Tui Ba launched an attack on spinsters by proposing a 
regulation that would “put a stop to their wandering about without the consent of their 
relatives”.21 The motion was put to a vote and adopted unanimously. It read: 
 
Our women also too often wander from their homes and fall into bad habits. 
… [W]e ask Your Excellency to help us in their case and also in the case of 
adult spinsters or widows who desert their mataqali and ignore their mataqali 
obligations. We … claim the control of them when they are able-bodied and 
useful to us.22
 
                                                 
17 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1880. 15. 
18 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1883. 16. 
19 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1883. 16. See also Resolution IX. 
20 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1883. 16. 
21 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1887. 13. 
22 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1887. 13-14. 
 328
While some women chose to decline or to sever matrimonial ties, others simply 
refused their husbands’ marital rights, deserted them, or abandoned their homes. 
Some women who were pressured into consenting to marriage by their relatives chose 
to refuse marital rights to their husbands. This was frequent among women in Colo 
North. One entry into the Supreme Court Schedule read: “The respondent Kasanita 
has resisted and continues to resist all attempts on the part of the Petitioner [her 
husband] to marital rights and in fact the marriage has never been consummated.”23
 
Some women left their husbands to live with European men. This was a source of 
recurring protest by chiefs and magistrates who pointed out that the law on adultery 
seemed to follow different standards when it applied to Fijians and Europeans. As 
early as 1876, the chiefs complained that: 
 
Europeans are in the habit of harbouring native women who abscond from 
their husbands, and if the woman is sent for, the person who endeavours to 
bring her back is threatened by fire arms.24
 
It was this sense of ownership that Fijian women threatened by moving in with 
European men. Whatever ethnic group they came from, men generally claimed 
ownership over “their” women and cross-ethnic liaisons were often viewed as 
betrayal. Such liaisons eroded claims to ownership and reversed the emerging 
assertion of racial difference. Miscegenic liaisons also produced biological and 
cultural hybridities that transgressed racial distinctions and ethnic purities of which 
the colonial administrators and Fijian chiefs were self-appointed guardians. Inter-
racial sex was therefore seen as a threat to the establishment of a race-based colonial 
order.25
 
                                                 
23 Commissioner Colo North to CS, 17 February 1903, CSO 03/929. 
24 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1876. 28. 
25 There is a significant body of literature that documents the threat posed by miscegenation and the 
fear of racial degeneration in the colonial power structure. It is not my intention to review or engage 
this literature here because while it is useful in understanding the complexities of European masculine 
power, it is less helpful in reconstructing the aspects of colonized island women’s resistance which are 
discussed in this chapter. See among others Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the 
West. London: Routledge, 1990; Robert Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and 
Race. London: Routledge, 1995; and Stoler, 1995. 
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A similar plea was repeated at the 1878 Bose when the delegates asked the governor 
to devise some measure for preventing “white men taking, carrying off, and detaining, 
native married women” because it caused “great vexation and trouble to the husbands, 
and to all the women’s relations” and because it was “a most unbecoming thing, and 
has the appearance to the people that the law is not the same to all”.26 The issue was 
revisited throughout the 1880s. One prominent chief called for every woman who 
entered a “white man’s house” to be punished, and in addition, that her parents also be 
punished for permitting it. He added: 
 
If we once allow our women to do as they please, they will become 
unmanageable. If we find any of our women living in a state of concubinage 
with Europeans, let them be punished.27
 
Apart from mounting a direct attack on competing European men, the chiefs were also 
trying to halt the increasing number of women who, out of their own volition, left 
their homes to seek a better life outside the oppressive confines of the village and its 
community. While they feared losing women to European men, they also faced a 
fundamental policing problem. Their power was being undermined by women who 
refused to obey orders, to marry, or to carry out their reproductive function. These 
women were thus becoming “unmanageable”. 
 
From the late 1880s the Fijian population began to decline to such an extent that its 
survival was called into question. Explanations other than women’s resistance to 
marriage and reproduction can account for the decline of the population in the late 
1880s, the 1890s and the first decade of the twentieth century. Scarr has attributed the 
decline in the Fijian population in the 1880s and 1890s to demoralisation among 
indigenous Fijians who saw no point in raising children in a land that was no longer 
theirs.28 A more plausible reason is advanced by Norma McArthur who ascribes the 
decline to the low number of child-bearing women in the 1880s and 1890s caused by 
the death of so many young girls during the 1875 measles epidemic.29 Further 
                                                 
26 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1878. 64. 
27 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1888. 25. 
28 Scarr, 1980: 298-9. 
29 Norma McArthur, Island Populations of the Pacific. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 
1967. 30-1. 
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outbreaks of diseases in 1883, 1884, 1885, 1886, and 1891 all conspired to show a 
marked decline in the 1891 population census.30
 
While census statistics indicate that the numerical depletion of women was a major 
cause for the decline in the Fijian population, there were other factors at play. Among 
them was the regularity and ease with which women refused to marry, deserted their 
husbands and homes, or sought and obtained a divorce. In the early 1890s, the 
government took measures to stop “the comparative facility with which divorces have 
been obtained by the native population”.31 This, Thurston explained, had had a most 
“injurious effect” on Fijians’ ability to reproduce as a race.32 In 1892, a new 
regulation regarding married women was enacted and imposed severe penalties for 
women’s marital offences and made imprisonment mandatory for women who 
deserted their husbands and/or abandoned their homes.33
 
In 1893, a commission was appointed to inquire into the decrease in the Fijian 
population. The Commission found that the number of couples living apart was 
“seriously increasing”. It attributed this to the laxity of morals among young Fijians, 
the effects of the warm climate, the natural indolence of the people, and the survival 
of heathen customs. 34 But morality, climate, indolence, and heathen customs had 
little to do with Fijian women’s refusal to marry and their applications for divorce. 
They had more to do with the government’s growing desire to intervene in the lives of 
ordinary Fijians, and to control and order their bodies, space, and movement, as 
discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
The Commission represented Fijian women’s defiance of marriage norms as driven 
by youthful impatience, frivolity, and sexual licence.35 However it did admit to a 
factor of crucial importance. The young Fijian woman, it reported: 
 
                                                 
30 McArthur: 26. 
31 Despatch 41, Thurston to SS, 23 June 1891. CSO Despatches to the SS. 
32 Despatch 41, Thurston to SS, 23 June 1891. See also despatch 17, Thurston to SS, 9 April 1890 for 
more background to the new regulation. CSO Despatches to the SS. 
33 Regulation 1 of 1892. Regulations of the Native Regulation Board: 1887-1895. Suva: Government 
Printer, 1898. 
34 Report on the Decrease of the Native Population: 61. 
35 Report on the Decrease of the Native Population: 42. 
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prolongs her liberty as far as possible by showing a disinclination for 
marriage, which would tie her to one man and transform her life from one of 
frivolity to one of drudgery; for; once married, she cannot abandon field-work, 
as the men will not undertake it, and without it she would starve.36
 
The report does not indicate how many women prolonged their liberty by avoiding 
marriage. However the above passage suggests that at least until the 1890s, a 
significant number of Fijian women retained control over their lives by resisting 
marriage. This was not an organised mass movement. Rather, it appears that some 
women shared a desire to avoid or break out of matrimonial arrangements which 




The increasing incidence of abortions, still-births and barrenness in Fijian women was 
another major source of concern. Abortion was not a new phenomenon and had been 
the subject of debate at the Bose Vakaturaga since 1876.37 In an 1880 report on the 
census, the Reverend Rooney (residing Wesleyan minister at Rewa) testified that 
abortion was common among Fijian women and could account for the low birth rate 
in the colony. Women, he claimed, procured abortion repeatedly and in succession.38 
However, if many women were seeking abortion, only few were prosecuted.39 This 
suggests that women were apt at concealing their abortions and that the authorities, 
though conscious of the problem, were unable to police and punish it. 
 
                                                 
36 Report on the Decrease of the Native Population: 42. 
37 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1876. 28-9; See also “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1887. 
14. 
38 William McGregor and Philip Solomon, “Report of a Commission Appointed to Investigate Certain 
Alleged Errors in the Recent Census of the Native Population and Other Matters thereto Pertaining.” 
Levuka, 1880. Paper 44, MS 2, im Thurn Papers. 2. 
39 See for instance the case of a Bua woman sentenced to six months imprisonment for taking medicine 
to procure abortion. SM Tripp to CS, 2 August 1885, CSO 85/2135. See also the case of Limau 
prosecuted and jailed for 9 months for procuring abortion. SM Colo East to CS, 10 June 1891, CSO 
91/1828. For the case of a woman who died as a result of complications after procuring abortion, see 
NSM Ba to Acting Native Commissioner, 29 June 1894, CSO 94/2521. In his response to this case, 
Thurston minuted that such incidents were regrettably not uncommon. Thurston to CS, 30 July 1894, 
CSO 94/2521. For a case which triggered a long series of correspondence about the jurisdiction of 
Provincial courts to try cases of abortion, see Ratu Savenaca Seniloli’s report on a suspected abortion 
case, 15 April 1895, enclosed in CSO 95/2320. For two Labasa cases of abortion, see SM Labasa to 
Attorney-General, 9 August 1898, CSO 98/3565. 
 332
There were many reasons other than resistance for women to procure abortion. 
Foremost among them was the fear, humiliation, and ostracism that mothers of 
illegitimate children faced from the village pious. The Bose of 1896 heard that some 
women who became pregnant outside marriage were much ashamed and desired to 
conceal their condition from their relatives. Frightened of being taken to court and 
punished, they resorted to different methods to procure abortion, or they arranged for 
the child to be born secretly in the bush, with the usual result that the child died.40 
Women who had children outside marriage also automatically lost their membership 
of the Church.41 It was forbidden in some provinces for those who were in church 
fellowship to assist at the birth and in the nurturing of children born out of wedlock.42  
 
As early as December 1876, the chiefs sought to put a halt to abortion by 
recommending a punishment of two years imprisonment and flogging for those who 
assisted them. A regulation forbidding the drinking of medicine causing barrenness 
was also recommended.43 These regulations had little effect.44 The 1887 Bose heard 
that there was now “a great number” of still-born children and barren women in the 
land.45 The chiefs also listened to the following testimony about the increasingly open 
and public operation by which a woman could become barren: 
 
On a certain day she entered a house where a number of women were 
assembled, some of whom were fanning one of their number who was lying on 
her back on the floor. A vessel containing a decoction of lime juice and Chili 
peppers was beside her, and the contents were being poured into the vagina. 
On being asked why they were doing this, they said that it was to cause 
barrenness. The women to whom this was done have had children formerly 
but have had none since. A woman from Macuata, by the name of Losalini, 
originated this practice.46
 
                                                 
40 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1896. 34. 
41 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1892. 24. 
42 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1883. 14. The practice in Wesleyan villages of ostracising 
children born out of wedlock was first criticised in 1898 by Governor O’Brien. See Governor to CS, 7 
July 1898, CSO 98/2650. 
43 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1876. 28. 
44 See the testimony of Rev Rooney already cited above. 
45 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1887. 14. 
46 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1887. 14. 
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The willingness to endure such pain is indicative of how sincerely the women wanted 
to be childfree. 
 
In 1890, the Native Stipendiary Magistrate for Lomaiviti reported that not only were 
women seeking divorce more regularly, they were also choosing not to have more 
than one child.47 To elude the strict laws forbidding abortion and the omnipresent 
surveillance of government and church officials, women organised themselves into 
secret societies. This made it almost impossible for anyone, including village chiefs or 
the Commissioners charged with inquiring into the decrease in the Fijian population, 
to establish the full extent of the practice: 
 
The natives veil the practice with so much secrecy that a proper investigation 
of their methods has hitherto been impossible. … There is a freemasonry 
among the women which conceals the practice not only from the police but 
even from their husbands and fathers. … The natives of Vanualevu are 
generally reputed to be the most adept in procuring abortion.48
 
The Commission found that the provinces of Bua, Macuata, Cakaudrove and Tailevu 
had very high rates of abortion and still-births. Macnaught cites evidence in some 
provinces, such as Bua, that as many as 30% of women were either childless or 
aborting.49 This is corroborated by the Roman Catholic Bishop Julien Vidal who 
estimated in the late 1890s that in Bua abortion was “almost generally procured” 
especially among Wesleyan women.50 Other reports speak of abortion as being “a 
common offence” throughout all provinces.51
 
The government responded to the Commission’s findings by instructing all Native 
Stipendiary Magistrates to report any sign of still-births in their districts. Reports 
flowed from the districts between 1894 and 1898 but like previous efforts, they 
                                                 
47 NSM Lomaiviti to CS, 26 April 1890, CSO 90/1473. 
48 Report on the Decrease in the Native Population: 121-2. A similar inquiry had been conducted in the 
South Eastern parts of Viti Levu in 1880 by Carew and testimony from the various chiefs in the area 
had yielded no further clues about the nature and extent of the practice. See William McGregor and 
Philip Solomon, “Report of a Commission,” Paper 44, MS 2, im Thurn Papers. 35-6. 
49 Macnaught, 1982: 15. 
50 Bishop Vidal to Governor, 4 January 1899, CSO 99/109. 
51 W. A. Allardyce minute to Assistant CS, 3 November 1895, CSO 95/2320. 
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revealed very little further information. In 1898 the penalty for abortion was raised to 
three years of imprisonment,52 reflecting the state’s fear about the decline in the Fijian 
population and the continued contempt with which women seemed to regard the law. 
 
By 1898, it was believed in government and religious circles that “the salvation of the 
Fijian race l[ay], for a large part, with its women”.53 To coax Fijian women into 
changing their behaviour, the Commission had recommended that a “Ladies’ 
Hygienic Mission” be instituted.54 The mission was to consist of European women 
deployed in Fijian villages “for the improvement of the domestic status of the Fijian 
women and the practical amelioration of the numberless little ills by which their daily 
life is surrounded, and also for the safeguarding of the children during their critical 
age”.55 Commenting on this report, Margaret Jolly suggests that the high rates of 
infant and maternal mortality amongst white women in the colonies should not have 
inspired much confidence in their maternal superiority. Yet, the assumption that 
native women were poor mothers was a common and powerful trope for transferring 
some of the blame for depopulation onto indigenous women.56
 
The “Sisters’ Hygienic Mission” was in difficulty from the beginning. The 
administration compromised its own objectives by refusing to support the mission 
financially.57 The Roman Catholic mission volunteered to conduct trials for the 
scheme and, believing that Fijian religious sisters were best placed to influence Fijian 
mothers, the idea of a European mission gradually dissipated.58 A few “white” 
women demonstrated astonishing zeal in their attempts to rearrange Fijian women’s 
domestic space and behaviour.59 However, the bulk of the work was done by Fijian 
sisters from the outset, though little evidence exists of their success at meeting the 
government’s initial objectives. Jolly shows that the mission had largely petered out 
                                                 
52 Native Regulation 6 of 1898, Fiji Royal Gazette, 13 April 1898. 
53 Anonymous Memorandum, undated, enclosed in CSO 98/4919. This memo was circulated among 
government officials and its views supported by the missions’ highest authorities. See Bishop Vidal to 
Governor, 22 December 1898, CSO 98/5268. 
54 Report on the Decrease of the Native Population: 188. 
55 Report on the Decrease of the Native Population: 188. 
56 Jolly: 182, 196. 
57 Assistant CS to Vidal, 2 February 1899, CSO 98/4919. 
58 Assistant CS to Vidal, 7 January 1899, CSO 99/215. See also CSO files 99/1259, 99/3920, and 
99/4014. 
59 Macnaught cites Laura Spence’s efforts as particularly conspicuous. While accompanying her 
husband in Vanua Levu she inspected 299 houses, burnt 665 dirty mats and treated sixty cases of 
ringworm in one month alone. Macnaught, 1982: 18. 
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by 1903, partially as a result of the resistance, evasion, and ridicule with which it was 
met by Fijian women.60
 
The gradual demographic recovery of the Fijian population in the early twentieth 
century suggests that the chiefs, church, and government had some success in 
influencing Fijian women’s reproductive choices. However, writing to im Thurn in 
July 1904, the stipendiary magistrate for Kadavu, Dr Brough, reported that there 
could be “little doubt” that in every town on the island, “one or more women practise 
the art of procuring abortion”.61 There is insufficient evidence to determine how 
widely this “art” was practiced in Kadavu or elsewhere in the colony in the first 
decade of the new century, or to account for any oscillations in the frequency of 
abortions during this period. 
 
By the early 1910s, senior officials were convinced that women were the principal 
menace to the government’s population policy. In his speech to the 1911 Bose 
Vakaturaga, the Governor commented on the reasons given for the decrease in the 
native population and stated: “I have studied them all, and I think you will agree with 
me that the fault lies entirely with the women.”62 A year later and no longer able to 
hide his exasperation, the Governor issued this command to the assembled chiefs: “I 
order you to increase and multiply.”63
 
One must be careful not to impose a contemporary feminist agenda on these 
observations. The image of a freethinking, empowered, and liberated Fijian woman in 
late nineteenth century Fiji is anachronistic. Yet, one must not presume that many of 
these women could not conceive of protecting the limited freedom they enjoyed by 
controlling their fertility. When they did so, they were actively subverting colonial 
authority. 
 
                                                 
60 Jolly: 197. 
61 Brough to Governor im Thurn, 18 July 1904, Paper 25: “Private and Confidential Memo,” M.S 2, im 
Thurn Papers. 
62 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1911. 4. 
63 Cited in France: 165. 
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Control of Movement 
 
As much as colonial officials and Fijian officials sought to control Fijian women’s 
sexuality, they also sought to control their movement. As early as May 1877 women 
were forbidden to abandon their homes.64 In 1883, women were no longer permitted 
to work beyond their home district.65 By 1887, any woman who was found in any 
place which had been proclaimed a town or its neighbourhood and who could not give 
a satisfactory explanation for being there, could be apprehended and taken back to her 
village.66 In spite of these restrictions, women continued to run away from their 
villages. Some left to escape abusive husbands, others left because they were 
overworked and could not survive the work regimes imposed by their husband, chief, 
community, church, and child-rearing. Such was the reason for the mass exodus of 
people from the Yasawas in 1876. Yasawa women left because their husbands had 
gone to work on plantations and the burden of providing for Ba and for Bau fell back 
on them. They spent all their time plaiting with no time left for planting. They had 
nothing to trade, and not enough food and clothing for themselves or their children.67
 
From the 1880s, some women migrated to urban centres where they lived with 
storekeepers or in the periphery of sugar mills where they befriended and cohabited 
with mechanics and overseers.68 The presence of these women among men of other 
ethnicities caused authorities some concern and was deemed to be at the source of 
“growing immorality”.69 Thurston denounced it as vagabondage and tried to censure 
it, fearing that it would lead to the disintegration of the Fijian family and that Fijians 
were not ready for the sense of ‘individualism’ that this exodus was promoting.70
                                                 
64 Native Regulation 11 of 1877. Fiji Royal Gazette, 2 June 1877. 
65 Native Regulation 5 of 1883. Fiji Royal Gazette, 26 October 1883. 
66 Paper 20: “Regulations of the Native Regulation Board.” in JFLC, 1887. See Regulation 1 about 
women absenting themselves from their homes. 
67 Eastgate to Gordon, 25 August 1876, in Arthur Gordon, Records of Private and Public Life, II: 141. 
68 Roko Tui Ba and Yasawa to CS, 19 October 1894, CSO file 94/4040; and Roko Tui Ra to CS, 27 
March 1903, 03/1507. 
69 Despatch 70, Mitchell to SS, 1 June 1887. CSO Despatches to the SS. NAF. 
70 Governor to CS, 16 March 1885, CSO 88/1442. Most of the women described in this file were 
prostitutes. They had run away from their villages in Rewa because they would not marry the husbands 
chosen for them by their parents. Others simply ran away and settled in Suva to escape the drudgery of 
village life. Details about Moala women who ran away to Suva without seeking the permission of their 
Buli are contained in NSM Nemani Valucava to Native Commissioner, 21 September 1892, CSO 
92/3172. CSO files 93/1595, 96/1592, 02/5247, 03/1204, 08/5597, 09/5347 contain evidence of the 
regularity with which women left their villages in search of a better life in urban centres. These are 
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 What is important in these relationships is that apart from the love and affection that 
they may have felt for their Fijian, European, Chinese or Indian partners, the Fijian 
women who elected to live in concubinage in urban centres saw opportunities in these 
arrangements that promised a better future than that which they could expect in their 
villages. It is therefore inaccurate to represent miscegenation merely as the sexual 
exploitation of a subordinate group of Fijian (and other) women by a group of 
dominant European men.71 The male domination - female subordination dichotomy 
masks a more complex process whereby women rejected the endless toil and 
obligations of conjugal, domestic and communal life in their villages. Some moved 
because they believed that for the advancement of their personal aspirations, a 
relationship outside the constraints of village life was more promising. This is not to 
say that women who migrated to urban centres did not suffer from patriarchal 
exploitation. However, in the absence of evidence from their most intimate 
relationships, it is speculative to venture ideas about the kinds of contestations 
employed by women in the households of their urban lovers. 
 
Other women were drawn by the prospect offered by education and the opportunities 
provided by Wesleyan and Catholic training schools. Education was a means to 
mobility, improvement, and independence. This was frowned upon both by the chiefs 
and the government. Thurston exclaimed that: 
 
Instead of these young women being at their homes assisting their parents, or 
getting married they are uselessly immured under Priestly domination wasting 
and idling their time in the mimicry of an institution they are unable to 
comprehend.72
 
In this context, as we saw in the previous two chapters, the missions played a vital 
educational role, and opened for Fijian girls a range of possibilities beyond 
domesticity. The Wesleyan girls’ school at Nailega in Ba run by Reverend Slater 
enjoyed a good reputation and several women who passed through its doors went on 
                                                                                                                                            
examples that were singled out among others for special mention in Stipendiary Magistrates’ monthly 
reports and or in separate files because of their exceptional nature. 
71 For such a representation see Knapman: 170. 
72 Thurston to SS, 15 August 1896, CO 83/64. Cited in Scarr, 1980: 218. 
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to make successful careers. Among them, Lolohea Ratu was perhaps the most 
prominent. She spent three years training as a teacher in Australia and came back to 
take charge of the primary school at Davuilevu in 1915, and established the first 
kindergarten for Fijian children.73
 
As we saw in Chapter Five, the first forty years of Fiji’s colonial rule were replete 
with regulations intended to restrict the movement of Fijian people. These laws were 
largely ineffective because they were simply ignored. When a comprehensive review 
of Native Regulations was carried out in 1912 and the movement of Fijian men was 
relaxed for the first time, the restrictions on the movement of Fijian women was 
maintained and those who remained absent from their homes for more than sixty days 
without the permission of their parents could expect to be fined.74 Yet, women 
continued to slip through the surveillance cordon. In 1926 Ratu Sukuna pleaded that 
Fijian women should always be in the power of a husband, a parent, or a guardian and 
another Native Regulation was put into force to demarcate sugar mills and large urban 




Not all women who were overworked ran away. Those who did were a conspicuous 
minority. Given the elaborate system of surveillance that worked against them, 
women who elected flight took the considerable risk of being quickly identified, 
arrested, repatriated and punished. The punishment usually entailed their confinement 
to their homes, plaiting mats, making masi, fishing, preparing and mending nets, or 
making pottery.76
 
Of the women who stayed in their villages, those who disobeyed their husbands or the 
village authorities were charged under the broad offence of talaidredre 
(disobedience). However, exactly what sorts of transgressions they were committing 
under this rubric remains largely a matter for speculation. Most of these offences were 
                                                 
73 Thornley, 1979: 320. For more bibliographical information about Lolohea Ratu, see the pamphlet by 
The Pan-Pacific and South-East Asia Women's Association “Mrs. Lolohea Akosita Waqairawai.” 1968. 
74 See Clause 77 of the Regulations of the Native Regulation Board. Suva: Government Printer, 1926. 
75 As 1941, some provincial councils suggested that women who remained in prohibited areas should 
be whipped. Macnaught, 1982: 104-5. 
76 Native Regulation 4 of 1885. Fiji Royal Gazette, 14 August 1885. 
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dealt with at district level by Native Stipendiary Magistrates and their reports do not 
contain sufficient details to establish with any accuracy the quantity or the frequency 
of women’s village-based transgressions. 
 
Norman Etherington’s work on gender and criminality in Fiji suggests that women 
seldom committed serious crimes. He writes that between 1879 and 1885 women 
comprised only about 20% of all Fijians brought before the Provincial Courts when 
about 47% of the Fijian population was estimated to be female. Most women who 
appeared in the lower courts were likely to be charged with sexual impropriety such 
as adultery and fornication.77
 
Some village women rebelled by refusing to perform their allotted tasks. For instance, 
in 1885 a number of women working in the Roko Tui Cakaudrove’s household left 
the house stating that they were tired of serving him.78 In 1892, several women from 
Ba refused to shell corn after being instructed to do so by their chief. They 
successfully protested that the burden of tax work should not be transferred to them to 
make up for the backlog created by their husbands prolonged absence in the cane 
fields.79 Similarly in 1898, several women from Bau were imprisoned for refusing an 
order and then refusing to pay their subsequent fine.80
 
A few women chose to articulate their grievances through the medium of print. In 
1894 for instance, Akosita, a woman from Matailobau, submitted an article to Na 
Mata in which she described the pain and neglect of mothers who gave birth and 
whose husbands were too busy working for government taxes to take care of their 
families. She protested that too many women in this situation were left to starve, as 
were their children. Carew’s response was that these “stalwart peasant women” were 
seizing on the prevailing mood of sympathy for the plight of women and children “to 
demand constant and incessant petting”.81 In 1901, several women from Ba petitioned 
                                                 
77 Norman Etherington, “The Gendering of Indirect Rule: Criminal Law and Colonial Fiji, 1875-1900.” 
in Journal of Pacific History. 31: 1, 1996. 52-3. The Report on the Decrease of the Native Population, 
cites 1,979 cases tried in district courts for fornication in eight provinces in 1892. Sixty-three resulted 
in convictions. Report on the Decrease of the Native Population: 118. 
78 SM Taveuni to CS, 5 November 1885, CSO 85/2907. 
79 Native Tax Inspector (Ba and Yasawas) to Native Commissioner, 8 January 1892, CSO 92/383. 
80 Minute by Milne to CS, 16 May 1898, CSO 98/2029. 
81 Minute by Carew to CS, 18 February 1893, CSO 93/440. 
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their Roko to complain that they were being forced to marry.82 The relative absence 
of petitions may reflect a certain degree of contentment. However it could also be 
symptomatic of women’s general lack of literacy or of literate men declining to assist 
them. 
 
As for their participation in organised movements, women only played minor roles. 
They were the attendants to Navosavakadua and Apolosi Nawai, carrying and 
chewing yaqona for the former and providing sexual pleasure for the latter. There is 
mention of a widely feared woman priest who fought alongside men in the Colo War, 
but her name was never recorded and is not remembered in oral tradition. No women 
rose through the ranks of the Tuka or Viti Kabani movements to become leaders in 
their own right. Women’s resistance during the early colonial period in Fiji has more 
in common with the petty struggles of everyday resistance. While they did not have 
recognizable leaders, there was no lack of organisation. Some provinces such as Bua, 
held women’s councils every month and were encouraged in their endeavours by their 
chiefs.83 This suggests that the nature of village authority was an important factor in 
influencing women’s inclination to collaborate or resist. For the most part however, 
women organised themselves into informal networks of which insufficient records 
exist to ascertain their impact with any confidence. 
 
Women on the Plantations 
 
Discussions about indentured women in Fiji have been dominated by arguments about 
their morality and the extraordinary levels of violence they endured.84 While these 
discussions are useful, they have tended to represent indentured women as subjected 
to the multiple effects of colonial, plantation and patriarchal power, and to doubly 
victimise them as women and as labourers. Without denying the importance of these 
debates or the interweaving of domination and resistance, this section searches for 
those moments when indentured women created space for themselves to variously 
subvert, defy, and resist the powers that sought to control their bodies and labour. 
 
                                                 
82 SM Ba to CS, 18 April 1901, CSO 01/1780. 
83 “Proceedings of a Native Council,” 1894. 12. 
84 Ali, 1979, 1980; Naidu, 1980; Lal, 1985a, 1985b, 2000; Shameem, 1990; and Kelly, 1991a, 1991b. 
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The defining feature of indentured women in Fiji was their disproportionately small 
number. Colonies which imported Indian indentured labour were required by law to 
bring at least forty women to every 100 hundred men. This means that only about 
30% of Indian indentured labourers in Fiji were women. Fiji’s colonial 
administration, acting under pressure from the CSR, tried to lower the ratio to thirty-
three to every 100,85 but the minimum requirement was usually met. Meeting this 
quota posed a number of difficulties for the arkati (recruiters in India), operating as 
they were in a society where it was unusual for young unmarried women to leave their 
homes in search of work. Oral tradition speaks of many unscrupulous means by which 
women were lured to the recruitment depots.86 The available data is not sufficient to 
determine how many women were abducted, threatened or deceived into indenture, 
but we can infer that a significant number of them came to Fiji against their will. 
 
About one third of all indentured women were married and accompanied their 
husbands from India to Fiji. The others were single women: some were widows, some 
came to escape domestic quarrels, and some young women left their homes under a 
cloud and hoped to avoid the stigma by coming to Fiji.87 Others sought to escape the 
economic hardship and dreariness of rural life, and a few came as the daughters of 
immigrant parents.88 The colonial administration usually perceived them as coming 
from the lowest of India’s social and economic rungs. In a despatch to the Secretary 
of State, Thurston cited from the Agent-General of Immigration’s report to complain 
that indentured women introduced in Fiji were “of such low class that they form by no 
means desirable colonists … I am disposed to think that the major part of such 
females belong to the lowest class. Few of them live with one man and prostitution 
appears the rule rather than the exception.”89 However, in his detailed reconstruction 
of the origins of the girmitiya, Brij Lal has demonstrated that about half of them came 
from high or middle castes. In the main therefore, indentured women who came to Fiji 
                                                 
85 See Paper 25: “Annual Report on Indian Immigration for 1885.” and Paper 38: “Annual Report on 
Indian Immigration for 1886.” both in JFLC, 1887. 
86 J. S. Kanwal. A Hundred Years of Hindi in Fiji. Suva: Fiji Teachers Union, 1980. 33. See also Lal 
2004a: 143. 
87 Lal, 2000: 197. 
88 Corney to CS, 15 October 1897, CSO 97/4801. See also Lal, 2004: 145. 
89 Despatch 114, Thurston to SS, 18 December 1888. CSO Despatches to the SS. 
 342
were not a homogenous lot. They came from diverse backgrounds and caste groups in 
India and had diverse reasons for emigrating to Fiji.90
 
On arrival however, they were levelled off as indentured labourers. They were put on 
the same work regime as the men and faced the same punishments. Recounting his 
experience as a sardar during indenture, one old man told Naidu: 
 
though the women worked in separate groups under the charge of sardars they 
did very much the same kind of work required of men. They cut grass and 
planted cane for example and during the busy seasons they helped in 
harvesting and loading trucks. Like the men, some were active and others 
lazy.91
 
Writing in the early 1910s, Totaram Sanadhya was more explicit about the extra 
hardships that women faced because of their additional domestic responsibilities: 
 
Even though men are also forced to suffer many difficulties in Fiji, women are 
forced to bear more sorrows than the men. First of all they have to get up at 
half past three in the morning and cook some roti. After that for ten hours they 
have to do hard labour in the fields, and then, having gone back to the house, 
make more roti. When women return from work, there is a corpse-like shading 
to their faces.92
 
Writing at the same time the Wesleyan missionary Hannah Dudley was profoundly 
disturbed by the indentured women she encountered. She wrote: “Some looked 
crushed and broken-hearted, others sullen, others hard and evil. I shall never forget 
the first time I saw ‘indentured’ women. They were returning from their day’s work. 
The look on these women’s faces haunts me.”93
 
                                                 
90 Lal, 2000: 197. 
91 Testimony of Kutarkaru in Naidu: 36. 
92 Sanadhya: 61. 




The imbalance of males to females on the plantations generated severe competition 
among men and placed extraordinary sexual pressure on women. This combination of 
excessively high workloads, poor living conditions, insufficient food and money, and 
disproportion of the sexes, produced extraordinary levels of violence against women. 
Commenting on her mission work among indentured women, Hannah Dudley wrote 
that “every few months some Indian man murders for unfaithfulness the woman 
whom he regards as his wife”.94 Naidu has recorded that sixty-eight women were 
murdered between 1890 and 1919 against twenty-eight men. This was at a time when 
indentured women constituted only one third of the total number of immigrants in the 
colony.95 Some women escaped from such attacks with their lives but endured 
horrific wounds to their bodies. Several women were wilfully disfigured by their 
assailants who cut off their noses.96 Many were raped.97
 
This extraordinary violence was a product of women’s vulnerable position in the 
plantation microcosm which made them targets of abuse both by employers and by 
indentured men. However, it was also a reflection of their determination to retain 
some control over their lives. Until recently, violence against indentured women was 
generally understood in terms of sexual jealousy. In this view, indentured men killed 
women because of their infidelities and because of their own innate violent 
dispositions. Stories about the murder of indentured women were reported both in the 
Fiji Times and the Western Pacific Herald and consistently presented indentured 
women as immoral and men as having naturally brutal temperaments. The official 
view of indentured labourers did not differ significantly. Summing up prevailing 
opinions, J. W. Davidson, the Agent-General for Immigration, wrote in 1902 that 
indentured women were “unstable” and “mercenary” and men were “revengeful and 
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regardless” of life.98 This representation of women implied that they were responsible 
for their own murders and absolved employers and government of any responsibility 
in the violence. As Lal points out, women bore the brunt of the blame for the social 
and moral ills of the system and shrouded their lives with “a veil of dishonour”.99
 
Much recent historiography has since tended to rehabilitate the status of indentured 
women.100 Kelly, for instance, has demonstrated in his skilful comparison of 
newspaper reports and court records for the year 1912, that newspapers tended to omit 
the sexual involvement of overseers and sardars in the crimes.101 The laundering of 
European crimes against indentured women was further aggravated by the court 
process which called into question the morality of the defendant or placed immense 
pressure on women to retract their accusations of rape, wounding, or assault. If the 
case went to court, defendants could always count on a sympathetic all-European jury 
eager to exonerate one of their own.102 On the rare occasions when these men were 
found guilty, they were merely transferred to other plantations where they often re-
offended, or as it happened after 1907, they were allowed to leave the colony without 
ever serving jail terms. 
 
Several of these studies have shown the system of indenture to be at fault for coercing 
men and women into situations of sexual immorality and for the violence that arose as 
a consequence. In this sense, indenture exploited women’s sexuality by forcing them 
as Dudley called it, into “a system of legalised prostitution”.103 Without denying that 
women were forced into sexual promiscuity and thereby attracted the wrath of their 
lovers, this view tends to withhold from women their capacity to act wilfully and to 
turn seemingly hopeless situations into profitable ones. 
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 Shameem’s work is useful in this respect. She locates the reasons for the violence 
against and murder of so many women more specifically within the patriarchal 
framework of the plantations. Shameem contends that men killed women because 
they could not cope with the relative independence that indentured women gained 
from their status as workers.104 Although they earned less than male labourers, 
indentured women generally earned more than women in India.105 This gave them the 
power of choice and the possibility to acquire a greater degree of control over their 
lives than was possible in India. In asserting this independence they came into conflict 
with indentured men and their attempts to reconstruct in Fiji a domestic world which 
mirrored that which they had left behind in India. The killing and wounding of so 
many women, reflects both the intensity with which indentured men sought to do this 
and the determination of women to resist it. The following 1899 report cited by Lal, 
describes the indentured woman’s obstinate yet tragic last stance: 
 
detected, she brazens it out with defiance and recrimination – offered pardon, 
on amendment, she spurns the offer – threatened, she dares and defies; and the 
matter ends by a sudden blow, followed by blind and mad hacking and 
mutilation.106
 
Kelly’s work shows that many of the assaults on women took place not at the scene of 
“adulterous” activities but rather in the lines when women refused to be the provider 
of food and other domestic services.107 This refusal struck at the heart of indentured 
men’s attempts to reconstitute a traditional patriarchal “home away from home”. As 
much as they sought sex, indentured men also desired marriage to reconstitute a 
household and secure for themselves the benefits that would accrue from such an 
arrangement. As such, conflicts between indentured men and women were as much 
about food as they were about sex.108
 
                                                 
104 Shameem: 248. 
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Sexuality and Partnership 
 
As it was for women in the villages, marriage was a contentious issue on the 
plantations. But if Fijian women could use the new laws to opt out of or avoid 
marriage, Indian women were often denied the opportunity of marriage altogether. 
The state in Fiji refused to recognise Indian marriages unless they had been registered 
by a government official or previously registered in India. Because of their relentless 
work programmes and the tight restrictions around their movement, few couples could 
ever find the time to formalise their marriage. This lack of official recognition 
allowed several men (including the most powerful men on the plantation) to lay claim 
to one woman. Some historians have interpreted the lack of recognition of such 
matrimonial arrangements as the source of much immorality and violence.109
 
Shameem, on the other hand, contends that the absence of kinship and family helped 
to liberate women from their previous subordinate position as the property of men in 
India.110 She sees the ritual of marriage as reinforcing the position of women as 
property. Precisely because marriage and other principles of patriarchy were loosened 
by the particular circumstances of indenture, it deprived Indian men of the power to 
own, domesticate and confine Indian women. In the absence of marriage, women 
were guided in their choice of partner by pragmatic considerations and refused to stay 
in monogamous relationships unless the conditions were attractive. Hence when Gopi, 
a Navua woman left her husband in 1897, it was because he had gambled her earnings 
away and he was ill-treating her.111 Similarly, when Papamma got other men to kill 
her husband, it was because she could not otherwise escape from his enslavement.112 
As Shameem explains, these women “refused to conduct their lives in terms of the 
rules of custom and tradition”.113 One former girmitiya told Naidu: 
 
there were many fights between men over women which eventually resulted in 
suicides and murders. When men told something to their women, the latter 
                                                 
109 See Ali, 1979, 1980; Naidu, 1980; Lal, 1985a, 1985b, 2000; and Kelly, 1991a and 1991b. 
110 Shameem: 248. 
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replied that, “I am the King of my mind.” This led to beatings that were 
sometimes fatal.114
 
The fact that women were in short supply, that they were earning workers, that they 
were mostly single, and that traditional patriarchal institutions and practices were 
weakened, produces the profile of a woman who, exploited as she was, disposed of an 
unusual degree of economic and social independence and self-sufficiency. It also 
made her less manageable. 
 
There is evidence that women tried to control their fertility through their extensive 
knowledge of methods of contraception.115 However, they could do little to protect 
themselves against venereal diseases. The spread of syphilis in the lines was not 
treated with any seriousness until the disease began to seriously interfere “with the 
efficiency of employees and financial returns of employers”.116 In 1897 new 
legislation was contemplated only when the profits of the CSR were threatened by the 
reduced productivity of labourers. The government and the company both held 
indentured women to be responsible for the spread of the disease.117 In the late 1890s, 
a debate took place in senior government circles about the desirability of introducing 
the compulsory genital examination of immigrant labourers, accompanying costs, and 
the likelihood of immigrants, especially women, resisting the examination.118
 
The government’s intention to intervene in and attempt to regulate the bodies of 
indentured women was met with opposition from the Home Government in London 
and from indentured women themselves. While indentured women did not seem to 
mind being examined by European female nurses, they refused to be examined by 
European male doctors.119 Reverend Burton reported that some doctors were in the 
habit of calling indentured women into a closed room under the pretext of examining 
them, “and then torture her most indecently for the gratification of their lust and even 
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for getting her to swear a charge against some Indian who may have incurred their 
displeasure”.120 Hence, plantation hospitals were not necessarily safe places for 
women and may account for the surprisingly large number of women who were 
charged for “refusing to go to hospital” (see Chart 1). When they were in hospital, 
many more were charged for disorderly conduct and other breaches of hospital 
regulations (see Chart 1). This may be a reflection of the strict supervision of 
hospitalised patients by plantation authorities in trying to get their labourers back to 
work at the earliest possible time. But it may also reflect the tendency for some of the 
patients to make the most of their time away from the hardships of the plantation 
frontline. 
 
Prostitution is another point of contention in which it is often argued that indentured 
women were forced to surrender control of their sexuality to satisfy men’s sexual 
appetites and to supplement their own income. There are good reasons and some 
evidence to support this view. Women were more susceptible to sickness, absence 
from work, and non-completion of tasks because they worked longer hours than men 
and had a shorter recovery time at night. Some also had the added burden of 
childcare. In this context, women were more likely to have their pay cut and 
prostitution was one way of complementing lost income in the fields. In the late 1880s 
for instance, it became apparent to the administration that several women indentured 
on Rewa plantations who were committed to jail for desertion or unlawful absence 
from work were being bailed out by ‘free’ labourers living in the vicinity of the 
Capital who then employed the women during the term of their original sentence in 
prostitution around Suva.121 Most prostitution occurred in close proximity of the 
lines, with some women working as prostitutes with the consent of their partners.122 
In such cases prostitution was a temporary measure and allowed the couple to make 
ends meet. 
 
Issues of morality have often clouded other motivations which women may have had 
in demanding money for sexual services. Shameem for instance argues that some 
women prostituted themselves because they refused to become wives and provide sex 
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for free. She argues that this was another way by which women undermined male 
attempts to domesticate them.123 While there is little direct evidence to support this 
claim, it is reasonable to expect that women took advantage of their sex to survive or 
even to envisage a better financial future. The reports about the Rewa women who 
extended their stay in Suva to make money as prostitutes, suggest that they only made 
their way back to the plantations after a considerable time had lapsed.124 In their 
calculations, some indentured women labourers may have reasoned that the 
opportunities for income earning, better working conditions, and less brutality were 
greater in prostitution than in plantation work. In reality however, prostitution rarely 
acted as a form of resistance and few women ever became prostitutes. Most preferred 
other forms of resistance within the patriarchal framework of the plantation. 
 
Violation of Labour Laws 
 
If women used their sexuality as a weapon to resist the power of men in the domestic 
sphere, as workers they resorted to other subtle “everyday” forms of resistance to defy 
their employers in the work place. Compared to Fijian women who were more likely 
to be brought to the courts on charges of sexual impropriety, Indian women’s status as 
indentured workers multiplied their chances of coming before the courts for violation 
of the labour laws, and being found guilty.125 Records from the Superintendent of 
Prisons show that in May of 1887, there were thirty women in Suva’s jail, only four of 
whom were Indian women.126 Two years later, the number of female prisoners had 
grown to fifty-seven, almost all of whom were indentured women from India.127 This 
can be partly explained by a 10% increase in the population of women labourers. It 
can also imply that they were particularly targeted because they were the most 
vulnerable. On the other hand, it may also mean that indentured women became 
increasingly combative and difficult to manage. 
 
The statistics of the annual reports on Indian immigration provide a useful source of 
information in assessing the extent to which indentured women were disobedient. 
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They provide data for each year from 1885 (except for 1887 and 1898) about the kind 
of labour laws that women broke, the frequency with which they did so, the locations 
where the offenders were charged, the rates of conviction, and a comparison with 
indentured men. When collated these figures provide the following information: 
 














































This graph suggests two prominent peaks in the number of charges laid against 
women during this twenty-five year period. The first indicates that antagonism 
between women and employers was particularly strong in the mid-1880s immediately 
before and after Thurston’s repressive laws previously discussed in Chapter Four 
came into force. Most of the offending took place in the Rewa region where the 
largest concentration of female labourers was employed. The number of charges 
reached a second peak in 1901 mainly due to the figures from Labasa where the level 
of violence sometimes threatened, as discussed in the previous chapter, to disintegrate 
into all out civil war. 
 
The establishment and growth of the sugar centre in Labasa from 1892 marks the 
beginning of one of the most violent phases in the history of indenture. And if Labasa 
was particularly bad for labourers in general, it was even worse for women. Women 
were first employed in Labasa to clear land for planting and milling. Within the first 
few months, several women were charged for threatening and insulting their 
employer, for refusing to do their work, and for inciting others to desist from work.128 
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Conditions in Labasa gradually worsened and women appear to have borne the brunt 
of the violence when it peaked at the turn of the century. Stipendiary Magistrate 
reports suggest that violence against women by their employers was commonplace 
and one inspector of immigrants in Labasa was so outraged by the frequency of 
assaults against women that he called for the compulsory imprisonment of repeat 
offenders without the option of a fine.129
 
The downward trend from 1907 is similar to the combined figures of men and women 
and suggests that legislative changes designed to improve the working and living 
conditions of labourers began to take effect. Furthermore, the Government of India 
began to exert pressure on its Fiji counterpart regarding the welfare of Indian 
labourers. The presence of resident inspectors and the successful prosecution of a 
number of violent overseers by the immigration department may also have had a 
deterring and appeasing effect.130
 
Figure 2 below suggests that from 1899 to 1904, the percentage of charges against 
women was significantly higher than those against men. 
 
Percentage  of Charges Laid Against Women 
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In 1901 the number of charges against women rose to such an extent that they 
surpassed that of men, at a time when the percentage of indentured women was still 
only 29%. Women indentured in Labasa were again the main cause of this increase. 
However, it is difficult to ascertain whether this was due to increased suppressive 
activity by Labasa’s overseers, or whether it reflects the existence of a culture of 
insubordination and militancy among the women of Labasa (or both). The graph also 
shows that women enjoyed a greater proportion of the decline in charges in the latter 
years of indenture and were therefore less likely than men to be brought before the 
courts. However, averaged over the entire period of indenture, the figures show that 
women tended to suffer the same rates of conviction as men. These fluctuated 
between 78% and 99% for men and 74% and 95% for women.131
 
When looking at the type of offences that women committed against the labour laws, 
the two most prominent were unlawful absence and refusal or neglect to complete a 
task. Chart 1 below reveals that more than three quarters of all charges were filed in 
these two categories. 
 
                                                 
131 Etherington: 45. 
 353
Refusal or Neglect to Complete or 
Perform a Task 34%
Want of Ordinary 
Diligence 5%
Refusal to Amend Work 3%
Disorderly Conduct in Hospital 
and breaches of Hospital 
Rules 3% Others 1 %
Using Abusive and Threatening 
Language 2.5%
Desertions 2.3%
Committing a Nuisance 
3%
Refusal to go to Hospital 1.4%
Wilfully Damaging Property 1%
Inciting Others to Desist from Work 0.4%
Unlaw ful Absence 45%
 
Chart 1: Percentage Number of Charges for Labour Offences Against Indentured 
Women from 1885 to 1909 by Type of Offence.132
 
The comparative figures for indentured men reveal remarkable similarities between 
the two groups. 
 
                                                 
132 The category “Others” includes the following: leaving hospital without permission, unlawful use of 
fire, unlawfully leaving the plantation, disobeying orders, insubordination, selling rations, refusal to 
take a sick child to hospital, taking food to patients in hospital, damage to sugar-cane, smoking in cane 
fields, refusing to attend a medical inspection, causing a disturbance in the lines, ceasing from work for 
more than one and a half hours, unlawful use of company property, and threatening behaviour. 
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 Refusal to Amend 
Work: 2% 
Others: 5% 
Disorderly Conduct and 
Abusive Language: 2% Committing a Nuisance: 3% 
Wilfully Causing Damage 
to Property: 3% 
Disorderly Conduct in 
Hospital: 3% 





Refusal or Neglect to 
complete a Task: 24% 
Chart 2: Percentage Number of Charges for Labour Offences Against Indentured 
Men from 1885 to 1909 by Type of Offence. 
 
Absenteeism was the most common charge against women and accounted for almost 
half of all charges against indentured women for offences against the labour laws. In 
1886 for instance, Carew reported that only 44% of women were at work on the 
Nausori plantation in the month of October.133 This is similar to the proportion of 
charges for unlawful absence laid against indentured men. However, significant 
variations occurred in time and location. 
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133 Agent-General for Immigration to CS, 28 February 1887, CSO 87/443. 
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 Figure 3 shows that in the decade between 1892 and 1902, which again corresponds 
with the development of the sugar centre in Labasa, women’s response to the violence 
was to stay away and withdraw their labour. By comparison, the figures for men 
indicate no significant upsurge in unlawful absence in this district. On the other hand, 
men were more likely to take a confrontational stance, and remonstrate with the 
authorities in a body. There were ninety-five cases against Labasa indentured men for 
absenting themselves in a body during the turbulent years between 1899 and 1904, 
compared to only fifteen charges against women for the same offence.134
 
The figures on desertion also suggest that men were more likely to escape from the 
plantations than women. The option of staying with “free” labourer friends or in 
Fijian villages appealed more to indentured men than women. Many indentured 
women, including those who were single, had children under their charge, and 
desertion entailed too much uncertainty and sacrifice to warrant the risk. Other 
security and cultural factors would have acted as deterrents. 
 
Absence from work does not necessarily mean that all women who stayed away from 
work were resisting. As Lal and Munro point out, women absented themselves for 
several other reasons. They had to stay home because they were more likely to suffer 
from debilitating ailments such as anaemia.135 Lal sees such conditions as pregnancy, 
childrearing, and excessive domestic work as impediments that further weakened the 
position of women and made them more prone to stay home and face a charge of 
unlawful absence.136 In other words, they were complained against more because they 
constituted a more vulnerable segment of the workforce. Absence from work could 
therefore be more reflective of the system’s oppressive nature than women’s 
resistance to it. 
 
On the other hand, Shameem conceives of indentured women as more militant and 
their absenteeism as evidence of their implacable spirit and their resistance to various 
                                                 
134 See Annual Reports on Indian Immigration from 1899-1904. 
135 Munro, 1993: 9. 
136 Lal, 2000: 184. 
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attempts to control their bodies and wrest from them the products of their labour.137 
She reads in women’s ailments the opportunity for them to withdraw their labour 
from the violent plantation frontline and to use pregnancy and nursing as 
opportunities to stay home. While this is certainly conceivable, only few examples of 
this strategy have so far surfaced. For instance, there is evidence that different women 
would come to court with the same child to plead for a reduction of work or for 
leniency.138 Shameem’s conclusion that indentured women defied authority by 
selectively resurrecting motherhood and wifehood, or denying them altogether is 
essentially justified, although questions about when, how and why, remain 
unanswered.139 A more thorough excavation of the archive is now required and 
should yield important results. 
 
Other data also suggests that proportionate to their number, women were as likely as 
men to be charged for “refusal or neglect to perform or complete a task”. “Refusal” 
implies resistance while neglect implies inability. The conflation of the two makes it 
impossible to distinguish what proportion of women refused to perform their task and 
what number were simply unable to complete them. What can be established is that 
more than a third of the offences (34%) that women committed against labour laws 
were in this category. We can assume that a substantial number of these women 
refused to perform the tasks assigned to them and that many of them did so by 
wilfully absenting themselves from the fields140 or, as Gill experienced, by organising 
go-slow work protests.141
 
                                                 
137 Shameem: 282. 
138 Taylor to CS, 15 February 1886, CSO 86/375. 
139 Shameem: 298. 
140 See for instance Paper 28: “Annual Report on Indian Immigration for 1900.” in JFLC, 1901. 39. 
141 Gill: 35. 
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Percentage Number of Charges Against Women 
(compared to men) for Refusal or Neglect to 










































Fluctuations from year to year and region to region suggest that antagonism depended 
on individual circumstances. Some plantations enjoyed good management during 
certain periods and labourers had less difficulty completing their tasks and 
consequently harboured fewer grievances. Others, like those in Labasa, operated in 
the midst of a culture of violence fuelled by ruthless sardars and overseers.142 In such 
circumstances it is arguable that the higher proportion of women who failed to 
complete their tasks (compared to men) did so out of sheer exhaustion rather than 
covert resistance. Hence, while a basic level of antagonism remained constant, the 
figures signal many grey areas in the interplay between power and resistance with 
many competing and contrasting variables combining to make the plantation 
experience inherently violent and exploitative, but also intrinsically unpredictable. 
 
Hence, charges against individuals do not necessarily reflect resistance. They may in 
fact represent severe repression. A high number of charges can reveal employers’ 
propensity to intimidate their workers or to seek extensions to their indenture. 
Extensions were quite lucrative and many employers used this proviso to extract work 
from their labourers well beyond their period of indenture. In 1896, 58% of women 
                                                 
142 See Agent-General to CS, 29 September 1902, CSO 02/4411. See also the discussion in Chapter Six 
regarding the specific dynamics of the Wailevu plantation. 
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had their indentures extended.143 The number of charges laid against indentured 
women can therefore suggest a degree of resistance but it cannot establish with any 




Like their male counterparts, women labourers filed relatively few complaints. Some 
did not know how. A woman, Mahadai, who was raped by the chief warden of the 
Suva jail while serving a six weeks term for unlawful absence from work, explained 
she did not complain about the rape “because I did not know how to make a 
complaint” and “because we get no redress”.144 Seeking redress was fraught with 
difficulties. Making a report involved the risk of further violence and jeopardising the 
few things that were going well for them. Allegations could compound their misery 
and make life unbearable. A complainant could get her money cut, heavier tasks, 
possibly another thrashing, or be raped.145 Those who dared to lodge complaints 
usually did so at night under the cover of darkness so as not to arouse the suspicions 
of overseers and sardars. Sergeant Mason in Labasa complained that he was busy 
almost every night from nine to twelve midnight attending to the complaints of 
women too afraid to come during day time.146
 
Knowing that the court system was stacked against them, few women sought redress 
through legal avenues.147 Indeed, on one occasion several women made a run for it 
and escaped from the Ba jail.148 There were a few spectacular instances when women 
ganged up against their employer and beat them and/or urinated on him. One woman 
who was nearly raped explained how she only escaped because of the vigilance and 
intervention of her women co-workers: 
 
                                                 
143 Paper 22: “Annual Report of Indian Immigration for 1896.” in JFLC, 1897. 
144 Superintendent of Prisons to CS, 12 August 1887, CSO 87/1842. The complaint was made for her 
by a Fijian inmate. 
145 See testimony from Burton, 1910. See also girmitiya accounts in Prasad, 1975; Ali, 1979; and 
Naidu, 1980. 
146 Sergeant Mason to CS, 21 March 1897, CSO 97/1315. 
147 Few victims of rape for instance, ever won their cases. 
148 Heffernan to CS, 15 July 1887, CSO 87/1646. 
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At about 11.30 a.m. I went out of the cane-field to the mangrove to take a rest 
on the raised bank under the shade. As I sat down and got rid of the knife and 
guava-hook, with which I had been collecting grass, I saw the para grass about 
ten yards from me move and make a rustling sound. Before I realized what it 
was, a huge figure pealed at me and grabbed me. I screamed, he reached for 
my mouth, I bit his hand, he uttered “Bastard”, I screamed again and smacked 
him on the face. Now we were face to face. I tried to reach for the knife but 
could not do it. He tore my blouse. I pleaded with him not to do that, but he 
was furious. He tried to reach for my skirt, I kicked him, tore his face with my 
fingers, and got hold of his hair. He became red and slapped me. We struggled 
only for some minutes before I realized that a part of my skirt was torn off. 
But by then a number of women had arrived. We all beat the kulambar 
properly – tore parts of his trousers and then let him go. … When the men 
heard this, they swore about the kulambar and made arrangements to kill him. 
However … they decided to inform the bara kulambar (big sahib). The report 
was not accepted as trivial news. It compelled the big sahib to transfer the 
aggressor.149
 
This incident emphasises the importance of interdependence on plantations. Women 
did not have recognisable leaders to organise protests or resistance, but they made 
collective arrangements to secure the spaces within which they operated. Recounting 
his days as an overseer, Walter Gill recalled one of his peers leaving Fiji in shame 
after being overpowered by a group of women who then held him down and took 
turns urinating on him.150 Another overseer landed in a sewer pit after another group 
of women took up their hoes and advanced against him. “The women then threw shit 
on him.”151 In other anecdotal evidence provided by former girmitiyas, Basir recalls 
the day his mother-in-law hit back at a new overseer who whipped his labourers: 
 
One day my wife, who was pregnant, and was hoeing the field was whipped 
by the kulambar. Guljariya who made herself my mother and my wife her 
                                                 
149 Cited in Prasad: 22. 
150 Gill: 34 and 37. This is supported by the oral testimony of former girmitiyas. See Sidhaya in Naidu: 
66. 
151 Hussein cited in Ali, 1979: 55. 
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daughter pulled the kulumbar from his horse and gave him a hiding – he ran 
for his kottee.152
 
Such stories rarely made it into official documents but they survived in popular 
consciousness through the medium of songs.153 For the most part however, women 
dealt with the perennial threat of brutality by using strategies which prevented 
situations arising in which they could be attacked or raped. 
 
Forging Alliances with Men 
 
They also depended on their male counterparts for their protection. Women acted 
against men in certain situations but they also aligned themselves with men on other 
occasions. It is therefore not useful to see indentured men and women as being in 
perpetual opposition to each other in their engagement of authority. Indentured men 
often accused women of being cold calculators who exhausted one man’s wealth only 
to leave him for another.154 But for the most part, indentured men and women were 
interdependent. Some women avoided lengthy extensions of their terms of indenture 
by having men assist them in the completion of their tasks.155
 
Indentured men mostly came to the aid of women to defend or protect them against 
sexual assault. Such incidents could provoke riots when the aggressor was a Fijian co-
worker as happened on two occasions in Rewa in the mid-1880s.156 When the 
aggressor was European, the retaliation took the form of revenge attacks such as the 
assault in October 1906 of Mr Creig in Rewa by indentured men after he and a sardar 
took a woman from the lines and attempted to rape her.157 Many other such 
conspiracies were hatched. Some were found out and the plotters punished,158 others 
succeeded and some overseers paid the ultimate price for their sexual abuse. Some 
                                                 
152 Cited in Naidu: 46. 
153 See Kanwal: 35. 
154 Kelly, 1991b: 176. 
155 Basil Thomson cites the unusual case of a Nepalese woman indentured in Sigatoka who was reputed 
to have a roster of men to do her work. South Sea Yarns. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood 
and Sons, 1894. 53. 
156 See CSO 83/2141 and CSO 84/1405 about separate affrays between Indian and Fijian workers after 
attempted rapes on indentured women. 
157 For the full account see SM Rewa to CS, 16 October 1906, CSO 06/4850. 
158 Paper 24: “Annual Report for Indian Immigration for 1899.” in JFLC, 1900. 23. 
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sardars met with the same fate. In one typical case, Parandai, a woman indentured 
near Lobau in Navua, was told by her sardar to make her way to an isolated banana 
patch because he wanted to talk to her. After having his sexual advances refused the 
sardar seized hold of her but her screams alerted men working nearby and they came 
to her aid. They assaulted the sardar and then proceeded in a group to the government 
station in Naitonitoni to inform the resident magistrate of the incident adding that they 
would refuse to continue working under his control.159
 
These incidents reflected different perceptions among men about who “owned” 
indentured women. These contrasting perceptions are well captured in a petition sent 
to the government by Indar Singh, formerly indentured to Veisaru plantation in Ba, 
who on his return to India complained that “the Government should see that the 
Indian Females are for Indian coolies not for sahibs”.160 Employers and supervisors 
on the other hand, generally perceived indentured women as sexually available.161 
One former Girmitiya was told in no uncertain terms by his sardar that the women 
belonged to the company, not to the men.162 This led the most powerful men on the 
plantations to claim indentured women even when they were in stable relationships. 
Hence, as Shameem contends, “for European men, they were property twice over, as 
women and as bonded workers”.163 As black women too, they suffered from their 
position on the lowest rung of Fiji’s racially compartmentalised society. 
 
As such, sexual relations between European men and indentured women were 
particularly fraught.164 In 1909, the administration’s policy was to oppose sex 
between European employers and indentured women on the grounds that “improper 
interference with women” would be “subversive of discipline and likely to cause 
jealousy and ill-feeling between immigrant and employer”.165 In public discourse too, 
                                                 
159 For the full account, see SM Navua to CS, 18 September 1908, CSO 08/4431. 
160 Indar Singh to Government of India, undated, enclosed in CSO 09/5050. 
161 Etherington: 52. 
162 Sarju in Naidu: 38. 
163 Shameem: 238. 
164 For historiography on miscegenation in colonial settings see among others Knapman, 1986; Young, 
1995; Stoler, 1995 and Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in 
Colonial Rule. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002; Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather; 
Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest. New York: Routledge, 1995; Manderson, Lenore 
and Margaret Jolly  (eds.) Sites of Desire/Economies of Pleasure: Sexualities in Asia and the Pacific. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997. 
165 CS to Secretary to the Government of India, 29 June 1909, CSO 09/5050. 
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a severe censure of such relations defined sex between Europeans and native and 
immigrant as transgressions that threatened the colonial order. They were threatening 
because they crossed racial boundaries in the private sphere that were forbidden in the 
public sphere. As Stoler has argued in relation to Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia, 
inter-racial sex and the potential biological offspring from such unions were thought 
to be a dangerous source of subversion of “white prestige” with the potential to cause 
European degeneration and moral decay.166 Such arguments were of course designed 
to uphold the colonial, bourgeois, racial edifice. 
 
Clearly however, indentured women did not set out to have sex with European men in 
order to deliberately subvert the colonial order and its racial taxonomy. Neither was 
their sexuality simply there to be controlled by European employers. Not all liaisons 
between male employers and female employees were adversarial or antithetical. Not 
all employers or overseers were sexual predators. Some relations were quite 
consensual. This suggests that apart from sex and emotional attachment, women 
sought alliances from which they could gain material and other advantages. Many 
practical considerations guided the decisions of women to variously resist and 
embrace sexual rapport with European men.167
 
Although such relations were frowned upon by the establishment, the law provided no 
power to prohibit them and in spite of public efforts by officials and newspapers to 
hide or ignore them, such unions appear to have been quite common.168 In a context 
where European men vastly outnumbered European women on the plantation, public 
discourse was not particularly effective at the management of colonial inter-racial sex. 
Commenting on this, an old girmitiya remarked that “if a woman bore a white man’s 
child then he or she was accepted as the child of that woman’s husband. There were 
several cases of Indian women having children fathered by Europeans.”169 
                                                 
166 Stoler, 1995: 46. 
167 For further reading about relations between slave women of colour and their white overseers see 
Trevor Burnard, Mastery, Tyranny and Desire: Thomas Thistlewood and His Slaves in the Anglo-
Jamaican World. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. 
168 See Gill’s testimony in Turn North-East at the Tombstone. See also the comment by Dr Fox, 
member of the legislative Council, that “there are a great number of different races here and one race 
cannot be associated with the other”. Journal of the Fiji Legislative Council. 1909. Debates: Second 
Session, 1909. For a discussion of official and press disapproval of sexual relations between overseers 
and indentured women see Kelly, 1991a: 35-40. 
169 Jagan cited in Ali, 1979: 51. 
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Notwithstanding that some of these children were conceived from sexual assault 
rather than consensual sex, as racial hybrids they were not wanted in European society 
because they represented the transgression of public boundaries in the private 
sphere.170
 
Girmit Women and the End of Indenture 
 
In Chapters Four and Six, it was shown that internal forces of resistance were often 
complemented by external forces. This was particularly so in the lead up to the end of 
indenture, in which girmit women featured prominently. Several commentators 
(Kelly, Lal and Shameem in particular) cite one remarkable event as the catalyst for a 
groundswell of agitation and Satyagraha resistance in India which propelled the end 
of indenture. Kunti was indentured to Nadewa in Rewa and on 10 April 1913, she was 
sent to an isolated banana patch well away from other indentured men and women. 
Soon after, the overseer Cobcroft arrived and attacked her. Kunti managed to free 
herself and ran towards the Wainibokasi River where she seemingly jumped to her 
death. As fate would have it, Jagdeo, a young boy happened to be paddling his dinghy 
down the river at that moment and pulled her out to safety. When Kunti told the 
plantation manager about her ordeal he was reported to have replied: “Go away. I 
don’t want to hear about field things.” When she failed to turn up to work the next day 
“she was given the task of weeding twenty chains of grass, and her husband was 
beaten so much that the poor man was half dead”.171
 
Her story found its way into the Indian newspaper Bharat Mitra,172 and immediately 
triggered a major public outcry. Under strong censure from the Indian Government, 
the Fiji administration was asked to investigate, explain, and hopefully report that the 
whole incident had been fabricated.173 The Acting Agent-General for Immigration, 
Montgomerie, reported that the story was indeed a “fabrication” and that it was 
                                                 
170 For literature on the threat of racial hybrids to white prestige, see Young, 1995, McClintock, 1995; 
Stoler, 1995 and 2002. 
171 For a complete account of Kunti’s story, read from CSO 13/8779 and 14/6609 and Sanadhya, 1991: 
44. Kunti’s letter of protest was drafted in Sanadhya’s home in Wainibokasi. Backhouse to Agent-
General for Immigration, 6 November 1913, CSO 13/8779. See also Lal’s reconstruction of the event 
in his article “Kunti’s Cry,” 2000: 195-6. 
172 See “Kunti’s Story” in Bharat Mitra, 8 May 1914, enclosed in CSO 14/6609. 
173 Secretary to the Government of India to CS, 17 September 1913, enclosed in CSO 13/8779. 
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“absolutely untrue” that female indentured immigrants were violated or received cruel 
treatments at the hands of their overseers.174 However, in India, the incident 
confirmed popular belief that indentured women in Fiji were regular victims of 
violent sexual abuse and that they were regularly denied basic justice. Kunti was 
celebrated as a heroine for courageously protecting her virtue, for her strength of 
mind, and was likened to other “honourable and brave ladies” in Indian history.175
 
Kelly has identified three key elements in Kunti’s story which gave it critical political 
power: The issue of chastity, resistance to evil, and the denial of justice.176 They 
brought together the essential elements of Satyagraha and helped expose the 
immorality that reigned on Fiji’s plantations. Fiji’s reputation was permanently 
damaged and with the momentum provided by the Nationalist movement in India and 
the anti-indenture lobby led by C. F. Andrews and Mahatma Gandhi’s colleague Mrs 
Sarojini Naidu, the movement to end indenture took root in India.177 A speech in 
Allahabad by Mrs Naidu, also known as “the nightingale of India”, illustrates the 
flavour of the movement: 
 
 Citizens of India, 
 
Words from me tonight! No, tears from me tonight because I am a woman and 
though you may not feel dishonour offered to your mothers and sisters, I feel 
the dishonour offered to me in the dishonour of my sex. 
 
I have travelled far, gentlemen, to come to you tonight only to raise my voice, 
not for the men but for those women whose proudest memory is that Sita 
would not stand the challenge to her honour but called Mother Earth to avenge 
her and the earth opened up to avenge her. 
 
                                                 
174 Minute by Montgomerie to CS, 8 January 1914, CSO 13/8779. 
175 “Kunti’s Story” in Bharat Mitra, 8 May 1914, enclosed in CSO 14/6609. See also Sanadhya: 44, 
and Lal, 2000: 196. See also a poem celebrating Kunti’s courage and dignity in Kanwal: 43-4. 
176 Kelly, 1991a: 48. 
177 Between 1914 and 1920 when indenture finally ended, Gillian and Kelly both argue that the 
abolition of the indenture system formed a significant part of the rise of nationalism in India. Gillian, 
1962: 182-3; Kelly, 1991a: 62. 
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I come to speak on behalf of those women who like Savitri, have followed 
their men to the gates of death and have won back by their indomitable love, 
the dehumanised soul of their men in the colonies abroad … 
 
If after tonight, men of India, if after tonight, I say, it is possible for the most 
selfish interests to use the humanity of India to enrich almost as a manure, the 
sugar plantations of the colonies, if it is possible, I say let the forces of the 
greatest evil to daunt you in this campaign, you are not only unworthy and 
degenerate sons of our Mother whose name stood for glory in the past but we 
are the murderers, the suicides of national honour and national progress … 
 
… Let the blood of your hearts blot out the shame that your women have 
suffered abroad. The words (of other speakers) that you have heard tonight 
must have kindled within you a raging fire. Men of India, let that be the 
funeral pyre of the indenture system.178
 
The reference to Sita is not accidental. Sita was the devoted wife of Ram who 
remained chaste and true to him in the epic battle between good and evil in the 
Ramayana. Many labourers likened their experience of indenture to a banishment, 
like Ram’s, but found in the epic a powerful political metaphor for their struggle 
against the evil of indenture. The casting of an indentured woman like Kunti in the 
shape of Sita, allowed anti-indenture forces to produce and articulate a discursive 
counter-offensive which simultaneously depicted the colonial order as immoral and 
decadent, and indentured women as the virtuous and valiant heroines in urgent need 
of protection and liberation. Hence, even if Kunti did not openly challenge British 
colonial rule or the indenture system in Fiji, the story of her preference for protest, 
even death, over a life of suffering and humiliation served to boost the moral 
ascendancy of the anti-indenture movement and galvanise the Indian public to call 
more forcefully for the abolition of the system. Kunti’s cry of protest was a moment 
in history when the conditions were ripe for one individual act of resistance to help 
trigger a much larger conflagration. 
 
                                                 
178 Cited in Kanwal: 20. 
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Gillion has concluded that it was agitation in India that brought indenture down.179 
However, it can also be argued that indentured women’s petty acts of resistance were 
just as important as the wider forces of nationalism in India in precipitating the 
demise of the system. They gave resistance leaders the ammunition to extend the 
battlefront from the cane-fields of Rewa, Navua, Labasa and Ba into the political 
arena of Suva, Delhi, and London. In the end, and in spite of the acute shortage of 
labour in the colony, neither the Fiji government nor the CSR were able or willing to 
meet the basic working and living standards demanded by the senior governments in 
London and India and indenture was abolished. 
 
However, the portrayal of indentured women as virtuous and dutiful wives was not 
without consequence. Earlier we saw that indenture allowed many Indian women to 
break free of the cultural constraints and controls that they might have otherwise 
endured in India. In this respect, they appear to have been markedly different from the 
women in Guyana whom Poynting has described as being “the main preservers of 
Indian domestic culture”.180 In Fiji, the opposite seems to have occurred. Lamenting 
on Indian women’s abandonment of traditional Hindu religion in Fiji, C. F. Andrews 
and Pearson reported: 
 
The moral ruin is most pitiful on this side. Though there are beautiful and 
stately rivers in Fiji no women are seen making their morning offerings: no 
temples rise on their banks; there are no household shrines. The outward life 
which the Hindu women in the ‘lines’ lead in Fiji, appears to be without love 
and worship, a sordid round of mean and joyless occupations.181
 
If indentured women in Fiji had little incentive to preserve Indian domestic culture 
and much to gain from challenging it, the idea of independent women doing “just 
what they pleased” and living “just as they liked”182 did not sit well with the 
missionaries or the political and religious figures who led the nationalist movement in 
India. As Shameem has remarked, girmit women’s “opposition to the CSR was 
                                                 
179 Gillion, 1977: 7. 
180 Jeremy Poynting cited in Lal, 2000: 55. 
181 C. F. Andrews and W. W. Pearson, Indian Indentured Labour in Fiji: An Independent Enquiry. 
Calcutta, 1916. 36. 
182 Andrews and Pearson: 32. 
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celebrated and supported with passion, but their resistance to Indian men was being 
curtailed”.183 Both the McNeill and Chimman Lal Report (1913)184 and the Andrews 
and Pearson Report (1916) identified the absence of family life as the cause of much 
of the evil on the plantations. If women could return to their roles of mothers and 
wives, families reconstructed and patriarchy restored, then much of the evil would be 
eliminated. Hence, when Andrews, Pearson, Manilal, Naidu, and Gandhi condemned 
the indenture system for its treatment of women, as Shameem points out, they 
condemned it on the grounds that women were not allowed to ‘keep their chastity’ on 
the plantations, and because they did not have the protective power of men to watch 
over them.185
 
As such this discourse aimed at their secure confinement in the domestic sphere and 
sought to roll back the errant years that had transformed women from maidens into 
self-reliant workers in the waged sector. This intervention was conservative in the 
sense that it was premised on middle class, upper caste Christian and Indian values 
and sought to recuperate for patriarchy the wayward girmit women who had strayed 
too far from their model of ideal Indian womanhood.186 Paradoxically then, the end of 
indenture deprived women of their only source of direct income and threw them back 
on the farms that leased plots of land where they slowly faded from centre stage and 
in the words of Shameem, went from being “an active, vibrant and colourful working 
group of women” to a “colourless and invisible” silent mass.187 A discussion of the 
challenge posed by women after indenture lies outside the scope of this thesis. 
However, the formation of women’s organisations in the 1930s and evidence from 
other post-indenture contexts188 suggests that Shameem may be overstating her case. 
 
In spite of efforts to domesticate them, many indentured women continued their fight 
not so much against abstract issues such as indenture or colonialism or capitalism but 
                                                 
183 Shameem: 316. 
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for the more immediate and tangible issues of high food prices and low wages. In 
1920, under the leadership of Jaikumari Manilal, they led the first general strike in Fiji 
on the Gandhian principles of non-violent resistance.189 Astounded by their militancy, 
Andrews remarked of Indian women that in terms of militancy they eclipsed their 
male counterparts: 
 
[They] shamed the men again and again into holding out for higher wages and 
not betraying the cause. They organised themselves into “Strike Committees” 
and would not let their men surrender. … They used the moral force of openly 
and publicly disgracing the men, in their own eyes, if they dared to play the 




Knapman remarked in her study about white women in Fiji that “the empire was 
rooted in the home” and home was “the empire’s first line of defence”.191 But the 
empire only ever achieved a variable degree of visibility in the homes of village and 
plantation women. Empire was visible in the sense that village women produced tax 
and reproduced labour for free and thus helped to fund the colony’s administration. 
Plantation women were brought as a complement to indentured men to make the 
economy viable. But their respective homes were also the sites of ordinary and 
extraordinary struggles against indigenous Fijian and Indian patriarchies. In this 
domestic sphere, the lines of offence and defence, of empire and indigeneity, of power 
and resistance were often blurred. Indentured women like their counterparts in the 
villages could not do ‘just as they liked’, but many sought and obtained space within 
the shifting and uneven terrain of dominant private and public colonial and indigenous 
structures to attain a greater degree of autonomy. While these fractures created greater 
powerlessness in some instances, they allowed opportunities to emerge in others 
where women could leap out and dare to rebel. It is essentially with the latter that this 
chapter has been concerned. 
 
                                                 
189 Shameem’s PhD dissertation contains a valuable reconstruction of the strike and women’s 
participation in it. See 311-51. 
190 Andrews cited in Shameem: 386. 
191 Knapman: 176. 
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In the process, it has been found that women do not constitute a homogenous group 
and did not act like one. As colonized women, indigenous and migrant women in Fiji 
shared a common condition of domestic subjugation at the hands of colonial and 
indigenous Fijian and Indian patriarchies. However, their respective experience of 
colonialism differed markedly in that one group experienced colonialism through the 
prism of indirect rule in a village based rural setting, while the other comprised almost 
exclusively bonded labourers who experienced colonialism almost exclusively in the 
realm of plantation-based capitalist production. They lived in separate worlds and 
occupied different economic and geographical spaces. Their interaction was restricted 
to the brief moments when their paths crossed to trade goods at Saturday afternoon 
markets.192 Consequently, they did not come into contact with each other with 
sufficient regularity to forge cross-ethnic ties. Both groups emerged from this period 
with little knowledge of each other. 
 
Women’s experiences of authority differed across space and time and so did their 
responses. Of these responses, only a portion consisted of resistance.193 Contestation 
was varied and occasionally ambiguous and contradictory. Women did not all resist at 
the same time, in the same places or in the same way. Some did not resist or did so in 
ways yet to be discernable to posterity. Some resistance was expressed privately 
within the domestic sphere and shows that if the home was a primary site for the 
imposition of patriarchal power (colonial, indigenous, and Indian), women also turned 
it into a principal site of contestation. Other battles were fought in the public sphere. 
Language, geography, religion, economic function, legal, ethnic and physical 
confinement all constituted obstacles that made it practically impossible for women of 
different localities and cultural backgrounds to ever make common cause. 
 
There were however, important points of convergence and patterns that suggest a 
common thread linking Fiji’s colonised women. The first is that they were actively 
engaged in and responsive to the power relations that permeated their world. They 
were not Amazons, but neither were they perpetual feeble victims of the intrusive and 
                                                 
192 There were very few occasions when Fijian and Indian women worked together as labourers. One 
example is the Wainunu tea plantation in Bua, Vanua Levu, where they were employed in picking tea 
leaves. See Paper 20: “Annual Report on Agriculture for 1904.” in JFLC, 1905. 16. 
193 For example, chiefly women did not have any incentive to rebel or support resistance for they 
enjoyed the privileges that inherently flowed to their families. 
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oppressive effects of colonialism and patriarchy. Non-resistance may have prevailed 
in most situations, as Lal has argued,194 but there were always some women who 
created space to challenge the complex structures that sought to bind them. For 
instance, some women sought to retain control over their sexuality and fertility. Some 
used their sexuality to get in and out of relationships as the conditions allowed. While 
recent scholarship has shown interest in the ambivalent embrace of miscegenation and 
the threat it posed to the colonial order of things,195 only a small proportion of women 
sought the opportunities for advancement that lay in union with European men. 
Colonised women in Fiji were much more likely to have a relationship with men of 
their own ethnicity. Resistance in these relationships took various forms including 
rejecting the institution of marriage. Women who chose this path variously used, 
avoided, postponed, or ended their marriage to acquire greater control of their 
destinies. They were also likely to adopt covert forms of everyday resistance to 
alternately undermine and circumvent their respective authorities. Absenteeism from 
villages and from plantation work was particularly prevalent but so were other petty 
acts of disobedience. 
 
Many questions remain unanswered and much work is yet to be done in this important 
area of Fiji’s history. How much, for instance, was ‘discourse’ a part of women’s 
resistance in comparison with their ‘actions’ and ‘activisms’ or lack of them? While 
evidence can corroborate some women’s resistance, several arguments presented here 
remain tentative and inconclusive. This is inevitable given the particular nature of 
women’s history, the paucity of evidence, and the inherent opacity of such parts of 
our past. A more profound excavation of the documents is now required from a 
perspective that is informed by the complications and specificities posed by writing a 
history of colonised women. 
                                                 
194 See “Kunti’s Cry” in Lal, 2000. 
195 McClintock, 1995; Stoler, 1995, 2002; Young, 1995; and Evelyn Wareham, Race and Realpolitik: 




Although several conclusions specific to each chapter have already been presented, a 
number of other propositions relating to the overall study remain to be made. These 
have been categorised as answers to the following question: what does this study 
reveal about the history and nature of resistance in Fiji? What kinds of continuities 
and discontinuities emerge from this study? What kinds of deductions can be made 
about people’s colonial experience in Fiji based on their resistant behaviours? What 
kinds of periodisations appear in this study and what causes them to surface or fade? 
What does this study suggest about the possibility and value of writing subaltern 
history and of reading Fiji’s history against the grain? And finally, how can this study 
contribute to present and future history-writing in Fiji? 
 
Firstly, the study suggests that resistance in Fiji is best understood in terms of a 
plurality of forms. Clearly, there was no singular unitary monolithic anti-colonial 
resistance in Fiji. Resistance features as a constant but partial component of an untidy 
mixture of other constituents such as collaboration, consent, appropriation and 
opportunism which together form the colonial landscape. The continuity of resistance 
through this period becomes apparent when individual events are placed alongside 
each other on a chronological timeline. The Colo War of 1876, the Tuka Movement of 
1878, 1885, and 1891, the plantation strikes of 1886 and 1887, the dockworkers strike 
of 1890, the Seaqaqa War of 1894, the Movement for Federation of 1901 to 1903, the 
Labasa strike in 1907, the Sawakasa rising between 1909 and 1912, the Tokatoka 
agitation of 1912, and the Viti Kabani of 1913 to 1917 show that large conflagrations 
were few and relatively far in between but regular enough to show some continuity. 
 
When the ceaseless forms of everyday resistance are placed alongside these larger 
conflagrations, resistance is shown to have run almost uninterrupted for the first forty 
years of colonial rule. The murmurings of the people in the 1870s and 1880s, the 
regular flaunting of regulations against village absenteeism, the struggle against taxes 
culminating in the Movement for Federation, the long and uninterrupted boycott of 
the Native Lands Commission, the outbreak of luveniwai between 1885 and 1887, the 
state of quasi civil war in Labasa from 1895-1907, the potential for and actual 
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retributive attacks on employers by plantation labourers, the evasion of work, the 
desertions and sabotage, the numerous petitions and letters of complaint, all fill the 
gaps in between larger upheavals. In this light, resistance appears to be a permanent 
feature of the colonial terrain. Therein lies the value of a broad survey. It shows 
resistance occurring in a wide range of places at varying levels and in multiple forms. 
There was violent and non-violent resistance, personal and collective contestations, 
organised and undeclared movements, and overt and covert defiance. 
 
At best, however, the continuity indicates that the people were constantly engaged in 
the shaping of their lives and in the form that colonial rule took in their localities. It 
also shows that various colonial and indigenous authorities had their hands full. 
However, it cannot be concluded that all people rebelled all the time. They did not. 
There is no continuous straight line connecting all forms of resistance to form a neat 
linear history of resistance in Fiji. Rather, one should speak of resistances and look for 
the multiple points of resistance where people engaged the multiple deployments of 
power. 
 
Secondly, the study thus shows that points of engagement were diverse and widely 
dispersed. For instance, resistance movements were likely to arise in places that were 
historically independent of or opposed to Bauan, eastern, and other coastal chiefdoms. 
They were also likely to arise in places where Christianity was regarded as 
synonymous with the ravages of war, the enslavement of populations, and the 
alienation of lands. They also occurred in places where European and Bauan 
administrators were placed in charge of local affairs including the extraction of taxes, 
ahead of more favoured local men. This was the shared experience of people in Colo 
and the western and northern parts of Viti Levu. It is in these areas that one finds the 
leadership for the movements, the greatest support for Tuka, the strongest political 
strands of luveniwai, the greatest concentration of converts to rivals of the Wesleyan 
mission, the core support for the latter phases of the Movement for Federation, and 
the greatest backing for the Viti Kabani. 
 
However, in each of these cases specific local conditions combined to produce 
important variations that break the appearance of a grand narrative of resistance. For 
instance, the religious evocation of the Nakauvadra gods in the Tuka Movement, was 
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a significant change from the call to arms used in Colo. However, the mana derived 
from its Nakauvadra identity made Tuka simultaneously less appealing for 
populations who derived their identity from other sources of legitimacy. The life of 
Tuka could therefore only be continuous within the domain of the Vatukaloko polity 
and its extended kinship ties. This limitation is well illustrated in the case of the 
Seaqaqa War of 1894 in Vanua Levu which showed no influence from Tuka or 
Navosavakadua in spite of its occurrence a mere three years after the third phase of 
the Ra movement. This suggests that twenty years after Cession, many parts of the 
colony remained insular, disconnected from each other, and that resistance continued 
in such cases to reflect power struggles in local politics rather than conflict on the 
wider colonial stage. 
 
The Seaqaqa War also serves as a reminder that discontent was not confined to Viti 
Levu. The Movement for Federation at the turn of the century marks a significant 
shift in this respect. It showed that a large number of Fijians spread across the country 
were sufficiently dissatisfied with their administration to join a settler driven initiative 
to petition for a change of government. 
 
In the following decade, conflicts continued to be fought at local levels. The mood of 
discontent in the early twentieth century was fuelled by a fear born out of the 
experience of im Thurn’s new land laws which had triggered the selling of large tracts 
of prime land. This had been aggravated later by the participation of senior Bauan 
officials particularly in Tailevu and in Bua in pressuring landowners into leasing 
prime land at under-priced rentals. Adding to this climate of disgruntlement was 
grumbling about maladministration, the inequitable distribution of work burdens and 
rent monies, the continued tax burden, and frustration about the general lack of 
opportunities for self-advancement. 
 
When Apolosi Nawai devised his plan for a company that would yield direct financial 
returns to them as individual shareholders, he found a mass of villagers eagerly 
disposed and prepared to respond to his organisational ability. It would put them 
(members of the Viti Kabani) in control of their own resources, thereby by-passing 
chiefly and European middlemen. Nawai’s style of leadership ensured that previously 
muted voices and grievances were publicly presented as Fijian demands to control the 
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economic benefits of their land and its produce. In thus challenging notions of Fijian 
submissiveness, he gave numerous disconnected local grievances a countrywide 
unified expression. 
 
Yet, if Nawai and his scheme had united a large body of villagers across the entire 
colony, he had no influence among Indian immigrant labourers. Neither had Tuka or 
the Movement for Federation. Because ethnic groups were compartmentalised into 
separate geographic and economic spaces, with little potential for interaction, the two 
main ethnic groups developed distinct strategies of resistance. Herein lies another 
reason to reject resistance as encompassing a total response to colonial rule. 
 
Resistance was therefore fashioned in people’s immediate environments such as their 
homes, villages, plantations, and was usually manifested against particular individuals 
such as husbands, elders, chiefs, sardars, overseers, planters, clergymen, surveyors, 
and other officials of the administration. These struggles rarely arose out of a broad 
anti-colonial feeling. Rather they came out of very specific immediate experiences of 
oppression, disempowerment, exploitation, suppression, intimidation, violence, fear, 
disrespect, and humiliation. This was not a permanent state of affairs and resistance 
was certainly not the only coping mechanism. 
 
Not all who joined the movements were necessarily discontented. Many chose to 
follow out of desperation for a break from the suffocating reality of village life and a 
simultaneous sense of the opportunities for a different world that lay in such 
movements as Tuka, Federation, and the Viti Kabani. These responses were often as 
much about opportunities for betterment as they were about resentment and 
discontent. 
 
Thirdly, in this maze of relationships, the lines of domination and resistance were 
drawn in diffuse and complex ways. In the process, many of the colonial power’s 
cultural forms were appropriated in the act of resisting. Resistance was a constituent 
of a wider and dynamic array of practices that were partly independent of and partly 
produced by colonialism. 
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Several examples from the study can be used to illustrate this point. The initial wave 
of Tuka in 1878 was against Bauan chiefs in the area and sought to reaffirm Rakiraki 
chiefs’ right to rule. Yet, fused with elements of Christianity and colonial soldiery, the 
second wave was much more complex. In appropriating aspects of foreign religion 
and culture, Tuka was never totally about expressing antagonism, nor was it wholly 
about resistance. In this way, Tuka was never one thing for everyone. It carried 
different meanings in each of the three phases, and for the multiple protagonists who 
took part in them in their distinctive geographical and cultural contexts. It was anti-
chiefs in some parts, anti-European in others, and anti-Bauan in others still. In most 
cases, it was about invoking a proud past to combat an unsatisfactory present in a 
search for a better future. 
 
Aside from religious syncretism, there were other forms of borrowing. The Movement 
for Federation shows people’s willingness to adopt an initiative sponsored by 
renegade Europeans even though both sides had very different motivations for 
seeking change. The promise of being free from the obligations of the vanua, levies of 
the lotu, and taxes of the matanitu was appealing enough for thousands of ordinary 
Fijians to sign a petition addressed to the King of England, asking for a change of 
administration. As we saw in Chapter Four, the petition as an instrument to express 
grievances, to seek redress, and ask for change, was not new to Fijians. Many 
labourers had resorted to it in seeking the intervention of higher authorities against the 
abuses of plantation managers. Yet, this nationwide campaign saw an unprecedented 
number of Fijians (4000 petitioners) place their trust in a legal document which they 
believed could be used to secure long-term political change. In the past, Fijians had 
had ample opportunity to regard colonial law with suspicion, especially in the way 
that it was interpreted by European lawyers and administered by European stipendiary 
magistrates. Yet when they were approached by European lawyers who, with the 
backing of Seddon’s New Zealand administration, offered a tangible way out of the 
state of wretchedness in which they found themselves, many believed that the colonial 
legal framework could be used to strategic effect. 
 
Many other Fijians chose to use colonial law for their benefit. In the early years of 
colonial rule, some village women used it to escape from marriage or to terminate ill-
assorted ones. Other Fijians used the law to maximise periods of absence from 
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villages, effectively nullifying their chief’s attempts to restrict their movement. In a 
different context and after a long boycott of the Native Lands Commission, some 
Fijians decided that the NLC could be used as an instrument to protect, indeed to 
engrave permanently their rights to land. As for indentured immigrants, after thirty 
years of experience, they had little reason to trust in the law. Yet, when Manilal 
Doctor arrived, he gave them the opportunity to move their challenge of the CSR 
from the fields to the courts.1
 
Education was another area which subaltern groups identified as holding the key to 
mobility beyond the restricted confines of domesticity, village drudgery, and 
agricultural labour. While many Fijian villagers used Christian education as a 
stepping-stone for self-advancement, the response of Indian labourers was more 
ambivalent. They feared being dominated by a foreign form of ready-made thought 
but they also feared losing out on the opportunity for self-improvement. In the end, 
they resolved to educate themselves by forming their own schools. 
 
The Viti Kabani was another opportunity to resist by appropriation. Capitalising on 
the spirit and ideals of free enterprise and the rationale of individualism promoted by 
certain sections of the administration (including governors im Thurn and May), 
Apolosi Nawai articulated demands for an end to chiefly exactions, a stop to land 
alienation, and a spirit of indigenous enterprise in which ordinary villages could 
aspire to improve and keep returns on their labour and resources. Under his 
organisational ability however, a movement of indigenous capitalist enterprise took 
on a political character and resulted in the formation of a rival administration which, 
in some places, effectively overtook the government. In all these examples, resistance 
cannot be reduced to a simple set of opposites. It must be understood as behaviour 
within a wider context in which appropriation, consent, and opportunism were equally 
important motives. 
 
Hence, not all who joined popular movements were necessarily discontented. Many 
chose to follow out of desperation for a break from the suffocating reality of village 
life and a simultaneous sense of the opportunities for a different world that lay in such 
                                                 
1 The extent to which Manilal was directly responsible for this is yet to be determined. A detailed study 
of his career in Fiji is necessary to establish this but lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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movements as Tuka, Federation, and the Viti Kabani. These responses again were 
often as much about opportunity as they were about resentment and discontent. The 
study thus reinforces current views in Pacific historiography which argue that 
indigenous people behave in colonial domains in degrees of resistance, degrees of 
accommodation and appropriation, and a host of complications in between.2
 
One must therefore guard against imposing too much order and coherence on 
occasions of resistance. This may conceal what was in fact an untidy state of affairs 
where the intentions and rewards to participants were quite divergent. For instance, 
Viti Kabani farmers may have made a choice for ideological reasons over economic 
sense when they were deciding not to sell their bananas to Europeans offering higher 
prices. Yet, these same resisters could have been oppressors in their own homes. By 
the same token, it is impossible to establish with certainty the role that women played 
in the Viti Kabani (or any other mass movement) or their views about how the Kabani 
might have acted as an avenue for their own personal advancement “as women”. 
 
Fourthly, although much of the resistance of ordinary Fijians and Indian labourers had 
an anti-colonial dimension, it did not take place only in response to European actions 
or to colonialism as such. Such a view overstates the central importance of Europeans 
in the lives of ordinary people. For the most part, Fijians interacted with other Fijians, 
including times when the struggle was over the power to control. Unless they were 
working on plantations, in the sugar mills or living in Suva, ordinary villagers seldom 
came into direct contact with Europeans. They were thus more likely to encounter 
repression from within the village structure and to express resistance against the 
primary enforcer of that structure: their chief. Constructing Europeans as a “race” that 
could be rebelled against simultaneously produces homogenised races masquerading 
as dominant and subordinate groups. The evidence confirms that there were several 
group relations which produced insider and outsider relations within subordinate 
groups. Power structures inside indigenous and subordinated immigrant groups 
produced all sorts of inequalities which prompted multiple and unequal struggles. 
 
                                                 
2 Borofsky: 182. 
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In addition, Europeans did not constitute a homogenous group and neither could they 
exercise power in anything other than a tentative and fragmented manner. For 
instance, Europeans in Colo were not attacked because they were white. Rather, they 
were attacked when they threatened the independence and livelihood of Colo 
communities. They could also expect reprisals if they were perceived to be in alliance 
with Colo enemies. The killing of the seven vuli alongside Thomas Baker, shows that 
the character of Colo’s enemy went well beyond race. Similarly, on the plantations 
labourers were just as likely to attack an Indian sardar as they were a European 
overseer. Race was thus only one of several factors that affected the exercise of 
domination and resistance. 
 
There is also a danger in projecting “European” institutions such as “the missions” 
and “the administration” as fixed transhistorical entities. The prominence in resistance 
movements of such misfits as Henry Anson, Reverend Slade, Humphrey Berkeley, 
Hannah Dudley, J. W. Burton, C. F. Andrews, and Stella Spencer undermines race-
based binary analyses of domination and resistance. Similarly, the actions of such 
high chiefs as Ratu Matanitobua, Ratu Rodomodomo, Ratu Tuivuya, Ratu Wainiu, 
and Ratu Manoa highlight the dangers of treating chiefs as a unified class. 
 
It is clear therefore that intermediate group and relational strata existed at all levels of 
domination and resistance. One is thus better served by looking for complex dynamics 
of engagement in each individual case rather than being satisfied with one-
dimensional formulae for an entire category. This is not meant to absolve European 
colonialism and capitalism of their oppressive features in the operations of colonial 
rule. On the contrary, it is an attempt to acknowledge their greater intricacy. 
 
That the colonial administration was heavily dependent on Fijian chiefs to deploy, 
enforce and maintain power, is not a new proposition.3 Yet chiefs were not always 
united. In immediate post-Cession days, they were impaired from acting as a class by 
existing enmity and rivalry. Chiefs of the 1880s were different from the chiefs of the 
early 1900s who were well aware of the rewards of ruling class solidarity and action. 
The chiefly “system” did not become such till much later after years of refinement 
                                                 
3 See among many others, Macnaught, 1982; Durutalo, 1985a and 1985b; and Sutherland, 1992. 
 379
and reinforcement. Chiefs’ ability to act as a unified class was compromised by 
internal and external criticism. Chiefly rule was contestable and contested from within 
their own ranks and by the general populace. 
 
Yet, chiefs rarely initiated or led forms of resistance. Most of them formed part of the 
edifice on which was constructed the Fijian Administration. They depended on it for 
their power and wealth. In voicing their grievances therefore, people were more likely 
to be led by fringe leaders such as Navosavakadua and Apolosi Nawai. Those chiefs 
who participated in popular movements of disaffection were not members of the 
administration. As we saw, the chiefs who supported change could expect to be 
disciplined, dismissed, or even deported. 
 
The ambivalence and uncertainty of groups who were allied with the dominant culture 
is also noticeable on the plantations, with the role played by sardars. Dependent on 
management for their position of relative privilege, it was in their interest to enforce 
the management’s ruthless regime of work. Yet, while most sardars chose to preserve 
this position, some chose to side with their fellow countrymen. In both cases, this was 
a dangerous position to be in. If they were perceived to be too violent they would 
often suffer tragic consequences from the hand of offended labourers. When they 
sympathised and occasionally led protests, they could expect to be thrown back in the 
lines. While they do not fall within the scope of this thesis, the tensions and 
ambivalences within powerful groups are aspects of Fiji’s history that deserve more 
attention from historians. 
 
The evidence presented in this study provides unequivocal support for the view that 
colonial power in Fiji was shaped in struggle, that it was fragmented and often fragile, 
and its application in the daily lives of ordinary people imperfect and susceptible to 
subversion. This is not a new proposition4 but merely serves to reinforce what Guha 
meant by domination without hegemony in a South Asian context.5
 
                                                 
4 Thomas, 1994. 
5 Ranajit Guha, Domination Without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1997. 
 380
The idea therefore that colonialism succeeded in imposing itself as a Panoptic 
monolith, stamping out opposition and that it then established a long and prosperous 
period of peace, order and stability, is a fallacy.6 Colonialism, never was a formidable 
autonomous and impervious force that spread itself completely over subordinate 
groups. Neither were other large systems of power that operated through the state, 
capitalist relations or patriarchy. They were never so absolute that they could control 
everything within their realm of operation. Aside from the internal contradictions that 
constantly weakened them, their principles and practices were regularly tempered 
with, challenged, and altered by the multitude of actions and reactions of those they 
sought to dominate. 
 
The evidence also emphatically supports the view that the active agency of 
subordinate groups can never be left out of the equation of the colonial experience. 
The subaltern were always active participants in the making of their own destinies. As 
such, they were always less “wretched” than Fanon’s “wretched of the earth”.7 They 
were enterprising, engaging and combative agents who managed to carve out 
relatively impervious social and cultural spaces from which to evade the control and 
surveillance of powerful groups. They broke the physical, legal, customary, and 
personal boundaries and restrictions that bound them to people and places and 
impeded their personal development. 
 
Yet, these individuals and their numerous acts of protest should not be romanticised. 
Most plotted an existence which minimised the risks of confrontation with authority. 
They were well aware that open defiance would result in imprisonment and possible 
deportation. They therefore sought to cope with oppression as best they could without 
resorting to rebellion. In this way, Fiji’s subaltern groups resembled the African-
American slaves who, as Eugene Genovese has argued, adopted alternative strategies 
for survival when they found the odds for insurrection too long and uncertain.8 In this 
context, it is better to look for the unspectacular acts of everyday subversion rather 
than the cataclysmic events born out of collective transformational goals. 
 
                                                 
6 This is not a new proposition and has been made before notably by Thomas, 1994 and Stoler, 1995. 
7 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967. 
8 Eugene Genovese, From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American Slave Revolts in the Making of the 
Modern World. Baton-Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979. 7. 
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This survey also shows that Fiji’s colonised people did not constitute one 
homogenous block. They did not share one consciousness, one grievance, or one 
strategy to engage oppression. They were not consistently united in what they 
experienced and what they did. On the contrary, popular consciousness was 
characterised by fluidity, malleability, ambivalence, contradiction, occasional 
furtiveness and intermittent assertiveness. Although all people experienced some 
degree of disempowerment, their experience of and response to oppression differed 
from time to time, group to group and place to place. 
 
Other fractures that caused the fragmentation of Fiji’s masses consist of ethnic, 
geographic, and gender divisions. In the villages and on the plantations, Fijian, Indian 
and “Polynesian” men and women shared an experience of oppression and a history 
of resistance. Yet, there was little collaboration or cross-ethnic solidarity. This is 
because ethnic groups and the different sexes were kept compartmentalised in spatial 
and economic zones. In these insular worlds the kind of communication needed to 
transcend ethnic division was virtually impossible. Cultural prejudices also militated 
against a broader ‘grass-roots’ coalition. Splintered into different inter-ethnic and 
intra-ethnic clusters, the subaltern fought their own battles within their own 
immediate spheres of existence. Restrictions on movement between geographic 
entities also deterred communication between villages and between plantations. This 
is also true of gender relations. While men and women both shared the experience of 
resistance to domination, the patriarchal relations in both colonial and intra-ethnic 
power relations ensured that women faced an extra layer of subjugation. 
 
History does not therefore proceed inevitably from the momentum provided by the 
powerful. Rather, revisiting history from below reveals dates, protagonists, and events 
that disrupt conventional demarcations of the past. For example, in the interior of Viti 
Levu, the measles epidemic of 1875 had far greater repercussions than the Cession of 
1874. In other parts of the new colony, the post-Cession period was a time to take 
advantage of the new possibilities offered by a power vacuum associated with the 
transfer of power and to exploit the indecisiveness of chiefs and administrators. 
During this period the murmurings of the people received prominent attention from 
the highest echelons of the administration. 
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By the mid-1880s a significant shift took place. In response to numerous strikes and 
the spirit of insubordination that prevailed in Rewa in 1885 and 1886, the 
administration hardened its position and legislated draconian laws to stop gatherings 
of more than five labourers. The closure of channels for the expression of 
dissatisfaction and grievances would drive plantation resistance underground for the 
next few years. 
 
The government’s intransigence is reflected in its response to the second wave of 
Tuka which occurred at the same time as the labour unrest. The passing of the 
ordinance to deport Fijians who were dangerous and disaffected marks an important 
turning point in the management of resistance by dissenters. Yet, in Ra, the 
periodisation of dissent began as early as 1873 with the battle of Nakorowaiwai 
underwent several mutations that continued beyond the time frame of this study. 
Within this Tuka period however, the year 1891 takes on a particular significance 
with the burning of Drauniivi and the onset of a long period of exile for several of the 
tribes of Vatukaloko. Such local periodisations are often lost in the larger narratives of 
colonial adminitrative and economic history. To acknowledge them is to recognise 
that in reconstructing moments of importance, larger colonial demarcations must not 
override local history. 
 
The publication of the 1896 “Report on Decrease of the Native Population” marks 
another important intersection in Fiji’s history. On the one hand, it justified the 
intervention of the administration into the domestic lives of ordinary villagers and 
supported the regimentation of village activities and space. On the other, the report on 
the cultural and demographic demise of Fijians can also be reread, to borrow Vincente 
Diaz’s phrase, as a moment of survival and vitality among Fiji’s indigenous women.9 
Read against the grain, the report signals the effects of an earlier period during which 
women participated in an undeclared movement that undermined village patriarchy by 
variously avoiding marriage, seeking divorce, procuring abortion, withholding marital 
rights from their husbands, or escaping village patriarchy and finding sanctity in 
religious orders and institutions. 
                                                 
9 See Vincente Diaz’s “Simply Chamorro: Telling Tales of Demise and Survival in Guam.” in 
Remembrance of Pacific Pasts: An Invitation to Remake History. Robert Borofsky (ed.) Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2000. 362-82. 
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 Another epochal shift is visible at the turn of the century through the Movement for 
Federation. This movement helps to account for a major popular upheaval by tracing 
the confluence over time of numerous acts of everyday resistance. The persistent 
opposition to taxes through the late nineteenth century created a climate conducive for 
a large number of Fijians to petition the King for a change of government. How much 
weight was given to the petition in the ultimate decision to retain the status quo is 
difficult to establish. However, the importance of the petition is that Fijians across the 
colony formally expressed dislike for the way they were being governed. It also 
represents their ability and willingness to seize opportunities which they thought 
would improve their political status. 
 
These everyday forms of resistance did not originate in any revolutionary purpose nor 
did they deliver revolutionary outcomes. Yet, as covert forms of individual dissent, 
they were not inconsequential. For instance, the undeclared boycott of land 
registration from 1876 until im Thurn’s term of office had lasting consequences. The 
non-cooperation of landowners in the registration of their lands in the previous thirty 
years ensured that in 1905, only a small quantity of registered native land was 
available for sale when im Thurn relaxed the colony’s land laws. Previous 
administrations’ failure to convince Fijians to register their lands meant that im Thurn 
could only access a small pool of registered native land. This slowed the process of 
alienation sufficiently long enough for other forces to intervene and reverse the new 
land laws before any more alienation could take place. 
 
Another example of a petty act of everyday resistance which provoked an epochal 
shift is the process by which Kunti’s ordinary act of self-defence spurred an 
extraordinary movement of national and international significance. When the manager 
of her plantation ignored her complaint about the overseer’s attempted rape, he had 
little idea that the story of her remarkable escape would spread so far and so quickly. 
In deciding to run and jump in the river, Kunti may have acted out of sheer fear and 
desperation. Her initial motivation probably had little to do with the wilful contest of 
power or of resistance to the plantation authorities, let alone the indenture system. But 
the subsequent transmission of the incident by word of mouth, its recording in a letter 
of complaint, and its report in the Indian press, sent shock waves through India. 
 384
Public outrage precipitated mass movements to end indenture, and fresh calls were 
made for independence. In this case, the regular and largely unpunished occurrence of 
overseer violence triggered a confluence of events which acquired extraordinary 
proportions. Admittedly, a complex array of forces was already leading to the 
abandonment of indenture before Kunti’s act of defiance. Yet, it is the conjuncture of 
ideas and events which were brought together in this act that makes this case uniquely 
prominent in the way that other similar previous tragic cases were not. 
 
In the annals of indenture history, the 1910s thus mark the point when outside agency 
including missionaries, Manilal, the Arya Samaj, the Indian and British governments, 
and public opinion, began to play a major role in support of labourers and in 
campaigning and securing the final demise of the system. 
 
Apart from allowing alternate periodisations to emerge, reading and writing against 
the grain also warns of the dangers of accepting uncritically the memory of dominant 
groups as one’s own. Dipesh Chakrabarty has suggested that colonial archives can be 
regarded as at once indispensable and inadequate. This recognition works to facilitate 
the emergence of other sources and the alternative histories they hold.10 Writing in the 
Pacific context, David Hanlon has suggested that in addition to content, the medium 
by which history is recorded and transmitted also needs revising and decolonising.11 
This has opened an exciting new field of cross-disciplinary historical investigation 
into indigenous ways of knowing, remembering, and representing. Local history, 
women’s histories, and peoples’ histories lend themselves particularly well to this 
enterprise. The vital point, as Gyan Prakash puts it, is that whatever form or content 
they adopt, historians must continue “to push at the edges, to unsettle the calmness 
with which colonial categories and knowledges were instituted as the facts of history 
… [and] shake colonialism loose from the stillness of the past”.12
 
In this light, I reiterate that the aim in this study has not been to tell the whole story. 
The whole story can only ever be told in short episodes and in a multi-vocal mode. 
                                                 
10 See Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
11 Hanlon, 2003. 
12 Gyan Prakash, “Introduction.” in After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial 
Displacements. Gyan Prakash. (ed.) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 6. 
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Mine is a deliberately partial history. In the process of revisiting, revising and 
reconstructing the first forty years of colonial rule in Fiji, I have sought the stories and 
voices that interrupt the chorus of dominant cultural and historical worldviews. I have 
tried to shake colonialism loose from the stillness of its Fijian past. Much shaking 
remains to be done and many gaps and silences remain to be found and recovered. But 
if I have succeeded in disturbing some received ways of knowing Fiji’s past; if I have 
presented an alternate way of reconstructing Fiji’s past; if I have identified previously 
muted voices and let them speak through these pages; and if the stories that I draw 
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